

Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan

Nationwide Study



November 2016

Table of Contents

SECTION I: INFLUENCE PATHWAYS AND TARGET AUDIENCES	6
1.0 INTRODUCTION	7
2.0 OVERARCHING FINDINGS	7
2.1 Terminologies and General VE Assessment	7
2.2 Influence Pathway Characteristics	13
2.3 Individual Dynamics - Key Drivers on Influence Pathways	19
2.4 Local Contexts - Key Drivers on Influence Pathways	21
2.5 VEO Characteristics - Key Drivers on Influence Pathways	24
3.0 INFLUENCE PATHWAY AND TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS	27
3.1 The Research-led Influence Pathway Analysis Framework	27
3.2 Influence Pathway Types - Summary	33
3.3 IP 1: The Opportunist Influence Pathway	38
3.4 IP 2: The Avenger Influence Pathway	45
3.5 IP 3: The Ideologue Influence Pathway	56
3.6 Crossover Between Influence Pathways – Case Study	66
3.7 PTAs and Specific Influence Pathways	75
SECTION II: TARGET LOCATION ANALYSIS - KEY DRIVERS IMPACTING PROPENSITY TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM	107
1.0 INTRODUCTION	108
2.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: NORTH REGION FINDINGS	108
2.1 Irbid Key Findings	108
2.2 Ajloun Key Findings	116
2.3 Jarash Key Findings	123
2.4 Mafraq Key Findings	130
3.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: CENTRAL REGION FINDINGS	138
3.1 Balqa Key Findings	138
3.2 Amman Key Findings	148
3.3 Zarqa Key Findings	157
3.4 Madaba Key Findings	164
4.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOUTH REGION FINDINGS	170
4.1 Karak Key Findings	170

4.2 Tafiela Key Findings.....	177
4.3 Ma'an Key Findings	184
4.4 Aqaba Key Findings	193
SECTION III: VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX	200
1.0 THE VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK.....	201
1.1 Introduction	201
1.2 Domain Hypotheses	203
2.0 THE VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX	208
2.1 Introduction	208
2.2 Calculating Indicator Scores.....	208
2.3 Violent Extremism Vulnerability Index Baseline Tables	208
2.4 Violent Extremism Vulnerability Index Baseline Charts	209
2.6 Findings: VEV Index Baseline Tables and Charts By Domain.....	210
2.7 Findings: Overarching VEV Measures	255
SECTION IV: PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS.....	273
1.0 INTRODUCTION	274
2.0 PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK	274
3.0 CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES	276
4.0 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS	280
4.1 Foster Resilience Against VE.....	280
4.2 Delegitimize VE/VEOs	298
4.3 Expand CVE Community Engagement.....	309
SECTION V: APPENDICES.....	319
1.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	320
2.0 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY	329
3.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY	334

List of Acronyms

AB-MOE:	Audience-Based Measurement of Effectiveness
AJYC:	All Jordan Youth Commission
AQ:	Al Qa'ida
AQI:	Al Qa'ida in Iraq
CVE:	Counter Violent Extremism
DI:	Depth Interview
DK:	'Don't Know' (GQ Answers)
EI:	Expert Interview
EU:	European Union
FSA:	Free Syrian Army
GID:	General Intelligence Directorate (Jordan)
GQ:	Guided Questionnaire
IAF:	Islamic Action Front
IP:	Influence Pathway
IPA:	Influence Pathway Analysis
ISIS:	Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham
JAF:	Jordanian Armed Forces
JD:	Jordanian Dinar
JN:	Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Nusra Front) ¹
M&E:	Monitoring and Evaluation
MB:	Muslim Brotherhood
MP:	Member of Parliament
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
NR:	'Neither Agree nor Disagree'
OPSEC:	Operational Security
PTA:	Primary Target Audience
RF:	'Refuse to Answer' (GQ Answers)
TAA:	Target Audience Analysis
TAR:	Target Audience Research

¹ In July 2016, Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Nusra) rebranded as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (Conquest of Syria Front). For the purposes of this report, the group is referred to as the former since primary research—including specific questions about Al Nusra—commenced prior to the group's rebranding.

- TLA:** Target Location Analysis
- UAE:** United Arab Emirates
- UK:** United Kingdom
- USD:** US Dollar
- VE:** Violent Extremism
- VEO:** Violent Extremist Organization
- VEV:** Violent Extremism Vulnerability

SECTION I: INFLUENCE PATHWAYS AND TARGET AUDIENCES



1.0 INTRODUCTION

The following section presents findings relating to Influence Pathways (IPs) that encourage violent extremism (VE), support for, and recruitment into, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in Jordan, as well as the relevant Primary Target Audiences (PTAs).

2.0 OVERARCHING FINDINGS

2.1 TERMINOLOGIES AND GENERAL VE ASSESSMENT

Distinguishing between violent extremist mindset and behavior is key to gauging the risks associated with violent extremism in Jordan.

It is important to distinguish between violent extremist thinking and action. The former is a cognitive attribute that describes an attitudinal acceptance of violence, which may or may not result in behavioral change. It involves advocating for violence and morally supporting the use of violence, and/or individuals and groups (including VEOs) who engage in violence – to further social, economic and political objectives that are outside the *acceptable* mainstream attitudes of society. Meanwhile, violent extremist action is a behavioral attribute that involves preparing and engaging in acts of violence and/or providing material support to individuals and groups who engage in violence. For the purposes of this project, the definitions of violent extremism (VE) and violent extremist behavior (VE behavior) reflect this distinction. Specifically, VE was defined as violent extremist thinking or mindset insofar as it refers to a set of beliefs and thinking patterns that motivate individuals to condone or fully embrace the idea of violence to pursue specific goals and that may also compel them to engage in violent activities at a later point. Such views can be religiously/ideologically inspired or can have an exclusively political basis. VE behavior, meanwhile, was defined as the action of participating directly or indirectly in acts of violent extremism/violence (e.g., carrying out a violent attack on a specific group as well as providing logistical/financial support to carry out such an attack). It was also defined as traveling to Syria/Iraq to 'participate in jihad' or fight a designated enemy as a VEO member. Note that the first definition does not necessarily require membership of a VEO and helps explain how an advocate of, and participant in, VE may still retain nationalistic feelings and consider involvement in a (foreign) VEO a form of betrayal.

Recognition of violent extremism among Jordanians is limited due to confused interpretations of associated indicators.

Overall, respondents held the view that Jordan experiences low levels of VE, although it was believed to be on the rise. Among some of the key reasons cited for the moderate prevalence of VE in the country were the hindering effect of Jordan's tribal structures and customs, the government's counter violent extremism (CVE) efforts, the activities of moderate Islamist groups and Jordanian culture in general. For example, with regards to tribal influences respondents highlighted that in most areas tribal dynamics do not supersede affiliation to, and respect for, the rule of law. In addition, even where tribal affiliation is strong, tribal dynamics can act as a barrier to VE where members ensure that they and others behave appropriately. Meanwhile, with regards to government efforts, the Jordanian authorities have undertaken a series of programs to ensure that it can respond to VE 'well enough' – often within the security domain (e.g., efficient and effective tackling of VEOs present inside borders) but also across other domains such as social (e.g., education measures), economic (investment), political (e.g.,

generating political CVE consensus) and communication (e.g., awareness raising programs). As for the activities of moderate Islamist groups, research demonstrated how groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and even Salafist Quietists police society at an informal level and work toward a reduction in VE. Finally, as regards Jordanian culture, respondents cited a number of barriers to VE ranging from close family structures to a propensity to place high trust in the Jordanian security forces, especially the Army. Despite these barriers, respondents often had limited knowledge and/or understanding of the subject of VE and/or the processes involved. Most amalgamated radicalization, extremism, and VE and many were unable to distinguish between extremist views and propensity to violence. Changes in religious observance and practices, social interaction and physical appearance were sometimes – in hindsight – identified as signs of radicalization but very rarely interpreted as being threatening or indicative of a progression toward VE behavior. As for potential drivers of VE in the country, respondents usually speculated as to their nature and often fell back on common and vague assumptions such as 'ignorance' and 'poverty'.

Manifestations of violent extremism are limited but extremist attitudes and sectarianism are prevalent, thereby creating an enabling environment.

Research revealed that overall manifestations of VE are primarily visible in geographic and community clusters (most notably within the cities of Zarqa, Rusaifeh, Salt and Ma'an; refugee camps; and among Salafist communities more generally). However, although that subsection of VE manifestation that refers exclusively to public support for VEOs is also limited (except with regards to Hamas) it is more widespread in terms of geography (across and within all governorates) and population segments (not only among Salafist communities). In other words, it is wrong, for example, to assume that support for VEOs only comes from certain socio-economic groups. Perhaps even more concerning, however, was the higher prevalence of extremist views or tendencies. In this project, extremism refers to polarized attitudinal support for certain individuals and ideologies that are in opposition to moderation or violate accepted norms of society. Holding extremist views does not necessarily equate advocating violence, and therefore there is an important distinction between extremism and VE. For example, Salafist Quietists exhibit a desire for Sharia above civil law, a particularly deep sense of religiosity and reluctance to consider new forms of female empowerment, but do not prescribe violence to achieve their goals. By contrast, VE implies a consent to, or desire for, violence as an expression or vehicle of extremism. While VE does not appear to be common in Jordan, research revealed that extremism is much more common across the country. Levels of sectarianism and intolerance are high in Jordan, across all governorates. In particular, the belief that violent jihad is justifiable in certain circumstances was surprisingly widespread, notably with regards to violent jihad in Europe, Israel and against Shias. Many respondents were also in agreement that 'Sharia should be the only source of law', 'only Islam can guarantee justice' and albeit to a lesser extent, that 'the Caliphate will help restore Islam'. These views, which in some forms correspond to key VEO narratives, do not necessarily translate into widespread VE and/or VE behavior. However, they do feed an enabling environment for VE and make people more vulnerable to VEO narratives and messaging, thereby reducing the gap between extremist tendencies, violent extremist thinking and violent extremist action.

Current actual engagement in VEOs remains low across the country - the appeal of VEOs has dropped considerably since the beginning of the Syrian crisis.

Although there was evidence of respondents knowing of, or hearing about, locals who joined Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Nusra Front) (JN) or Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS), several indicators confirmed that current actual involvement in VEOs is not an ongoing behavioral concern in Jordan. Firstly, the number of respondents who personally knew locals that have joined VEOs was low, particularly in the case of recent recruits. Secondly, nearly all of the VEO recruits known by respondents chose to fight in Syria rather than remain in Jordan. As such, the current VEO threat in Jordan is one of disjointed covert sleeper cell activity rather than open public involvement. Thirdly, respondents themselves showed very little desire to provide demonstrable support to JN and/or ISIS, especially with regards to their activities in Jordan. Finally, the large majority of recent VEO-related activities in the country have been small in scale and number. A further critical distinction is to be made between those fighters recruited in the earlier years of the revolution and those who have joined more recently. Specifically, many of the former were primarily driven by a humanitarian desire to help Sunnis suffering from oppression by Syrian President Bashar Al Assad and his regime. By contrast, more recently, the Jordanian public has become sensitized to the brutal activities of VEOs, particularly those committed by ISIS. New recruits go to Syria knowing the negatives of ISIS and JN, suggesting that they are either more opportunistic and/or less caring of weaknesses in VEO ideology than those who joined earlier. Moreover, VEOs today have become 'infected' by conspiracy regarding foreign support for, and involvement in, these groups. For example, some respondents believe that Israel created ISIS, or that Western governments and/or intelligence agencies support VEOs to divide the region (e.g., along sectarian lines) and/or pursue their financial and military interests (including war by proxy against each other). The suspicion of war in Syria 'by proxy' has undermined public belief that VEOs have legitimacy and credibility.

ISIS still dominates perceptions as the most powerful VEO although the murder of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh was a polarizing event and public support subsequently plummeted.

Respondents believed that ISIS has the largest supply of weapons and wealth compared to other VEOs and that it also continues to dominate the media space. These factors help it remain the VEO of choice for the small number of local violent extremists unfazed by the idea of an ISIS presence in Jordan and/or who remain to go and join the group in Syria. Furthermore, respondents pointed out that even if locals do not actively support ISIS, its media machine can continue to drive awareness and knowledge of core VEO narratives and messages, some of which stimulate sympathy. Typical examples include claims that the Jordanian government system is corrupt, nepotistic, ineffective, un-Islamic, controlled by foreign agendas, etc. However, despite these threats, the ISIS murder of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh and the subsequent release of the video in February 2015 was a polarizing moment, with ISIS popularity dramatically falling in the aftermath. Not only was ISIS opposed for the brutality of the killing but also for the way in which it was carried out. Specifically, it showed that ISIS was prepared to murder fellow Sunni Muslims using a means of punishment (fire) that Islam believes only Allah can deliver. Furthermore, the killing stoked nationalist sentiment and sensitized the country to an increasing prioritization of national identity and affiliation. The ISIS brand has not managed to recover since the murder. In fact, subsequent small-scale attacks in Jordan have only worsened its image, although there has been a backlash against the Jordanian government's involvement

in the international Coalition against VEOs among those who believe that non-participation would be a better strategy for Jordan.

There is sympathy for JN due its effectiveness in countering Assad and deep-rooted links between the VEO and the Jordanian Salafist community.

Although the vast majority of the Jordanian public remains unwilling to provide behavioral support to VEOs, there remains a significant degree of attitudinal sympathy, particularly in the case of JN. This is in large part due to ongoing deep antipathy toward Assad regime's atrocities that are perceived as unforgivable violence against innocent Muslim civilians. As such, many in Jordan still consider the organization one of the more realistic hopes for saving Syrians from the Assad regime. Furthermore, aside from recruitment, JN has ensured that operations remain almost exclusively focused on Syria. Thirdly, although ISIS has 'benefited' from a higher media profile, the fact that JN has been less 'loud' has softened views toward this VEO. Respondents admitted that there are groups of JN supporters that have behaved immorally, but the organization still remains more palatable than Al Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS. Jordanian Salafists have traditionally been supportive of JN and a number of Salafist Jihadists from Amman, Zarqa, Rusaifeh, and cities of the south have provided a steady flow of fighters to the VEO, especially in the beginning of the Syrian conflict. It is true that the older generation of Jordanian Salafist Jihadists has typically supported JN out of ideological affinity, while the younger generation turned to ISIS as the more powerful and perhaps more glamorous option despite the VEO's rivalry with, and intolerance toward, other Islamic factions and minorities. However, the aforementioned ISIS brutality has overall worked in the favor of JN.

AQ is largely deemed irrelevant while Hamas is primarily seen as a resistance movement rather than a VEO.

Respondents viewed AQ as a more irrelevant organization than JN and ISIS. This is because AQ has effectively lost the battle for media coverage and does not appear to have the same resources, rewards and recognition that JN and ISIS can give, particularly in Syria. AQ also seems to operate along a more rigid hierarchical structure than JN and ISIS, making it less attractive to those driven by a more 'revolutionary' spirit. Supporters still associate AQ with resistance against the United States and the figure of Osama Bin Laden, however the group is less salient today and residual sympathy should not be mistaken for proactive engagement. Meanwhile, the situation remains very different for Hamas. Many respondents insisted that it was not fair to label the organization a VEO, and refused to compare it to others such as JN or ISIS. Instead, they described it as a national liberation organization or resistance movement, despite any occasional violent outbreak. Hamas appears more respectful and humane than other VEOs. Respondents also believed it had never struck against Jordan or carried out any related activities in Syria, Lebanon or Egypt.

There is disagreement over the connection between Islamism/Islamist groups and VE/VEOs although the similarity of messages may indirectly anchor acceptance of VE and/or VE behavior among the population.

There was substantial support across Jordan for an array of religious-political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafist Quietists that commit to Islam as a way of life. These present themselves as non-violent or only condone the use of violence (notably jihad) under specific circumstances. However, such Islamist groups can appear to share a number of core messages with Salafist Jihadists and VEOs - such as promoting jihad, Sharia and even martyrdom. As such, any link between Salafist communities and VEOs, or between the MB and

VEOs, is a complex and disputed one. Respondents who perceived a direct relationship between Salafist areas and VEO membership, and even those who believed that there was a predisposition rather than a relationship, argued that Salafists follow an extremist ideology (including that of a religious nature) with messages and narratives that bear striking similarities to those espoused by VEOs. Likewise, they pointed out that Salafist groups tend to generate strong support in refugee camps and other less-prosperous areas, where locals feel more frustrated and marginalized but tend to be less educated and critical in their thinking – elements respondents felt catalyze VEO membership. However, those who reject any correlation between Salafism and VEO membership point out that few Salafists become actual recruits. Secondly, they argued that there are clear ideological differences, as evidenced in the thinking of Salafist Quietists. A sensible conclusion would be that unchecked membership of a Salafist group can accelerate a pre-existing disposition to join a VEO, but that it is dangerously incorrect to claim a perfect correlation between Salafism (particularly Quietist) and VE/VE behavior. Even if Salafism might increase the number of VE sympathizers among the Jordanian population only a small minority may end up resorting to violence or even endorsing it openly.

The same disagreement exists over any link between the Muslim Brotherhood and VEOs. For example, those who perceived such a link pointed to ambiguity in the organization's leadership and structure. Secondly, they believed that the MB encourages sectarianism, political zeal, deep opposition toward Israel, the idea of obedience to religious leaders and duty to carry out jihad, even in a violent manner. Likewise, the MB also draws strength from more marginalized areas. However, opponents to the idea of any link argued that the organization has overt political ambitions within the existing domestic government structure – as opposed to supporting the idea of creating a new one. Furthermore, the low ratio of MB supporters to VEO recruits clearly defies the idea of a modest, let alone strong, correlation. In fact, the strong presence of the MB in VEO-prone areas may be as much a positive as it is a negative, in that it presents an alternative to otherwise disillusioned potential recruits. A sensible conclusion would be that the relationship between MB and VEO membership is a weak one, even if a few individuals 'slip' through the net. Nevertheless, the organization could improve its internal regulations and self-censorship in order to minimize this risk.

Jordanian government CVE efforts are recognized but deemed excessively security-centric while expectation lies on parents and close ones to detect and report signs of VE and/or VE behavior.

There is a strong positive perception regarding the efficacy and efficiency of the Jordanian government and its security services. Examples include efforts to monitor imams and mosques, securing the border with Syria, swift and successful action against sleeper cells, a rehabilitation program that understands the value of respecting the rights of former VEOs that have returned, discussions and other engagement activities at schools and university, and direct and indirect CVE messaging across the media. Indeed, even fear of the Jordanian government and its security services has acted as a powerful barrier – not only the threat of punishment but also the risk of social marginalization and shame from the rest of the community and society. Nevertheless, many respondents agreed that the Jordanian government has placed too much focus on security-centric activities and that effective tackling of VE and VEOs also requires dealing with the wider problem of extremism. Note that those less enthusiastic about the Jordanian government's CVE efforts also complained that there are many unregistered mosques and imams, incidents of security service and police heavy-handedness, and too much focus on theory rather than reality when it comes to discussing the problem.

Overall, local society places the greatest share of responsibility on parents to ensure that their children do not embrace VE and/or join VEOs, although the extended family and peers are also there to help and intervene where necessary. Although respondents maintained that they would report family members to the authorities, it was also clear that significant barriers exist. For example, in tribal communities there is a propensity to deal with problems internally rather than always reaching out to authorities first. Likewise, there is a risk of suffering from shame that prevents some parents from reporting suspicions. More widely, there was fear that reporting a loved one could be a form of betrayal and that with enough personal intervention it would be possible to persuade the loved one to give up his/her membership. Likewise, there was fear of the authorities themselves – that these would be too tough on loved ones and/or that drawing attention to the loved one would place the whole family under suspicion.

2.2 INFLUENCE PATHWAY CHARACTERISTICS

Adopting an extremist worldview legitimizing the use of violence sets the stage for VE behavior without making it inevitable - the process involves the convergence of a multiplicity of factors that varies with time and individual circumstances.

Embracing VE describes a gradual process whereby individuals progressively adopt complicit attitudes toward violent ideology and behavior, which may – but not definitively - result in their engaging in religiously or politically motivated extremist violence. This process of shifting attitudes toward acceptance of violence may occur through ideological radicalization or simply through group polarization without religious motivations, although religious justifications may later arise. The motivational factors involved in the entrance of ostensibly ordinary Jordanians on the pathway to violent extremism (and later potentially extremist violence/behavior) are numerous, extremely diverse, and continually subject to change. For instance, they may entail feelings of marginalization and personal experiences of victimization (e.g., among West Bank Jordanians), hatred and prejudice toward specific groups (e.g., Shias, non-Muslims), uncertainty surrounding one's identity and future (e.g., among youth), enduring political grievances and the failure of peaceful political protest (e.g., following the Arab Spring), real or perceived group inequality (e.g., between tribes, ethnic groups, governorates), a sense of threat/attack on group identity (e.g., among Sunnis, Muslims), feelings of solidarity toward oppressed citizens (e.g., in reaction to events in Syria), etc. Combined with more structural elements such as geography, socio-economic environment and cultural networks, these motivational factors can play out in a number of ways, which will also vary with age, gender, and general individual idiosyncrasies as well as with the context and circumstances of their convergence.

The path to VE behavior is neither uniform nor linear and evolves with the confluence of multiple factors such as grievances, beliefs, and networks as well as their relative salience.


The passage to violent action (or VEO membership) is not a spontaneous act but the result of a non-linear process starting with shifting moral standards toward general acceptance of violent extremism as a solution to a problem. Nevertheless, holding radical beliefs and/or embracing the idea of violent action does not automatically mean that an individual is engaging, or will engage, in violent behavior. Progression along the Influence Pathway toward VE Behavior/Extremist Violence involves the intervention of additional factors that will act as enablers, most notably socialization with like-minded or radical communities/groups and access to logistical guidance and facilitation (e.g., to travel to Syria). The causes and motivations of extremist violence are often an extension of the factors driving radicalization and acceptance of violent extremism on an attitudinal level and thus vary from one individual to another. VE behavior/VEO membership may, for instance, arise in a bid to assert group identity and social inclusion when faced with perceived (or actual) discrimination (e.g., 'true Muslims' versus corrupt oppressors) or to achieve retribution or revenge for personal or group victimization (e.g., Sunnis, women, civilians, etc.), but it may also come about as a form of escapism, the outcome of a commitment to uphold and defend sacred values, or in response to group pressures to conform. The determinants or 'tipping points' of VE behavior are just as varied and diverse. For instance, the final step to engaging in violence may result from the desire to affect change faster (e.g., political change in Jordan/Syria, the reconstruction of society based on Sharia law) or as a reaction to catalyst events such as chemical attacks by the Assad regime against the Syrian population. Overall, attachment to a given group identity and perceptions of group

solidarity and shared ideological commitment play an important role in an individual's decision to engage in violent acts and/or join a VEO.

Influence Pathways emerge from the fortuitous interaction of ever changing individual dynamics (motivations and vulnerabilities), local contexts (circumstances and grievances), and VEO characteristics (ideology and organization).

Individuals do not embrace and/or take part in VE in a vacuum. Their backgrounds, past experiences and opportunities increase or reduce their propensity to do so, while their local environment and the actions of VEOs influence their immediate and subsequent behavior. As such, Influence Pathways to Violent Extremism and/or Extremist Violence, whereby seemingly peaceful, moderate Jordanian citizens transition into individuals with more radical beliefs and worldviews and potentially engaging with VEOs, operate as a process that interconnects individual motivational factors and vulnerabilities with local (socio-economic, political, cultural) contexts and grievances as well as VEOs' ideological and organizational characteristics. The existence and interaction of these three 'super-factors' – individual dynamics (motivations and vulnerabilities), local contexts (circumstances and grievances), and VEO characteristics (ideology and organization) – may enhance the appeal of VE and VEOs to vulnerable audiences and prospective VEO recruits, which culminates with the physical journey to Syria (or Iraq), VEO membership and/or acts of violence. However, each of these three 'super-factors' is variable over time, difficult to measure and open to interpretation. For example, motivations and vulnerabilities can change as an individual matures from a child to an adolescent to an adult. Likewise, local circumstances and grievances develop over time in terms of their salience and their impact – unemployment can go up or down, leaders come and go, institutions improve or worsen. As for VEO characteristics, these are also rarely set in stone. Much like any other social grouping, VEOs adapt over time as a result of decisions and actions taken by their leaders and members. This inevitably impacts their modus operandi and the way people view them.

Figure 1. 'Super-factors' intervening in the appearance of Influence Pathways.



The profiles and motivations of vulnerable individuals are extremely diverse but Influence Pathways share a number of identifiable elements that allow for the conceptualization of VE/VE behavior trajectories.

There is great diversity within the profiles of Jordanians embracing violent ideology and deciding to join VEOs (outside Jordan) and engage in extremist violence. Demographic factors such as age, gender, religious background, family status, location, education attainment, etc., do not in themselves allow for the creation of clear profiles of individuals/audiences at risk of radicalization. Worldviews and personal motivations examined against a given environment are

much more compelling in identifying why, and how, some Jordanians follow a path of down violent extremism to a point at which they might decide to join a VEO or engage in extremist violence. As such, three main sets of motivations have come to light during research and form a basis for the identification of vulnerable audiences and Influence Pathway types. Firstly, VE and VE behavior can be motivated by remuneration, boredom, or purposelessness (opportunistic motivations). Secondly, VE and VE behavior can be motivated by a desire to redress an injustice and/or take revenge, effect political change, or achieve personal redemption (retributive motivations). Thirdly, VE and VE behavior can be motivated by yearnings of salvation and/or a desire to restore the 'true nature' of Islam (ideological motivations).

While each individual pathway to VE and/or VE behavior is unique and subject to adjustments, Influence Pathways as a whole often share common characteristics that come together to produce violent extremism and, potentially, VE behavior. These common characteristics are view/group polarization, ideological radicalization, association with like-minded or radical communities, and engagement with enabling structures. These four elements or 'nodes' form a continuum rather than a chronological sequence (see section 3.0 Influence Pathway and Target Audience Analysis for further detail). They are not necessarily consecutive; some may overlap and some may be skipped. For instance, not all who decide to go fight in Syria are radicalized and not all who are radicalized become members of VEOs. Furthermore, Influence Pathways toward Violent Extremism (distinct from Influence Pathways toward VE behavior) can integrate exclusively either a state of polarization or a state of ideological radicalization, both (concurrently or consecutively), or with some degree of association with like-minded and/or radical communities. However, at no point along Influence Pathways toward VE do individuals engage in acts of VE/VE behavior (including VEO membership), although the desire, and therefore susceptibility, to do so may well exist. While there is no generalizable passage from being a supporter of VE to being an active member of a VEO, traveling to Syria, and/or engaging in acts of violence; research suggested that association with like-minded/radical communities and encounters with enabling structures (e.g., a VEO recruiter) are essential nodes to undertaking violent extremist action/engaging in VE behavior. These nodes deepen the commitment of susceptible individuals by providing them moral, emotional, ideological and material support.

Figure 2. Influence Pathway 'Nodes'



Three primary types of Influence Pathways lead to VE and/or VE behavior: the 'Opportunist', 'Avenger' and 'Ideologue' Influence Pathways.

Research uncovered three primary Influence Pathways to VE and/or VE behavior including VEO recruitment. The first Influence Pathway type centers on individuals who embrace VE and/or engage in VE behavior out of a sense of opportunism. He or she perceives a greater chance to maximize previously prioritized rewards and judges the benefits of these rewards to outweigh the risks. It is important to note that rewards come in many guises. For example, some 'Opportunists' seek financial gain in the face of ongoing underemployment and unemployment at home. Others are attracted by the promise of sex or marriage – with women in this life or the next. Yet others crave non-tangible rewards such as power, status, heroism, and a sense of belonging and purpose. In fact, the allure of religious rewards such as reaching Paradise highlights the overlap between this pathway and the third one. It is incorrect to assume that those on an Opportunist Pathway come only from a marginalized, lower socio-economic background – some are

educated, wealthy, married and even have children. This variety pays testament to the way that different perceived rewards have different impacts.

The second primary Influence Pathway type involves individuals who are open to revolutionary ideals, people who believe that they have a duty and responsibility to protect Syrian civilians from Assad regime atrocities, correct the unfair treatment they have been exposed to and both punish the groups deemed responsible and avenge their victims. Many 'Avengers' embrace VE and join a VEO out of frustration and bitterness but also in search of political empowerment and to effect political change at home or in the region. Once more, these feelings can be directed at a variety of groups and phenomena. The most worrying cohort consists of those exasperated at the stagnant job market and weak Jordanian economy that they feel has failed to meet expectations after years of expenditure on schooling and time spent studying. Another sub-group feels deep antipathy toward Israel and the West, perceiving an international agenda to serve the interests of these nations to the detriment of Muslims around the globe (note the overlap with the third Influence Pathway type). Also note that Avengers often come from higher socio-economic levels and that sensitivity to conspiracy is not at all restricted to those with poorer education levels.

The third primary Influence Pathway type features individuals swayed by ideals and an accompanying degree of 'self-actualization' that spurs them on to try and attain such ideals. The most obvious example consists of those who have a particularly deep religious conviction, such as the need for a caliphate, an urgent drive to correct today's 'rotten' and 'corrupt' version of Islam, rejection of Shia Islam, etc. However, the 'Ideologue' Influence Pathway is not just about religion. It is also a pathway that provides more ideological and socio-political certainty to individuals suffering from an identity crisis and with a deep need for belonging. It also offers an honorable exit from life for desperate individuals resigned to escape their daily lives as well as an avenue for individuals who seek to make amends for past misdeeds.

Influence Pathways transform or overlap along the way but all point to a form of personal and/or socio-political disengagement that is both influenced and harnessed by VEOs.

Given the wide array of factors involved and the variety of ways in which these factors may converge, Influence Pathways to Violent Extremism and Extremist Violence/VE behavior do not follow a defined path but rather change in form or nature along the journey, which can be rapid or slow. For instance, an individual may originally enter on a pathway toward violent extremism due to a desire to redress an injustice or avenge a group or community perceived as victimized (retributive motivations) but may then become driven toward extremist violence by ideology and, for instance, a desire to overthrow governments deemed un-Islamic and fully implement Sharia law as a means to establish a fairer society and model of governance (ideological motivations). In addition, Influence Pathways may not necessarily transform in nature but may simply overlap. For instance, an individual may be driven to embrace violent extremism and/or join a VEO by a personal taste for adventure, violence and war or yearnings for recognition from peers (opportunistic motivations), and simultaneously find in the Salafist Jihadist ideology an appealing form of identity as well as compelling group standards for behavior (including violent behavior). VEOs' propaganda and recruitment efforts guide or facilitate a process of polarization and/or radicalization among individuals who experience a form of personal or social, or even political, disengagement (or all at once), a sort of frustration with life, and who are looking for a drastic change, whether in their personal lives (break away from the routine, day-to-day difficulties, identity confusion) or in the larger society (bring about a

seemingly 'fairer', more adequate, potentially Islamic model of governance). VEOs therefore do not necessarily build Influence Pathways and push recruits along them. Rather, they walk the Influence Pathway hand-in-hand with vulnerable and/or receptive individuals and provide 'advice' (often in the form of narratives that seem to fit with the individual's views) so that recruits end up believing that their direction of travel is a result of their own decision making process.

Internet and social media play a central role in enabling and developing Influence Pathways toward VE/VE behavior.

Research revealed that a large portion of the pathways toward VE/VE behavior in Jordan involve some interaction with the Internet, especially social media, notably when individuals are 'seeking out' information on VE/VEOs and/or when individuals are looking for corroborating 'evidence' for their developing worldviews and beliefs. In many instances, the Internet and social media have replaced community leaders and other inspirational figures in VEO recruitment methods, and are also widely used as a propaganda tool and a means to gather financial donations. Some respondents notably gave the example of Al Maqdisi's website *Tawheed* which can still be accessed from Jordan or Syria using a proxy server. While it is rather infrequent that VEO propaganda campaigns alone radicalize, they play an important part in normalizing violence, especially when combined with an individual's curiosity about VE and/or existing polarized views. Extremist views and beliefs thus tend to deepen with exposure to, and ultimately participation in, extremist/jihadist online forums and platforms. The multimedia and instantaneous environment of the Internet allows for linkages between individuals, their experiences and suffering, thereby giving them a sense of a wider virtual community, especially among socially isolated individuals.

VEO social media platforms, in particular, play a key radicalizing/recruitment role by playing up emotive imagery and other impactful content such as, for instance, the plight of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq while calling for action that promises glory. Much of the ideological material used by VEOs to rally people to their 'cause' is online and as such, ideological radicalization increasingly can occur from the privacy of one's home without contacts with VEO members or religious leaders preaching radical views. Research indicated that some of the VEO cells in Jordan are established primarily on Facebook and thus comprises members that do not necessarily know each other in person initially. Using nicknames, members of these cells recruit new individuals by getting close to them on social media. The Internet can exacerbate or prompt an individual's social isolation by providing a 'safe environment' populated by like-minded people who access common forums and groups. Violent extremist/Jihadist platforms online are typically closed groups in which members form dissenting information and opinions, thereby fostering radicalization among them. Such platforms can help further radicalize beliefs, encourage and justify the decision to join a VEO and engage in extremist violence. They also facilitate connectivity and information exchange among like-minded, VE-oriented individuals and groups. However, the importance of online radicalization and recruitment processes should not be overestimated. Exposure to VEO-filtered online content does not suffice to push someone to join a VEO, travel to a battlefield in Syria, or participate in a suicide attack. Peers and family settings, as well as the active, face-to-face influence of an enabling structure – typically a VEO recruiter – are much more central to the decision of embracing VE, joining VEOs and/or engaging in extremist violence.

Social networks facilitate the diffusion of extremist beliefs; solidify commitments to a cultural identity and enable VE behavior.

While catalyst events and ideology play a central part in the pathways toward VE/VE behavior, transitions from mild to hardened extremist beliefs and/or resolve to engage in VE behavior/join a VEO often occur within small groups in specific social contexts. As such, personal affiliations, peer groups and broader social networks (including social media networks) not only satisfy psychological needs such as the search for meaningful relationships and belonging but they also offer opportunities for socialization with extremists, especially in radicalized communities. Association with such (preexisting or new) networks and groups can solidify both interest in, and commitment to, the Salafist Jihadist ideology and/or violence, typically through dynamics of groupthink or in some cases peer pressure. In conservative/radicalized communities and/or groups of activists, the pool of family/spouses and friends can form a favorable environment to ideological radicalization and/or VEO recruitment. For example, research indicated that in some areas in and around cities such as Balqa, Rusaifeh, Zarqa and Ma'an, conservative and/or religious families and wider communities can be nurturing environments for VE (extremist mindset) as well as recruitment into VEOs. Even if parents do not necessarily act as conduits toward VE/VEOs, in some cases they support or rationalize the decision made by their children to join these groups and go to Syria (or Iraq). In some instances, when a relative dies in 'martyr' waging jihad, they organize traditional funerals and celebrations to show their pride.

Nevertheless, research pointed to numerous cases of individuals making a decision to join a VEO/engage in extremist violence without their family and friends having any idea. In such instances, radicalization and/or the decision to join a VEO/engage in extremist violence occurs through other group settings such as an online community, for example, but also schools/universities and mosques, religious study groups and local charities, workplaces and professional associations, community and sports centers, political and social activist movements, or prisons. In other words, Jordanian youth sometimes radicalize and/or decide to join a VEO/participate in jihad together with a group of pre-existing or newfound friends that they know personally. They find the encouragement and support that they need among their peers, and sometimes decide to go to Syria along with, or shortly after, one or several other friends. Note that this type of VEO recruitment also occurs among Jordanians living abroad.

2.3 INDIVIDUAL DYNAMICS - KEY DRIVERS ON INFLUENCE PATHWAYS

Personal motivations and psychosocial factors such as self-realization, belonging and recognition are key drivers of VE/VE behavior common to all Influence Pathway types.

Overall, respondents were of the opinion that VE supporters and/or those engaged with VEOs are primarily ideologically or socio-economically vulnerable, which they typically understood as the result of environmental circumstances (e.g., lack of education, poor religious instruction, poverty, etc.). However, research revealed that personal psychosocial factors were just as important in explaining an individual's entrance on, and progression along, a pathway toward VE and/or VE behavior. Indeed, many vulnerable or 'at risk' individuals are often emotionally as much as socially or politically disenfranchised and feel that they lack opportunities as well as emotional support, a voice or place in society. As such, desire for status elevation, belonging, realization and acknowledgment are strong drivers of VE and/or VE behavior across the three primary Influence Pathways. Such vulnerable individuals exist across the country and it would therefore be incorrect to fall for the stereotype of poor, uneducated, anachronistic villagers being more susceptible to violent extremist mindset or being more supportive of VEOs than their modern urban counterparts. In fact, urban/educated individuals can also be motivated, and perhaps more so, by unfulfilled personal expectations, and can be just as susceptible to ideological argument providing them reassurances and/or guidance on how to alleviate their own personal sense of inadequacy. Many VE supporters and aspiring VEO recruits share a desire to be recognized and respected for who they are (their perceived or ascribed identity) and what they do. Actual or perceived socio-economic or political marginalization may galvanize these individuals to 'make something' of their lives, for which VE and VEOs provide a seemingly welcoming and efficient platform. This partly explains the overrepresentation of youth, especially young men, in audiences deemed vulnerable to VE/VE behavior – they have a greater propensity to engage in a range of 'impulsive' behaviors as well as a greater likelihood to engage in a quest for individual and/or social significance.

Self-identification and/or the need for a positive identity are at the heart of individual vulnerabilities to VE and/or VE behavior.

Issues related to identity play a key role in pathways toward VE and/or VE behavior. Specifically, the salience of a particular identity, especially the one desired or perceived by the individual (rather than his or her ascribed identity), and its convenience in providing a positive sense of self is a key driver of behavior including VE behavior. As such, identity confusion or identity crisis among youth (e.g., self-perception as a 'failure' or 'ordinary', as belonging to a 'suspect' category such as criminals or Salafists, etc.) can lead them to look for a new, or perhaps more rebellious or ideologically-grounded form of identity in VE and VEOs. Similarly, in instances of actual or perceived isolation or marginalization of identity such as among West Bank Jordanians or Syrian refugees, group identification may be reinforced and VE/VE behavior may thus be driven by a desire to defend and/or avenge such identification. While fairly high among the population, the sense of belonging to a unified Jordanian nation continues to clash with other forms of self-identification such as those linked to ethnicity and/or homeland (e.g., East Bank vs. West Bank Jordanians, Syrian refugees), tribes (primarily among East Bank Jordanians), religion (mostly Sunni Islam but also 'Muslims' in general or differentiating between Salafists and 'moderate' Muslims) and race (Arabs vs. Jordanian nationals), but also gender and age. In the absence (perceived or real) of a cohesive national identity and/or faced with the inability to peacefully advocate or negotiate a more inclusive position for their sub- or supra-national

identities, many individuals are likely to deepen their commitments to, or choose new forms of identifications that empower them, including through VE and VEOs.

A sense of victimhood, helplessness about the present and hopelessness about the future can increase propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior.

Research revealed that propensity toward VE is often heightened by sense of personal (or collective) victimhood. Some individuals feel victimized at a personal level, for example in terms of broken family and/or deprived socio-economic backgrounds. They also tend to have limited confidence in their ability to control their situation or the events that affect them and typically believe that more powerful others or fate determine what happens to them. Many respondents indeed felt that their actions, regardless of how carefully thought through they are, rarely produce meaningful or desired outcomes. For instance, respondents often agreed that 'the people who work the hardest are never rewarded the most' or that 'it is useless to try and get the government to listen to them'. A significant number also felt that 'there is no point in voting as it doesn't change anything'. This sense of helplessness in their own ability to impact their life for the better was often accompanied by a sense of hopelessness that this ability would increase in the future. In particular, many Jordanian youth including – and perhaps increasingly – students and university graduates, experience a sense of despair with regards to access to socio-economic opportunities that match their aspirations and expectations. This in turn increases propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior as a last resort to achieve success and status elevation among people who feel they have nothing to lose. Collective victimization, for example due to government neglect or marginalization, among individuals for whom group self-identification is strong such as among West Bank Jordanians or Salafists, can also increase propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior. Collective victimization can be real or perceived. For instance, individuals holding strong feelings of solidarity and empathy toward, or identify with Syrians and Palestinians, may feel that their 'community' is being victimized at the end of oppressive regimes and decide to 'do something' about it. VE/VEOs thus become means to redress what recruits perceive as legitimate grievances rooted in political or socio-economic oppression by corrupt or immoral governments.

2.4 LOCAL CONTEXTS - KEY DRIVERS ON INFLUENCE PATHWAYS

Real or perceived threats of a political nature and general disenchantment with mainstream politics can lead to polarization and/or radicalization.

To many in Jordan, VE has become a vehicle of disaffiliation and discontent. At the political level, widespread disenchantment with the political process, a belief that neither mainstream political parties nor traditional social institutions seem to grasp their grievances and needs, and a general sense of being voiceless and irrelevant have led a number of Jordanians, particularly among the youth, to turn to other avenues and to interpret their problems in cultural and religious terms rather than just political ones. This new interpretation can also include an anti-Western sentiment, which is not simply a rejection of Western values but also, or rather, a reclaiming of Islamic ones.

Among Jordanians who express dissatisfaction with the domestic government or political system as a whole and/or look for a more Islamic form of governance, many turn to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the Islamic Action Front (IAF) or even Salafist Quietist or 'reformist Salafist' movements, which many respondents described as 'moderate' in terms of the means they advocate to affect change in society (non-violence). Others decide to turn to more radical options such as VEOs and the broader Salafist Jihadist movement, which offer Jordanians in search of a new form of socio-political belonging an alternative that claims to fulfill the political ideal of a truly Islamic society, encompassing the entirety of the Muslim Ummah. They also appeal to segments of the population who believe that violence has become a last resort option to solving the political, socio-economic, and security issues facing Muslims and can bring about a change in governance in the wider region. One of the most important or perhaps most pressing examples is the question of Palestinian territories. Frustration and anger at the perceived injustice faced by Palestinians is often a trigger to look for more radical ways to improve their fate. As such, the identification of Israel as a common enemy is a stepping-stone toward greater receptiveness to VEO rhetoric, including that which is focused on the fight in Syria and Iraq. Research revealed that there are many Jordanians who subscribe to the idea of violent jihad against Israel, the Assad regime, and even Shias. However, the caveat must be repeated that not all of them reach out to VEOs or any other organized group to act upon these ideas and beliefs.

Political climate and perceived legitimacy of the state, as well as perceived injustice, are key factors impacting the decision to opt for extremist violence.

Research indicated that some Jordanians make the decision to join VEOs for political reasons and, more specifically, out of frustration or anger toward the Jordanian government and/or toward Arab regimes in the wider region. Once it is perceived to be unsuccessful, political opposition to the structures and people in power is channeled through increasingly radical alternatives, including VEOs, deemed to be either more effective or a last resort option. This was notably the case of Commander Ahmad Al Majali who defected from the Jordanian Air Force to fight against the Assad regime in Syria, first as part of JN and later as part of ISIS,² to make a point against the Jordanian government rather than out of ideological reasons (at least not initially). A sense of injustice feeds radicalization mainly by instilling a desire to rectify the injustice, and so provides radical Islamic ideology a firm footing. Specifically, ISIS' pledge of having reinstated the 'Islamic Caliphate' resonates with a longing for fundamental change and a

² Al Majali was reportedly killed in battle in August 2014.

better system among some Jordanians. As such, it is an important factor in someone's decision to opt for extremist violence (join a VEO) as a means to reshape the established political order. Typically, such individuals have attempted to pursue this aim through legal means, through exerting political influence via other political movements (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood), but when that proved impossible, a violent alternative became gradually (or suddenly) acceptable.

Catalyst events can lead to heightened perceptions of threats and/or exacerbate latent conflicts between groups into immediate dangers that require immediate response.

The civil war in Syria has been the main catalyst for young Jordanians to support VEOs and/or leave their home country to join these groups. JN and ISIS have both proven particularly effective at capitalizing on the Syrian crisis as well as sectarian divisions in Iraq notably through sophisticated social media campaigns. The absence of response from Western nations to US President Obama's infamous "red line" in Syria marked by Assad's 2013 chemical attack on civilians, galvanized support for VEOs and furthered recruiting among Jordanians. Similarly, ISIS' declaration of its 'Caliphate' following the capture of Mosul in 2014 accelerated the flow of aspiring recruits and fighters from Jordan eager to find an alternative to governments they perceive as oppressive regimes. In some cases, catalyst events triggering support for VEOs or the decision to go to Syria were more personal to aspiring recruits such as the death of a relative due to sectarian violence, children left to live as orphans as a result of Syrian Army bombings, etc. To many Jordanians, including among the West Bank Jordanian community, Syria has momentarily replaced Palestine as the main point of moral outrage, due to the brutality of the Assad government. For many, this brutality acts as the primary justification for jihad, including among non-religiously observant individuals. In other cases, the conflict in Syria has provided those individuals deeply affected by events in Palestinian territories, for example the 2014 Israeli offensive against Hamas in Gaza, with an opportunity to act out their frustration. Indeed, the relative ease of access into Syria (via Turkey more than Jordan) facilitates participation in VE/VEOs in contrast to tight Israeli border controls. Despite these concerns, it should also be noted that catalyst events such as the execution of captured Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh by ISIS, can also serve as barriers to further support for, and recruitment into, VEOs.

Hostility toward Israel and deep concern for the fate of Palestine are symptomatic of underlying extremist tendencies among the population and can, in some cases, heighten more general propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior.

Research uncovered deep antipathy toward the Syrian regime and Iran. However, the situation was not always entirely clear. For example, although there was deep mistrust of Western intentions and quick rejection of seemingly anti-Islamic decisions taken by countries such as France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, the same respondents acknowledged that locals strive for the quality of life that such countries offer their people. Likewise, religious values can often appear contradictory. On the one hand, there was strong desire for Islam in politics and for the rule of Sharia. However, on the other there was often a wish for people to have the freedom to practice their own religion and a rejection of takfirist violence even against Jordan's oldest enemies. However, opposition to the 'occupation' of Palestine by Israel was more clear cut and remains a central and deeply rooted grievance across the entire population, which, along with high support levels for Hamas, contribute to creating a favorable environment for VE in Jordan even if it does not necessarily lead to VE behavior. It was not clear whether there was a link between the Palestinian issue and the Syrian issue. For example, for some VE supporters and

aspiring or actual VEO recruits, advances in Syria and Iraq against Western-backed corrupt Arab governments are a stepping-stone to the liberation of Palestine from Israeli influence. However, for many other Jordanians the use of violence against Israel is more acceptable and does not necessarily translate into acceptance of violence in other countries or situations.

2.5 VEO CHARACTERISTICS - KEY DRIVERS ON INFLUENCE PATHWAYS

VEOs' outlooks and structures unlock various individual preferences and vulnerabilities.

When combined with individual vulnerabilities and motivations as well as local circumstances and grievances, the ideological and organizational characteristics of VEOs can deeply impact the trajectory of an individual along an Influence Pathway. Recruitment methods vary from one VEO to another and are generally highly flexible and tailored to their targets. For instance, in a bid to showcase its state-like attributes, ISIS has broadened its recruitment pool and strived to appear as a more diverse entity in which everyone is accepted (e.g., men and women, the educated and non-educated, the unemployed and professionals) and in which numerous avenues can be pursued (not simply fighting). The organization and hierarchical structure of a VEO also plays a part in unlocking an individual's preferences and weaknesses along an Influence Pathway. For instance, the top-down structure of AQ and, to a lesser extent, of JN is more likely to appeal to individuals among whom pressure for group behavioral compliance is strong such as traditional Salafist Jihadists/MB members. In addition, these VEOs tend to recruit from communities that already have a large presence in their organizations and who tend not to be new to the Salafist Jihadist ideology. In comparison, ISIS has presented more of a bottom-up approach whereby individuals are inspired to join the VEO on the promise that they will be actors of their own future, thus breaking down traditional authority structures. They can, therefore, be quite ignorant with respect to religion.

VEO narratives harness key grievances and provide vulnerable audiences easy explanations and guidance on how to address them.

The narratives used by VEOs form a particularly influential VEO characteristic impacting Influence Pathways to VE/VE behavior. The most successful VEO narratives in influencing individuals toward VE and VE behavior are those that provide easy to grasp explanations that tally with existing individual perceptions all the while integrating alternative meaning. For example, VEO narratives – especially ISIS' – provide justifications for the frustrations of susceptible individuals at the plight of Muslims in various countries. They notably highlight the responsibility of 'corrupt' governments whose actions have shown that they have deviated from Islam, which they often present as a consequence of past colonization by Western powers. VEOs harness the concept (and experience) of humiliation to foster righteous indignation among potential recruits and convince them of taking steps to address it. They tend to group grievances and disaffection of Muslims around the world so as to legitimize violence, presenting other groups (notably non-Muslims) as immoral aggressors. ISIS, in particular, emphasizes the message that ordinary Muslims have an opportunity to become 'jihadist heroes' by defending the Ummah in the face of their own government's indifference or collusion with immoral aggressors. In contrast, JN seems to increasingly focus its message on the fate of Syria/Syrians as opposed to Muslims in general. The VEO's July 2016 decision to rebrand as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (Conquest of Syria Front) thus presents both a different and powerful narrative whereby the VEO displays its commitment to embed itself in the Syrian (Islamic) Opposition and seemingly distance itself from AQ's global jihadist movement. This is likely to revive its appeal among individuals who want to focus on toppling the Assad regime and putting an end to the Syrian conflict (as opposed to gaining territories in the name of the Caliphate, fighting with rival Islamic groups or not doing anything at all).

VEO recruiters do not focus on one specific background or location although refugee camps, university campuses, conservative communities offer favorable environments.

VEO recruits come from a variety of socio-demographic backgrounds. For example, although poorer individuals are often less well educated and, therefore, more susceptible to some VEO narratives, other recruits have come from educated and even comfortable backgrounds. This diversity within the recruitment pool has made it harder to identify 'at risk' individuals. It is possible to narrow down the pool by age – most recruits tend to fall within the range of 18-30 years, although some are as young as 13 years and others are in their late thirties. Furthermore, in terms of gender, recruited fighters are almost exclusively male, with respondents explaining that Jordanian culture was too conservative to allow women to leave and fight. However, focusing too much on VEO fighters ignores the importance of the role played by other types of VEO behavioral supporters (including the wives and mothers of jihadist fighters) and attitudinal supporters, who are less constrained by age and gender. For example, a few respondents claimed that even older women of around 45 years could among the most 'hardcore' supporters of extremist values.

Research revealed that VEO recruiters are operating across Jordan as well as from abroad, whether online or offline and as such, it is difficult to identify specific locations where such recruitment systemically occurs. However, there are several types of environments that offer propitious conditions for VEO recruitment. For instance, respondents expressed concerns that (Palestinian and Syrian) refugee camps in Jordan are recruitment points for VEOs. In particular, the Za'atari refugee camp located near Mafraq has been known to serve as a recruitment center for ISIS: aspiring recruits reportedly paid 50 Jordanian dinars (JD) to enter the camp, from which smugglers would place them among refugees in buses bound for Syria. Similarly, the Baqa'a refugee camp located on the outskirts of the capital Amman and home to a largely impoverished West Bank Jordanian community waiting to return to Palestine raised some concerns among respondents. Many respondents also expressed concern about poor urban areas such as East Amman and certain rural areas, infamous for lower economic, education and employment levels, which make locals reportedly more susceptible to VEO recruitment. Others commented on the dangers associated with Salafist Jihadists 'strongholds' such as the cities of Zarqa, Salt or Ma'an and remote tribal towns. Further, many respondents identified universities, such as in Irbid, as key sites where VEOs are effectively channeling their ideologies and gaining loyalty from impressionable, frustrated or activist students. Likewise, radical imams have drawn youth into smaller settings – notably after Friday prayers – to preach violent jihad and views that can be categorized as 'radical'. Indeed, the idea of 'jihad' against the Assad regime has consistently been preached and shared in mosques since the start of the Syrian civil war. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledged that the Jordanian authorities have tightened control over mosques and that VEO recruitment does not take place here easily.

Aspiring recruits undergo thorough VEO checks before being trusted with a mission or brought to Syria - isolation from previous relationships is a key requirement.

Aspiring recruits undergo thorough VEO checks before being trusted with a mission or brought to Syria to verify whether they are genuinely motivated to join the group/the fight. Notably, VEOs check the history and activities of potential recruits, follow the ideological views that they might have expressed on social media, and check their participation at key political, religious or social events. Ideological checks were said to be much more thorough and determining in JN's recruitment process than in ISIS's. Some respondents added that recruits are being placed in 'host communities' in foreign countries including Syria before being sent to battle. Once they

have left their home country, new recruits are subjected to a number of VEO isolation tactics. Respondents who had first-hand experience of VEO recruitment processes stated that VEO recruits, once in Syria, are encouraged to think of those they left behind (family members, friends, wider community) as 'blasphemous' Muslims. Contacts with family members and peers in Jordan are thus forbidden for several months while new recruits are also banned from returning to Jordan or moving freely within and outside VEO-controlled territories in Syria (or Iraq). Failure to comply generally leads to accusations of apostasy followed by death sentences, which constitute strong barriers to leaving the VEOs including among disenchanting recruits. Once in Syria as part of a VEO, notably in the case of ISIS, new recruits are typically stripped of their old identities – their passports are either confiscated or burnt – and given new names according to their area of origin or other nicknames.

VEO recruits enter Syria across Turkish and Iraqi borders, via a third country.

Respondents explained that Jordanians (and Lebanese) individuals determined to join VEOs in Syria do so by passing as Syrians returning to their home country (thanks to very similar accents and dialects) across official border crossings in Turkey and Iraq. Recruits from other nationalities, however, are reportedly smuggled in via unofficial border areas. Many respondents accused the Turkish government of colluding with ISIS by facilitating the entry of foreign fighters into ISIS-controlled areas in Syria in return for low-priced oil and for keeping Kurdish advances in check in Syria-Turkey border areas. Respondents mentioned the existence of safe houses for aspiring recruits on the Turkish-Syrian border and highlighted cases of complicity by Turkish border officials. Several respondents highlighted that crossing into Syria from Jordan or via Turkey has become increasingly arduous for new recruits due to heightened security controls on the borders with Syria. Nevertheless, crossing (both ways) is not impossible. Jordanian recruits originating from the south of the country typically cross into and return from Syria via Jordan and those originating from the north of the country do so via Turkey. Increasingly, however, Jordanian individuals aspiring to join VEOs in Syria have done so by travelling/flying to a more distant country such as Egypt, before entering Turkey and then Syria. VEO recruiters are operating both in Jordan and abroad and they are the ones informing aspiring and new recruits of the route and process to follow to get into Syria. The vast majority of the recruits have to pay close to 1,500 JD as registration and training fees, and also buy one or several flights to get to Syria. For those who cannot afford it, VEO recruiters reportedly sometimes lend them the money or/and arrange for them to be smuggled out of the country. Several respondents believed that many VEO supporters decide to go to Syria or Iraq because VEOs do not really have the financial and logistical capacity to conduct operations and attacks inside Jordan due to heightened security checks.

3.0 INFLUENCE PATHWAY AND TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

3.1 THE RESEARCH-LED INFLUENCE PATHWAY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Research showed that individuals in Jordan follow a variety of pathways into violent extremism (or extremist mindset) and/or violent extremist behavior (or VEO membership/terrorism), often but not always through a process of ideological radicalization. The pathways to VE and/or VE behavior are affected by various factors – personal beliefs and motivations, socio-economic, political and cultural contexts, opportunity, enabling conditions and precipitants, the impact of which differs among individuals. Accepting violence as a solution to grievances, joining a VEO and/or engaging in extremist violence are the outcomes of very personal sets of circumstances for which there are no standard models.

Consequently, this section does not seek to present an exhaustive account of how all Jordanians embrace VE and/or join VEOs. Rather, it attempts to provide a better understanding of this complex, multidimensional process in order to identify ways to counter it more meaningfully and effectively. To this end, a research-led conceptual framework was designed using a number of identifiable elements that seemingly come together to produce VE and, potentially, VE behavior and that, research revealed, tend to repeat across locations. This framework was then used to structure Influence Pathway Analysis (IPA) of the transition into VE/VE behavior in Jordan across a number audience segments identified as most relevant to achieving Project Objectives. In short, the IPA Framework seeks to highlight the most common and relevant pathways toward VE and/or VE behavior among the Jordanian population and provide, whenever possible, measurable transitions that can be used to design effective strategic CVE communications/interventions and identify key moments at which to implement them (see section IV. Project Recommendations).

Note that the Framework distinguishes between 'Influence Pathways toward VE', understood as the processes whereby individuals progressively adopt radical ideological beliefs and/or complicit attitudes toward violent behavior; and 'Influence Pathways toward VE behavior, which describe the courses through which VE supporters/sympathizers become VEO members and/or engage in acts of VE.

Super-Factors and Drivers

There are many different reasons and pathways leading to an individual's radicalization and just as many leading to the same individual's possible decision to take part in acts of VE. The nature, motivations and mechanics of VE behavior remain as diverse as the number of individuals engaging in such behavior. Nevertheless, research revealed that engagement with, and/or participation in, VE occurs with the intersection and interaction of an individual with their environment, which includes the very existence and/or presence of violent extremists themselves (including VEOs). As such, our IPA Framework suggests that Influence Pathways toward VE/VE behavior arise from the junction of three main types of factors, hereafter referred to as 'Super-Factors': Individual Dynamics, Local Contexts, and VEO Characteristics.

IPA takes into account the intersections and effects that various external elements have on the individual and vice-versa, leading up to the decision to engage (or not to engage) in acts of VE. As such, the Individual Dynamics Super-Factor is a reference to a person's demographic and psychological profile as well as his or her motivations and vulnerabilities. The Local Contexts Super-Factor, meanwhile, encompasses the socio-economic, politico-cultural, and security

circumstances experienced by an individual but also his or her grievances in relation to these circumstances. Finally, the VEO Characteristics Super-Factor integrates the ideological attributes and organizational aspects of a given VEO, how they appeal to an individual, and how such an individual in turn contributes to their manifestation and evolution. The various elements contained within each Super-Factor are identified in this report as 'drivers', which have been organized according to a number of key domains during Target Location Analysis (TLA): Basic Needs, Governance, Psychosocial, External (Foreign Policy), and Communications (see standalone Target Location Analysis Reports).

All three Super-Factors both influence and are influenced by each other, i.e., an individual both is impacted by, and has an impact on, the wider environment. As such, someone's psychological makeup alone does not prompt them to commit acts of VE, nor is VE behavior solely the product of one's conditions or the result of a VEO's propaganda campaign. Rather, the three drivers must be considered alongside each other and propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior must be understood as a dynamic process born from the interactions between a person, their environment, and VEO strategic communications (which includes tangible activities/operations on the ground).

Essentially, identifying Influence Pathways toward VE/VE behavior consists in recognizing which linkages between the three Super-Factors may/will lead to engagement in VE and/or VEO membership. It entails mapping out the confluence of personal drivers such as an individual's self-efficacy level (Individual Dynamics) alongside environmental drivers such as the individual's access to social services or level of political disenfranchisement (Local Contexts) as well as a given VEO's main narrative, its appeal, or the target of the VEO's recruitment campaigns (VEO Characteristics).

SUPER-FACTORS		
INDIVIDUAL DYNAMICS	LOCAL CONTEXTS	VEO CHARACTERISTICS
Motivations & Vulnerabilities	Circumstances & Grievances	Ideology & Organization
Demographics (Gender, Age, Ethnicity, Religion)	Political Integration	Main Narrative(s)
Psychosocial 'profile' (Self-Efficacy)	Access to Security/Justice	Recruitment Methods
SES/Employment Status	Access to Services	Recruitment Targets
Education Level	Access to Opportunities	Organizational Structure (top-down vs. bottom-up)
Cultural Identity	Media Environment	Presence & Prevalence

Grievances and Motivations


While each individual experiences the intersection of these three Super-Factors in a different way (if at all), IPA aims to identify distinct, though recognizable, sequences of VE trajectories that apply to a grouping of individuals, or Primary Target Audiences (PTAs), and examine which individual dynamics, local context factors, and VEO characteristics shape the VE/VE behavior trajectory (or trajectories) of a given PTA. In particular, the confluence of drivers across the three Super-Factors heightens or gives rise to personal and/or collective grievances, which themselves induce and bring to the fore different motivations to explore, consider, embrace and engage in VE/VE behavior. Research revealed three main sets of motivations, which form the basis for the identification of Influence Pathway types. The first set of motivations identified is 'opportunistic motivations' whereby VE and VE behavior are motivated by remuneration, boredom, or purposelessness. The second set of motivations identified is 'retributive motivations' whereby VE and VE behavior are motivated by a desire to redress an injustice and/or take revenge, or effect political change. The third set of motivations identified is 'ideological motivations' whereby VE and VE behavior are motivated by yearnings of salvation and/or a desire to restore the 'true nature' of Islam or achieve personal redemption.

Influence Pathway Main Characteristics - 'Nodes'

Research revealed that Influence Pathways share common characteristics or 'nodes' associated with VE and VE behavior and that are not necessarily consecutive but may more commonly overlap both in time and in nature, while some may be skipped altogether. These nodes include group/view polarization, ideological radicalization, association (online or offline) with a community of like-minded people and/or radical groups, and exposure to (or active search for) enabling structures (conditions and individuals) allowing VE supporters/potential VEO recruits to realize their aspirations. Each node is impacted by the confluence of various internal and external drivers, the role of which differs from one individual to another.

Research revealed that individuals who support and share VE ideas and/or turn to violence follow a path of nodes that do not form a chronological sequence and that may or may not co-exist. For example, research showed that Influence Pathways toward Violent Extremism can draw from either a state of group polarization or a state of ideological radicalization, or both (concurrently or consecutively), or with one of the two sharing some degree of association with like-minded and/or radical communities. However, at no point along Influence Pathways toward Violent Extremism do individuals engage in acts of extremist violence (and VEO membership), even though the desire to do so may exist. While there is no generalizable passage from being a supporter of VE to being an active member of a VEO, traveling to Syria, and/or engaging in acts of violence; research suggested that association with like-minded/radical communities and encounters with enabling structures (e.g., a VEO recruiter) are essential nodes to undertaking violent extremist action/engaging in VE behavior. These nodes deepen the commitment of susceptible individuals by providing them moral, emotional, ideological and material support. Note, however, that the process through which an individual becomes willing and able to commit acts of VE and/or join a VEO is more opaque than the polarization/radicalization process and is also less frequent.

Figure 3. Influence Pathway Analysis Framework



Influence Pathways toward VE and VE behavior emerge from, and progress with, the ever-changing confluence of drivers (across the three Super-Factors), the grievances and motivations those generate or enhance, and the various resulting nodes that come about.

However, Influence Pathways cannot be understood as an invariable set of stages from neutrality/ambivalence to support for, and engagement with, VE/VEOs. For instance, an individual's decision to join a VEO for money or improved social standing does not necessarily require prior ideological radicalization. Likewise, the IPA Framework does not aim to establish any temporality involved with Influence Pathways to VE/VE behavior, nor does it seek to establish direct causation between the appearance of a given driver and that of another variable such as a set of motivations or a specific node. The reality is that individuals/audiences vulnerable to engagement in VE/VEOs can discontinue their progression on, or exit the Influence Pathways at any point (see section IV. Project Recommendations). As such, the best way to understand a pathway is to recognize that all the variables presented in the IPA Framework form a continuum in which all variables can intervene simultaneously in an individual's journey along the pathway, whether such a journey be rapid or slow.

Node 1: View/Group Polarization

VE or extremist mindset precedes engagement in violence and/or VEO membership, and consists of a growing acquaintance with nuance-less worldviews and/or outright radical beliefs that feed into one's existing personal grievances. Such acquaintance occurs either through proactive selection on the part of the individual, passive exposure, or simply familiarity and experience with such views and beliefs (e.g., one's upbringing). Embracing VE is accompanied by a shift in values and norms, specifically in terms of what is morally and ideologically acceptable/justifiable, and enhancing of an 'us-versus-them' thinking. Polarization of opinions can arise from a sharpening of one's emotions (e.g., anger and fear over the Syrian crisis) and over-emphasis on one's own perceived social identity (e.g., Sunnis, Muslims, oppressed civilians, minority, etc.). While not ideologically motivated, polarization often goes hand in hand with viewing one's situation as unfair and very difficult to change (if at all), with another group being responsible for it. This in turn serves as vindication for VE further down the Influence Pathway and often gives rise to sympathy with the causes professed by VEOs.

Node 2: Ideological Radicalization

In some instances, embracing VE occurs through a process of religious and ideological radicalization before any association with radical communities or groups. In this case, religious ideology provides a clear cause for (perceived or actual) injustice/oppression and sets particular goals to solve it. Moreover, ideological radicalization generally comes with a conviction of moral superiority, which goes much further than mere polarization with regards to intolerance for contrasting views. Yet, it does not alone bring about extremist violence or VEO membership.

Node 3: Association with Like-minded or Radical Communities/Groups

Node 3 describes how individuals with highly polarized views and/or radicalized individuals become integrated, or even immersed, into a small community of like-minded people. This small community can be found online as well as offline, include preexisting networks (e.g., family, peer group) and also take the form of a more established group that reinforces extremist views and beliefs but that is not an established VEO (e.g., an Islamist charity or political movement). With such association, individuals typically become more isolated from mainstream society and/or existing non-radical relationships, which can include relationships with family and friends. Association with radical communities or groups either catalyzes or accelerates ideological radicalization. For instance, if an individual is already radicalized, association with like-minded communities/groups typically furthers and hardens his or her extremist leanings. By linking individuals who share similar beliefs or a social category (e.g., marginalized ethnic group), Node 3 gives rise to a more salient collective identity, which makes mobilization toward VE behavior more likely. While the attitudinal shift toward VE is particularly strong at this point, VE behavior (acts of VE, VEO membership) nevertheless remains absent.

Node 4: Encounter with Enabling Structures

Research showed that engagement in extremist violence and/or VEO membership is rarely a spontaneous or sudden act; it is most commonly the result of the process starting with an attitudinal shift toward VE via polarization and/or ideological radicalization. However, only few radicalized individuals/supporters of VE in Jordan seemingly reach a point at which they engage in an act of VE or join a VEO, which makes VE behavior overall rather infrequent in proportion to the total population of Jordan.

While many of the drivers feeding into the shifting attitudinal process toward VE (in this project called Influence Pathways to VE) also feed into the process of moving from attitudes supportive

of VE to acts of VE (in this project called Influence Pathways to VE Behavior), this passage from radicalized views to violent action is not entirely visible (or accessible for research)³. This is largely due to the fact that this part of the process becomes clandestine as potential VEO recruits are logistically enabled (whether by chance or as a result of an active search) to engage in acts of VE and/or travel to Syria or Iraq. However, it is clear that enabling structures (e.g., VEO recruiters and facilitators but also kinships and social networks, social media, access to money, etc.) typically provide material and moral support to susceptible individuals thereby furthering their radicalization and mobilization.

³ In order to understand this passage fully, it would be necessary to examine the accounts from VEO members and/or returnees of their journey to VE behavior, as well as the logistics involved in dealing with VEO recruiters.

3.2 INFLUENCE PATHWAY TYPES - SUMMARY

While the pathways to VE/VE behavior are many and vary considerably according to locations and individuals, three main types of Influence Pathways Toward VE/VE behavior were derived from analysis of storylines and testimonies recounted by respondents. Each one of the three types presented can be mapped out using the IPA framework. Figure 4 below displays the most relevant variables intervening most commonly in the emergence and progression of each Influence Pathway type. This list does not claim to be either exhaustive or inflexible but rather aims to represent in the most accurate and functional way possible the myriad personal storylines and circumstances that lead certain Jordanians, men and women, to embrace an extremist mindset, support and/or join VEOs and/or engage in extremist violence.

Influence Pathways were classified according to the core motivation (opportunistic, retributive, or ideological) displayed by individuals to embrace VE, support VEOs and/or join VEOs/engage in extremist violence. Those individuals were categorized in three main profiles of 'aspiring or potential recruits': Opportunists, Avengers, and Ideologues and the three types of Influence Pathways identified were therefore named accordingly, i.e., the Opportunist Influence Pathway, the Avenger Influence Pathway, and the Ideologue Influence Pathway. Each Influence Pathway outlines the key demographic and psychosocial characteristics of 'at risk' audiences, the key environmental drivers that influence/enable their views/beliefs and the decision to join VEOs or engage in extremist violence, as well as the outcomes (whether attitudinal or behavioral) of the radicalization/recruitment journey.

As mentioned above, the various elements of a given Influence Pathway form a continuum. The confluence of Individual Dynamics, Local Contexts and VEO Characteristics may impact the entrance and progression of an individual on an Influence Pathway at different points in time or continuously, while the confluence of factors may itself mutate along the way. Grievances and motivations may evolve, extend, and overlap. The four nodes identified may intervene consecutively or simultaneously, while some may not intervene at all.

Figure 5 lists a selective, research-led series of behaviors that can be indicative of general propensity toward VE/VE Behavior and/or an individual's progression along an Influence Pathway. These cross-Influence Pathway behavioral indicators may feature at any time along an individual's journey toward VE and/or VE behavior or may not feature at all. Note that they are not in and of themselves evidence of ongoing or future radicalization or resolve to engage in VE behavior/join a VEO.

Figure 4. Influence Pathway Types - Summary

IP TYPE	OPPORTUNIST	AVENGER	IDEOLOGUE
Individual Dynamics	Youth, mostly males, identity confusion, uncertainty about future, taste for action.	Youth/young adults, educated, politically aware/active, feelings of empathy/solidarity with Syrians/Palestinians.	Youth, males & females, personal isolation, Salafist socialization/traditional religious education.
Local Contexts	Lack of opportunity, socio-economic marginalization, political disenfranchisement, exposure to violence.	Social, cultural, political and economic disconnect and/or discrimination but socio-political integration as well.	Conservative communities, incarceration, exposure to insecurity, facing repression/tight government controls.
VEO Characteristics	Bottom up structure, projection of power & excitement, social media use, Salafist identity.	Portrayals of co-religionists' suffering, designation of culprits, uprooting status quo.	Salafist identity, denouncing a campaign against Islam, promise of heroic redemption.
Grievances	Neglect, not being paid attention, low self-esteem, lack of success, no hope for improvements.	Political disillusionment, moral outrage at events/ inaction in Syria/Gaza, unfair group treatment.	Indiscriminate targeting, Islam under attack, corrupt regimes, deviation from Sharia.
Motivations	Recognition, status elevation, material support, financial gain, belonging.	Political change/reform, justice or vengeance, defense and protection of the perceived victims.	Belonging, personal redemption, true Islamic governance, purification of Islam, defense of Islam.
View Polarization	Heightened fatalistic views about own personal situation vs. mainstream society. VE seen as 'cool' youth counterculture and/or socio-economic revolution for the 'underdogs'.	Exacerbated feelings of guilt/compassion, and/or group socio-political disaffection. VE seen as a way to even out unjust conflict and/or bring about real change (a realization or the result of exasperation).	Asserted communal religious identity, enhanced perceptions that the West threatens religious identity. VE seen as a necessity to defend and protect Muslims, consolidate Islam.

Ideological Radicalization	Newly found rebellious identity and value system: jihad/ performance of religious duty linked to notions of virility, honor and prestige. Appetite for violence normalized and legitimized (fighting for a cause).	Sense of moral superiority, demonization of society outside the 'superior' group, justifying violence against them. Idealized politico-religious reality (Caliphate), perceived duty to rapidly overthrow governments deemed un-Islamic.	Islam vs. apostasy conflict and victory of Islam framed as inevitable. Return to a purified version of Islam cast as the answer to the vows of Muslims worldwide. Personal sacrifice seen as steppingstone to eternal salvation and redemption.
Association with Like-Minded/ Radical Groups	Discovery of online community linking isolated individuals with broader goals and identities. Preexisting friendships.	Discovery of, or preexisting, activist networks (e.g., HIRAK, MB, Fatah, student groups, campuses, refugee camps), online community.	Preexisting kinship and friendship, peer-pressure, Islamic organizations and charities, religious fallback in prison, online community.
Encounter with Enabling Structures	Friendship networks offline and online. Online VEO recruiter.	Networks of like-minded activists, friendships, kinship. VEO recruiter in refugee camp, on campus.	Kinship and friendship ties, peer pressure. VEO recruiter in local mosques, charities, and prisons.
Choice of VEO	ISIS, other fighting groups (by chance rather than by choice).	JN, ISIS, other Islamist VEOs, Free Syrian Army (FSA) (also strong support for Hamas, some support for Hezbollah).	ISIS, JN, potentially other Islamist VEOs.

Overall Salience	Medium and decreasing with growing visibility of ISIS brutality and associated disillusion about 'life in the Caliphate/on the frontlines', reversals on the battlefield.	High in the first years of the Syrian crisis, currently Medium though particularly reactive to catalyst events abroad. JN's recent rebranding and apparent focus on Syria is likely to reinvigorate its appeal.	High and on the rise with government crackdown on Salafist community and other Islamist groups (including the MB) inside Jordan.
PTAs	Marginalized Jordanian Youth, Young Women, Syrian Refugees, University Students and Underemployed Graduates.	Marginalized West Bank Jordanians, Hardline MB Members and Supporters, University Students and Underemployed Graduates, Syrian Refugees.	Salafist Youth, Young Women, Young Inmates, Marginalized Jordanian Youth, Marginalized West Bank Jordanians, Hardline MB Members and Supporters, Syrian Refugees.

Figure 5. Behavioral Indicators of Propensity/Progression Toward VE/VE Behavior

	BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS
Propensity Toward VE	<p>Expressing disillusionment with personal efficacy or situation, national political or religious authorities, or with regional or global geopolitics in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media.</p> <p>Seeking out information from new avenues and sources than the ones exposed to in own environment, both online and offline.</p> <p>Evidence of personal crisis such as substance abuse, criminality, social isolation (limited or no friendships), family problems.</p>
View Polarization	<p>Voicing intolerant statements in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media; criticism of and failure to accept dissenting views.</p> <p>Voicing (non-ideological) support for VEOs in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media; voicing discontent at Arab Spring 'failure'/lack of reform.</p> <p>Voicing calls for inter-tribal and inter-ethnic conflicts and/or fighting between various political/social groupings in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media.</p> <p>Violence on university campuses between different tribal, ethnic, and political groups (including student groups).</p> <p>Accessing online content that fits one's geopolitical views and/or consumption of VE propaganda on social media platforms including 'liking' and sharing such content; avoiding of mainstream news channels considered biased, corrupt, or discriminatory.</p>
Ideological Radicalization	<p>Adopting more conservative practices, e.g., wearing more conservative dress (scarf, veil, traditional male robes), asking family members to pray with,</p>

	<p>praying more often, memorizing Hadith, 'enjoining good and forbidding wrong' to others (Islamic prerequisite found in the Qur'an).</p> <p>Voicing (ideological) support for VEOs in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media.</p> <p>Voicing calls for inter-religious conflicts in public settings, family gatherings and/or on social media.</p> <p>Voicing claims to an authentic truth and dismissal/criticism of dissenting religious views; e.g., trying to convince others to change by starting an association or a blog, picking fights with those who disagree including family, friends/peers but also authority figures such as teachers or local imams.</p> <p>Attempts to marginalize women in own family/local community.</p> <p>Accessing online content that fits one's religious views and/or consumption of VE propaganda on social media platforms, including 'liking' and sharing such content.</p>
<p>Association with Like-Minded/Radical Groups</p>	<p>Detachment from previous relationships; e.g., spending large amounts of time with online peers, leaving home/dropping out of school or work to become closer to a group of like-minded individuals; adopting more conservative practices and dress.</p> <p>Seeking to get closer to new authority figures such as radical preachers, attending suspicious after-prayer meetings, religious circles, or events organized by radical groups.</p> <p>Support VEOs through donations seen as a duty, engaging in Da'wa and creating and disseminating VE content online and/or offline.</p> <p>Issuing threats online and/or offline against individuals and groups with dissenting views and beliefs.</p> <p>Supporting (online or offline) another individual or group carrying out violent action on behalf of similar religious and ideological beliefs.</p>
<p>Encounter with Enabling Structures</p>	<p>Cutting communications with family and previous friends/peers, deleting social media accounts, dropping out of school, leaving work.</p> <p>Saving or asking peers/family (including extended family) for unusual amounts of money, looking for flights or traveling to countries such as Egypt or the United Arab Emirates (UAE), being in contact with individuals/relatives living in Turkey.</p> <p>Voicing a desire to go abroad and/or join a network or group to live as prescribed by 'true Islam', to get married, to be a hero/make a difference.</p> <p>Finding a spouse through association with an extremist community/radical group online or offline.</p> <p>Developing interest for/acquiring weapon training or other skills (e.g., medical training, Sharia education) considered important to like-minded individuals/radical groups/VEOs; acquiring weapons and other materials needed to an attack.</p>

3.3IP 1: THE OPPORTUNIST INFLUENCE PATHWAY

General Description: VE/VE behavior as motivated by remuneration, boredom, or purposelessness.

The first Influence Pathway identified is one followed by 'Opportunists'. The core motivation displayed by Opportunists to support VEOs and/or join VEOs or engage in extremist violence is the perception of a beneficial ratio of reward to risk. These individuals imagine and consider the outcomes of joining a VEO, and subsequently conclude that membership will bring a greater number of positives than negatives.

Opportunists tend to express sympathy or support for VE/VEOs and/or decide to join VEOs due to the appeal of financial rewards and/or material support they anticipate VEOs will provide, but also because of yearnings for increased social standing and recognition from peers, or in the case of younger individuals (including women), a taste for action and adventure compounded by a romanticization of the experience (VEO membership and war in Syria). While it does not appear to be the strongest driver of support for VEOs and/or the decision to go fight in Syria, financial gain – or at least perceived financial stability/security – appeals to segments of the population suffering from financial hardships and with little hope for imminent improvements. It also appeals to individuals who are not necessarily self-interested but see in VEO membership the opportunity to provide some material support to their families otherwise struggling financially.

Overall, however, Opportunists tend to engage with VEOs in search of heightened social status and recognition which they largely believe to be driven by money and belonging to a recognizable, almost fashionable outfit such as ISIS for instance. The perception that ISIS holds territory, bases, and weapons and is able to govern a 'Caliphate', also enhances the VEO's appeal among youth for whom the jihadist fantasy, combined with a desire for excitement, offers an escape from the monotony and/or tribulations of their daily lives.

The sense of adventure most commonly observed among youth without anchoring commitments (e.g., marriage, children, rewarding jobs) drives many to leave home to travel to new places and meet new people...These vulnerable individuals are often young people who are bored/unemployed/impoverished, feel disengaged from society/marginalized, and whose aspirations have been frustrated.

In becoming Jihadist fighters, these youth expect to be recast as 'champions' and look to reclaim a sense of purpose, recognition from the community as well as self-esteem. Further, VEOs' savvy use of social media on which certain Jihadists are lauded as celebrities and have effectively become media personalities, facilitates their appeal among the younger prospective VEO recruits.

The sense of adventure most commonly observed among youth without anchoring commitments (e.g., marriage, children, rewarding jobs) drives many to leave home to travel to new places and meet new people. Sometimes, finding a wife (or a husband for female prospective recruits) is a strong motivation for a number of Jordanian youth to make the journey to Syria. These vulnerable individuals are often young people who are bored/unemployed or underemployed/impoverished, feel disengaged from society/marginalized, and whose aspirations have been frustrated. In particular, teenagers (and children) whose life views are in the process of forming often fall prey to VEO worldviews. When met with compelling VEO recruiters/recruitment material (e.g., on jihadist online platforms) that promise financial security, excitement, romance, and recognition (including posthumously), the motivations and vulnerabilities of certain individuals may begin to dovetail with the goals of a given VEO. The

local context is what affects the likelihood and extent to which these individuals will engage with VEOs and in extremist violence.

Research showed that the Opportunist Pathway is also heavily impacted by perceived risk and not just perceived rewards. As such, tribe, family, friends and a closer relationship with the authorities can all act as drivers or barriers to progress along the Influence Pathway. Moreover, the attraction of the Opportunist Influence Pathway is often related to an individual's belief and/or awareness of alternatives. For example, research uncovered anecdotal evidence to suggest that some individuals decide during/after their recruitment that it is wrong to support a VEO. Nevertheless, the perceived heavy-handedness of the authorities, family ostracization and fear of reprisals from the VEO all prevent the individual from disengaging. Similarly, others who have not had the opportunity to think critically about the merits/dangers of joining a VEO are never able to comprehend the value of disengaging at an early stage (this is particularly true for children and/or badly educated individuals).

KEY MOTIVATORS FOR 'OPPORTUNISTS' PARTICIPATING IN VE

- ✓ *Earn more money, get access to a house (in Syria), get opportunities to trade or smuggle, win booty, pay for schooling and other family benefits.*
- ✓ *Access social services and/or protection offered by VEOs that are either needed or deemed of better quality than essential services at home.*
- ✓ *Earn power and status – particularly over peers and those who did not respect the individual.*
- ✓ *Get access to romance/companionship/marriage when this would have been much harder/more expensive at home (men and women).*
- ✓ *Get access to weapons and adventure when authorities at home would never allow this.*
- ✓ *Ultimately get access to a better quality of life given the perception of no/few opportunities at home.*
- ✓ *Become the hero/anti-hero, be a member of the elite and someone special.*
- ✓ *Enjoy a sense of brotherhood and camaraderie that is missing from everyday life.*
- ✓ *Have a sense of purpose, fulfillment, meaning and dignity.*
- ✓ *Get to Paradise and win the associated rewards (crossover with the Ideologue Influence Pathway).*
- ✓ *Desire for excitement and adventure/desire to participate in new activities.*
- ✓ *Respond to gendered views, i.e., comply with a certain vision of masculinity.*
- ✓ *Desire to have (illusory) control over one's familial and relationship situation (especially women).*

FACTORS THAT INCREASE PROPENSITY TOWARD VE AMONG 'OPPORTUNISTS'

- ✓ *Appeal for activities that carry an element of danger or risk/romanticization of the idea of taking part in the 'real action'.*
- ✓ *Poverty/relative deprivation and lack of education.*
- ✓ *Lack of opportunities and hopelessness for the future.*
- ✓ *Need for services unmet by society/government (e.g., salaries, marriage).*

Relative deprivation, linked to perceptions of inadequacy and neglect, is a steppingstone toward acceptance of VE.

Alongside personal feelings of inadequacy, low self-efficacy, and hopelessness, socio-economic factors are particularly influential in causing some Jordanian youth to embrace VE and/or decide to become members of a VEO and join the fight in Syria. Specifically, financial difficulties and/or economic marginalization, which are tied to low employment rates in governorates such as Ma'an and Zarqa, were said to increase youth's vulnerability to VEO rhetoric and recruitment processes highlighting the financial and material rewards associated with membership. More than absolute poverty, it is deprivation (or the perception of), reflected in lower levels of educational attainment and the associated limited career prospects and opportunities for upward mobility, that is particularly impactful in fostering support for well-funded VEOs. Combined with a context of social isolation from, and/or disenchantment with, governance structures, actual or perceived deprivation fuels a sense of disadvantage and injustice, which can trigger or further radicalization. Jordanian youth who are impoverished and/or have lost hope for their future can increasingly turn to VEOs that serve as providers of services and employment as well as outlets for youth to express their grievances against a government/authorities that have failed them in socio-economic terms. Consequently, some may decide to join or support VEOs, and notably ISIS, because they believe these groups can provide some material or financial support for them and their family in the form of salaries, the guarantee of a job, free food and accommodation, etc. However, there have been no reports of VEOs offering financial incentives to aspiring recruits to join or funding their journey to Syria. In fact, research revealed that aspiring recruits must finance their trip to Syria themselves and must also often pay a registration fee (reportedly around 1,500 JD) that will cover the costs of training materials and tools once in Syria.

Financial gain is intrinsically tied to a quest for status and recognition, which leads the progression along the Influence Pathway.

VEOs such as ISIS and JN do not appear to use primarily financial rewards as incentives to entice Jordanians to join their ranks, although they do promise potential recruits that they will have access to everything they need if they become members, from employment opportunities to wives. As such, the decision to go to Syria among Opportunists is often motivated by less rational factors than mere financial compensation despite widespread unemployment and limited economic prospects for local youth. To many aspiring recruits in Jordan, joining a VEO meets a desire to experience security and support in situations whereby they feel unable to overcome hardships through their own efforts, i.e., working hard does not necessarily mean they will lift themselves out of poverty. In this context, joining a VEO is a means to compel change, especially for individuals who perceive their social position (or that of the group they identify with, e.g., Sunni youth) as unjust. Disseminating polarized worldviews in which the ruling elites (e.g., the Assad regime; the West) are responsible for social and economic problems affecting a given group (e.g., Muslim, Sunnis, youth), VEOs offer recruits and aspiring recruits a common enemy and a cause to fight for (crossover with Avenger and Ideologue Influence Pathways). In this context, the elimination of the 'oppressor' is portrayed as the solution to these problems. For many new recruits, the illusion of security (income security, rewards attached to religious observance, etc.) is often short-lived as new recruits are generally sent to battle and/or on suicide missions a few weeks/months upon their arrival in Syria.

While Jordanian aspiring recruits tend to self-finance their entry into the ranks of VEOs in Syria (or Iraq), paying their own smuggling and training fees, a number of them nevertheless display a desire to join a VEO for personal financial gains. In numerous cases, this desire stems from a genuine need to overcome poverty or a lack of income although in many other instances it can be linked to a quest for status and recognition, especially among unemployed or idle youth.

Aspiring recruits who are driven primarily by money live in areas that are rather impoverished and/or marginalized. Those include Zarqa, Rusaifeh, Irbid as well as East Amman (e.g., Hay Nazzal neighborhood), Karak, Ma'an but also refugee camps, where the environment is believed to be more conservative or even more radical. These decide to join VEOs in Syria because they believe these groups will provide some material or financial support for their family. In addition, several respondents saw a direct link between poverty and socio-economic marginalization and vulnerability to ideological and religious VEO rhetoric, which appears to offer solace to many Jordanians who feel disenchanting and hopeless that their living conditions will ever improve. Going to Syria or Iraq can give these individuals a sense of purpose and empowerment to affect change, if not in their lives, in the broader fight between 'victims' and 'oppressors'.

Support for, and recruitment into, VEOs often answer a need for action and adventure among spiritually hungry Jordanian youth.

VEOs – and notably ISIS – use professional media and video campaigns, especially via social media platforms, to attract people to their cause and sway them to join. In these campaigns, the glamorization of violence appears time and again to resonate particularly with male youth. Combat can be seen as an exciting prospect and/or a rite of passage among young men who find it hard to find a purpose in economically depressed environments. In many instances, the decision to join VEOs and/or engage in extremist violence is driven by a desire for action and belonging among youth who tend to romanticize the experience of war that promises glory and esteem among peers. VE and/or VEO membership can fill a void among youth in search of meaning and who display a general desire to be a part of something much larger than themselves. Among Opportunists, research indicated that that males aged 16-30 were most vulnerable to VEO messaging for that very reason. Religiosity can be (but does not have to be) an irrelevance on the Opportunist Influence Pathway.

Figure 6. Key Characteristics of the Opportunist Influence Pathway

IP TYPE	OPPORTUNIST
Individual Dynamics	<p>Demography:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Male and female youth without anchoring commitments (e.g., marriage, children, rewarding jobs). ○ Teenagers (and children) whose life views are in the process of forming. <p>Psychosocial:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Frustration over not being listened to. ○ Low self-efficacy. ○ Social disconnectedness and isolation, sense of non-belonging. ○ Little hope for imminent life and status improvements. ○ A taste for excitement, action and adventure/romanticization of the experience of conflict/jihadism. <p>SES/Education:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Unemployed/impoverished or suffering from financial hardships. ○ Underemployed. ○ Unoccupied/bored. <p>Cultural Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Disengaged from politics/national identity: absence of recognition in any political or social grouping in Jordan. ○ Belonging to a social category identified as 'suspect' by the government (e.g., troubled youth, petty criminals).
Local Contexts	<p>Structural factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Unemployment/low social standing. ○ Exposure to/Involvement in criminality, insecurity. ○ Limited access to justice. <p>Catalyst Events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Experience of loss or a crisis, opens individuals to considering various ideologies. ○ Losing a job, blocked mobility.
VEO Characteristics	<p>Main Narratives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Labeling the status quo as “unjust,” “exploitative,” “oppressive,” or “heretical.” ○ Attributing ills of the disenfranchised to larger conspiratorial campaign launched against them. <p>Recruitment Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Portrayals of certain jihadists as celebrities on social media; turning them into and media personalities vs. portrayals of senior VEO ideologues quoting extensively from scared texts. ○ Compelling VEO recruiters/recruitment material (e.g., on jihadist online platforms) that promise financial security, excitement, romance, and recognition (including posthumously).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Use of multiple social media platform. <p>Recruitment Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Youth (males and females) dreaming of belonging, adventure and glory. o Educated youth and young professionals. <p>Organizational Structure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Bottom-up vs. top-down efforts.
Grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Economic marginalization and neglect (real or perceived). o Personal disaffection with family, local community, society. o Personal or collective disaffection with the government. o Frustrated aspirations blamed on government/society.
Motivations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Reclaim a greater sense of potency/purpose/self-esteem. o Overcome gender discrimination/find empowering roles (young women). o Escape from the monotony/tribulations of daily life. o Gain increased social standing and recognition from peers (be recast as 'champions'). o Obtain financial gain/rewards; material support; financial stability/security (for oneself and/or family). o Belong to a recognizable and/or fashionable cause or entity. o Pursue the jihadist fantasy ('jihadi cool', sexual jihad, heroism, etc.). o Seek a new path in life; prioritize action over words.
View Polarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Political admiration for VEOs/Salafist Jihadist (e.g., JN). o Polarization of opinions/individuals driven to even more prejudiced/extreme views. o Heightened fatalistic views about own personal situation vs. mainstream society. o Lost hope in power to improve own situation. o Come to the conclusion that for VE/VEO membership is the only way to bring about personal change. o Attraction to VE/VE behavior as a counterculture or subculture.
Ideological Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Belief that one's involvement is needed in the defense of Muslims and Islam from immoral attackers as well as the infiltration of corrupt, Western/secular values. o Religion imbues individual with a sense of moral & spiritual superiority. o Ideology provides an alternative value system/a more definitive identity; compulsion to act out a religious duty. o Idealized politico-religious reality (e.g., Caliphate); jihad and martyrdom seen as legitimate means to defend faith and 'brothers' all the while accessing to praise and recognition on a personal level. o Ideological violence embraced as a way to effect personal change and status elevation faster; appetite for violence normalized and legitimized (fighting for a cause).
Association with Like-Minded/Radical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Association with micro-community of like-minded people online. o Association with micro-community of like-minded people offline: Qur'anic study groups, (VEO) Islamic charities, which can be vehicles of

Groups	<p>VEO recruitment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Isolation from existing (supportive) relationships (family, friends).
Encounter with Enabling Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Preexisting friendship and kinship ties that facilitate recruitment. o VEO recruiters met on social media, in school/mosques, recreational centers, sports teams, trips and journeys abroad (e.g., UAE). o Access to money via petty criminality or loan. o Relatives/friends in Turkey, Syria facilitating travels.

3.4IP 2: THE AVENGER INFLUENCE PATHWAY

General Description: VE/VE behavior is motivated by a desire to redress an injustice and/or take revenge, effect political change, or achieve personal redemption.

This Influence Pathway is followed primarily by individuals who identify themselves as part of a group, existent or imagined, that is seemingly being ignored, unfairly treated/oppresed, or under attack at the hands of another group, whether it is a distinct religious or ethnic community, a government (against civilians), or an entire culture (e.g., 'the West', 'unbelievers'). Identifying with a beleaguered population – be it Syrian civilians,

Identifying with a beleaguered population – be it Syrian civilians, Sunni Muslims, or the broader Ummah – Avengers react to what they perceive as injustice, which they are determined to bring to an end or rectify. VEO membership then becomes a way to even out a conflict deemed unjust, on behalf of a reportedly besieged community.

Sunni Muslims, or the broader Ummah – Avengers react to what they perceive as injustice, which they are determined to bring to an end or rectify. VE/VE behavior then becomes a way to even out a conflict deemed unjust on behalf of a reportedly besieged community. In some instances, this leads to a desire to avenge the group seen as being victimized and some Avengers are therefore willing to engage in VE behavior/extremist violence to do so.

VEO recruiters often find a way to foster conflict zone effects by bringing the conflict zone (e.g., the Syrian conflict, Palestinian 'resistance' against Israel) to vulnerable individuals in non-conflict zones (e.g., via graphic pictures, videos, etc.), which subsequently induces a sense of outrage. VEOs then exploit such emotional responses, vulnerabilities, and needs to trigger consideration of VEO membership/violent jihad as a means of righting injustice. Likewise, even in non-conflict zones (inside Jordan), perceptions of long-standing discrimination (e.g., among West Bank Jordanians), exposure to violence (domestic, crime-related) or direct traumatization can open the pathways to accepting violence in exchange for the rewards of group membership.

Other Avengers decide to join VEOs and/or engage in VE behavior/extremist violence in search of political empowerment. The perceived and/or actual lack of political voice, such as that witnessed in answered calls for help to the international community to protect the Syrian population from widespread violence or end the Syrian conflict, can lead to disillusionment with, and alienation from, conventional political processes. Similarly, the weakening and/or governmental crackdown on political Islamist organizations such as Jordanian MB but also the Salafist community as a whole, both identified as key opposition channels through which grievances against the government can be voiced, can lead to disillusionment with the Jordanian political process. While many individuals accept tacitly the status quo and do not condone violence of any form, frustration with conventional modes of political engagement can nevertheless increase the appeal of VEO membership and recourse to violence, including 'martyrdom' operations.

KEY MOTIVATORS FOR 'AVENGERS' PARTICIPATING IN VE

- ✓ *Desire to be a 'good Muslim' and defend those Muslims/Sunnis who are oppressed/helpless.*
- ✓ *Strong feelings of solidarity with other struggles (e.g., Palestinian cause, Syrian crisis, etc.).*
- ✓ *Reaction to the actions of the Assad regime perceived as morally reprehensible.*
- ✓ *Desire to correct the perceived wrongs committed against one's group (e.g., Sunnis/civilians/'innocent people'/Muslims, etc.).*
- ✓ *Desire for recognition of an identity group (e.g., Sunnis/civilians/'innocent people'/'true Muslims', etc.).*
- ✓ *Avenge a loss, i.e., the death/arrest of family/community members.*

FACTORS THAT INCREASE PROPENSITY TOWARD VE AMONG 'AVENGERS'

- ✓ *Development of a binary worldview between good/innocent people and those believed to be responsible for the Syrian crisis.*
- ✓ *Attribution of responsibility for the Syrian conflict to an external 'opponent'.*
- ✓ *Belief that the use of violence is justified by the initial violence committed by the opponent (e.g., Bashar Al Assad) or its inaction (e.g., the West, international community).*
- ✓ *Belief that violence is used in defense of the helpless/oppressed.*
- ✓ *Feelings of alienation and/or marginalization in current socio-political context/sense of helplessness about the present.*
- ✓ *Actual or perceived state oppression/'indiscriminate' targeting (e.g., arrests of MB members).*

Political change is sought out to alleviate marginalization and the lack of reforms at home - Disillusionment leads to acceptance of violent action.

In general, armed VEO operations in Jordan are very rare. Likewise, there are few counter-VEO operations in Jordan that result in significant collateral damage. This means that the Avenger Influence Pathway in Jordan is different from that found in countries such as Syria where airstrikes and/or other operations can result in direct personal loss and trauma to an individual. Despite this, the Avenger Influence Pathway remains salient in Jordan, albeit to a lesser extent than in the early years of the Syrian uprising. Target Audience Analysis (TAA) showed that expressions of public support for VEOs, including ISIS, are used as a means of voicing grievances with the government, in particular the perception of socio-economic and political marginalization as well as mistreatment by the authorities can trigger a search for alternatives. For example, in Ma'an governorate, segments of the local population have publicly expressed their support for ISIS in the past few years, most commonly in the aftermath of incidents of police violence.⁴ Some disenchanted locals have also suggested that ISIS might provide an alternative to failing government institutions, which has even led to protests at government buildings and attacks on government buildings and property. In other locations as well the expression of support for VEOs, including ISIS, has become a means of calling attention to wider socio-economic grievances, in

⁴ For instance, at demonstrations in April 2014, following the alleged killing of 20 year-old Qusai Al Emami by the police, and at demonstrations in June 2014, following the killing of Aref Abu Darwish by the police.

particular the perceived economic marginalization and neglect of some governorates, notably in terms of job creation, service provision and local investment, among others.

In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring and the first years of the Syrian conflict, many Jordanians increasingly embraced VE as a means to effect political change. In particular, the dissolution of the HIRAK movement that emerged around 2011, the arrest of activists involved, and persisting frustration at the failure of the government to implement democratic reforms, contributed to a sense of political marginalization that drove propensity toward VE. One of the most well known examples is that of the Amman resident Jihad Ghaban, who left Jordan to join a VEO in Syria after the HIRAK movement disintegrated and he failed to integrate in a national political party. Currently, barriers to political and social involvement, notably among MB members and supporters as well as certain segments of the Salafist movement, seemingly continue to push some Jordanians to embrace VE and join VEOs. Overall, perceptions of perceived political disenfranchisement is on the rise, especially among West Bank Jordanians, and many including among East Bank Jordanians have lost faith that petitioning the government and/or voting can lead to change.

In addition to being a means of effecting political change, VE becomes a means to redress an injustice, avenge the victims, and punish the perpetrators.

TAA showed that there are individuals who experience a heightened desire to punish the Assad regime (along with its foreign backers and helpers) for the crimes committed against the Syrian population as well as to punish the West for the injustices carried out against Muslims in general, even if such injustices do not take place in Jordan itself. In such instances, religious and ethnic identities (e.g., Sunnis vs. Alawites/Shias, Muslims vs. Christians, Arabs vs. Kurds, Arabs/Muslims vs. the West, and also in Jordan specifically West Bank vs. East Bank Jordanians, etc.) then take precedence over a (unified) national identity. This leads to group/view polarization and potentially to radicalization on the basis of group identity and perceived group injustices. This overemphasized, or in some cases newfound, cultural identity is primarily a result of feelings of compassion or empathy commonly triggered by mainstream media portrayals of the suffering of fellow Muslims/Arabs/civilians/youth and VEO propaganda whose intended outcome is precisely to reinforce this 'us vs. them' thinking. TAA revealed that education is not necessarily a barrier against propensity to VE along the Avenger Influence Pathway and several respondents notably referred to the path of Jordanian Member of Parliament (MP) Mazen Dalaeen's son, a medical student who was recruited to ISIS while studying in Ukraine (see quote below) to illustrate this point. Similarly, TAA showed that pre-existing religiosity and/or religious observance is not necessarily an important driver of VE among members of the Avenger PTA, as the emotional processes that eventually incorporate the individuals into a larger, imagined community of resistance draw as much on geopolitics as on religion.

Catalyst events and feelings of empathy and indignation tie in with VEO narratives of discrimination.

With reference to the three 'Super-factors', it is important to note how psychosocial motivational factors such as empathy, self-identity and self-belief contribute to the individual's movement along this Pathway. In particular, sensitivity to frustration and a sense of indignity because of the actions of authorities can lead to a search for alternatives and a propensity to see a VEO as a source of comfort and retribution. As such, local context also plays a critical role. Those who suffer or empathize with 'oppressed' Muslim populations - including those outside of Jordan - are more attracted to VEO narratives of discrimination and suffering at the hands of non-Muslims. Specifically, the notion of a justified violent jihad against Israeli Jews is widely accepted across

most governorates to the extent of being normalized. This is something that both West Bank and East Bank Jordanians endorse, and is fueled by a perception of victimized Palestinians at the hands of an Israeli occupation. By extension, this sustains support for Hamas and in some southern governorate, a degree of support for Hezbollah. Similarly, although less widespread, a perception of victimized Muslim civilians at the hands of the Syrian regime is the most powerful factor encouraging young men to adopt the notion of a legitimate, if not obligatory jihad in Syria. The narratives of these conflicts (Syria, Gaza, etc.) are conveyed via mainstream media channels and VEO propaganda but also through family and community. Drawing on injured pride at the group being victimized, these narratives can lend themselves to acts, including acts of VE, that appear to support and/or ensure the survival of the group in question.

Communal solidarity and perceptions of threat commonly pave the way for ideological radicalization - Sectarianism is a key step in that direction.

It is important to note, that as with other Influence Pathways, the Avenger Pathway can easily merge and diverge from others. For example, an individual on the Avenger Pathway can find plenty of justification for their cause in the religious language, imagery and discourse used by VEOs. In this way, the Ideologue Pathway quickly reinforces the Avenger Pathway (see below 'Crossover between Influence Pathways – Case Study'). In fact, it is not uncommon for an individual, through a process of cognitive dissonance, to look back on his/her Pathway and interpret it as ideology-driven rather than vengeance-driven. This is because religion provides useful concretization of the individual's sense of commitment and consistency – including in the eyes of other Muslims. Specifically, Sharia provides the legitimization for the use of force when taking revenge.

Sectarianism, and how it impacts an individual's entrance upon, and progression along, an Influence Pathway is a good example of this overlap between the Avenger and Ideologue Influence Pathways. Although the vast majority of the Jordanian population follows Sunni Islam, sectarianism and, specifically, the perceived threat of a coming 'Shia Crescent' across the region is widespread and reportedly on the rise in the country. Framing the current crisis in Syria and Iraq, the Sunni-Shia divide is central to receptiveness to Salafist Jihadist rhetoric among segments of the population, thereby reviving the long-lasting rift between the two major branches of Islam in Jordan as well. Many Jordanian youth decide to go to Syria and join VEOs because they perceive the region-wide Sunni community to be under threat from Shias and the countries that back them (mainly Iran) and see in VEOs such as ISIS and JN groups capable of defending this community. A similar psychosocial phenomenon is at play regarding Alawites which are largely associated with the Assad regime and the crimes it has committed against Sunnis in Syria. Fostering a sense of anger among Jordanian youth and a desire to defend/or avenge the larger Sunni community against oppressors (whether the Assad regime, the Alawite community, the Shia community, or foreign countries), reports and accounts of the affliction and tragedy lived by Syrians serve as key drivers of polarization in favor of Sunni VEOs as well as ideological radicalization.

Figure 7. Key Characteristics of the Avenger Influence Pathway

IP TYPE	AVENGER
Individual Dynamics	<p>Demography:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Male youth. ○ West Bank Jordanian youth. <p>Psychosocial:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interest in geopolitics/international politics (e.g., the Israel-Palestine conflict). ○ Intolerance toward injustice; feelings of solidarity with communities seen as being unfairly treated. ○ Determination to make a difference. ○ Questioning one's identity. <p>SES/Education:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Low SES. ○ Middle class professionals. ○ Underemployed graduates. ○ Educated youth, university students and graduates. <p>Cultural Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Social and/or cultural isolation (real or perceived), including uncertainty of belonging within a given social context/community. ○ Disconnect from cultural origins (Palestinian/Syrian refugees). ○ Politically/ideologically close to MB and other Islamist organizations (e.g., Fatah). ○ Belonging to a social category identified as 'suspect' by the government (e.g., MB, WB Jordanians, etc.). ○ Moderate to strong religious identity.
Local Contexts	<p>Structural factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lack of opportunities/poor services in local neighborhoods, refugee camps and their outskirts. ○ Economic hardships, unemployment, residential discrimination and segregation, poor housing conditions. <p>Catalyst Events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Personal loss; emotional trauma. ○ Media portrayals of the suffering of civilians/co-religionists in other countries. ○ Weakening of, and/or governmental crackdown on, political Islamist organizations such as Jordanian MB; (real or perceived) indiscriminate targeting of community of reference. ○ Specific events in Gaza/Syria/Iraq/Jordan/elsewhere (e.g., treatment of refugees in Europe).
VEO Characteristics	<p>Main Narratives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Creating/perpetuating perceptions of intentional religious and racist discrimination against Muslims/Arabs. ○ Emphasizing a powerful collective Muslim community as a catalyst for (further) radicalization. ○ Focus on a 'far enemy' vs. a 'near enemy' (e.g., fighting the US/West vs.

	<p>fighting regional corrupt regimes vs. fighting other regional enemies such as Hezbollah, Yazidis, Jews, etc.).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Labeling the status quo as “unjust,” “exploitative,” “oppressive,” or “heretical.” o Islamist narratives similar to those of VEOs (e.g., MB’s acceptance of the concept of jihad despite condemning violence). <p>Recruitment Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Portrayals of the suffering of civilians/co-religionists. o Fostering conflict zone effects by bringing the conflict zone (e.g., the Syrian conflict, Palestinian ‘resistance’ against Israel) to vulnerable individuals in non-conflict zones (e.g., via graphic pictures, videos, etc.). o Dislodging Islam from specific cultural reference points enabling its adherents to identify with Muslims around the world regardless of national or ethnic boundaries. o Use of multiple social media platform. <p>Recruitment Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Educated youth and young professionals. o Individuals from within local (Syrian, Jordanian) Salafist communities. o Long-standing, religiously committed individuals (with recommendations). <p>Organizational Structure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Level and quality of governance provided in areas under VEO control; ‘proselytizing’ (JN) vs. ‘terrorizing’ (ISIS). o (Perception that) VEO works with other groups to counter the Assad regime (JN) vs. fights with rival groups (ISIS). o Top-down vs. bottom-up efforts (AQ, JN). o Perception that VEO is primarily an indigenous movement (JN) vs. a foreign movement (ISIS).
<p>Grievances</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Sense of outrage toward events in Syria/Gaza, etc. o Frustration with international inaction (e.g., in response to specific catalyst events in Syria, Gaza, etc.). o Frustration with the failure of the Arab Spring to bring about change; with conventional modes of political engagement. o Dissatisfaction with political opposition groups perceived as too close to King; political disillusionment. o Lack of political voice (real or perceived). o Personal or collective socio-cultural discrimination/victimization/alienation; economic marginalization (real or perceived). o The group/community identified with is being ignored, unfairly treated/oppressed, or under attack at the hands of another group (perceived or real). o Long-standing discrimination such as among West Bank Jordanians (perceived or real). o Exposure to violence (domestic, crime-related) or direct traumatization. o Strong disagreements regarding the foreign policies of states (including Jordan).
<p>Motivations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Assert citizenship rights, social inclusion, and communalist identity. o Help/avenge victims of unfair treatment/oppression.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Bring injustices to an end. ○ Improve Jordan's political system and/or regional (potentially global) political order; seek political empowerment. ○ Punish groups perceived as aggressors/oppressors (e.g., Assad/West/Shias). ○ Take action personally in light of international inaction/own past impassivity. ○ Make amends for past misdeeds and mistakes (real or perceived).
View Polarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political admiration for VEOs/Salafist Jihadist (e.g., JN). ○ Exacerbated feelings of guilt/compassion/empathy derived from heightened solidarity with Palestinians/Syrians/Iraqis. ○ Exacerbated feelings of political and social disaffection (e.g., perceptions of being treated as second-class citizen), increasingly difficulty/failure to identify as national. ○ Strengthening ties to 'imagined' community of resistance (e.g., WB Jordanians, MB, Muslims, the 'oppressed') and further segregation from mainstream. ○ Supportive of jihad in principle. ○ Lost hope in reform/peaceful change. ○ VE/VEO membership seen as a way to even out a conflict deemed unjust, on behalf of a reportedly besieged community. ○ Accessing online content that fit one's geopolitical views; avoidance of mainstream news channels considered biased.
Ideological Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Feeling that the international Muslim/Sunni community as a whole is being violently persecuted. ○ Belief that Islam is under threat because infiltration of Western values which corrupted Muslim morals and weakened the unity of the Ummah. ○ Religion imbues individual with a sense of moral & spiritual superiority. ○ Geopolitics presented through religious frames (attack of the West against Islam). ○ Perceived duty to rapidly and comprehensibly rebuilt societies in which Muslims are the majority/violent overthrow of government deemed un-Islamic. ○ Loose conception of Islamic apostasy. ○ Belief that Muslims must show loyalty to their coreligionists by fighting those who threaten them, including through jihad and martyrdom.
Association with Like-Minded/Radical Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Preexisting kinship and friendship ties, activist networks (e.g., West Bank Jordanians, former Hirak members, etc.). ○ MB/Fatah student groups, political activists on campuses. ○ MB/Salafist networks in Palestinian/Syrian refugee camps.
Encounter with Enabling Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Preexisting friendship and kinship ties, MB/Salafist networks in Palestinian/Syrian refugee camps, MB/Islamic charities and associations that facilitate recruitment. ○ VEO recruiters met on social media, in school/mosques, recreational centers, sports teams, trips and journeys abroad (e.g., UAE), and refugee camps. ○ Access to money via employment or loan.

o Relatives/friends/connections in Turkey, Syria facilitating travels.

Case Study

Young man from Ma'an went to Syria to join JN and 'make a difference' on the ground.

"My brother left Ma'an quite suddenly. We come from a religious family, especially my brothers; we come from a strict religious background more so than others around us. My brother started praying more often, I mean he started focusing on not missing a single prayer, and we had the regime, I mean the tragic events we saw unveil on the television really had him going. My brother was a passionate man. I mean he was inclined to follow his emotional side and what he saw moved him on an emotional level so he left for Syria. It was quite a shock when he left for Syria. The change was not, I mean I don't think he changed, he just started to be more committed, more committed to the religion, praying more, you know what I mean? So, the scenes, the images that suddenly surfaced and were apparent to us, they were influential and he was driven by his emotions, he listened to his emotions, because he saw what was happening to the people, saw what was happening to the Syrian people and what their regime was doing to them and things were, I mean they were very emotional.

I can't retrace his exact steps. We once suspected that he was trying to leave for Syria, we called him quickly to try and locate him and he denied that he was trying to get to Syria, but the second time around, I don't know how he got there exactly to be honest, I can't be 100 percent sure of his exact steps, that is hard. He, I mean, there were youngsters, the gang of rebellious young people that left for Syria from here, it was quite a big group. We kept hearing that this guy left and that guy left for Syria and so on. A lot of youngsters left, especially people from our area here. The movement from here to there was accelerating. Most youngsters left. We once suspected that he was leaving and he denied it. I know how he left; he left from here to a bordering area. Exactly, as I understood from him they left as a group to an area bordering Syria. There were maybe four in his group. They left to the border and slept there, a smuggler met them there and took them to Syria in exchange for money. I don't remember the name of the area near the border. They slept at someone's house. He was a smuggler and he smuggled them into Syria. I believe the amount was 500 JD per person. He helped them cross the Syrian border and pointed them in the direction. He wasn't very helpful, he just pointed them in the direction of the road and just left them there, and then he just turned back and left them. He was in it for the money, more so than to help them. He didn't care he just wanted the money. My brother was 24 when he left and he had a job when he first left. He had a good job but he left it.

My brother was in Syria for about a year and eight months. My brother left Ma'an and he met people there, of course. Most of the youngsters of our area they all left to join JN. I mean the path was already paved, it was known that you would go to join JN. Most people from this area here, from Ma'an, were leaving to join JN. He left and got there and he asked about JN. He found the FSA and asked them about JN and they took him there, for a fee, and that is how he got to JN and joined them. He stayed for about a year and eight months.

We were hoping that he would come back right from the start. He is your brother; you don't know where he is, is he cold? Is he warm? Does he eat? Is he thirsty? Is he still alive?

Is he dead? You think about him every day. Of course we pressured him to return but he didn't really give us much room to do so. He would keep repeating broad phrases like: God willing and hopefully it's all for the best and such. Of course if you tried to pressure him too much, he would stop calling. After a while, to be honest, we did not expect him to change his mind. My brother was a bit stubborn but he just came back on his own. We didn't expect this and he didn't tell us that he was coming back. We found out he was returning when he was in Jordan already. I didn't expect him to come back, neither I nor any one of my family members, I mean it was a shock to us the way he came back like that without telling us or even uttering a word about it. He never said that he wanted to come back or anything. He never told us or said that he wanted to come back. He kept in touch on a monthly basis. Every month or a month and a half he would call on the phone. He was in Dara'a.

My father was very upset that Moath left to Syria. He was hoping that if Moath were to be martyred or if he was killed in Syria, he wished that he wouldn't be killed by a Muslim and at the same time that he would never kill a Muslim either. This was his only wish, just that. If my brother died, If Allah destined him to survive then he was going to survive. But my father was different, my father's whole life was different, he became very agitated and quick to anger, he didn't have patience for anything anymore. Such was the way he lived his life. Of course, my father tried talking to my brother and reasoning with him, come back he told him, why do you even want to be involved with all of this? Come back, do you even know what you are doing? He told him. That is what he used to tell my brother. My brother would just say things like 'God willing this is for the best'. He used to try and distract my father and change the subject, or say that the phone credit is about to finish. He used every kind of excuse there was, especially when speaking to my parents. He used all kinds of excuses like the phone credit or he use to say that things were not ok where he was or that something important came up and so he had to go. I will call you back mom, he used to say.

He reached the Jordanian borders and surrendered himself to the Jordanian army, later we found out that he already surrendered himself, he sent word with someone, he, I mean, told the military personnel there and, you know, that is how we got word of it. I mean we didn't know, we only found out after he entered Jordan and surrendered himself. He stayed at -Praise be upon our prophet Muhammad- the military police, maybe with the military intelligence or military police, for four or five days, for four days and five nights and then they sent him away to the Jordanian intelligence agency. He was there for about 65 days or maybe 70 days. They released him. He was not prosecuted.

My brother went to Syria because of the tragedies he saw, the tragedies we all saw. I mean, the killing and the bloodshed that was going on in Syria, all of the destruction, and the killing of the Syrian people. He was mostly moved by his sentiments and passions and my brother was somewhat of a sentimental man and he left everything behind and he thought that he and the others could make a difference and change the situation in Syria, I mean to defend the Syrian people, to defend people, because there are freedom seekers there. I mean the violations that we saw committed over there, they stirred something inside you, whether you liked it or not. The violations, killings, killing of children, murdering of women, killing of men, killing of the elderly, you know? The Syrian

regime was killing its people. I mean it was an Alawite regime, a Shia regime, for the most part, you know? That sect, the Shia sect, what they were doing to the Sunnis over there, it was something that moved you deeply, whether you liked it or not. I suspect that anyone, any young man that saw what was happening, was moved and wished that he could go over there and do something. I mean if there was something you could do, if you had something to offer, you wouldn't say no. The biggest proof of this is when the Syrians themselves came here, I mean I suspect that our area here in Ma'an, they stood by the Syrians wholeheartedly because of the atrocities they had to suffer. I mean it's a tragedy what happened to them and it saddened us deeply with all that the Syrian people had to suffer. I mean the welcoming they got from the people of our area was something out of this world I suspect. They gave to them support until they had nothing more to give.

My brother decided to come back when he felt the situation wasn't all right. I mean, say now I left for Syria, you know? And in my heart of hearts I wanted to give something to the Syrian people, for example, because of all these things that I saw, when the whole situation changes, I would come back. He knows that things were confused. For example, my brother was a medic there, my brother was a medic because my brother could speak English very well and could help with things. For example, he could help because he could understand the medical personnel and medical staff and he could help them out. Something was wrong, I mean when you go and find things to be different than what you thought they would be, that you could kill another innocent Muslim. You can't do that, you know? If you did that you would lose your life and lose your afterlife.

There were differences between factions that prevented him from doing what he came to do in the first place. He was there to seek Allah's approval and to try and change the reality of what was happening to the Syrian people. He was there to make a change, but he couldn't. He found out that him being there was harmful. It wasn't beneficial. He was with a group of people that were not really seeking the approval of Allah, that wasn't their main aim, so he came back and he came back of his own accord. He didn't come back because we tried to influence him, as I said he didn't really give us any room to do so. My mother tried talking to him, my father tried talking to him, but he didn't really give us a chance to try and get through to him. He even used to delay his calls, I mean instead of calling you every 40 days he would call every two months if you tried to pressure him and that was the end of it. I mean that was the main reason.

At first his main purpose was to uphold the word of Allah, to please Allah and to die a martyr. In Islam the greatest status you can achieve is to be a martyr, right? Martyrs hold the greatest honor in Islam. So say I left for Syria to try and uphold Allah's words and to support the religion of Islam, I would ask myself, am I helping to uphold all of this by being here? So at first that is what he thought he was doing, but then he saw differently after a while.

Yes, he was with JN and he saw that they were practicing harmful things, so he left them. They had things that were wrong with their creed, for example what they used to do, some things were wrong. My brother was the one that saw all of these things. Factions were fighting against other factions. You know what that means? Say a faction for

example were Muslims, then you wouldn't fight them, because you had a difference of opinion with them or because you were different from them, they should have been considered the maintainers of the righteous religion, but he couldn't accept them as such. This was one of the reasons that made him come back, or actually this was the main reason that he came back, because they were not adhering to the teachings of the religion and were breaking Sharia law, so he left.

No, my brother surrendered himself, of course they had to question him, but there was not a law in place yet for getting a permit to go and fight. He was one of the very first people to go and one of the first to come back when he saw that things were confused. I mean he wasn't the very first to go, lots of people went before he did, but he was one of the first to come back because he saw that things were confused. Right now people are standing trial for such things but at the time that he came back there were no trials being held. He left in August 2012. He came back in 2014. He use to work in a company, you know what I mean? As for his attributes, my brother was somewhat of an emotional man and stubborn. I mean he does what he wants to do no matter what happens. That's mostly it.

Our society doesn't consider leaving to fight in Syria to be very wrong. On the contrary, when my brother got back, a lot of people came to greet and congratulate him, and they sat with him and started to ask him questions. The only problems he faced were with the authorities. I mean, that troubled him the most. It's giving him a hard time, but as for our society, it's quite the contrary, he is very popular. For the most part, people are supportive of these actions, because in Syria what happened is not an easy thing. It is a Muslim country and he went there not to join any faction, but to uphold Allah's words, and because our religion is asking us to do so."

(Male, 35, HR Officer, Ma'an)

3.5IP 3: THE IDEOLOGUE INFLUENCE PATHWAY

General Description: VE/ VE behavior is motivated by yearnings of salvation and/or the desire to restore the ‘true nature’ of Islam.

This Influence Pathway involves individuals who subscribe to the Salafist Jihadist ideology and who are consequently already radicalized in ideological terms. The core motivation displayed by Ideologues to support and/or join VEOs or engage in extremist violence is linked to a desire to impose personal religious views on others, the appeal of jihad and martyrdom, and, overall, a general quest for significance and belonging that the Salafist Jihadist ideology satisfies.

Ideologues strive to emulate the earliest Muslims who, in their views, practiced the purest form of Islam. They make a point of not deviating from the sacred texts and deem those who do to be apostates, who even deserve death for ‘mocking’ Islam and God. Stemming from these views is hostility toward, and refusal to take part in, what Ideologues perceive as un-Islamic systems of governance and the belief that an Islamic caliphate that follows Sharia is the way forward to restore the

For Ideologues, Islam is not simply a religion per se but the cornerstone of their identity and the Salafist Jihadist ideology provides them with a more appealing socio-political framework reinterpreted without the perceived cultural hues of the Islam associated with Jordan’s current rule and socio-political context, in which Ideologues may feel marginalized or alienated.

righteous nature and interpretation of Islam. In this context, Ideologues view jihad against ‘apostate regimes’ such as the Alawite regime of Bashar al Assad as part of their religious duty to progress toward their vision of the Islamic Caliphate. As a result, many Ideologues may also decide to join VEOs with a view to overthrowing Jordan’s political system, which they deem illegitimate due to its ties with Western countries and entente with Israel, both perceived as a betrayal of Islam. VEO membership and engagement in the Syrian conflict is understood among Ideologues as a stepping-stone for VEOs/Salafist Jihadists to consolidate their support base, secure territory and thus pave the way for the removal of Jordan’s pro-Western regime and reinstatement of the original ‘Caliphate’. Paradoxically, government crackdowns and suppression of known Salafists who may not have committed any crime or violent action tend to prompt potential Ideologues to join VEOs more readily and/or engage in extremist violence more quickly.

For Ideologues, Islam is not simply a religion *per se* but the cornerstone of their identity and the Salafist Jihadist ideology provides them with a more appealing socio-political framework reinterpreted without the perceived cultural hues of the Islam associated with Jordan’s current rule and socio-political context, in which their own families may live and abide by but in which Ideologues may feel marginalized or alienated. Further, the Salafist Jihadist ideology offers individuals faced with traumatic losses and/or deep emotional pain a legitimate and honorable exit from life via the concept of martyrdom. Some Ideologues may indeed be individuals who seek to die as martyrs rather than commit suicide. Violent jihad is thus legitimized as a path to paradise for those who want to put an end to their lives without bringing shame to themselves or their families. The Ideologue Influence Pathway also provides an avenue for individuals who seek to make amends for past misdeeds and mistakes, real or perceived. As such, prison detainee populations can also prove receptive audiences for charismatic jihadist recruiters.

KEY MOTIVATORS FOR ‘IDEOLOGUES’ PARTICIPATING IN VE

- ✓ *Desire to purify and renew Muslim society through a strict application of Sharia law or bringing about an apocalyptic event.*
- ✓ *Participate in the institution of Sharia law as a (delusory) means to promote justice and freedom.*
- ✓ *Remove Arab nationalist regimes, which have betrayed Muslims.*
- ✓ *Remove/punish untrue Muslim rulers who fail to respect religion or fully enforce Islamic laws.*
- ✓ *Desire to reinstate/participate in the Islamic State or 'Caliphate'.*
- ✓ *Desire to spread one's religion/ideology (Salafism Jihadism) to create a supranational ('Muslim') community.*
- ✓ *Desire to be a 'good Muslim' and comply with one's perceived religious duty (armed jihad).*
- ✓ *Animosity/hostility toward other religious groups, particularly non-Muslims, Alawites, and Shias.*
- ✓ *Find means of escape and/or protection from various forms of domestic abuse (for women, young men) or other violent environment (e.g., prison).*
- ✓ *Search for opportunities to participate socially and politically and overcome forms of gender discrimination/seek other ways to assert one's identity and independence (women).*
- ✓ *Obtain divine forgiveness/redemption/mercy and/or the opportunity for a second chance (on an individual level).*

FACTORS THAT INCREASE PROPENSITY TOWARD VE AMONG 'IDEOLOGUES'

- ✓ *Feelings of alienation and/or marginalization in current socio-political context/sense of helplessness about the present.*
- ✓ *Perceived rejection and/or arbitrary targeting by the central government/legal system (e.g., Salafist community).*
- ✓ *Upbringing in Salafist communities/self-identifying as Salafist (Quietist or Jihadist).*
- ✓ *Suicidal tendencies, deep emotional trauma/loss, mental illness.*
- ✓ *Separation from supportive relationships (e.g., imprisonment, personal loss).*
- ✓ *Negative view of one's own past (e.g., criminal activities, perceived lack of religiosity, etc.) and need for redemption.*
- ✓ *Belief in, and focus on, rewards in the afterlife and/or belief that the 'End of Times' is near.*
- ✓ *Belief that strict application of Sharia law is the right practice of Islam and will reinstate its purest form.*
- ✓ *Belief that Arab regimes are corrupt under the influence of the West.*
- ✓ *Romantic vision of the caliphate: belief that an Islamic caliphate is the only acceptable system of governance and its reinstatement will unite (Sunni) Muslims and make them safe.*
- ✓ *Belief that armed jihad is a duty to defend/avenge (Sunni) Muslims and should be waged in Syria/Iraq and elsewhere.*
- ✓ *Gender-based inequality and discrimination making women more susceptible to becoming both passive/active victims of recruitment.*
- ✓ *Being single, divorced or widowed and lacking the social standing and protection that comes with having a male spouse or guardian (women).*

✓ *Having close ties or relationships with radicalized individuals (men and women).*

Islamic governance is both a means and an end - VE is not only believed to be necessary to achieve Islamic governance but is also perceived as a duty.

Ideologues tend to be particularly receptive to familiar and common VEO narratives of Muslim shame and humiliation at the hands of others. Within this context, the Caliphate established by ISIS is presented as a means to restore the honor and might of (Sunni) Muslims, a concept that strongly resonates among those Jordanians who yearn for a return of the golden age of Islam and the day when Muslims around the world will be united under one state. With the desire to restore Islam in its purest form, Ideologues are opposed to any form of governance that is not exclusively based upon Sharia law, not just the Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad but also the current political system in Jordan. To Ideologues, the Jordanian monarchy has deviated from the 'righteous' interpretation of Islam, notably by establishing ties to the West and more recently, participating in the US-led coalition strikes in Syria, which is construed as support for the killings of other Muslims. As such, an ideologue's presence in Syria is regarded as a means to strengthen the jihadist base (Diyar Al Tamkin), prevent Iranian and Western expansion in the region, and establish a united Muslim community independent from previously imposed boundaries that will allow Sunni Muslims to practice their religion in safety.

Ideologues view militant jihad against regimes perceived as 'infidel' as the only means to bring about the desired change in Muslim countries and it also serves as a justification for the use of violence against Arab regimes viewed as backed by the West such as Jordan. Ideologues entirely subscribe to the portrayal of the Syrian conflict as a battle between Sunnis and Shias or righteous Muslims against infidels, and jihad in Syria is regarded as a religious obligation to defend Sunnis and/or seek revenge on their behalf against the regime of Bashar Al Assad and its supporters, including Hezbollah and Iran. To them, jihad can only be achieved fully by living in an Islamic state, which can prompt some pious individuals to join ISIS despite its violence. In fact, violent jihad can become an important gateway to enter paradise as it separates 'believers' from 'non-believers'.

Shared experiences and close personal bonds facilitate VEO recruitment in conservative/radical communities.

Ideologues' identification with a given VEO largely stems from the degree to which the VEO's messaging fits with the individual's personal motivations. Specifically, some Ideologues may be drawn to ISIS based on its establishment of a caliphate while others may prefer JN's prioritized focus on the concept of jihad. Location and grassroots ties to prominent Salafists and VEO supporters also play an important role in determining which VEO radicalized youth may turn to. For instance, in the North Region and especially in Irbid governorate ISIS is thought to have some clout, notably because two of Jordan's most prominent pro-ISIS Salafist leaders are from the governorate: Abu-Muhammad Al Tahawi, who has a following among West Bank Jordanians, and Omar Mahdi Zeidan. JN has traditionally been closer to local communities in Mafraq but also in Zarqa (along with Abu Musab Al Zarqawi supporters). In the South Region and notably in Ma'an, JN and AQ have traditionally had a stronger influence among local youth.

Radicalization and VEO recruitment among Ideologues most commonly takes place in group, using interpersonal ties in the community of origin. As such, Ideologues typically embrace VE and/or join VEOs because they have one or more friends or family members in the movement. However, they may often be isolated from the broader community and mainstream information channels. For instance, in conservative and Salafist communities, children may be home schooled together rather than as part of the official education system. Similarly in such

communities, individuals who feel that they hold distinct views or beliefs may feel the need, or be compelled, to keep silent about their opinions, further marginalizing them from mainstream society and forming a propitious VEO recruitment environment.

Tribal affiliation is not necessarily a barrier to VE/VE behavior among Ideologues.

While Salafist Jihadist movements in Jordan have traditionally comprised West Bank Jordanians who lack the tribal support to help provide reasonably paid employment, access to higher education and other social markers of progress like home ownership (see below 'PTA 5: Marginalized West Bank Jordanian Youth'), an increasing number of Jordanian VEO recruits appear to be East-bank Jordanians, many of whom come from areas and communities where the tribal system remains influential - notably cities such as Karak, Salt and Ma'an. For instance, Muhammad Mazen Dalaeen, the son of a Jordanian MP who became radicalized in Ukraine, came from an elite family in the tribal town of 'Ay in the Karak governorate and reportedly joined ISIS after the group's capture and immolation of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh, a fellow tribesman. As such, the popularity of ISIS and its strain of Salafism Jihadism have seemingly started to pervade Jordan's tribal culture, and so could further undermine adherence to tribal norms including traditional loyalty to the Jordanian monarchy. This has been facilitated by worsening socio-economic conditions. For instance, in Rusaifeh, the hometown of Abu Mohammed Al Maqdisi, the rising appeal of Salafist Jihadists is attributed to the weakening of tribal traditions (Bani Hassan tribe) in the face of pervasive poverty. The entire Zarqa governorate, in fact, suffers from rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, including in Zarqa City, home of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, where youth unemployment is particularly high.

Jails are identified as major incubators for radical Islamism and VEO candidates.

Respondents highlighted that Jordanian jails have become a fertile radicalization and VEO recruitment ground. Many incarcerated petty criminals (e.g., drug dealers, thieves) are being introduced to the Salafist Jihadist ideology and offered recruitment into VEO, especially ISIS, in jail. Once they are released, some then go to fight in Syria. Isolation from society, a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future, and fear make prisoners, especially new arrivals, more vulnerable to individuals and groups offering friendship and spiritual support. Petty criminals are mostly ordinary Muslim youth who are often poorly educated and/or have only limited knowledge of the Qur'an. As such, long-life extremists who take the role of spiritual leaders can easily sway them into adopting rigid Islamist beliefs that offer them a new sense of identity and belonging. Moreover, religious narratives are particularly effective among new prisoners who see in the call to join 'God's side' a path to redemption for past crimes, away from drugs and alcohol, and the possibility to make a 'new start' in life. Religious observance is therefore praised and encouraged. Ideological indoctrination ensues in the form of preaching during small gatherings such as prayer circles or using smuggled propaganda material. VEO recruitment occurs among prisoners who are naturally receptive to an ideology that glorifies violence against 'oppressive regimes and groups' thereby building on anti-government sentiment. However, it can also be 'forced' on prisoners who have no way to avoid jailed Salafist Jihadists preachers/leaders.

Figure 8. Key Characteristics of the Ideologue Influence Pathway

IP TYPES	IDEOLOGUE
Individual Dynamics	<p>Demography:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Male and female youth. <p>Psychosocial:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Low self-efficacy; frame personal and/or social ills in fatalistic terms. ○ General distrust of foreign intervention/conspiratorial mindset. ○ Disconnect from family members (e.g., generational differences in their sense of religious and national identities). <p>SES/Education:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Low SES/Impoverished communities. ○ Religious instruction. ○ Educated youth, university students and graduates; or uneducated/illiterate youth. <p>Cultural Identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Salafist socialization in home communities. ○ Strict religious observance and/or puritanical interpretation of religion; religion as the cornerstone of identity. ○ Belonging to a social category identified as 'suspect' by the government (e.g., Salafists); social or communal isolation.
Local Contexts	<p>Structural factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lack of opportunities, poor services, economic hardships. <p>Catalyst Events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Media portrayals of the suffering of Muslims in other countries. ○ Media portrayals of 'anti-Muslim' acts (e.g., books, cartoons, films) and laws (e.g., veil ban) in Western countries. ○ Specific security-related events in Gaza/Syria/Iraq/Jordan/elsewhere. ○ Governmental crackdown and/or (real or perceived) indiscriminate targeting of the Salafist community/Salafist Jihadists; suppression of known Salafist Jihadists. ○ Violent experiences in prisons among detainee populations. ○ Personal disaffection, loss, or crisis.
VEO Characteristics	<p>Main Narratives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Attributing ills of the disenfranchised to larger conspiratorial campaigns launched against Islam. ○ Creating/perpetuating perceptions of intentional religious and racist discrimination against Muslims/Arabs. ○ Emphasizing a powerful collective Muslim community as a catalyst for (further) radicalization. ○ Focus on a 'far enemy' vs. a 'near enemy' (e.g., fighting the US/West vs. fighting regional corrupt regimes vs. fighting other regional enemies such as Hezbollah, Yazidis, Jews, etc.). ○ Presenting the Caliphate as a long-term vs. short-term goal. ○ Labeling the status quo as "unjust," "exploitative," "oppressive," or "heretical." ○ Labeling other groups including Muslims as apostates; presenting attacks

	<p>on (regional) apostates as the way to purify Islam.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Islamist narratives similar to those of VEOs (e.g., MB's acceptance of the concept of jihad despite condemning violence). <p>Recruitment Methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Portrayals of the suffering of civilians/co-religionists. o Incentivizing sacrifice by promising heroic redemption. o Dislodging Islam from specific cultural reference points enabling its adherents to identify with Muslims around the world regardless of national or ethnic boundaries. <p>Recruitment Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Individuals from within local (Syrian, Jordanian) Salafist communities. o Long-standing, religiously committed individuals. o 'Born again' jihadists. <p>Organizational Structure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Bottom-up vs. top-down efforts. o Victories and advances on the ground, conquest of territories for the Ummah, defeating 'corrupt' Islamist factions and regimes.
<p>Grievances</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Outrage toward events affecting Muslims; sense of being humiliated (real or perceived), symbolic and actual attacks on their identity. o Deviation of society from the purest form of Islam. o Social isolation and cultural alienation (e.g., Salafist communities). o Being seen as a cultural or religious threat (real or perceived); becoming the objects of suspicion and surveillance.
<p>Motivations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Seek deeper meaning, a new path in life, belonging. o Change environment to bring it in accordance with religious views. o Alleviate the vows of Muslims worldwide by returning to a more purified version of Islam, establishing a truly Islamic state. o Alleviate the vows of Muslims worldwide by destroying existing political system/order. o Refusal to take part in un-Islamic systems of governance. o Punish apostates. o Perform religious duty (e.g., jihad, donations to VEOs). o Assert a communal religious identity; consolidate the Salafist (Jihadist) community (e.g., support base, territory); reactive religiosity. o Seek a legitimate and honorable exit from life (e.g., martyrdom).
<p>View Polarization</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Polarization of opinions/individuals driven to even more prejudiced/extreme views. o Exacerbated feelings of threat against one's religion/religious sect. o Exacerbated feelings of political and social disaffection, of being directly or indirectly targeted by domestic government and authorities. o Strengthening ties to 'imagined' community of resistance (e.g., Salafists, Salafist Jihadists, 'Muslims') and further segregation from mainstream; demonization of society outside the group of reference. o Embrace the concept of jihad, caliphate, full application of Sharia and martyrdom. o Come to the conclusion that violent revolution/jihad is a necessity to bring about change. o Accessing online content that fit one's geopolitical views; avoidance of

	mainstream news channels considered biased.
Ideological Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Feeling that the international Muslim/Sunni community as a whole is being violently persecuted. o Belief that Islam is under threat because infiltration of Western values which corrupted Muslim morals and weakened the unity of the Ummah. o Religion imbues individual with a sense of moral & spiritual superiority; claim to an authentic truth. o Demonization of society outside the 'elite' group, justifying violence against enemies. o Belief that returning to a more purified version of Islam is the answer to the vows of Muslims worldwide. o Come to the conclusion that jihad is therefore a necessity. o Status of Islam is supposed to be elevated by adherence to a strict moral code that attempts to apply religion in every aspect of life. o Perceived duty to rapidly and comprehensibly rebuilt societies in which Muslims are the majority/engage in the violent overthrow of government deemed un-Islamic. o Perceived duty to pursue the reconstruction of all world societies based on Sharia. o Loose conception of Islamic apostasy. o Perception of threat against Muslim cultural identity reinforces fall back on religion. o Salafist Jihadist ideology provides a more appealing socio-political framework; belief in Salafi doctrines that seek to purify Islam of any innovations or cultural accretions. o Personal sacrifice in this world seen as a stepping-stone to eternal salvation and redemption. The rewards of afterlife far exceed any possible pleasures that can be derived in this world.
Association with Like-Minded/Radical Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Preexisting kinship and friendship ties with extremists/extremist groups that cement extreme or radical beliefs. o Association with micro-community of like-minded people in Qur'anic study groups, (VEO) Islamic charities, etc. o Salafist networks in local communities. o Violent experiences in prisons leading to association with group perceived as powerful.
Encounter with Enabling Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Conservative, Salafist Quietist, and Salafist Jihadist communities that facilitate recruitment. o Known VEO recruiters in local communities/refugee camps/prisons. o Loyalty to group members, especially close kin, that acts as a barrier to exiting the pathway and foster recruitment.

Case Study 1

A Salafist Sheikh recruited several youths from a conservative neighborhood in Zarqa City.

“Mahmoud, a young man, he minded his own business here in our area. He came from a family of seven people. He was not committed religiously; he didn't even pray. He spent a lot of his time with his cousin, who was a troublemaker. However, he was never arrested.

One day, he happened to meet a sheikh we have here in the area, called Al Sheikh Sufian, who took him to the mosque, and explained to him what is happening in Syria, and what our role as Muslims is, which is to join jihad). First, he joined the events happening here and got arrested in Zarqa [Salafist protests]; they let him go once he signed a warranty that he would not leave the area. Then one night, he calls his family and tells them that he is in Syria. He stayed for one or two months, and then we heard he became a martyr. He carried out an operation, a bombing, it was filmed and available on phones and they brought it for his parents to see. This same Sheikh Sufian also convinced his own brother to join the fight. First, he sent him to Syria, then he sent him to Yemen, then he sent him to Saudi Arabia to do Al Umrah (Pilgrimage to Mecca). His brother was not at all committed either, he didn't pray, he was sort of a troublemaker, he did not have a steady job, he would work with his brother in construction sometimes. This brother was influenced by Sheikh Sufian, who was arrested 8 years ago for vandalizing liquor stores in Amman, and in prison, he was involved in the arson incident that was carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in Al Jwaydeh prison in Jordan. He went to Syria, got wounded there and then he returned to Jordan. No one even questioned him or talked to him, it was as if it was normal. Then he went back again to Syria, and took his wife and child with him. He was declared a martyr a month and a half later. They sent someone by bus to get the wife and child. Exactly one month later, Sheikh Sufian Awad sent his own son to Syria, who stayed for six months I believe. Then he came back and was arrested directly by the police.

There is another young man also from our neighborhood, who tried to go to Syria, he was caught by the police and brought back to his family. The second time he tried to go to Syria he was also caught and arrested by the police. There is also another young man, who went to Syria for about eight months. He comes from a family that cared about their jobs; they were committed, and not at all involved in violent extremism. He went, stayed for eight months and got hit in the eye. When he returned, him and his father signed a warranty that he would not leave again. He is still here now, however he remains in communication with the sheikhs in Syria that brainwash him to think that what happens in Syria today is jihad.

These youth were introverts. They were not at all involved in this; they were in the streets. I have no clue how Sheikh Sufian managed to brainwash them. He is a Salafist of course and goes to Siham Mosque. When his brother died, they accepted condolences for only one day at the mosque. They accepted condolences at the Diwan Al Thahreyyeh (public building) for one day, which his brother requested before dying, and because the authorities refused to bring down the photograph of King Abdullah on the second day, the condolences were held outside the Diwan.

All of these youth became suddenly religiously committed right after they met Sheikh Sufian. When he left prison, he came to our neighborhood and opened a supermarket. If you passed him and said hello and you were not dressed in Islamic wear - you were wearing a t-shirt and pants for example, he wouldn't say hello back. He would sell you things at the supermarket but he wouldn't talk to you. They went to Syria through Sheikh Sufian also; he would take them to the borders and connect them with sheikhs on the ground in Syria. He would smuggle them through the Jordanian/Syrian borders. Saed, another young man from our neighborhood was caught twice when he was crossing the borders. The first time, they sent him home, and the second time he was arrested for three

years. He is here now, and still communicating with the violent extremist groups in Syria. Sheikh Sufian no longer has the supermarket, and now he drives a public transportation bus on the northern line 'Raghadan- Northern Mountain- Talal residence'.

Sheikh Sufian had a brother that worked in construction, and another brother, who was involved in a robbery here and fled to the UK, he stayed there and sent them money, they opened a shop on the way to the oil refinery in Zarqa, they are very comfortable financially. He doesn't use his personal money to send the youth to Syria; he takes money for each one he sends. I heard this from a trusted source from Syria. Everyone he sends gets a monthly salary when they arrive in Syria. He takes a percentage. Saed told us but he didn't mention the amount. About the smuggling, he told us all the details when he first got out of prison; he said someone would drop them off at the border. They would cross from an opening in the barrier, and someone would wait for us on the other side. A while after he got out of prison, he stopped talking. When he first got out, his father sat him down. His father is a bearded religiously committed man who is not involved with violent extremist groups - he only prays to god and worships him at the mosque, he is not interested at all in that is happening in Syria.

Mahmoud's family was doing ok, financially, his dad was a blacksmith and he worked. It was the religious ideology by Sheikh Sufian that influenced the youth. This used to happen at Siham mosque all the time. When all these events happened, and Sheikh Sufian's brother died in Syria, he was martyred, he stopped going to the mosque as frequently as he used to. It still gets chaotic at times at the mosque during Friday prayers, as the imams speak about joining jihad in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. Now not many people go to pray at Siham mosque, only a handful of people go today.

This other kid, Abu Khoosah, we used to go to Fajr prayer together in Ramadan at the big Mosque. I tried to tell him not to join jihad in Syria, as he wasn't fully convinced. We would discuss what happened to Ali or Saed. Suddenly, he started avoiding me on the streets. I have a brother who goes to Al Tawbeh Mosque; he talked to him and told me that this kid speaks a lot about ISIS and Syria. I talked to his brother, Osama, he told me that once, he found an ISIS flyer on him when he was on his way out. Osama tried to take it from him, he couldn't, and he returned home later without it. He has his friends coming over to visit, they come in normal pants, but he wears a traditional robe. He accepts his friends saying that they are 'undercover'; they can't wear the robe all the time not to be discovered by the government. This kid for example, does not have a job. His brother was sentenced to 15 years in prison in Saudi Arabia. His father had pushed him (the brother) to become a preacher but he went to Saudi Arabia where he was caught three or four months later for planning to carry out a bombing."

(Male, 25, Carpenter, Zarqa)

Case Study 2

Desperation prompts religious men to participate in jihad and escape the shame of being unable to take care of their family.

"I wouldn't consider education a major aspect in this equation [as to whether or not

someone left to go fight in Syria], nor the nature of their job. It depends how big their responsibility is. There is a difference between someone being alone, or being married or with a child or with two children. As a man's responsibility increases, he gets attached to the place he lives in, unless there are certain conditions that force him to run away from his reality. If his children are sick and he cannot provide them with medicine, if he can't provide his wife with a decent living, or if he can't play his role among his family and relatives, if he can't pay the rent or electricity bill, or even buy bread, he can go crazy, and reach this stage where he would want to run away from reality. Committing suicide is prohibited in Islam, that's why Muslims think if they did that they would go to hell, so the other option is going to fight in defense of the Islamic nation, sacrifice oneself and therefore go to heaven. I told you about that businessman who left his business and family and went to fight; or that engineer; some of them went because they couldn't handle their lives. I can't determine a certain story but I know one person who was married and had children, and had lots of responsibilities, and he's past due with his rent and several people were asking him for money. He was religious and he didn't have a job, so suddenly he left to Syria. He was 26. Why did he go? He left to fight; he thought Allah would protect his wife and children. He was killed in Syria. He went by smuggling through the Jordanian borders. Certain groups would help smuggle him and on the Syrian side, Al Nusra would receive him. Al Nusra recruits anyone who wants to join, they train them and recruit them."

(Male, 50, Local Official, Ma'an)

3.6 CROSSOVER BETWEEN INFLUENCE PATHWAYS – CASE STUDY

Merging of grievances and motivations occurs to overcome cognitive dissonance.

Influence Pathways often overlap or merge and many end up taking the form of an Ideologue Influence Pathway. For example, the combination of emotional distress experienced in light of events in Syria (and the wider region), heightened idealism and belief in the necessity of administering retributive justice, as well as a desire to develop a more compelling sense of identity (all core motivations displayed in the Avenger Influence Pathway) often give rise to attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that coincide with those identified in the Ideologue Influence Pathway. In particular, increased religious observance and/or religiosity (behavioral), association with more or less radical Islamist networks/outfits inside Jordan (behavioral), endorsement of any variation of the Salafist Jihadist ideology (attitudinal), and belief that the society they live in is blasphemous (attitudinal) are outcomes that are common to individuals following either IP 2 or IP 3. Furthermore, Influence Pathways do not just merge as an individual travels along the pathway toward VE/VE behavior. The merging continues to take place even once VE behavior/VEO membership has occurred (e.g., enrollment in Sharia courses, isolation from family members left behind, jihadist marriages) and/or aspiring recruits have arrived in Syria without association to any particular VEO (e.g., membership of various fighting groups and VEOs in search of the most virtuous Islamic outfit).

Merging takes place because individuals consciously and unconsciously seek to justify their values, attitudes and beliefs to themselves and others. This process of attempting to overcome cognitive dissonance and to maximize social proofing has been well documented by social scientists such as Leon Festinger and Robert Cialdini.⁵ The process is even more pronounced in environments – such as that in Jordan – where stress is placed on the value of informal communication and relationships.

Case Study: Merging of the Avenger and Ideologue Influence Pathways.

The case of 26-year-old Samer, who had left for Syria in 2013 and died as a fighter with ISIS over a year later, illustrates precisely this crossover between the Avenger and Ideologue Influence Pathways. Relatively well-educated and financially stable, Samer became more devoutly religious as a result of the extreme disquiet he began to experience over the Syrian civil war and the crimes committed by the Assad regime against the civilian population. Islam, and later on the ideologies of various Salafist Jihadist groups – the latest of which being ISIS – provided him clarity over his perceived role in the struggle to redress all injustices committed against Syrians, Sunnis, and ultimately Muslims, as well as how to live according to Sharia law.

⁵ For example, Robert Cialdini highlights the importance of feeling that a new attitude or behavior is 'consistent' with the existing set and with the norms of others within the group.

Description of Samer’s Influence Pathway

Figure 9. Samer’s path down radicalization and VEO membership, as recounted by his brother



Despite stable family and socio-economic backgrounds, unsociability and extreme sensitivity to the plight of Muslims are factors that primed Samer to be vulnerable to VEO messaging.

Samer came from a relatively well-off, middle-class family in Amman. He was the holder of a BA degree and worked as an accountant in a local company. The eldest of two brothers, Samer was described as seemingly ‘non-religious’, and something of an introvert with few friends and not much of a social life. Although in his mid-20s, Samer was not social media savvy or interested in marriage. He was however described as particularly sensitive to the plight of Palestinians and Syrians and increasingly emotional over the years while watching the news relating to the Syrian conflict.

Increased religiosity, association with like-minded individuals via social media, and progressive adherence to Salafist Jihadist narratives are outcomes indicative of Samer’s path down radicalization leading up to his decision to go fight in Syria.

Around six months before he left for Syria, Samer reportedly became more religiously observant, listening to the Qur’an and religious lectures on his cell phone while attending the local mosque for morning and evening prayers. A couple of weeks before his departure, Samer asked one of his cousins to open a Twitter account for him, which he used almost exclusively for contacts with someone, reportedly linked to ISIS, promoting ‘participation in jihad’. Samer had told this person that he wanted to ‘join jihad’ and ‘go to heaven’. The jihadist recruiter encouraged Samer to go to Turkey, where they were due to reconnect (via Twitter) and where Samer would receive specific instructions on how to get into Syria. A few days before he left, Samer told his family that he was going to sell his phone because it was no longer working properly.

The decision to leave Jordan and the departure itself occurred without the involvement of, or knowledge from, Samer’s family.

The night of his departure from Amman, Samer did not go home to watch a soccer game with his brother and uncle – he had warned that he had to stay late at work that night – and actually never came home. Having got rid of his cell phone a few days before, he called his brother from Turkey (a number that was traced to company near the Ataturk Airport in Istanbul) though there

was no response. He then called an uncle living abroad and asked him to bid farewell to his family and let them know that he was going to participate in jihad in Syria and become a martyr.

Samer's journey to Syria started as individual travelling to Egypt and Turkey, from where he was smuggled into Syria by local contacts of the online Jihadist recruiter.

Samer flew from Jordan to Egypt, and then from Egypt to Istanbul, Turkey. Once in Turkey, he traveled to Antakia, reconnected via Twitter with the jihadist recruiter, who sent someone to pick up Samer and take him to Syria. Samer never gave his family the details of his journey from Antakia to Syria.

Following his arrival in Syria, Samer contacted his family to let them know he was alright and kept in touch during the entire time he spent in the country up to his death.

Approximately a week after his departure from Jordan, Samer contacted his brother via WhatsApp from an unknown number, and explained that he was training "with the mujahideen" and would "hopefully become a martyr". Samer would then give his family in Amman regular appointments to talk via WhatsApp messages, mostly on Fridays.

Samer's ideological commitment to 'jihad in Syria' and martyrdom was made clear to his family and never withered away despite emotional appeals highlighting his responsibilities toward the welfare of his loved ones.

Samer was not receptive to emotional pleas made by his relatives for him to return to Jordan. He was seemingly unaffected by accounts of his mother's poor health as a result of his departure, and also appeared indifferent to reminders of his duties to his family as the eldest son. Despite keeping in regular contact with his close relatives whom he asked to join him in Syria, Samer claimed that he thought of them as deceased.

Samer used Twitter to find like-minded individuals and was encouraged to travel to Syria.

Samer reportedly followed several people of similar ideological leaning on Twitter but only ever communicated with one person who had published an 'online ad' appealing to individuals interested in 'participating in jihad', to which Samer had replied. This Jihadist recruiter explained to Samer that he had to reach Turkey through his own efforts (including financially) and further, pay a 1,500 US dollars administration/registration fee to undergo religious and military training once in Syria. Once in Syria, food and accommodation were to be provided for free.

Samer's ideological radicalization and religious fundamentalism further increased while in Syria.

Samer was determined to reassure his relatives about his living conditions but also appeared to genuinely believe that he was living in a better, truly Islamic, society, with righteous spiritual guidance and all his basic needs fulfilled, including security. Once he joined ISIS, after having fought alongside various other groups, Samer was convinced that he was living in the "Islamic reign" and repeatedly asked his family to join him. He emphasized the cosmopolitan aspect of his new life, whereby he met and learned from fighters/individuals from various countries and backgrounds. Samer seemed to embrace fully ISIS' religious narratives, and notably the interpretation – amplified by hope for salvation at any price – that he would go to hell if he left the battlefield (where he was fighting the enemies of God) and returned to Jordan.

Samer led an entirely new life in Syria, getting married and holding jobs (fighter and Imam).

Despite unwavering radical beliefs, Samer regularly offered to provide financial support to his family in Amman, highlighting that he had a monthly salary. Samer got married when he joined ISIS and asked his parents to send him money (via a money exchange shop he identified) to furnish his house, which he repaid once ISIS gave him his 'marriage bonus'. After Samer's death

in the battle of Sireen (Aleppo's countryside) against Kurdish fighters, his family stayed in contact with his widow to find out whether or not she was pregnant.

Analysis of Samer's Influence Pathway

In analysis, the first step is to establish the relationship between the three Super-factors (Individual Dynamics, Local Contexts and VEO Characteristics) and a given Influence Pathway. For example, in the testimony it is clear that demographic variables did not predict the individual's future allegiance to JN. Specifically, although he was an orphan he subsequently married and had two daughters, and continued to care greatly for his family members - even after he left Jordan to fight in Syria. However, there are several important psychosocial markers within the individual 'super-factor' that do have relevance. For example, the individual felt a strong desire for change coupled with unfulfilled expectation – in this case frustration at the lack of peaceful change in Jordan.

Likewise, the second Super-factor - Local Context – played a part in this individual's pathway. For example, the individual was part of the Fatah Movement and so felt a strong sense of political grievance before he became a member of JN. In addition, the testimony points out that the individual was poor. Neither attribute by itself is powerful enough to trigger the behavioral change of moving to Syria. For example, there are many much poorer individuals or more politically polarized individuals who have not gone to fight in Syria. However, these factors, when combined with the individual's dashed hopes, increase the likelihood.

Finally, the VEO chosen – in this case JN – displayed characteristics attractive to both the individual and also wider society. The VEO did not need to persuade the recruit. Its narratives and purpose successfully aligned with the needs and feelings of the individual. In this case, a particularly strong narrative was that of religious compulsion and duty to make sacrifice for others in need – for example, note how the individual was described as a good person who helped others before he joined JN.

It is important to note:

- Analysis of mainstream demographic variables would not have highlighted Samer's propensity to move toward VEO membership. For example, he was both educated and employed.
- Instead, individual markers that would play a key part in his decision to leave Jordan were psychosocial by nature. For example, he displayed a strong degree of empathy and sensitivity for Syrians suffering in their country. Likewise, he experienced relative social isolation.
- Once in Jordan it is possible that his pathway became Opportunist – for example, getting married in Syria shows he overcame his sense of isolation. However, it is more likely that his primary motivation for joining was ideological, as evidenced by his increased religiosity and eventual decision to become an imam.
- It is also likely that the Avenger Influence Pathway played a role in his continued membership of ISIS. Notably, his decision to fight the Kurds would almost certainly be based on the perceived ethno sectarian risk to Muslims posed by the Kurds in Northeast Syria.

The overarching problem posed by merging Influence Pathways is that it is difficult to establish when intervention is most appropriate. However, the positive outcome of Influence Pathways that merge is that it raises the possibility of multiple intervention points and chances to block an individual's progression along a pathway.

Account of Samer's story

Samer's path, as recounted by his brother – Part I.

"My brother is the eldest between us. He graduated with a bachelor's degree in accounting in 2008-2009. He was like any other guy his age. He wasn't very religious; he sometimes went to the mosque to pray but at times he would miss prayer as well. He was more of an introvert. He would sit at home, with his earphones on. He would leave for work in the morning and come back to sit with us for a bit. He used to sit with us, go on family visits with us. He did not have any friends; he only had my uncle and me as his friends. There were no signs before he left, he only told us that he would sell his phone as it was not working properly anymore, and that he was going to buy a new phone in a couple of days. He was acting normally. I remember that day a friend of mine was coming to watch the game with me at home, and my brother told me he was going to stay late at work and that he was going to miss the game. He worked as an accountant at a company. And I remember I saw him late the night before and he asked me to set my alarm for him for Fajir Prayer because he didn't have his phone. The next day I was waiting for him, the game had started and was coming to an end, and he didn't show up. My uncle lives in the house above us, he passed by my window and asked if Samer had come home, and I told him 'he said he would be at work late'. We didn't know anything at that point. After that, we received a phone call from my uncle who lives abroad, he asked my father where Samer was travelling and where he was going because Samer had called him from the airport in Turkey, asked him to give us (the family) his best and to bid us farewell. He had tried to call my number, but I didn't see the call as I was watching the game (I had received two international missed calls while I was away from my phone). He asked him to tell us that he was going to be a martyr and join jihad, and he hung up. My father then came and told us, and everyone at the house found out. It became very chaotic; I don't even remember what I did at that point. I yelled, I went down to the street to look for his car to see if he had come home. My mom had a breakdown. My father and me were lost; we did not know what had happened, or what to do. All my uncles came. My father called my mom's brothers and they all came as well. We didn't know what to do.

One of my relatives has a connection with a travel agent in Turkey; he called them and explained the story, and gave him the number Samer had called from. They identified the number; it belonged to a transportation company around the airport. We reached a point where we did not know anything about Samer, we didn't know where he was or if we would be able to bring him back or not. We decided that my uncle should go to look for him in Turkey. The number he called from belonged to a company next to Ataturk Airport. We booked the flight for my uncle; the next morning, he arrived around noon. My uncle began the search and asked around, they told him all the people that came to join jihad go to Antakia (they told him he likely went to Antakia). My uncle headed to Antakia and he was asking around there. At that point, I took my laptop, Samer was not social media savvy, he didn't have a Facebook or Twitter account. However a while back, he had asked my cousin to create a Twitter account for him. My cousin created the account for him, and he had the username and password. I talked to my cousin, who gave me the login information. I logged in and found that he had been in touch with someone in ISIS for a while. Samer had told him that he would like to join the Islamic

State, to join jihad and that he wanted to go to heaven. This person asked him to reconnect with him when he arrives in Turkey and that he would let him know how to join. I found that he got in touch with him again when he arrived in Turkey: "I am now in Antakia" he sent this message the morning of the day my uncle arrived in Antakia (but my uncle arrived at night). He told him that he would wait at the Internet café next to the bus stop there; the guy responded that he would send someone to get Samer. And that was the last thing written on his Twitter account. I informed my uncle of all of this, and he asked around but they did not know and they told him that he must be too late (10 hours late) as Samer would have arrived in Syria by that point. My uncle spent another day looking in Antakia (he had his picture and asked people in the streets) however in vain. My uncle then returned to Jordan.

At home, we were very troubled; we didn't know anything. My mother was getting worse every day, she didn't eat or drink anything, she would wake up and seep like she was in a coma. We could not feel anything. 5 or 6 days after, a Friday I remember, I received messages from an international number on WhatsApp, telling me: 'I am your brother, I am fine and I have arrived here in Syria, I'm living a good life, eating and drinking well. I am training with the mujahideen and I will hopefully be a martyr.' After that, he would give us an appointment when he would be available to communicate. He would say I would get in touch in two weeks for example, he would disappear for a period of two weeks, then on the Friday he would get in touch for an hour or two, then he would disappear again. We tried to tell him that our mother was in very bad shape, and that he should come and be good to them instead of doing jihad, he refused and said that he thought of us as being with God and we should think the same about him... Every time my mother told him to come back as he was her eldest and she counted on him and needed him, he would say 'why would I come back?' You should join me here. We have safety and life and everything here'. Whenever my mother asked him to come back, he would say the same.

My brother was very emotional and sensitive. He was sympathetic with the Palestinian people. He followed what was happening in Syria. If he wasn't watching the news, he had his earphones on and sat with us. I would assume he was listening to either the Qur'an or religious lectures. Six months before he left, he became more committed, he prayed a lot, and he read the Qur'an a lot. He would go to the mosque for Maghrib and Isha prayers. He rarely prayed Maghrib and Isha at home, mostly at the mosque. He used to read a lot of Qur'an, and listened to Qur'an and religious lectures all the time on his phone. I don't think he met anyone at the mosques that influenced him. The mosque he used to go to is very close to our house, we know the people that pray there, they are our neighbors, none of them are extremists. Most of them are regular people that have their lives and jobs. They only go to pray. At the mosque, for Maghrib or Isha, you would only find a few people praying, one to two rows maximum."

"He spent a year and four months there. We spent a lot of time trying to see what would cause him to leave for jihad, he was financially comfortable, his salary was good, and he had his own car. He did not need anything. My mom told him to get married and offered to find him a bride, he was not interested at the time. We spent a lot of time and still do trying to figure out why, and we could not find any reason that would push him to join the fight. He was not desperate; he did not have any major issues or problems. He

wasn't even too religious, he prayed but before he would miss prayers."

(Male, 26, Pharmacist, Amman)

Samer's path, as recounted by his brother – Part II.

"On Twitter, he was following more than one person, however, he only communicated with one person about joining jihad, I can't remember his name, it was something like Abu Saif or something. This one published something like 'for those interested in joining the fight, they have to pay 1,500 USD and reach Turkey'. He had ads on Twitter promoting joining jihad...I felt that he joined Twitter to meet with someone from these groups. His account was active only for two weeks before he left, and he didn't really know how to use it. I remember that the guy did not give him any confirmed information. He refused to say anything before my brother went to Turkey. He said once you are in Turkey they would inform him of everything. He did not offer any financial aid to my brother in order to be able to travel. He kept on asking my brother if he knew the conditions of joining the camp. The conditions are 1) to pay 1,500 USD as a registration fee, which will include the tools and the training; 2) to arrive in Turkey. There are trainings. Accommodation is provided and everything else is provided. This is what I remember. His account on Twitter was not cancelled; he just stopped checking it. After we checked it and we saw that he was waiting at the bus stop, he never signed in again."

(Male, 26, Pharmacist, Amman)

Samer's path, as recounted by his brother – Part III.

"He used to say to us that he would send us pictures. He would say 'I am meeting youth from all around the world; I am making them some of our dishes. I am learning from people here.' They gave him a course in Sharia. He tried to tell us that he was ok all the time; that he was not in danger. We used to ask if he was ever in dangerous situations, he would say 'no, we are still training and they are preparing us. We are in a safe location; there aren't any bombings'. He always tried to reassure us and tell us that he was ok...He used to reassure us all the time, that he was well, eating well and that he didn't need anything, and he asked us to tell him if we needed anything. He also asked us to move live with him, telling us it was safe and it was truly the Islamic reign, where when the prayer time comes, everyone leaves everything to go pray. We tried all the time to push him to return and he refused."

After that, it became a routine, my mother would try to tell him to return and he used to say that he couldn't come back. He used to say that he couldn't come back for religious reasons and he used to send us verses from the Qur'an (those that faced the enemies of God and ran away). He used to say that he couldn't come back fearing he would go to hell if he did. This is the reason why he couldn't come back, he was there to raise the flag of Allah and Islam and if he had fled, he would go to hell. At times when we would try to pressure him to come back, he threatened to stop communicating with

us if we continued.

He used to move from one group to another, he would tell us he moved to this group or that group. One group was under the leadership of Al Sheikh Abdullah Al Mohaisany [Saudi Salafist Jihadist cleric], then he joined the Al Nusra front, then he joined the Army of Islam (Jaysh Al Islam) and, at the end he was with ISIS. We discussed with my brother why he moved from one group to another. At first, he would say that the new group was more Islamic in their behavior than the previous one. 'These people really follow Sharia and Islamic rules' he would say. When he got to ISIS, he said that they were truly following Islamic Sharia; they want to fight in the name of Islam and God. He used to tell us that everything that we see through the media is wrong. Things are much better than this, there is no injustice, and they follow the Qur'an and the rules of Prophet Mohammed. We feared discussing this with him, for security reasons, we worried that we were or he was being watched (what he said or wrote), so we limited these discussions with him."

(Male, 26, Pharmacist, Amman)

Samer's path, as recounted by his brother – Part IV.

"He used to ask us at all times (when he was with all the groups) whether we needed anything. He meant if we needed any financial aid. He used to say that he would send us money if we needed it. From Syria and not through someone in Jordan. He had a monthly salary. When he joined ISIS, he got married. At the beginning he asked us for money, telling us that everyone that gets married receives 2,000 USD; however, he wouldn't have received the money for another month, so he asked for money to furnish his house and buy gold for his bride. We sent him the money and later he offered to repay the money. We sent them through a money exchange shop that Samer recommended. I don't know the name of this money exchange shop in Jordan; my parents handled that.

We heard at one point (from his wife after he died) that he got wounded for a long while and he was not allowed to fight, and that he became an imam at a mosque (an administrative role assigned to him). His wife said that he was officially forbidden from fighting because of his wounds, and that he joined the battle secretly (because he dreamt that he was supposed to go and fight at this battle). He died in that battle. His wife said that he was fighting under the name of ISIS, however from a personal principle, he had made an agreement with them that he would not fight in battles where both sides were Muslim. He died at a battle in Sireen against the Kurds. After he died, we continued to communicate with his wife, to make sure she was not pregnant. When we made sure she wasn't pregnant, communication with her went to a minimum. She was also married to another mujahid before him and had two kids from that one (who had died as well)."

(Male, 26, Pharmacist, Amman)

3.7 PTAS AND SPECIFIC INFLUENCE PATHWAYS

Introduction

The following sub-section details the profiles of Primary Target Audiences (PTAs) identified from the Target Audience Analysis process. PTAs describe those groups, whose attitudes and behaviors, if changed, would most contribute to achieving Project Objectives in Jordan. The Primary Target Audiences thus involve those who exhibit extremist tendencies or some inclination to support extremism, yet who are not firmly committed and remain vulnerable and potentially responsive to VEO strategic communication.

The PTAs were identified through the application of qualitative-led Target Audience profiling. Specifically, the identification of PTAs is correlated with, but not necessarily causal to, future involvement in VE/VEOs, and as such is used to present those individuals who are most 'at risk'. The PTA identification process involved distinguishing between men and women; people of different age groups and socio-economic, political, and cultural backgrounds, people at different levels of perception of, and/or engagement in VE, people with different behaviors related to VE and/or VEO membership, and people who may be affected by multiple drivers of VE, among numerous other distinctions.

Target Audience Analysis revealed eight, non mutually exclusive PTAs within the overall population that are of special relevance to identified VE/VEO-related threats and that should be the focus of CVE interventions, as follows:

1. Marginalized (East Bank Jordanian) Youth;
2. Young Women;
3. Salafist Youth;
4. University Students and Underemployed Graduates;
5. Marginalized West Bank Jordanians;
6. Hardline MB Members and Supporters;
7. Petty Criminals/Young Inmates.
8. Syrian Refugees;

Analysis of the PTAs served to identify more accurately specific pathways toward VE and, when relevant, VE behavior as well as to develop more effective communications/recommendations that are tailored and targeted to specific at risk audiences who share similar values, beliefs, and behaviors with regards to VE/VEOs (see section IV. Project Recommendations)

Each PTA could be categorized in one of the three main Influence Pathway Types identified: Opportunist, Avenger and Ideologue. However, analysis revealed that PTAs can pertain to several Influence Pathway Types at once or in time, as the core motivations to engage and/or participate in VE and their manifestations can differ in specific areas and at different points of an individual's journey based on the varying confluence of Individual Dynamics, Local Contexts, and VEO Characteristics. Figure 10 below displays, for each PTA, the Influence Pathway Type(s) most commonly at play.

Figure 10. PTAs and Most Common Influence Pathways

PTA \ IP TYPE	OPPORTUNIST	AVENGER	IDEOLOGUE
Marginalized Jordanian Youth	✓	✓	✓
Young Women	✓		✓
Salafist Youth			✓
University Students & Underemployed Graduates	✓	✓	
Marginalized West Bank Jordanians		✓	✓
Hardline MB Members/Supporters		✓	✓
Syrian Refugees	✓	✓	✓
Young Inmates	✓		✓

PTA 1: Marginalized Jordanian Youth - IP 1, IP 3

The first PTA is composed of young, disaffected and socially isolated men (and women – crossover with PTA 2 –Young Women), in search of financial and/or material support as well as a positive identity. Young men, in particular, may look to assert masculinity by supporting/joining VEOs as a means of overcoming unemployment, discrimination and exclusion. Overall, these youth tend to respond to real or perceived marginalization in ways that further distance them from social inclusion and empowerment including criminal behavior, substance abuse and potentially violence.

Marginalized Jordanian Youth often are youth in social transition or in the midst of an identity crisis. A large proportion of them come from impoverished neighborhoods and districts, low-income families and communities with limited access to resources, and some degree of exposure to crime and violence. They have not necessarily gone through a traditional religious education but look to define their identity and beliefs with more confidence and find meaning and recognition (even glory for some). Radical Islam/Salafism-Jihadism can thus be particularly appealing to vulnerable youth who are/feel marginalized in their own community/society/country in that it provides ideological certainty with all its associated rewards (bravery, experience, honor, etc.). Consequently, members of PTA 1 from the poorest and least advantaged areas/districts of the Target Locations, where prospects for youth are the most limited, are thus likely to find support for, and participation in, VE/VEOs particularly attractive as membership may offer them a sense of purpose and belonging along with economic benefits.

Marginalized Jordanian Youth typically follow the Opportunist Influence Pathway although often overlap with the Ideologue Influence Pathway and, to a lesser extent, the Avenger Influence Pathway.

Figure 11. PTA 1 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Turkman neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah), Hanina neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah), Al Barha Village (Irbid Qasabah), Palestine Street (Irbid Qasabah), Fo'ara neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah), Ashrafiyah area (located in Koorah district).	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Anjara (Ajloun district), Kufranjah district, Ibbin (Sakhras district), Sakhras Town (Sakhras district), Orjan district, Al Hashemiyyah (Ajloun district)	HIGH	AVERAGE

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
	JARASH	Muqbila. Borma district.	HIGH	MODERATE
	MAFRAQ	Irhab district, Khaldiyah Town (Khaldiyah district), Sabha district	HIGH	IMPORTANT
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Balqa City	VERY HIGH	MODERATE
	AMMAN	Hay Nazzal, Wehdat, Saifa	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Zarqa City, Al Azraq district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	MADABA	East and West Madaba City, Al Faisaliya,	VERY HIGH	AVERAGE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Qasr, Ghour Essafi district, Ghour El-Mazra'ah district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	TAFIELA	Hasa Town, Qadisia (Bsaira district), Jafr and Alalia (Hasa district)	VERY HIGH	MODERATE
	MA'AN	Ma'an City, Al Hseineya, and Al Jafr district, Mraighah district, Husseiniyyeh district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AQABA	Al Quweira district, villages in the Wadi Araba area, Rabyeh and the Old City in Aqaba City	HIGH	MODERATE

Case Study 1

Marginalized youth aged 15-24 'targeted' by Salafist Jihadists for recruitment in Zarqa.

"In Shoumar, I remember two years ago, Salafists Jihadists or those who belong to ISIS, well I do not differentiate among them, you know everything anyway has been mixed up...however I believe Al Nusra are way milder than ISIS. Two years ago, they started working with the same methods as Tablighi Jamaat; they were in the mosques 24/7 and very close to the youth and the children until they reached that phase. My aunt who lived in that neighborhood said that the youth and even the children would go back to their homes saying that they wanted to go to Syria. I remember this incident clearly as it was two years ago. It was everywhere. From the age of 14 or 15 to 24 years old, these youth wanted to go to Syria. Salafist Jihadists focused on the psychological pressure those youth are suffering from, in terms of family conflicts and economic or social problems. These youth did not have anyone to turn to."

(Female, 21, Student, Zarqa)

Case Study 2

Vulnerable orphan youth from Aqaba joined ISIS as way to escape from his life.

"I'm sure that many kids are vulnerable and extremist groups target them and they would join these groups out of necessity because they need money. The guy I knew was one of those kids. I don't know him really well because when I joined the orphanage as a volunteer he was already gone. But I know him informally. At first he was an introvert and anti-social and always feeling depressed. Maybe he also felt hatred toward society because of his situation; he was an orphan. You know these kids may hate their community because of their situation and they would question the reason behind why they were born with no parents looking after them, so I think it is easier to attract them to radical groups. That guy was very antisocial and many people tried to help him but he was always alone and very strange. He always felt that people owed him and he was never grateful. He thought that people helped him because they wanted to feel good about themselves and not because they wanted to help him. Some neglected kids left SOS [charity] and became something but with him it was different...This guy left the village when he was in his twenties, but I really don't know why he joined ISIS. Maybe because he wanted to get out of this place he was in. He hated it. Everybody knew him here. Maybe he wanted to get out of this city and join this group, maybe he was brainwashed. I don't know who talked to him to convince him of joining. I don't think he approached them, I think they approached him when they saw his situation.

...I think that since this guy has no family and no life, he felt there was no need for him here, he thought that people around him pitied him. Even the people who loved him, he didn't believe they were honest; he thought that everyone felt sorry for him. It is a common feeling among them [orphans]. In Ramadan, people may organize a charity or iftar event and they go with them and take pictures with them because they want to show the world they are doing something good. Some kids think that people do this because they believe in good but most of them think that people feel sorry for them. None of the other kids joined ISIS except for him because he had an emotional problem...I don't know if he told his brothers in the village about how he was recruited and I never asked them. His brothers in the village and the woman who raised him were shocked when they knew about this story and his nanny refused the idea completely and did not want to get involved with him at all. She used to love him a lot but now she doesn't even want to hear his name. He used to send his brothers pictures over the phone while wearing ISIS clothes and then he disappeared. Nobody knows anything about him, if he is alive or dead, even his brothers are very annoyed with him. They are considered his 'brothers' in the village because none of them have a family of their own. The women who raise them are called 'mothers' as well. I don't know if he had friends outside the village but I don't think so.

I don't think that he chose ISIS, I think he was waiting for a reason to get out and when someone approached him, he went for it. I don't think that religion was behind his

decision to go to Syria because he wasn't religious. When he joined ISIS, he was out of SOS and he wasn't in a stable job. The SOS used to try finding jobs for him but he never liked what they gave him and they tried to get him to go to a university but he did not go. He used to be absent all the time and fail subjects. I cannot be involved in everything here, I have 60 kids to take care of. There must be activities for them. I don't think that he will come back to Jordan. What I know from these groups is that they don't let people come back or else they would kill them. I don't think that he is happy now with ISIS because we all know what these groups are."

(Male, 31, School Principal, Aqaba)

PTA 2: Young Women - IP 3, IP 1

The second PTA overlaps PTA 1 'Marginalized Jordanian Youth' and comprises female youth, particularly those who are yet unmarried and/or without children. Members of this PTA most commonly follow the Ideologue Influence Pathway but their journey toward VE/VE behavior can also overlap with the Opportunist Influence Pathway. Young Women can be both unwilling and willing participants of VE. Most of the same factors that prompt men to embrace VE, become radicalized and join VEOs drive women in similar ways, e.g., economic and financial pressures, ideology. However, there are also distinct factors that prompt women's radicalization including family pressure (e.g., in conservative families/communities), family problems (e.g., domestic abuse, limited or no access to inheritance which make VEOs appear as safe heavens), as well as wider social discrimination and gender inequality.

While respondents commonly stated that women were less affected by radicalization and VE than men, women's adoption of radical beliefs does occur and has important second order effects in their families and communities as they can motivate others to violence, including other women in conservative environments. Indeed, while some Young Women may get radicalized but choose not to engage in violent activity, they may nevertheless work to encourage people to join violent activities, notably in their roles as mothers and wives. The radicalization of Young Women often stems from a pressure to conform within their own families and communities on the path to radicalization, whereby women are encouraged to follow the men in the family and may not have the capacity to dissent. The influence of male family members can be particularly strong, especially if there is a limited platform for women outside of the family. As such, a trend of religious conservatism among certain communities can lead women to become radicalized, which can then influence their behavior (including their dress code). In such communities, limited knowledge of religion and religious texts among women due to limited sources of alternatives make it easier for violent extremists (especially husbands, brothers and fathers) to fill this vacuum and thereby achieve influence.

However, there are other factors that lead Young Women toward a more active path down VE and toward VE behavior. In particular, actual or perceived limitations to women's roles in both the private and public spheres (both economically and politically) can increase the appeal of VEO membership for women hoping to preserve/access their rights and/or challenge societal gender norms (e.g., join all-female ISIS police brigades with the task of enforcing Sharia law among women). In this respect, the idea that women are valued as guardians of the ISIS ideology and mothers to the next generation has been increasingly emphasized in ISIS propaganda material. In fact, the issue of 'sexual jihad'/marriage to VEO members (i.e., supporting a jihadist husband) for unmarried women (as well as for widows/divorced women) can be a real incentive for those women to join VEOs as a means to feel valuable and effective. This is where the Ideologue and Opportunist Influence Pathways tend to overlap.

While the radicalization processes experienced by women are not drastically different from those experienced by men, they can be harder to monitor since women who adopt violent ideologies often operate in closed circles with very limited contact with individuals outside their communities. This is especially true of those brought up in austere religious families and withdrawn from school at an early age.

Figure 12. PTA 2 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Governorate-wide, especially Ramtha district, Al Husn Camp (Bani Obeid district), Hanina neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah)	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Governorate-wide, especially Kufranjah district, Ayn Janna (Ajloun Qasabah), Anjara (Ajloun district), Ibbin (Sakhras district)	HIGH	MODERATE
	JARASH	Governorate-wide.	HIGH	MODERATE
	MAFRAQ	Governorate-wide.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Governorate-wide, especially Salt.	HIGH	MODERATE
	AMMAN	City-wide, especially Hay Nazzal and Marka neighborhoods.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Governorate-wide, especially Zarqa city, Rusaifeh.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	MADABA	Governorate-wide.	HIGH	MODERATE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Governorate-wide, especially Karak city.	HIGH	AVERAGE
	TAFIELA	Governorate-wide, especially Tafiela city.	HIGH	AVERAGE
	MA'AN	Governorate-wide, especially Ma'an city.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AQABA	Governorate-wide	HIGH	MODERATE

Case Study 1

Young woman from Karak fails her studies, faces financial hardships and takes an interest in ISIS online.

"I had failed all my classes and lost my scholarship because of drugs. Suddenly, I had no money and no degree, and I had to pay back the debts I owed. And though my aunt

eventually paid them, I still had nothing to do afterward. I was very bored, and that's when I became interested in ISIS. I had heard people talk about them, but had never really taken an interest until I saw the videos on YouTube. I watched them over and over, and I even began to participate in online forums. I liked to argue with them there, even though I knew nothing about religion. I did make some friends, though – and one in particular: a woman. She was very kind and I talked to her every day, on Facebook and over the phone. I thought of her as a second mother. She encouraged me to read the Qur'an and to pray – something nobody else had done – and she always told me, 'Heaven misses you!' before we stopped talking at night. As I said, she was always so kind to me. She even transferred money to me so that I could go out a few times! It was never any problem for her, the money. And then she talked to me about travel. She asked if I wanted to travel the world and, when I told her yes, she said I could if I joined ISIS. My father had never let me have a passport, but she said I didn't need his permission and transferred the money for that, too. And I tell you now, if I hadn't felt bad about leaving that day, and if I hadn't called my mother, I would be there in Syria with them today, fighting probably. It's terrifying how quickly it could have happened!"

(Female, 23, Unemployed, Karak)

Case Study 2

Young woman from Irbid falls in love with JN fighter and flees to Syria.

"The girl was normal but did not complete her studies because she didn't like school. She met someone on Facebook and fell in love: he was in Syria. She is 22 years old. I can't remember how old she was when she fell in love. But from what I know she knew him for a while even before the Syrian crisis, and when the war started he joined Nusra. They used to talk over Facebook and she tried to bring him to Jordan but it didn't work. He was supposed to come here to marry her and move to Syria for jihad, but he couldn't enter Jordan. So then he tried to convince her to join Nusra and she flew to Turkey. I don't know how she paid for the ticket but she ran away from home and flew to Turkey where she met people to take her to the terrorist group. I don't know the name of the area where they met but it's along the border with Syria. Groups can enter to Syria through it. It wasn't the same person who she talks to who met with her in Turkey; it was other people with Nusra. When her family knew they tried to communicate with her and told her to come back, and they promised not to harm her. She told them on Facebook that she was in Turkey to get married to the guy she talks to, and when her parents knew he was with Nusra they tried to get her back. She used to tell her parents that she will take them to heaven. The girl thought that if she got married to him she will become a jihadist and be closer to God. She didn't tell us about her plan, and when we knew we were shocked.

We didn't know what happened to her after that. We only knew that she got to Syria and then we lost contact. We don't know what happened to her next. We knew three weeks ago that she went to Turkey but she was away for six months. People used to say that the girl ran away for a guy and went to jihad and even more talk about her.

I wasn't close to the girl because she was empty inside and she had religious tendencies

without depth. She only got them from her parents - how to pray, fast and dress modestly, and that everything is Haram. She used to wear the hijab but with normal clothes, then she started wearing the 'jilbab' and covering her chin because it's forbidden. She also started wearing gloves even in summer. We didn't expect she would go with Nusra. Suddenly her mind changed. Even her Facebook became supportive of Nusra. Once I opened her profile and I was shocked at how she talked about the importance of jihad and about certain guys who blew themselves up. Before she left she deactivated her account, then she re-opened it and told people that she was in Syria. The girl had nothing to do with her life and she was uneducated and the guy enticed her to come using love. He never saw her but she used to see his photos but he never wanted to see her face because he told her that it's haram for him to see her. The guy was very religious. She used to tell us that the guy is very kind and that he loves her. Once we were sitting, and I asked her how she could love someone she never met. She told me that it's haram to meet and this is adultery. I asked her then how come you talk to each other. She said we only talk of good things. I think her strength and decision to go came out of rebellion. In some cases girls would rebel by taking the hijab off, but if this girl's parent knew what she was up to they would have stopped her. I think that her love for the guy and jihad made her take that decision, especially because she is empty inside and has nothing to do with her life. I don't know anything about her parents."

(Female, 24, Receptionist, Irbid)

Case Study 3

Young woman became marginalized by her husband who radicalized and joined ISIS.

"I do not think that there is a violent extremism problem in Jordan. There is no way that it [VE] was present before, and then after the refugee crisis it began to show. The operation that happened in Irbid, where a group of terrorists were found, where they were planning to do a terrorist attack inside the city, it was said that before the refugee crisis, Jordan was much safer than now, and hopefully nothing else will happen to shake the security of Jordan in the future because of these extremists. There was never a place for extremism in Jordan, but unfortunately after the flood of Syrians it started to show, and we began to see actions from them in reality.

I heard a story of a Jordanian girl and her Jordanian husband. We tried to help her because her financial situation was not good and because we have a charity organization to help people in need, so we tried to help her. So after she sat down I asked her how I could help her. She said that I couldn't help, and I asked her why. She replied that she never imagined that her husband would put her in a difficult situation. I tried to understand what happened only in order to be able to help her.

She was married to a Jordanian man and had three children. Then her husband started treating her differently; he banned her from doing everything, he didn't like anything and he became religiously strict. Three or four months later he asked for her gold so that he could sell it. She asked him why. He said that he wanted to get money to start a project so that they could have a stable income for the house. She said yes and gave him her gold, which he sold. He took all the money for himself and left her very little

money for the house and children. What is interesting is that the husband's mother knew exactly where her son was going and what he intended to do. All his brothers also knew. So everyone knew except the wife and kids. And his whole family supported him and encouraged him to go.

He told his wife that he was going to a foreign country to start a business there, and then when the situation was stable he would come to fetch her and the children. Before travelling, he left her a very small amount of money - not more than 200 JD in an envelope - so that she could spend it on herself and the kids for a month or two until he came back to get them. Days passed, and it had been four months. The wife asked her husband's mother about him. So the mother replied that she would know later on, and that her husband would make money for them. After some time, her husband talked to her and explained everything. He joined ISIS and he couldn't say more. He said that he regretted it, and that he missed his children. He joined ISIS in Syria, and then when ISIS felt that he was planning to escape and go back to Jordan, they killed him. Ten days after his phone call with his wife, she got a call saying that her husband had died as a martyr. But he didn't, they killed him because he wanted to get back to his home. His family of course insisted that he was a martyr, but his wife thought that he got killed."

(Female, 45, Self-Employed, Irbid)

Case Study 4

A young woman backed into a corner after initial contacts and forced to join ISIS

"...I have managed to bring back a young female, who was lured in by ISIS and their claims that Jordan is not following the laws of Sharia; ISIS promised this young female heaven if she happened to become a martyr, or if she stayed, a husband, an income and whatever else she would like to have. They take advantage of the youth's religiousness, promising them heaven and an opportunity to join jihad, which is a duty for every Muslim. After that they start to send graphic Jihadi videos to the recruits, to desensitize them to killing. After that, they ask the recruit to murder her brother or father to prove loyalty to ISIS (to achieve 'self-jihad', the highest degree of jihad). As a result, she had one of two options: one, to join ISIS or two, to murder her father or brother. The violent extremists then threatened that, if this young female did not choose one of the two options above, they would report her to the Jordanian government. She chose to join them, to avoid murdering her father or brother or the disgrace. I managed to convince her with my wife through a phone call that she was making a serious mistake."

(Male, 56, MP, Amman)

PTA 3: Salafist Youth - IP 3

The third PTA comprises youth who self-identify as Salafists and/or were brought up in a Salafist community, whether among Salafist Quietists or Salafist Jihadists, or exposed to the Salafist ideology (e.g., at school, in mosque, etc.). It can be argued that many Salafist Youth are already radicalized in ideological terms, i.e., they subscribe to radical beliefs (e.g., full implementation of Sharia law, sectarianism toward Shia Muslims and even non militant Sunni Muslims, etc.) and some may even accept or support violent action to further those beliefs. Salafist Jihadists in particular are believed to actively seek opportunities to fight for their beliefs, primarily to participate in jihad and support the formation of a caliphate.

Despite the diversity of the Salafist landscape in Jordan, Salafist Youth all subscribe to the general principle of closely emulating the example of the Prophet during the golden age of Islam in as many spheres of life as possible. However, they might differ in the methods and timeline of such process. For example, Salafist Quietists have condemned ISIS' self-proclaimed Caliphate on the basis that the VEO did not adhere to the correct method stipulated in the Sunnah. They further denounced ISIS as a takfirist group that does not follow the correct framework for waging jihad. Despite conveying their support for jihad in Syria in the early years of the Syrian conflict and direct their support to AQ and its JN affiliate, Salafist Quietists generally continue to subscribe to the doctrine of a 'peaceful mission' in Jordan. Even though they tend to criticize secular political institutions, Salafist Quietist leaders have largely remained apolitical at home, which has led to accusations of subservience to the regime and reduced its appeal among segments of the Salafist Youth. Indeed, following the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Jordanian Salafists – who supported jihad in Syria – faced an increasingly tough crackdown and subsequently made rhetorical concessions in order to retain some operational freedom in Jordan. Nevertheless, such rhetorical restraint resulted in a wedge between Salafist youth and their leadership. In parallel, the rise of ISIS in Syria attracted to the Salafist Jihadist movement an increasing large number of those youth, drawn in by ISIS' victories, the VEO's appealing video campaigns and the physical existence of the "Islamic State". The rising popularity of VEOs among Salafist youth became increasingly visible in 2013-2014. For example, the city of Ma'an was the seat of an openly pro-ISIS demonstration in April 2014. However, ISIS' killing of Moath Al Kasasbeh has had a very negative impact on its standing among the general population including among many Salafist Youth, though hardliners have nevertheless remained supportive and placed blame for the pilot's death on the government of Jordan's 'wrongful' decision to be part of the international coalition against ISIS in Syria.

Inside Jordan, actual or perceived government reaction to the threat of the Salafist ideology can propel Salafist Youth/Ideologues to resort to violence more quickly. For example, in early 2011, Jordanian Salafists organized a series of protest against the central government to demand the implementation of Sharia law and the release of Salafist prisoners. The protests became violent in the city of Zarqa, where Salafists clashed with security services. 'Arbitrary' surveillance and arrests of group members by Jordan's security services remain key grievances among Salafists, especially following the arrests of several hundreds of Islamist militants and the suspension of radical preachers since the latter half of 2014.

Figure 13. PTA 3 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Hanina neighborhood, Hashmi Street.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Anjara (Ajloun district), Kufranjah Disitrc	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	JARASH	Sakeb, Souf camp, Jarash (Gaza) camp	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MAFRAQ	Sabha, Mafraq district.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Balqa city and Salt.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AMMAN	East Amman, Wehdad camp and neighborhood.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Zarqa city, Rusaifeh, Hay Massoum village (Relatives/tribal members of Former Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) Leader Abu Musab Al Zaraqawi, Hashemiyeh district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	MADABA	Madaba city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Idr and Althaniah in Ayy Qasabah and Zahoum in Qasr	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	TAFIELA	Governorate-wide, Tafielia city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MA'AN	Ma'an city.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AQABA	Aqaba city.	LOW	MODERATE

Case Study 1

Former Salafist Youth from Amman explains Salafist Jihadist views and the decision to participate in jihad.

"I started to go to a mosque when I was 10 and I liked the idea that people there took care of me and gave me attention, any young guy at that age would like this. Maybe because there was no technology back then my biggest concerns were to eat and drink and all these things. So I found people to talk to and be friends with and they were a bit older than me, maybe five years older. I liked the idea that there was a sheikh who was like a mentor, and was someone that you can go to, especially because my father was busy and absent, although he had time for us later when he retired. The point is that I didn't concern myself with details, I really liked the way they looked, they wore

traditional dresses and I looked strange wearing a t-shirt and pants. So the first day I told my brother I want to buy a dress, he asked me why and I said that I liked it, so that day I bought my first dress, it was grey, from downtown. I kept wearing it for a long time because it was the only one, I wore it for prayers, then later the idea grew big, I stopped wearing pants altogether except the ones for school, then back to the dress. I didn't go out much to do things that I didn't like. So the point is that I started to know a way of thinking, my friends were reading strange things that I didn't know. In my house we had a big library, more than 3,000 books. It had everything. On secularism, liberalism, communism, Sunni and Shia sects, Motazeleh, on Twelvers, etc. So I started going through them. While I was doing that I remembered Ibn Taymiyyah and found his books in the library. There were like 20 books so I hesitated, but being envious of my friends I told myself 'no I should start'. I started reading a book. I liked the idea that I was starting to form thoughts, from a scholar, and I started catching up with those friends of mine. When they mentioned something, I would tell them 'yes on that page and he said this and that'. The nature of Salafists, and this is a good thing in them, is that they like science but only religious science, they like it passionately. They can defend themselves in a very logical way, and they are not shallow people. They are not like someone who reads a book fast; they actually understand what they read. Along with reading we used to memorize the Qur'an, there was a competition. I started reading and memorizing, I felt I was growing old fast; I liked it, the fact that I was different than the rest. At that age, I should have been playing but I was doing something different, something nice, which made me feel good. The important point is that I reached a good level; I memorized the whole of the Qur'an and I reached a level where people around me gave me a position, a place, and even though I was young, everyone asked me a lot of stuff. I didn't have enough with just reading Ibn Taymiyyah, I started memorizing hadiths, around 5,000, and I led prayers at the mosque, the Al-Abrar mosque in Marka and also in Abdullah Ibn Omar...

... The mosque that I attended was Salafist, but at the Abdullah Ibn Omar mosque, only the imam was Salafist and not the worshippers as anybody can go and pray. In the end though, Salafists are the ones who are in control. There was a mosque in Jabal Al Nasr; I can't remember its name. This area has a lot of Salafists. I felt myself belong there more, in Jabal Al Nasr, because there were many who were dressed like me. There was power when you walked along with these people, especially when there was a known sheikh like Ali Awayehsh, or a religious sermon by Ali Al-Halabi, he is a Salafist but loyal to the regime. Now Salafists (Quietists) don't have a political side, they don't have a political strategy, they have a pure religious text that they consider as a reference, that's why it's hard to argue with them. If you sit with a member of the Muslim Brotherhood you can argue because they deal with politics, but for Salafists no, the Salafist only converses with you on a religious basis, fundamentally he doesn't understand politics and he doesn't want to. There is a fatwa by Sheikh Nasreddine Al Albani, one of the Salafist preachers in Jordan; he says leave politics to politicians. It's not for us. We have jihad and the Sunnah and the good people who follow the Prophet and the fundamentals of religion. We can distinguish between Salafists (Quietists) and Salafist Jihadists. They exist in most of the Arab countries. The regular Salafists are fundamentalists who called themselves Salafists, based on Al Salaf Al Saleh (the companions of the Prophet and their companions), they see themselves as the 'surviving sect', the sect that was mentioned in a Prophet

teaching, the ones who maintained the Prophet's Sunnah, they see themselves as the ones who deserve this because they apply all of it, and since they do that then they are for sure not wrong. This is Sunnah in the end, how can it be wrong? They don't consider other Muslims infidels but that they have problems in thought, or have been touched by a demon or something. And they ask God to guide them to the correct path, because they consider themselves the ones who are on the right one. And they consider the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, except for Shias, misguided people. They can't call them blasphemous. Others are infidels.

The regular Salafist dreams of living in an Islamic state but that depends on the conditions in each country and the conditions in Jordan are different from the ones in Syria, or in Algeria, or in Iraq. We can conclude that every Salafist Quietist is a candidate to be a Salafist Jihadist. They have the essence. Most of the people that go to fight under the name of jihad are Salafists. I never heard of anyone from the Muslim Brotherhood that went and fought there. I have never heard of anyone from the Tablighi group or a Christian for example. The idea doesn't concern Muslims in the first place, but concerns Salafists.

My childhood friend Abdurrahman died in Syria last year (July 2015) fighting with ISIS as a Salafist. This is a conclusion I reached myself, you won't probably hear it from the Salafist scholars, they don't divide themselves into Salafist (Quietist) and Salafist Jihadist movements, they only divide themselves for media purposes, to play it safe. The evidence is that most of the Salafist Jihadists are Salafists. When the opportunity comes for a Salafist, they will carry a weapon. Like in Iraq, a lot of people I know went for jihad and came back. It has something to do with politics. Abdurrahman was a regular Salafist, and for him it was an opportunity to fulfill his dream. And that was not heaven. For sure heaven is the dream of all Muslims, but for the Salafist it's not like this, for the Salafist the dream is not to contradict himself. The things that he reads and get interested in, these books about fatwas and jihad, who are they for? They are not for Jews or Christians; they are for us. When a Salafist hears 'And kill them wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out. And Al-Fitnah [disbelief or unrest] is worse than killing...' [Qur'anic verse], he understands 'kill infidels'. Anyone that is outside of the circle of Islam is an infidel, regardless of what they are. Now here the fatwa changes between the different Islamic groups, for example, for the MB, or the moderates as they are called, anyone who doesn't pray is called a sinner, but for the Salafists, this is not the case, they argue more tightly. Someone who has just stopped praying is as much an infidel as someone who hasn't prayed for the past five years. Meaning it applies to him in the same way that it applies to someone who has nothing to do with religion. He is even considered worse.

Jabhat Al Nusra is the preference (over ISIS) for the Salafists here I think but I haven't had anything to do with them since I left high school, I left the Salafists. I was too extreme for them to keep contacting me because I left religion completely. I am now an atheist. Now I'm the infidel. I only met Abdurrahman once after that; I know his mother and sister. The Salafists consider ISIS to be something of a concept that is promoted politically because the concept of the Islamic state is now promoted in public, but in content it is clear that they are all Salafists. On the other hand, Al Nusra is a mix between moderates and Salafists. They have among them the people who had a problem with the political

regime in Syria since the beginning. Jabhat Al Nusra has a political dream, they could have something like a Syrian state and be a part of it. ISIS want the Islamic State - they want the bigger piece of cake." (Male, 27, NGO Employee, Amman)

PTA 4: University Students and Underemployed Graduates - IP 1, IP 2

The fourth PTA comprises university students and recent graduates who face a dearth of employment opportunities matching their qualification levels (or are too young to have had a significant career). While some university graduates are capable of enduring employment for which they are over-qualified, a rather widespread “culture of shame” relating to low-skilled jobs deters many of those graduates from undertaking employment for which they feel they are over-qualified, with many choosing to remain idle instead. As such, Underemployed Graduates are vulnerable to VE when they seek alternative livelihoods or an outlet for their grievances in light of the social and financial difficulties they may experience and the general uncertainty surrounding their professional life.

University students appear vulnerable to VE even before graduation as many respondents identified universities as key sites where Islamist groups and VEOs are effectively channeling their ideologies and gaining loyalty among students, often through provision of services and/or financial support. Another factor accounting for students' vulnerability and/or attraction to VE and VEOs is the prohibition against universities to nurture political engagement. Young people's inability to engage in political process may make some feel powerless or even threatened, and so lead them to find alternative ways of asserting their views, and join political protest movements, irrespective of their initial sympathies for these causes (crossover between the Opportunist and Avenger Influence Pathways). Perceptions that established institutions are not working in youths' (especially educated youths') interest, or worse, that these institutions and those in authority will not take account of their predicament or political views, or identities and values, often lead to a belief that these institutions are opposed to (educated) youth and discriminate against them and their peer-group. As such, VEOs may appear as alternative platforms capable and willing of respecting and promoting such views, identities and values.

Figure 14. PTA 4 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Irbid Qasabah and city.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Kufranjah district, Anjara (Ajloun Qasabah), Ibbin (Sakhras district), Sakhras district, Ajloun City	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	JARASH	Governorate-wide, Jarash city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MAFRAQ	Mafraq district and city.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Balqa City and Al E'zareya (Salt)	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	AMMAN	City-wide.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Governorate-wide, Zarqa city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MADABA	Madaba city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
SOUTH	KARAK	Karak city	MEDIUM	IMPORTANT

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
REGION	TAFIELA	Governorate-wide, especially Hasa, Tafiela city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MA'AN	Ma'an city.	MEDIUM	IMPORTANT
	AQABA	Governorate-wide, but mainly Aqaba city	HIGH	IMPORTANT

Case Study 1

A university student and disillusioned member of the Muslim Brotherhood, pressed for money, went to Syria to take part in jihad.

"We know that the state is not democratic and that it makes an effort to repress any kind of movement especially after the protests. I think that this is one of the reasons why people went to Syria. You know Jihad [Ghaban], he was a normal person though his financial situation was really bad. However, everyone thought his involvement was not a consequence of his financial situation but rather that of what he felt emotionally. There is another young man, from El Manzal neighborhood, who joined Daesh three months ago despite being a university graduate with a very solid financial position. Well, in fact he was part of the Muslim Brotherhood and after the collapsing of the protests in Jordan he thought that the Muslim Brotherhood was helping the government and he expressed his criticism on Facebook. If you go back to his profile, you will see those views. He started to view violence as the only means of bringing change. Afterwards, he went to Syria. He was quite miserable, his father was Egyptian and his mother was Jordanian but his father died a few years ago. He couldn't continue his studies for lack of money. He and his sibling are an example of the marginalized children of Jordanian mothers. His sister was very bright but it was hard for them both to continue their studies, she had a scholarship to continue but he didn't. He was 28 years old and not married. He had a job and was paid daily. But they were seven siblings and their income was insufficient. This created the perfect environment for extremism. He was the only of his siblings to go to Syria. He looked very normal, dressed normally and then suddenly he went to Syria. He was religious and went to the mosque normally. They considered him to be a martyr, some people blamed him and others not."

(Female, 21, Student, Zarqa)

Case Study 2

A female university graduate almost joined ISIS.

"There was a girl from Ayy who almost joined ISIS. It was on the news. We had a lot in common. She was educated, a university graduate, and her father told us why she went. She was fresh out of university and didn't do anything with herself. She had a poor relationship with her parents; she didn't have a job; and she spent all her time in her room – just like me. Also like me, she got curious and watched those horrible videos

online, and eventually connected with ISIS. Thank God the vice's wife convinced her to stay. Thank God both of us had people there to keep us from going."

(Female, 20, Unemployed, Karak)

PTA 5: Marginalized West Bank Jordanian Youth - IP 2, IP 3

The fifth PTA comprises marginalized Jordanians of Palestinian origin who feel they are subject to discrimination and lack opportunities for employment and education as well as those who still currently live in Palestinian refugee camps. Marginalized West Bank Jordanian Youth can be members or supporters of the Jordanian MB and are well represented among Jordan's Salafists (crossover between the Avenger and Ideologue Influence Pathways).

Marginalized West Bank Jordanians, especially youth, feel that they are treated as second-class citizens facing systemic economic, social, and political restrictions and discrimination. Many Jordanians of Palestinian origin who arrived in 1948 remain in refugee camps with limited water and poor services including healthcare, working low-income jobs and living in poverty-stricken cities, many of them without full rights of citizenship. West Bank Jordanians who have national numbers are at risk of losing their status, threatening their citizenship and ability to travel outside the country. Those without national numbers (mainly refugees from Gaza with temporary Jordanian passports)⁶ do not have full citizenship rights and thus have reduced opportunities for employment and education. For example, they are not allowed to study certain majors at public universities, including medicine and engineering. In addition, they must obtain clearance from Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (GID) in order to own land, property, or business, or to work in certain professions. Further, Jordan's patronage system overtly favors Jordanians of tribal origin and thus prevents Jordanians of Palestinian origin from serving in the military or holding senior government positions, and it greatly limits their ability to attend public universities, since the quota system means that most available spots go to tribal Jordanians. Although West Bank Jordanians make up approximately over half of the Jordanian population; a common grievance is that election gerrymandering prevents them from gaining fair representation in Parliament.

Consequently, frustration and discontent with the central government is high among members of this PTA who deplore the little effort made by the government to improve their lives or help them return to Palestine. Marginalized West Bank Jordanians have turned to groups who can provide them with some assistance, including the MB, Hamas and some Syrian VEOs. The Jordanian MB has traditionally spoken against the government's exclusionary policies and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. However, as the reformists within the MB are increasingly shifting the movement's focus away from a Palestinian agenda and more toward domestic issues, Marginalized West Bank Jordanian Youth have moved closer to Salafist Jihadists and have even joined VEOs (both JN and ISIS) to fight in Syria. Support for Hamas and armed resistance against Israel is strong among Marginalized West Bank Jordanian Youth who commend the movement for successfully liberating part of the Palestinian homeland and freeing Palestinian prisoners from the Israelis. Between September and October 2015, residents of Palestinian refugee camps held large weekly protests against Israel where they chanted pro-Hamas slogans, which usually resulted in violent clashes with Jordanian security forces. Government crackdown on pro-Palestinian/pro-Hamas protests, arrests in Palestinian refugee camps and the travel restrictions imposed on West Bank Jordanians have limited the opportunities for them to join Hamas and increased the appeal of VEOs operating in Syria instead.

⁶ According to UNRWA, refugees from Gaza make up 140,000 of the approximately 2.1 million registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

Figure 15. PTA 5 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Irbid Camp, Al Husn Camp (Bani Obeid district), Irbid district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Anjara (Ajloun district), Kufranjah district	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	JARASH	Souf Camp, Jarash (Gaza) Camp.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MAFRAQ	Khaldiyah district, Mafraq district.	LOW	AVERAGE
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Baq'a Camp and Ain Al Bacha.	HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AMMAN	Hay Nazza neighborhood, Wehdat Camp, Jabal el-Hussein Camp, Talbieh Camp and Al Jeezah district, Marka Camp and district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Zarqa City, Zarqa Camp.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	MADABA	Madaba Camp, Madaba City.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Spread out, governorate-wide.	LOW	LOW
	TAFIELA	Spread out, governorate-wide.	LOW	LOW
	MA'AN	Spread out, governorate-wide.	LOW	LOW
	AQABA	Spread out, governorate-wide.	LOW	LOW

Case Study

A young West Bank Jordanian from Amman joined JN through a Salafist Jihadist network in Wehdat.

"A friend of mine joined a VEO, we used to study together. He is 27 years old, born in 1989; he's married and has two daughters. The latest news I heard about him was that he is in Idlib. He was one of those young men who had dreams but he had no religious thoughts when he was a student. He is a university graduate - he studied accounting. We used to have political discussions although his point of view was a bit different from mine as his political views were close to the Palestinian right wing, represented by the Fatah Movement. He actually used to be a member of the Fatah youth block at university.

I personally don't know why he joined a VEO. One day, I and another friend of ours received a message from him on Facebook saying 'please take care of my daughters, I have joined the jihad for the sake of Allah, and I don't think I will come back. I am completely convinced in what I am doing, I'm sure you will criticize me, but you will never neglect my daughters.' He went to Syria in 2012 and joined JN.

I went to his house in Wehdat where his mom still lives. I went there and asked, and it was actually true. I don't see him online anymore, as he deactivated his Facebook account, but he does call his wife every now and then. He called me once last year, during the Eid holidays and he said he was mad at me because I never go and check on his daughters. He said he was happy with JN. He said he was completely convinced and happy because he's there for the sake of Allah, and he told me you have no idea how beautiful life is there, but this was before JN took over Idlib. Before that, he was in rural Damascus. After that, his mother told me he was in rural Idlib, and since then I've had no contact with him. His mother is still in shock; she only has two sons, him and another who is 17 years old so he is not able to contribute to the family yet, so this son of hers was the only source of income for the household. She says that some good people help her, but I don't know who exactly. His wife and two daughters are still living with his mother.

In my opinion my friend went to jihad because he lost hope in change. He was so full of hope when the Arab spring started. He is also an orphan who was raised in an orphanage run by the MB and he lived most of his life in poverty. I don't think it was being in the orphanage that influenced him because he grew up to be a Fatah member. He was raised in an orphanage for more than five years, then, when he started university he joined Fatah's 'student unity' block. He was not even religious, he only prayed normally like most people. I think he was motivated to go on jihad because he lost hope that there would be any peaceful change in Jordan. Also the social conditions he lived in affected him, because he used to take care of his family, and he was so poor, and vulnerable. I want to add that he was one of the purest and most decent people in terms of politics, and social services. He organized several initiatives during the snowstorm, where he fixed people's houses and helped them without even being recorded or mentioned. On the personal and ethical level, he is a very good person, I really feel sorry for him.

The person who recruited my friend, I know at least four people that were recruited by the same man, but I don't know them as my good friend who went. I don't really know

how he recruited them, but they say in the Al Wehdat Camp that he is a recruiter and he's very well known for that. The police arrested him [late 2015], and he's still under arrest. He was actually in Syria before and then he came back. He stayed there for less than a year, then came here and recruited people. When he first came back, he was arrested for about two weeks. This person is actually a relative of a friend of mine, that's how I know about him. A while ago he used to meet with a group of religious sheikhs in the camp, and they used to act as if they were the masters of the area. They used to solve problems between people, and whenever someone committed an offence against religion, they would beat him. As if they were a commission judging what is good and forbidding what is wrong, just like the one in Saudi Arabia. The people of the camp stopped them more than once, until they learnt their lesson. This is even before the Syrian crisis started, they used to criticize other Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, they used to attack them and cause a lot of problems. I was a social and political activist at the time, so I used to organize some festivals, and they used to ruin most of my festivals and attack them, because they considered us secular; as for the Muslim Brotherhood, they used to consider them non true believers. As if Salafists are the real believers. They considered themselves to be the true believers. Then afterward, the Syrian crisis started, and this man increased his activism of course, he increased his communications. By the way, this person is one of the people who got arrested in the Zarqa crisis, if you remember it, when they attacked the police with swords during a protest in Zarqa in 2011, at the start of the reform movement. It was a protest in which only religious people participated, Salafists, they attacked the police, so he was one of them and he got arrested for that, and then he was released after a while, then I heard he travelled to Syria to participate in 'jihad', and then after a while he came back and built a house, based on his cousin's story...They say that this person is responsible for the recruitment of more than 13 young men from Al Wehdat Camp to go to Syria. He was a very close friend of my friend's and a shop owner in Wehdat. He is a member of the Salafist Jihadist movement. Even before the establishment of JN, this person had been a member of the Salafist Jihadist movement, and he is older than us, in his 40's I think. I always used to see him in the camp and he is a very well-known man. Most likely he recruited my friend but when I spoke with him on Facebook that time, he refused to give me any information. (Male, 29, Teacher, Amman)

PTA 6: Hardline MB Members/Supporters - IP 2, IP 3

PTA 6 is made up of members and/or supporters of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the younger generations of members and supporters who were found to be more at risk of radicalization and/or VEO membership. Although respondents generally made a clear distinction between the mainstream Islamist MB movement and VEOs such as AQ, JN and ISIS, their views were mixed as to whether the MB in Jordan serves as a counterweight or as a gateway to VE and VEO membership. Recognized in its role of political opposition with a degree of operational freedom, the MB can or indeed could serve as a platform that challenges and confronts VEOs on the ideological, political and militant levels and perhaps should it be encouraged. However, there are also a number of factors that can increase the propensity toward VE among MB Members/Supporters, especially the youth.

Hardline MB Members and Supporters believe that the MB's mission is primarily to serve the Muslim community through Da'wa as well as to establish a system of governance that is rooted in Sharia law when there is a broad consensus to do so, all the while working within the existing political system, obeying the rule of law and even contributing in government/Parliament. Further, the MB Members/Supporters see themselves to be working toward addressing socio-economic problems in the country, notably via the Brotherhood's extensive array of community initiatives and grassroots social work. As such, Jordanian MB members are generally less likely to radicalize, as the group's ideology appears rather moderate and flexible.

However, some MB members/supporters may radicalize in response to government crackdowns on the organization if they believe they are no longer able to work for change via legal channels. For instance, in light of recent events, MB members/supporters may feel that the central government has tried to limit their role in mosques and schools as well as in leadership positions, which has resulted in the boycotting of elections and the staging of protests to demand political reforms, including the call for a constitutional monarchy. Some are particularly frustrated over the arrest of MB members and changes to the licensing structure of the Jordanian MB that made the main faction of the group illegal in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood Association (MBA). Perceptions of government targeting of the Brotherhood may lead this PTA to consider other options to fight for the Islamic cause. While they tend not to identify with ISIS, its methods and twisted interpretation of Islam, most MB Members/Supporters believe in the cause of jihad (especially when it comes to resistance against Israel) and are thus likely to join JN in support of their oppressed Syrian 'brothers' (much like the Palestinians). Many hardline MB Members/Supporters are West Bank Jordanians to whom the Palestinian cause is of highest importance and among whom support for Hamas is particularly strong (see PTA 5 above). Many among members of this PTA believe that 'resistance'/jihad is the only option in Gaza given the "failure" of negotiations. MB Youth Members/Supporters who join VEOs, whether Hamas or JN, are effectively Muslim youth who want to play a role in improving the situation in Palestinian territories and Syria although some may also engage in VE for purely ideological reasons.

Figure 16. PTA 6 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Al Husn Camp (Bani Obeid district), Irbid Camp (Irbid Qasabah), Irbid Qasabah	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	AJLOUN	Anjara (Ajloun district), Al Hashemiyyah (Ajloun district), Ayn Janna (Ajloun district), Kufranjah district (especially the Nimer neighborhood), Ajloun City Center, Ibbin (Sakhras district)	HIGH	MODERATE
	JARASH	Souf camp, Jarash (Gaza) camp	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	MAFRAQ	Mafraq district and city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Salt.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	AMMAN	City-wide.	HIGH	AVERAGE
	ZARQA	Zarqa city.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	MADABA	Madaba city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Karak city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	TAFIELA	Governorate-wide, especially Tafiela city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	MA'AN	Ma'an city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	AQABA	Governorate-wide but mainly Aqaba city.	MEDIUM	MODERATE

Case Study

A young Muslim Brotherhood member from Aqaba joined JN in Syria in the early days of the Syrian crisis.

"This young man from Aqaba was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the events in Syria [uprising] he joined Jabhat Al Nusra. He used to study something related to medicine. He joined Jabhat Al Nusra and stayed with them for a year. After that he came back, and he was arrested for less than a month, and then he was released. The intelligence unit arrested him and then released him. He was 20 years old and he joined Al Nusra in 2013 and came back in 2014. He chose Al Nusra because at that time it was the only Islamic group fighting in Syria. The most religiously extreme group was Jabhat Al Nusra and they were the only group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and

his links to the Muslim Brotherhood made him join this group. At the beginning, Islamic groups fighting in Syria were being fed by the Muslim Brotherhood. I met with more than one activist who was once active in Syria; they said that their enemy is the Muslim Brotherhood, and that in 2011 and 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood started the military wing in the revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was a platform for Jabhat Al Nusra...He left because he wanted to defend his sect, Sunnis against Alawites But the real motive was because he wanted to fight jihad and to go to heaven. He supported Gaza; he would even get violent sometimes. With Syria, yes, he was a racist. He used to say that Shias are the enemies of the nation. He left his job and his wife for it. He is an educated person we went to fight in Syria. His older brother, and all his family were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and this was a major factor in his decision to go and fight in Syria...While the distance between him and Israel was only 5 kilometers, he could've gone there to fight! The Muslim Brotherhood are well organized in Jordan, they have, or at least had, their connections with sailors and smugglers at the border. The smugglers do this for money. Some people have financial motives, other have political or religious motives. I don't know how much they are paid to smuggle someone, I hear numbers between 2,000 and 5,000 JOD. Naturally, these smugglers don't do it for free. If you give me money, I'll smuggle cigarettes, jihadists or anything else...The Muslim Brotherhood went to fight in Syria, and many big leaders talk in events. Last year in Ramadan, even though there was war on Gaza they chose to go demonstrate in front of the Syrian embassy and call for the fall of Bashar. The language in their speech is extreme. They say that the Syrian regime and its soldiers are going to hell, and that jihad in Syria is through the soul, money and brain. They call for participation. As far as I know, in Aqaba, seven members of the Muslim Brotherhood went to Syria, even though the Muslim Brotherhood is not very popular here. The Muslim Brotherhood promises to take care of their families."

(Male, 28, Finance Manager, Aqaba)

PTA 7: Petty Criminals/Young Inmates - IP3, IP 1

The seventh PTA comprises imprisoned young offenders who are particularly vulnerable to radicalization due to negative effects of imprisonment, and notably a sense of marginalization from society and victimhood that makes exposure to Salafist/VEO proselytism more virulent. The number of prisoners held for VE and terrorist offences has been on the rise in Jordan, especially with the widening domestic crackdown on Salafists and VEO supporters in recent years. There is concern that such prisoners may spread extremist ideologies among the inmate population and a fear that radicalized detainees will engage in extremist activities on release. In particular, petty criminals coming from poor and marginalized backgrounds with low levels of education (crossover with the Opportunist Influence Pathway) are believed to be at great risk of radicalization while in prison, especially when faced with arduous living conditions such as overcrowding and lack of access to adequate services as well as long periods of time in pre-trial detention or prison sentence. However, detention/imprisonment can also further the radicalization process of VE supporters and/or prompt them to engage more readily in extremist behavior/perpetrate violent acts.

The insecurity, anxiety and threats to self-esteem that Young Inmates experience with the deprivation of autonomy while in prison often compel them to find physical and/or psychological protection in joining new groups. In such context, embracing religion (or an adulterated version of it) becomes a way of coping with imprisonment. It can help explain or rationalize how individuals find themselves imprisoned and assuage their feelings of guilt or shame. For example, a prisoner can come to perceive his current predicament as being the result of his failure to live by religious teachings, which allowed him to fall into a life of crime. Other prisoners do not seek to shift the blame for their actions, but embrace faith as a means of atoning for them. It can also offer a new set of rules and guidelines for living that helps to return some otherwise lost self-control, providing a prisoner with a degree of certainty. Salafist Jihadist and VEOs, especially ISIS, are known to recruit prisoners to VE through promoting the idea that this will help to compensate or atone for their offending and the harm they may have done to their family. In prison, joining Salafist Jihadists or VEO members/supporters provides Young Inmates with a supportive environment in which to learn about/deepen their understanding of their new faith and an element of protection from victimization and violence at the hands of other prisoners.

Further, a number of Young Inmates may perceive themselves to be rejected by society and/or targeted (perhaps indiscriminately) by the government/legal system (e.g., non-violent Salafists). The prison context may sharpen or exacerbate such experiences of rejection and prejudice, and increase the urgent need to find ways of overcoming these threats to personal and group identity, namely by associating with groups such as Salafist Jihadists and VEO members. However, this process should be contextualized - not all prisoners exposed to certain individuals and ideas in prison will come to fully embrace a radicalized worldview and VE. Even fewer will be those who may emerge from prison with a desire to engage in VE behavior. Associating with groups or strong individuals can be an opportunistic attempt to find security and safety while separated from supportive relationships (e.g., families, spouses, friends, etc.) and thus finish when such relationships no longer serve their purpose.

Figure 17. PTA 7 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Al Barha, Taybeh district, Koorah district, Turkman neighborhood (notably Al A'rous Street), Irbid City Street Market, Ramtha district	HIGH	MODERATE
	AJLOUN	Anjara (Ajloun district), especially the Al Ishara area, Kufranjah, Ibbin	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	JARASH	Governorate-wide.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	MAFRAQ	Khaldiyah Town (Khaldiyah district), Za'atari Village, Irbid district,	HIGH	MODERATE
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Al Sbeihi (A'llan), Deir A'lla (Ghour), Im Jozeh (Salt), and Zaii (Zaii)	HIGH	MODERATE
	AMMAN	Amman city-wide, south Amman.	HIGH	AVERAGE
	ZARQA	Zarqa city, Rusaifeh.	HIGH	AVERAGE
	MADABA	Madaba Camp.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Qasr districts.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	TAFIELA	Hasa district.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	MA'AN	Ma'an city, Al Hseineya, Al Jafr district, Qanater (Ma'an), and Al Tour (Ma'an)	HIGH	AVERAGE
	AQABA	Aqaba city.	HIGH	MODERATE

Case Study

An activist spent a night in prison with Salafist Jihadists arrested following demonstrations in Zarqa.

"I want to tell you a story. I mingled with Salafist Jihadists one day, maybe you heard about the Zarqa events? There was a demonstration in Zarqa, many buses from Irbid came to these demonstrations and the demonstrations were scattered by force. I consider that it was a governmental mistake because they allowed the demonstrators to

use this response and create a 'war' and promote it through the media. As a human rights activist, I took the side of the demonstrators and many things happened. I do not want to go through the details but I was detained by the military forces, who redirected me to the public security forces. I went to the hospital after those events for a reason that I do not want to mention now, and then I heard that the security forces ordered the gendarmerie to start beating all demonstrators, starting with journalists. So the security forces started the violence, not the demonstrators. Anyway, it's not the point I wanted to make. What I wanted to say is that I was taken to the preventive security bureau and from there I was taken to the intelligence forces, they kept me at a small prison with Salafist Jihadists that night to bring me back to the intelligence forces the next day. So that night I spent with Salafist Jihadists from both Irbid and Zarqa and we had long discussions during the whole night. Anyway, I met many new people and I took some contacts whom I tried to reach later on but with no success...Most of the prisoners I met were coming from very poor social backgrounds, and their beliefs were very limited, but there was a guy from a very well-known tribe in Irbid, he was let's say their leader or their sheikh, so most of my discussions were with this guy. I felt they were really peaceful, and had very good points. I tried to convince them to form an official association to defend and protect themselves but their reply was that they do not collaborate with the 'tyrannical regime' and that it would be 'haram' and so on. They said that if they formed an association that would mean that they want to be a part of this regime when all they want is an Islamic State, which they truly believe in. So they had very firm beliefs and were not suggestible."

(Male, 34, Sales Executive, Amman)

PTA 8: Syrian Refugees - IP 2, IP 1

The eighth PTA comprises Syrian refugees in Jordan, particularly youth. The security threat from Syrian refugees may be overblown by respondents/Jordanians who generally see them as competition for scarce jobs, services and public resources, particularly in northern governorates such as Irbid and Mafraq but also in Amman. Nevertheless, there have been accounts of Syrian refugees, in particular those living in camps, returning to Syria to fight alongside VEOs. Syrian children are even recruited for the same purpose. FSA operatives, reportedly, have also recruited with ease in the Za'atari refugee camp in Mafraq governorate, calling the refugees to sign up via loudspeakers and preachers in makeshift mosques. Although there are no reliable reports that VEOs are recruiting inside the refugee camps, it is highly possible that VEO supporters operate and recruit inside the camps as well.

Some Syrian refugees may join VEOs out of conviction and there was evidence that this was particularly true for men who experience a strong sense of shame that others have remained in Syria to fight and/or protect family assets. Meanwhile others do so for the financial compensation that the fighters receive or the priority in the aid distribution and better housing conditions for their families (crossover with the Opportunist Influence Pathway). While VEOs would likely focus on recruiting refugee youth (typically youngsters between 15 and 24 years old), Syrian youth refugees on their own can become politically aware, and perhaps militant, especially in light of events in their home country which are likely to have a deep emotional impact.

Overall, the large Syrian population present in Jordan seems unlikely to return home anytime soon. This will have numerous political and socio-economic implications in Jordan, and further turn Syrian refugees in a key target audience with regards to its propensity to radicalize and participate in VE. While Jordan granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees during an earlier era, it has kept them largely out of senior positions in state institutions, especially the army and security services, ever since. This has resulted in strong distrust of the Jordanian government/regime among the aggrieved and dissatisfied West-Bank Jordanian community, which makes it a key target audience with regards to propensity to participate in VE (see PTA 5 above). As for their Iraqi and Syrian successors, obtaining Jordanian residency, let alone a Jordanian passport, seems to be even less of a realistic prospect. As such, this new influx of seemingly permanent refugees could threaten Jordan's stability, as resentment and alienation are very likely to increase in coming years as young Syrians start work or university, and the Syrian community may feel increasingly disenfranchised and neglected by the Jordanian government, much in the same way as some West Bank Jordanians.

Figure 18. PTA 8 Prevalence and Vulnerability

REGION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATIONS	PREVALENCE	VULNERABILITY
NORTH REGION	IRBID	Ramtha district, Irbid City: the southern neighborhood, Al Jamal Circle, Al Sheikh Khalil area, Idoun Street, Hashmi Street and Al Sareeh Street (Bani Obeid district).	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	AJLOUN	Ibbin (Sakhrh district), Anjara (Ajoun district), Kufranjah district	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
	JARASH	Jarash City.	MEDIUM	MODERATE
	MAFRAQ	Khaldiyah Town (Khaldiyah district), Za'atari Village and Camp, Rwaished district, Al-Badiya Al-Shimaliya district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
CENTRAL REGION	BALQA	Al Jad'a (in Salt), Dair Ala district, Al Basha district.	HIGH	MDOERATE
	AMMAN	City-wide, especially in Sahab, limited numbers in West Amman (Abdoun, Sweifiyeh).	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	ZARQA	Zarqa City, Azraq Camp, Mrajeeb al-Fhood Camp, Al Hashmeah district.	VERY HIGH	IMPORTANT
	MADABA	Madaba City, Jrainah district.	MEDIUM	AVERAGE
SOUTH REGION	KARAK	Karak City, Mo'aab district, Mazar district.	MEDIUM	LOW
	TAFIELA	Tafiela City, Bsaira district.	LOW	MODERATE
	MA'AN	Ma'an City, Petra, Shobak district.	MEDIUM	LOW
	AQABA	Aqaba City.	LOW	LOW

PTA Ranking - CVE Intervention Optimality Levels

The relative relevance of each PTA for CVE interventions were determined based on three main criteria: Accessibility, Problem Relevance, and Susceptibility.

1. Accessibility refers to the level of access to a particular PTA both in terms of research (i.e., the ability to conduct Primary Research on a PTA) and intervention (i.e., the ability to reach a PTA with a CVE intervention).
2. Problem Relevance refers to the degree of relevance a PTA has both in terms of the problem space (i.e., the centrality of the PTA to the problem space) and Project Objectives (i.e., the ability of the PTA to affect Project Objectives).
3. Susceptibility refers to the degree to which a PTA can be influenced (i.e., the degree to which a CVE intervention is likely to have an effect on the PTA).

An optimum PTA is one that is readily accessible, highly relevant and open to influence. The following table displays the ranking of PTAs from the most to the least optimal PTA. Each one of the three criteria is ranked from 1 to 3, with 1 describing limited accessibility, relevance or susceptibility; 2 describing average accessibility, relevance or susceptibility; and 3 describing high accessibility, relevance or susceptibility.

Figure 19. PTA Ranking: Accessibility, Problem Relevance and Susceptibility

PTAs	ACCESSIBILITY	PROBLEM RELEVANCE	SUSCEPTIBILITY	TOTAL	RANK /8
PTA 1: Marginalized Youth	3	3	3	9	1
PTA 4: University Students & Underemployed Graduates	3	2	2	7	2=
PTA 5: Marginalized West Bank Jordanians	2	3	2	7	2=
PTA 8: Syrian Refugees	2	2	2	6	4
PTA 3: Salafist Youth	1	3	1	5	5=
PTA 2: Young Women	1	2	2	5	5=
PTA 6: Hardline MB Members/Supporters	1	2	2	5	5=
PTA 7: Petty criminals/Young Inmates	1	1	2	4	8

SECTION II: TARGET LOCATION ANALYSIS - KEY DRIVERS IMPACTING PROPENSITY TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM



1.0 INTRODUCTION

The following section presents key findings by Target Location (i.e., governorate). Each governorate consists of several sub-sections. Firstly, there is a short introduction summarizing key findings related to VEO support. Secondly, there is a discussion and presentation of quantitative scores of greatest concern - those that appeared either in the third or fourth quartile of overall scores. In other words, if a score was 70 percent out of results ranging zero to 100 percent, it was allocated to the third quartile. However, if a score was 20 percent out of results ranging zero to 25 percent, then it was allocated to the fourth quartile. In order to help differentiate, fourth quartile scores are highlighted in grey. Those written in red are the highest (or worst) of scores across all locations. Thirdly, there is discussion and presentation of qualitative key drivers of propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior. These are presented theme by theme, such as Governance, Basic Needs, etc., with each graded High, Medium or Low depending on analysis. Note that this grading does not mean that a driver is more important than another. Instead, it describes the degree to which respondents believed, in a particular governorate, that one driver is more/less salient than others. Finally, each Target Location section ends with the provision of a few respondent-led cases of VEO recruitment.

For broader analytical purposes, the order in which the Target Locations are presented follows Jordan's regional division. Each one of the 12 governorates of Jordan pertains to one of three geographical regions – the North Region, the Central Region, and the South Region – distributed by geographical proximity rather than area or population size. The regional distribution of Jordan's 12 governorates is as follows:

North Region	Irbid	Ajloun	Jarash	Mafraq
Central Region	Balqa	Amman	Zarqa	Madaba
South Region	Karak	Tafiela	Ma'an	Aqaba

2.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: NORTH REGION FINDINGS

2.1 IRBID KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Hamas was the most popular VEO in Irbid based on the perceived legitimacy of its struggle against a Jewish oppressor. As for VEOs focused on Syria, support has declined sharply since the early period of the conflict. This follows an increasing awareness of VEO violence toward civilians and territorial ambitions. JN has remained the most popular due mainly to its Syrian credentials – its perceived focus on combatting the Syrian regime and commitment to the revolutionary cause.

Although ISIS appears a more 'foreign', and therefore unpopular VEO, the organization has historically generated support among local Salafist Jihadists, and Irbid's accommodation of a relatively large number of "Zarqawists" – the wing of Salafist Jihadism with which ISIS is associated – is consistent with ISIS' growing appeal among the local movement. Indeed, Irbid is renowned for accommodating large numbers of Salafist Jihadists, as well as prominent figures from within the movement. Irbid's Salafist Jihadist community is concentrated in certain areas, most evidently Hashmi Street and Hanina neighborhood, both in Irbid Qasabah (or the district that contains Irbid City). Indeed, it was in Hanina that the well-documented March 2016 pre-emptive raid on an alleged ISIS cell occurred. Furthermore, following ISIS' murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh in

February 2015, a number of residents in Irbid Qasabah publicly expressed their approval. In addition to the neighborhoods of Turkman and Hanina, Irbid Camp emerged as a VE hotspot, also in Irbid Qasabah, from where targets of the March 2016 raid are suspected to have received training.

ISIS' gains among the Salafist Jihadist community can also be explained by its domination of media output – both internal and external. Thus, while the media has marginalized the activities of other VEOs such as JN and AQ, ISIS has acquired a reputation as the most formidable and well-resourced VEO in the region. Similarly, ISIS supporters and affiliates have proven far more vocal in campaigning for the organization than have JN and AQ, whose local presence and influence appears to be negligible. Ultimately, ISIS has failed to appeal to the vast majority of the general population due to its indiscriminate brutality toward Muslims in Syria and Iraq. Most locals viewed ISIS as un-Islamic, especially since its immolation of Moath Al Kasasbeh. Many also feared that ISIS poses an immediate threat in Irbid, and a widespread belief that it was an ISIS cell targeted by the March 2016 raid contributes to these anxieties. However, there are clear pockets of deep concern most often linked with the Salafist movement.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Quantitative scores yielded relatively few results within the third and fourth quartiles and not one of these was the worst score of its kind across the governorates, implying that the danger of VE and VEO is relatively limited in the governorate. There are still significant social hurdles such as employment, healthcare, housing, debt and drug abuse. Unsurprisingly, concern about these matters manifested itself as significant complaint at the lack of effective civil courts, the presence of government corruption and the government's lack of respect for human rights and freedoms, and the unreliability of the police. Likewise, there were accompanying levels of frustration at the perceived lack of meritocracy within the community, and a sense of social marginalization. However, the Jordanian government was not the only focus of dissatisfaction. Respondents in Irbid displayed particularly strong antipathy toward Russia and Israel, with many supporting violent jihad against the latter. Such results highlight potential vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway.

Respondents in Irbid also demonstrated high levels of religiosity and a lack of tolerance to other sects and religions. This would indicate a further susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. However, in comparison to other locations, scores are of lesser concern and, more importantly, appear not to have triggered higher levels of support for VEOs. The fact that qualitative data uncovered substantial evidence of former involvement in, and drivers toward, VEO engagement suggests that Irbid has become infamous for its past relationship with such groups. However, it would be a mistake to confuse increased awareness and concern about VEO for increased future propensity to engage in VE and VEOs.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	67% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Healthcare	40% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
Housing	53% were dissatisfied with the amount of affordable housing.
Government Official Corruption	61% agreed that government officials are corrupt.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Police Reliability	31% agreed that the Police are not reliable.
Civil Courts	36% agreed that civil courts are not effective.
Government Respect	36% agreed that the Jordanian government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Meritocracy	64% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Sense of Community	33% agreed that they did not feel part of their community.
Debt	76% agreed that debt is a problem.
Drug Abuse	71% agreed that drug abuse is a problem.
Russia	69% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Internet Impact	55% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
Media Exaggeration	61% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
Religiosity	72% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Sharia	67% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Violent Jihad in Israel	77% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Sectarianism	46% agreed that violent jihad against Shias is justifiable.
Segregation	31% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims

Qualitative Key Drivers

The notion of a justified violent jihad against Israeli Jews is widely accepted across Irbid to the extent that it has become normalized, endorsed by both West Bank and East Bank residents, and fueled by a perception of victimized Palestinians at the hands of an Israeli occupation. Unsurprisingly, this phenomenon acts as a key driver of sustained support for Hamas. Similarly, although less widespread, a second similar factor, which has encouraged young men to adopt the notion of a legitimate, if not obligatory jihad in Syria, is the perception of victimized Muslim civilians at the hands of the Syrian regime.

A third factor is the narrative of beleaguered Sunni Muslims suffering abuse by an Alawite regime, as is often advanced by the popular media. This narrative facilitates the adoption of Sunni-Shia sectarian attitudes among West Bank and East Bank men and women. A fourth key factor is the media's role in cultivating extremist attitudes. For example, respondents blamed Al Jazeera for strengthening the appeal of ISIS to young men by broadcasting the organization's battleground victories.

A fifth key factor involves religion. VEOs are boosting the legitimacy of radical ideologies among locals by incorporating religious text into their messaging, and many local men and women find it difficult to reject ideas – such as the glorification of jihad - that purport to have Qur'anic foundations. A sixth involves anti-government grievances, which groups such as Salafist Jihadists

channel into support for their own ideologies. Unemployed university graduates are noteworthy in this respect, as they have high employment standards that are consistently disappointed due to perceived government socio-economic neglect. Salafist Jihadists' capacity to capitalize on unemployment also explains why they have their greatest representation in some of the governorate's most deprived neighborhoods such as Hanina. The anti-Western element of Salafist Jihadist ideology is also appealing to many, predominantly based on widespread objection to US activities in the region.

A seventh factor is open display of support for VEOs. For example, funerals of many years have occasionally brought together large numbers of Salafist Jihadists, sometimes taking the opportunity to publicize their principles. Likewise, there have been cases of extremist preachers using mosques (such as Sadiq Amin Mosque in the Al Shamali area of the Hanina neighborhood, and Saleh Al Din Mosque in the Turkman neighborhood) to spread radical values during Friday prayers, or more surreptitiously indoctrinate young men during post-prayer lessons. Finally, respondents voiced concerns about rising numbers of Islamic schools and Qur'anic memorization centers operated by extremist Syrian refugees, notably from Dara'a, across the governorate.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Self-identifying as a Salafist Jihadist	HIGH
Residing in one of Irbid's poverty pockets (Turkman neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah), Hanina neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah), Al Barha Village (Irbid Qasabah), Palestine Street (Irbid Qasabah), Fo'ara neighborhood (Irbid Qasabah))	HIGH
Having family members who hold radical ideologies and are supportive of one or several VEOs	HIGH
Living on under-governed refugee camp peripheries (notably Irbid Camp)	HIGH
Residing in one of Irbid's more religiously conservative areas (Al Husn Camp, Ramtha, Hanina neighborhood)	MEDIUM
Living among large numbers of Syrian refugees	MEDIUM
Having kinship ties with Syrian refugees	MEDIUM
Having friends who have joined VEOs in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM
As a young man, struggling to secure a marriage as desired	MEDIUM
Being married with several dependents	MEDIUM
Having connections and/or encounters with Gulfi sheikhs	MEDIUM
Having close acquaintances who have adopted radical ideologies	MEDIUM
Residing in close geographical proximity to refugee camps	MEDIUM
Living in densely populated Irbid City outskirts	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing in the concept of a global Ummah (Islamic community)	LOW
Being a MB/IAF member	LOW
Being a young man aged between 18 and 40	LOW
Residing in close geographical proximity to the Syrian conflict	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Seeking religious solace for personal economic pressures	HIGH
Being overqualified for available employment	HIGH
Being an unemployed university graduate	HIGH
Having endured a recent deterioration in living standards and purchasing power	HIGH
Struggling financially and believing that VEOs provide economic security	HIGH
Being poor or coming from a poor family	MEDIUM
Living in an area lacking in security presence	MEDIUM
Being unable to afford accommodation as a consequence of rising prices in response to an influx of Syrian refugees	MEDIUM
Being disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of access to basic services such as water and electricity compared with other areas of the governorate (Sharqi neighborhood, Hakama Street, Al Quds Street, Hanina neighborhood)	LOW
Attending an under-resourced/over-populated school	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Believing that the government is unrepresentative of Islam and that state-appointed clerics are illegitimate	HIGH
Blaming the government for ISIS' murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh	HIGH
Living in an area under-resourced by state-appointed clerics	MEDIUM
Experiencing perceived injustices by the security services, either personally or through close relationships	MEDIUM
Believing that the government discriminates against certain governorates, including those on the northern border	MEDIUM
Receiving an insufficient salary as a state-appointed cleric	LOW
Believing security measures to be socially intrusive	LOW
Believing that the government is exaggerating VE threats to its advantage, such as falsely attributing the March 2016 Irbid raid to ISIS	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Experiencing frustration at government's failure to adequately address internal corruption	LOW
Believing that the government is using popular media platforms to launch propaganda campaigns	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Lacking religious education and therefore a reference point from which to assess VE religious interpretations.	HIGH
Being a socio-culturally isolated male	HIGH
Considering it more honorable to fight for a religious cause as advocated by ISIS, than a political cause as represented by the FSA	MEDIUM
Engaging in drug culture and developing a Captagon dependency	MEDIUM
Suffering boredom due to unemployment and a lack of socio-cultural engagement	MEDIUM
Having frequent face-to-face encounters with friends observing austere Islam and advocating Salafist Jihadist ideologies	MEDIUM
Bearing an intolerance to local Christian communities	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Believing that the Syrian regime is illegitimate and guilty of atrocities	HIGH
Believing that the US is seeking economic gains in the Middle East and has vested interests in a prolonged Syrian conflict	HIGH
Believing that the West has imperialist intentions in the Middle East	MEDIUM
Identifying ISIS and JN as key players in a Sunni-Shia sectarian war against Hezbollah and Iran	MEDIUM
Objecting to Russia's collaboration with the Syrian regime	LOW
Considering Jordan's participation in the US-led coalition against ISIS to be unjustified	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Being exposed to the politicization of Islam, particularly with relation to the Syrian conflict	HIGH
Believing in an Islamic duty to perform jihad against the Syrian regime, as advocated by certain clerics and VEOs	HIGH
Being simultaneously exposed to media depictions of injustices toward Muslims in Syria and the rhetoric of Salafist Jihadists advocating for jihad in Syria	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Being frequently exposed to media depictions of Syrian civilians suffering at the hands of the Assad regime	HIGH
Attending post-prayer “lessons” conducted by extremist preachers	HIGH
Joining online extremist forums such as Ahel Al Haq and the Jihad group	HIGH
Frequenting a mosque associated with Salafist Jihadists (such as Sadiq Amin Mosque (Al Shamali area, Hanina neighborhood) and Saleh Al Din Mosque (Turkman neighborhood))	MEDIUM
Witnessing news relating to ISIS victories on the battleground	MEDIUM
Identifying Qur’anic foundations to support the case for an honorable violent jihad	MEDIUM
Accepting interpretations of Qur’anic verses that denounce secular governance	MEDIUM
Attending Syrian-run Qur’anic memorization classes as a child	MEDIUM
Engaging in dialogue with VEO representatives on Facebook	MEDIUM
Mistrusting the validity of information presented in the media	LOW
Being frequently exposed to Salafist Quietist campaigning	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One university graduate living in Irbid City suffered the death of close relatives, after which he evidently became more religiously conservative. At this time he was searching for employment and found work within charities and community organizations, initially as a volunteer and later as an employee. He later signed a work contract in the UAE. While working there, he met a group of Gulf sheikhs at a mosque. Less than six months later, he called a friend in Jordan to explain that he was to embark on jihad in Syria. He travelled from the UAE to Syria via Turkey. Once in Turkey he received one to two months of training before being deployed on the battleground. While he ended up with JN, one respondent claimed that he first joined the FSA before defecting. He later returned to Jordan via Turkey and Kuwait.
- A 13 year-old boy was last seen playing football outside Sadiq Amin Mosque in Hanina before he disappeared. Later, religious figures from the same mosque explained to the boy's father that they had taken the boy for jihadi training. The boy later died in a suicide attack in Mosul, presumably fighting with ISIS. The father, himself a Salafist Jihadist, is thought to have brainwashed the boy before he was recruited. He celebrated his son's death in public.
- A 22 year-old girl who left school early fell in love with a Syrian man over Facebook before the Syrian crisis. The man in question later joined JN and convinced the girl to join him in Syria. She obliged, flying to Turkey, where a number of intermediaries met her and transported her to a JN base. The girl announced her arrival into Syria via Facebook.
- Saddam Bdour was a university graduate who used to work in a second-hand clothes store. He is known to have engaged in debauchery, including drinking and smoking late at night. He was persuaded by a fellow university graduate to adopt a more conservative approach

to Islam after which he was introduced to a group of Salafist Jihadists in Irbid whom he soon joined.

2.2. AJLOUN KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Ajloun has produced relatively few VEO recruits. However, those who have, successfully or unsuccessfully, sought to join VEOs have disproportionately come from Anjara (Ajloun district), Kufranjah district and Sakhras district. Indeed, Anjara has even witnessed overt public support for ISIS: Ayn Janna (Ajloun district) is another area that has exhibited pro-ISIS elements among its population, including mosque gatherings to pray for deceased and active ISIS recruits in Syria. The same area is reportedly home to imams who continue advancing extremist ideas and reportedly refrain from referring to ISIS and JN as terrorist organizations, instead labeling them 'jihadist groups'.

Aside from displays of VEO support, respondents described a notable presence of Salafist Jihadists in Ajloun, again concentrated within Anjara and Kufranjah district. Likewise, there were claims of travelling bands of Salafist Jihadist preachers who stay for three to four days within a given mosque, where they deliver sermons and religious lessons for locals before travelling elsewhere. One area in which they have done so is Sakhras district. Salafist Jihadists are also reportedly engaged in recruitment campaigns inside Ajloun City, where they are apparently attempting to convert Salafist Quietist elements of the Salah Al Din Mosque (Qal'aa Street) congregation. Finally, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence, albeit an inconspicuous one, and is known to have held private gatherings in Ajloun.

A number of respondents were supportive of Hamas, AQ and JN based mainly on their supposed embodiment of a justified Islamic resistance against malign foreign entities. In the case of Hamas, the most popular VEO in Ajloun, the perceived enemy was Israel. Meanwhile, AQ's appeal stems largely from its 'resistance' against US regional interventions – most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. JN's appeal stems from its perceived resistance against the Syrian regime on behalf of innocent Syrian Muslims. Several respondents claimed that JN support is concentrated in the Kufranjah district.

ISIS, although extremely unpopular, reportedly has its largest support based among Syrian refugees in Sakhras district - specifically Ibbin and Sakhras town. Reasons include its reputation as the largest, wealthiest and most formidable VEO in the region, its supposed resistance against the Syrian regime, and its apparent representation of true Islam manifest in its application of Sharia law and its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate. Nevertheless, these points were evidently trumped by aversion to ISIS' violent methodologies. Video footage of the organization's atrocities, particularly the immolation of Moath Al Kasasbeh, has served as a deterrent and its reputation has suffered further since. Despite being the least popular, ISIS is the most active and vocal VEO in Ajloun perhaps with the exception of the Salafist Jihadist movement. Accordingly, respondents perceived ISIS as the most threatening VEO. Numerous incidents have played into this perception. For example, in December 2015, an ISIS cell was reportedly discovered in Awsara town (Ajloun district). Likewise, in 2014, several locals from Orjan district, Kufranjah district and Anjara (Ajloun district) were alleged to have been part of an ISIS cell.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents in Ajloun expressed concern about employment, debt and the lack of activities for youth. They largely placed blame for these failures on authorities such as the Royal Court and the Jordanian government, accusing the latter of perceived corruption and not caring enough about the people. However, respondents were also negative about the perceived influence of a wide array of foreign governments on Jordan. Such findings imply that potential recruits could

be vulnerable to the Avenger Influence Pathway, as further evidenced by the belief in the narrative that the West is humiliating Islam as well as a high degree of sympathy for the concept of violent jihad in Europe.

Indeed, these last two findings show how the Avenger Influence Pathway somewhat interlinks with the Ideologue Influence Pathway, as further exemplified by high levels of religiosity, support for Sharia, and belief in the segregation of Muslims from Non-Muslims. Respondents from Ajloun also showed the least tolerance for freedom to practice any religion, indicating the presence of strong levels of religious extremism. Admittedly, potential interest in extremism does not automatically translate into support for VEOs – after all no VEO support level reached the third or fourth quartile. However, respondents believed that ISIS poses a threat and questioned how the Jordanian government was tackling the problem - for example, the idea that returning fighters should not be imprisoned was as much a statement of concern about the effectiveness of such an approach as it was a further example of no-confidence in the Jordanian government. As such, there is potential for extremist sympathies to exacerbate and transition into more ominous displays of support for VE.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	67% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Central government care	57% agreed that central government does not care about the needs of people.
Central government independence	52% agreed that central government does what the West says.
Central government ability	41% agreed that central government does not have the power to control VE.
Central government energy	37% agreed that central government does not want to control VE.
Royal Court	55% agreed that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of people.
Government official corruption	61% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
The Jordanian government respect	37% agreed that the Jordanian government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Debt	75% agreed that debt is a problem.
Boredom	80% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Tribal inequality	61% agreed that inequality between tribes is a problem.
US	61% agreed that the US has a negative impact on Jordan.
European Union	61% agreed that the EU has a negative impact on Jordan
Iran	78% agreed that Iran has a negative impact on Jordan.
Saudi Arabia	31% agreed that Saudi Arabia has a negative impact on Jordan.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Turkey	33% agreed that Turkey has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	82% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	70% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
ISIS threat	72% agreed that ISIS is a threat to Jordan.
Returned fighters	34% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
West against Islam	75% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Caliphate	49% agreed that the Caliphate will help restore Islam.
Religiosity	66% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Sharia	62% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Violence in Europe	31% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Segregation	31% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims.
Freedom of choice	37% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.

Qualitative Key Drivers

One of the main reported factors accounting for local youths' adoption of radical ideologies was poor religious education. Many respondents believed that those with the weakest Islamic foundations are most susceptible to extremist religious interpretations. Two young locals from Anjara for instance, known to have avoided mosque attendance, were religiously indoctrinated by ISIS supposedly because they had no reference point from which to judge the organization's religious interpretations. Another manifestation of radical ideology was the prevalence of Sunni-Shia sectarian attitudes. These are reportedly aggravated by numerous factors. One involves active rumors of Shia sleeper cells and Shia resurgence across the country. Another is the rhetoric of prominent Sunni clerics, particularly Gulfi sheikhs on television channels, who stir up Shia hatred among their followers. Thirdly, events in Iraq such as Shia militia atrocities against innocent Sunni civilians in Fallujah during the summer of 2016 have exacerbated sectarianism.

A second key driver was the promise of financial incentives, especially for young males. Note that this was particularly true of unemployed university graduates, meaning that unfilled financial expectations can be worse than absolute levels of poverty. Note that those striving to work in the private sector suffer most in this respect, given that Syrian refugees have exerted downward pressure on wages while intensifying demand and in some cases displacing Jordanian counterparts entirely from employment, especially in the catering industry. Locals living in areas with a strong Syrian representation, such as Ibbin (Sakhras district), are struggling against soaring living expenses leaving them with a heightened receptivity to VEO financial rewards. Further proof of the relationship between financial strains and VEO sympathies is the finding that Ajloun's poverty pockets are also the governorate's VE hotspots: namely Ibbin, Kufranjah district and Anjara (Ajloun district). It is potentially the small number of West Bank

residents from these areas who are most at risk of economically driven VEO recruitment, as they lack the tribal support that has the potential to guarantee reasonably paid employment.

A third key driver is the narrative of Syrian regime violence against Muslim civilians, which has facilitated the self-portrayal of VEOs such as ISIS and JN as 'resistance movements'. The same applies to Hamas and the Israeli regime, as well as AQ and past US regional activity. In each case many of the locals showing support for these groups believe they are acting on behalf of innocent Muslims and/or Islam. As well as generating sympathy for these groups, some local preachers are apparently inculcating a sense of Islamic obligation in their congregations to participate.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a Salafist Quietist who intermingles with Salafist Jihadists in the mosque environment (Salah Al Din Mosque, Qal'aa Street, Ajloun City)	HIGH
Having a close friendship with radicalized individuals	HIGH
Living alongside large numbers of Syrian refugees (Ibbin)	MEDIUM
Being a West Bank resident without the benefits of tribal affiliation	MEDIUM
Living in a densely populated suburban community (Kufranjah, Anjara)	LOW
Being a male aged between 18-35 years	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Feeling economically neglected while perceiving VEOs as socio-economic support networks	HIGH
Struggling to secure a marriage as a young man due to financial constraints	MEDIUM
Being an unemployed teaching, engineering or medical graduate	MEDIUM
Being aware of the supposed financial rewards associated with VEO membership	MEDIUM
Living in one of the governorates poverty pockets (Anjara, Kufranjah district, Al Hashemiyyah, Ibbin, Orjan district)	LOW
Being burdened with high levels of debt as a consequence of increasing housing rents and diminishing wages in response to competition from Syrian refugees.	LOW
Being a low-skilled private sector employee alongside a large Syrian refugees population competing for jobs	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Considering the government to be socio-economically negligent of the local area	HIGH
As a young person, feeling that the government is intentionally obstructing political participation	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Disapproving of the government's perceived subservience to Western interests and seeking a more representative form of governance	MEDIUM
Living in an under-policed sub-district (Al Ishara area of Anjara)	MEDIUM
Believing that the government permits internal corruption and is mishandling foreign donations intended for alleviating the pressures accompanying an influx of refugees	MEDIUM
Seeking the establishment of absolute Sharia law and believing that VEOs are the only movements working to this end	LOW
Believing that the government abuses its legal power to meet its own ends at the expense of civil liberties	LOW
Disapproving of the government's role in the anti-ISIS coalition, associating it with Al Kasasbeh's murder and domestic destabilization	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Having a poor understanding of Islam but seeking religious direction and belonging	HIGH
Believing that ISIS is a legitimate jihadist movement rather than a terrorist organization	HIGH
Believing that ISIS is focused on combatting the Syrian regime	HIGH
Subscribing to the idea of an Islamic obligation to perform jihad and feeling ashamed at having not achieved this	HIGH
Lacking respect for state-appointed Imams and seeking alternative sources of religious legitimacy	HIGH
Admiring or sympathizing with ISIS' pursuit of an Islamic caliphate	MEDIUM
Believing that JN is focused on combatting the Syrian regime and defending the interests of civilians	MEDIUM
Being a heavy drug abuser	MEDIUM
Feeling socio-economically estranged as an individual	MEDIUM
Holding anti-Shia sectarian attitudes and anxieties about a regional or local Shia expansion	LOW
Believing that AQ is a resistance movement against Western regional intervention	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Accusing President Assad of violent oppression and blaming him for the influx of refugees into the governorate	HIGH
Holding the US responsible for regional turmoil and civilian deaths	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing in the global Ummah (Islamic community) and identifying certain VEOs as Islamic resistance movements	HIGH
Considering the International community as negligent with relation to the Syrian conflict	MEDIUM
Being appalled at Shia militia atrocities against Sunni civilians in Iraq	MEDIUM
Perceiving European countries – namely France – as anti-Islamic	LOW
Believing Israel's conciliatory relationship with Jordan to be unjust	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Frequenting a mosque at which the Imam lends credibility to VEOs (such as in Ayn Janna)	HIGH
Being in contact with VEO operatives via social media, especially Facebook	HIGH
Spending long hours browsing VEO Internet material	HIGH
Encountering travelling bands of Salafist Jihadist preachers in the local mosque	MEDIUM
Having admiration for Sheikh Mohammed Al Arefe and considering him a legitimate Islamic authority	MEDIUM
Appreciating the quality of ISIS musical 'anthem', Salil Al Sawarim	LOW
Being frequently exposed to global news reports detailing violent atrocities against Sunni Muslim women and children	LOW
Relying on private social media and Internet sources rather than official media outlets for news updates	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- A 35 year-old man from Sakhrāh district was unemployed and living on benefits before joining a Salafist Jihadist group. As a member of this group, he participated in Salafist Jihadist preaching campaigns, which entail bands of Salafist Jihadists travelling to various mosques and staying there for three to four days. During this time, they provide religious lessons for locals and deliver sermons. The individual in question later joined ISIS, apparently recruited through his Salafist Jihadist network. He travelled to Syria via smuggling networks that took him across the Jordan-Syria border into Dara'a. After being with ISIS for two years the man died in Syria.
- A 35 year-old male agricultural worker from Kufranjah district became acquainted with a group of local Salafist Jihadists who provided him with money. After meeting them, he became increasingly devout, growing a beard and reading Islamic texts. He also made frequent trips to Ramtha (Irbid) although the purpose of these visits was unspecified. After one such trip he did not return home but left to join Jaysh Al Islam in Syria, travelling via

Lebanon. Having sustained an injury, he returned to Ramtha in August 2012 and turned himself into the Jordanian security forces.

2.3 JARASH KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Although several respondents described knowing of, or hearing about, locals who joined JN or ISIS, several indicators confirmed that actual involvement in VEOs was not an ongoing behavioral concern in Jarash governorate. Firstly, respondents knew few locals that had joined VEOs, particularly recent recruits. Secondly, nearly all known VEO recruits had chosen to fight in Syria rather than remain in Jordan. Thirdly, respondents showed very little desire to provide demonstrable support to VEOs such as JN and/or ISIS, especially with regards to their activities in Jordan. Finally, there have been no significant VEO-related activities in the governorate.

However, for several reasons attitudinal support of VEOs does pose a degree of risk. Firstly, even if opposed to their presence in Jordan, some respondents continued to advocate VEOs (particularly JN) as legitimate Islamist opposition to the Assad regime. Respondents admitted that there are groups of JN supporters that have behaved immorally, but the organization still remains more palatable than AQ and ISIS. Meanwhile, ISIS has the largest supply of weapons and wealth compared to other VEOs, and has also generated the most media coverage. Consequently, even those who did not support such organizations were nevertheless aware and knowledgeable of core VEO narratives and messages, some of which stimulate sympathy even if they don't compel individuals to join such groups.

Respondents saw AQ as more irrelevant organization than JN and ISIS because it has lost the battle for media coverage and does not offer the rewards and recognition that others can give. Finally, many respondents insisted that it was not fair to label Hamas a VEO, and refused to compare it to others such as JN or ISIS. Instead, they described the group as a national liberation organization or resistance movement, despite any occasional violent outbreak. Hamas appears more respectful and humane than other VEOs. Respondents also believed it had never struck against Jordan or carried out any related activities in Syria, Lebanon or Egypt.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents from Jarash demonstrated few quantitative scores of concern in terms of the number of results within the third quartile (although the number of those in the fourth quartile was more elevated). Furthermore, not one of the scores was the worst of its kind across the governorates and although social issues such as employment and healthcare continue to present challenges, these were not comparatively worse than many governorates. The one exception to this involved pockets of particularly bad social conditions found in refugee camps (see drivers below).

In addition, the apparent religiosity of the local community is cause for concern. For example, respondents demonstrated high levels of support for the concept of a caliphate, justice through Islam, Takfirism, Sharia as the only source of law, and the inseparability of politics from religion. The governorate is a center for Salafist and MB activity, and again this is particularly prevalent within and around refugee camps. This is not, in itself, a cause for worry. However, coexistence of religiosity with comparatively high levels of support for VEOs of nearly all kinds, including AQ, JN, ISIS and even Hezbollah, suggests vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. Note that strength of belief that VEO fighters look after each other and are skilled fighters also implies susceptibility to an Ideologue Influence Pathway, albeit at a non-religious level where attraction to VEO draws from an image of fighters as heroic and able-bodied.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Healthcare	34% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
JAF ability	16% agree the Jordanian Armed Forces lack the ability to keep locals safe.
JAF culture	16% agree the Jordanian Armed Forces do not behave in a respectful way.
Iran	59% felt that Iran has a negative impact on Jordan.
Involvement in Syria	55% agreed that Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
AQ	24% expressed support for AQ.
JN	26% expressed support for JN.
ISIS	14% expressed support for ISIS.
Hezbollah	27% expressed support for Hezbollah.
Returned fighters	35% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS Intervention	44% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.
Salafist Jihadism	20% expressed support for Salafist Jihadism.
IAF	55% expressed support for the IAF.
Caliphate	48% agreed that a caliphate will help restore Islam.
Religiosity	75% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Takfirism	21% agreed that Takfirism is justifiable.
Sharia	73% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
VEO brotherhood	39% agreed that members of VEOs always look after each other.
VEO skills	43% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Freedom of choice	28% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.
Religion in politics	59% disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate.
Religious violence	22% disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people

Qualitative Key Drivers

One key driver was relative economic wealth. For example, many camp dwellers in Jarash lack job opportunities and/or are forced into 'free businesses' - markets, vegetable shops, and mechanic shops. Likewise, some rural areas also featured lower economic and employment levels, which make locals reportedly more susceptible to VEO recruitment out of a sense of opportunism and/or frustration at the lack of opportunities.

Note that the driver refers to relative wealth and not absolute wealth or poverty. This is because a second related key driver was a sense of victimization and marginalization, with increased

sympathy for VEO narratives to that effect. This was also particularly true for some of those living in refugee camps. For example, many families in Gaza camp do not own a national identity number, which means that they do not have Jordanian citizenship, and so cannot be treated by, or educated in, government institutions. Gaza camp also reportedly has poor sewage and other infrastructure.

A third key factor was education. Respondents explained that shortfalls in religious teaching, both at government schools and within religious centers, generate ignorance and inability to counter the messages/narratives put forward by VEOs. For some, this extended to include the religious teaching provided by groups such as Salafists and even the MB, although the role of the latter was more fiercely debated. A fourth key factor was the prevalence of symbiotic anti-social activities. For example, a few respondents believed that drug crime is prevalent (again in camps) and that VEOs have been able to fuse their operations with such activities. Respondents differed on whether this fusion exploits latent immorality within potential recruits or whether these were simply more 'impressionable'.

A fifth key factor was the gap between skills and opportunities. Although this may appear to contradict claims that poor education levels are responsible for recruitment, in fact the two are both relevance and apply to different pathways. Specifically, many respondents rejected the stereotype of poor and uneducated villagers being more supportive of VEOs than their modern urban counterparts. They explained that more urban/educated recruits can also be motivated by unfulfilled expectations and lack of opportunities, making them more susceptible to ideological argument of injustice and unfulfilled expectation.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a youth aged 18-32 years	HIGH
Being a male	HIGH
Living in a refugee camp	HIGH
Living in a rural area	MEDIUM
Living in an area known for extremist ideology (especially Salafist)	MEDIUM
Jordan's position next to Syria	MEDIUM
Travel to Turkey/UAE/Saudi Arabia	HIGH
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Quick access to wealth and other tangible rewards (including access to women)	HIGH
Lack of education or 'too much' education	MEDIUM
Lack of employment opportunities/underemployment	HIGH
Poor water and electricity supplies	LOW
Poor healthcare	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Inflation and unaffordability of goods and housing	MEDIUM
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Dissatisfaction with the Jordanian government	MEDIUM
Involvement in Salafism	MEDIUM
Involvement in MB	LOW
Negative experience at the hands of security services	LOW
Government failure to monitor/train imams and supervise unofficial mosques	HIGH
Antipathy toward the government for being a Western 'puppet' (e.g., involvement in Coalition against ISIS)	MEDIUM
Lack of opportunity for recruits to return and reintegrate into Jordanian society	MEDIUM
Desire for political reform	LOW
Government failure to amend the religious curriculum	HIGH
Perception of corruption and nepotism	MEDIUM
Police and/or army heavy handedness	MEDIUM
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
A sense of duty (to protect Sunnis and others from the Assad regime)	HIGH
Guilt and a desire for forgiveness	MEDIUM
Self-belief in the ability to right wrongs	MEDIUM
A sense of purpose	MEDIUM
A desire to be a hero	MEDIUM
Religious conviction that Takfiri Islam is correct	HIGH
Relative social isolation/marginalization	HIGH
Belief that liberalism is the enemy of Islam	HIGH
A sense of powerlessness and despair	HIGH
Emotional volatility (and a lack of critical thinking)	HIGH
Misunderstanding/lack of awareness of moderate religious interpretations	HIGH
Lack of perceived dignity and respect from others/authorities	HIGH
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Perception of injustice (by the Assad regime)	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Antipathy toward Shias and Shia countries/groups	HIGH
Antipathy toward the West for their perceived agendas in the region	HIGH
Antipathy toward the West for interfering in Jordan	MEDIUM
Antipathy toward Israel	HIGH
Influx of Syrian refugees	MEDIUM
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Lack of parental monitoring	MEDIUM
Accepting extremist cleric messages/direction without question	HIGH
Reading extremist literature	HIGH
Engaging in extremist online discussion and videos	HIGH

Brief Case Studies

- A sheikh, also a Qur’an reader and mosque imam, joined JN and became its Mufti. He recruited young men through social media networks who had an average academic background. The sheikh would plant ideas, providing proof and religious evidence, particularly from the Qur’an, to convince recruits. These recruits accepted the sheikh’s scholarly credentials.
- In the early years of the Syrian revolution, jihad was openly discussed in public events such as weddings and funerals. Salafists set up preachers on podiums to extol the virtues of fighting the Assad regime. Indeed, in 2012, over 100 Arab scholars signed a document approving of jihad in Syria.
- One respondent had a friend at a Palestinian camp school who achieved good grades but became attracted to MB ideology. He went on to study engineering at the university in Tafiela. He subsequently travelled to Syria for jihad and was killed.
- A Salafist from the Souf area became increasingly disgruntled with his financial condition and began to meet and preach with others in a similar condition. His wife has not heard from him for eight months. Her family has encouraged her to divorce him on suspicion that he has become radicalized.
- A young man was studying mathematics at the Jordanian University and decided to finish his studies in Turkey where ISIS then recruited him. He called his father a week before his death and told him he would be carrying out an attack on Syrian officers in Raqqa. The recruit was very religious but the family was moderately religious. Reportedly, no one in his family could control him.
- A manager of a money exchange company in Jarash had a very good financial situation. He had a small baby girl when he left to fight in Syria. His wife was surprised when he called her from the border and told her: “I am going with Daesh, pray for me”.
- A Jordanian young man in his twenties travelled to work in Bahrain and came back to Jordan with extremist ideology and a beard. He then travelled to Syria and joined ISIS. When

he regretted his decision he connected with his family and the Jordanian government. He came back and is once more part of the community after spending some time in jail in 2015.

- One individual finished his first year in university studying engineering at the Hashmi University in Zarqa before joining JN in Syria in 2012. Before he left for Syria, he demonstrated a commitment to Islam. He prayed and fasted in accordance with the five pillars of Islam. A fellow student suggested he meet a group of people attending a mosque in Jarash on a weekly basis. This was during his studies. While studying in Zarqa, he was still living in Jarash (he had a car and drove to Zarqa) and so attended mosque there too. The individual returned to Jordan.
- Sheikh Samer, a long-devout sheikh of 40 years old, went out to fight with JN against the Syrian regime, ISIS and Shias, leaving four sons and wife and a family. He went for jihad and out of sympathy with what happened in Syria. He was a religious person, well mannered, a respectable schoolteacher, educated and an intellectual.
- A son and daughter joined a terrorist group in Syria in 2014. They went in the name of religion. They were isolated for a long time at home, and left their house without their parents' knowledge.
- A man from the Bani Hassan tribe was working in heavy machinery, selling and buying through the Internet. He was of medium build, good looking, concerned with prestige and looked well off. He went to Syria in 2011 despite being married for about nine months. His wife was pregnant and he was very happy with her pregnancy. He started taking notice of what JN was doing, in one of gathering he showed friends a video clip of JN breaking into the building of the military intelligence in Syria, and the people who did it speaking about seeing virgins in heaven and the promise of Paradise. He followed JN news on YouTube even though he used to watch the latest foreign and Indian films. He was normal and a good sportsman who played soccer and volleyball. He started showing signs of religious commitment, worshipped more and withdrew more from friends, preferring to stay at home. He sent his wife to her family house, started slacking in his job, liquidated all his work in the company, put a sum aside for his wife and went to Syria through Turkey. He said that he had chosen the best course for his wife and himself. His wife and her family and his family in Jordan were shocked. His wife was so surprised she fainted. He asked her to forgive him and name his son Abdullah.
- A man attended Friday sermons that contained talk about Shias and Syria. The man used to sit with religious men from Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Arab expatriates, who rejected events in Syria, the killing and bombing and raping. The thing that most affected him was the raping of women and mothers. He felt deep frustration and used to say that Muslims and Arabs should stand together against the Shias.
- A normal young man who was not very religious finished his university studies and went to work abroad in the UAE. There, he joined an Islamist group and came back with a beard. He became very strictly religious, and then he travelled to Syria and joined JN. He was shot there, and was sent from Syria to Turkey for therapy. Before he graduated from university he used to drink, he even fought while drunk and was arrested. He was not raised on Islam.
- Three Syrians came to Jordan as refugees, and then scattered themselves around Jarash, Ain Al Basha and Zarqa City, where they managed to recruit 12 Syrians and a Jordanian. They convinced people with money, cars and houses. Five people were recruited in Jarash. They used to meet in coffee shops and public places. The people interested were arrested in May 2015 and were sent to the court attorney and were charged for attempting to join a terrorist group (ISIS), recruiting people in terrorist organization (ISIS) and promoting terrorist ideologies.

- One 16 year old was recruited through social networks to travel to Turkey and then Syria. He told his parents he went on jihad.

2.4 MAFRAQ KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Levels of support for VEOs in Mafraq were low. Even Hamas, which several respondents in Depth Interviews (DI) described in overwhelmingly positive terms, failed to score highly across the majority of those who filled out Guided Questionnaires. Meanwhile, ISIS was the least popular VEO among locals. As in other governorates this was predominantly due to the group's brutality toward civilians (especially women), which most residents considered to be un-Islamic. The organization's murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh in February 2015 further strongly damaged its reputation. JN was more popular than ISIS, largely due to perceptions that the organization has a focused objective in tackling the Assad regime. Its eschewal of gruesome media propaganda is an additional factor accounting for its marginal popularity compared with ISIS. However, for the most part, locals also viewed JN as unacceptably violent. As for AQ, respondents regarded this group as less savage than both JN and ISIS. Its relative lack of media attention may also have played into its favor seeing as many locals were generally unaware of its recent activities.

The idea of lower media coverage resulting in higher support was consistent with the fact that the most unpopular VEO in Mafraq was ISIS, and yet it appears to be the most prevalent and conspicuous across the media. For example, respondents expressed concerns that ISIS operatives are infiltrating local refugee camps and the June 21 suicide attack at Ruqban Camp was indicative of the organization's capacity to endanger the governorate. Likewise, ISIS also features most prominently on local youths' preferred social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Even ISIS' other Internet material, such as its online magazine, Dabiq, overshadows that of rivals JN and AQ.

Unfortunately, despite overall low levels of support for VEOs, there have been notable former examples of VE behavior within the governorate. For example, in 2015 alone there were a reported 26 VEO sleeper cells uncovered in Za'atari Camp. Accordingly, there were widespread suspicions that VEO operatives are infiltrating the governorate via refugee camps and establishing sleeper cells. Likewise, King Abdullah II has voiced concerns that VEO operatives are entering the country via Ruqban Camp and Hadalat Camp, both in Rwaished district. Finally, respondents also claimed that there have been numerous Syrian preachers condoning or promoting VEOs in mosques and several "martyrs weddings" have taken place in Mafraq City. Such evidence implies that even if the majority rejects VEOs, the small minority is a powerful and capable one.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Of all the governorates, respondents from Mafraq painted one of the most worrying pictures. Their responses yielded a very high number of results within the third quartiles, a very high number within the fourth quartile, and a very high number of worst scores across all the locations. The evidence suggests that even if support levels for VEOs are low, all Influence Pathways are of potential concern and there is a significant propensity for future VE attitude and behavior.

Respondents expressed deep concern over the Jordanian government provision of services and utilities. For example, dissatisfaction over employment opportunities, running water and electricity, education and healthcare was the strongest across all locations, with additional strong dissatisfaction expressed at the lack of affordable housing. Respondents also reported high levels of debt, drug abuse, ethnic inequality, crime and the availability of weapons. In fact,

respondents also registered the highest degree of concern over bored youths and tribal inequality from across all governorates.

Unsurprisingly, this deep social malaise triggered equally negative feelings about the authorities. Respondents provided results that yielded the highest levels of belief that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of the people, that the Jordanian government does what the West says, and that the Jordanian government does not want to, and lacks the power to, control VEOs. There was also strong belief that the Jordanian government does not care about the needs of the people, that it is corrupt and that its judiciary is ineffective. Perhaps even worse, respondents believed that the Jordanian government interferes too much in other political parties and the media, and even uses anti-terror legislation as a pretext to control others.

The dire social condition and blame placed on the authorities have combined to create a strong sense of neglect and marginalization. Respondents from Mafraq were most likely to believe that the Jordanian government does not listen to them. They also expressed low confidence in voting, or in working hard, as ways to bring improvement. There is even alienation at the local levels with respondents from Mafraq most likely to report not feeling part of the community. These findings all point to a strong potential susceptibility to the Avenger Influence Pathway, with recruits partly driven by a desire to right the wrongs imposed by the Jordanian government. This was confirmed by respondents from Mafraq demonstrating the highest levels of belief that it is better to die in revenge than living in shame. VEOs could also exploit the Avenger Influence Pathway by focusing on local concern over the 'external' enemy. Respondents interpreted the impact of the US, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Europe, Israel and Syria in highly negative terms. In fact, the last of these was in reference to Syrians in Jordan as well as the Assad regime, with respondents also providing the highest belief across all governorates that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem.

Respondents not only perceived foreigners as damaging Jordan, but also Islam itself. For example, they were the strongest advocates of the belief that the West is humiliating Islam, and strongly believed that the Jordan-Israel peace treaty was a betrayal of Islam. This high level of religious extremism was also echoed across a number of other results. For example, respondents displayed the strongest belief across all governorates that Muslims and non-Muslims should avoid interaction and that religion and politics should not be kept separate. They also believed that a caliphate would help restore Islam, that Sharia should be the only source of law, that Takfirism is justifiable, and that only Islam can guarantee justice. These results point to a strong connection between the Avenger Influence Pathway and the Ideologue Influence Pathway insofar as the latter refers to religious drivers and narratives.

There were numerous other indicators that respondents tolerate and even embrace violent extremism, even if they do not support VEOs per se. For example, they reported the highest levels of belief that violent jihad in Syria and Europe, as well as against Shias, is justifiable. They also reported strong belief that violent jihad was justifiable in Israel. If there was any positive, it was that respondents were the strongest believers across governorates that religious extremism is a problem and that ISIS poses a threat. Likewise, support levels of VEOs themselves were not the highest. As such, it could be argued that locals are more sensitized to VEO dangers. Nevertheless, the situation still calls for a high degree of concern with results suggesting that a 'spark' could ignite a substantial extremist fire.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	77% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Utilities	76% were dissatisfied with running water and electricity.
Education	53% were dissatisfied with education.
Healthcare	51% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
Housing	74% were dissatisfied with affordable housing.
Central government care	76% agreed that the central government does not care about the needs of people.
Central government independence	61% agreed that the central government does what the West says.
Central government ability	51% agreed that central government does not have the power to control VE.
Central government energy	48% agreed that the central government does not want to control VE.
Royal Court	77% agreed that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of people
Government official corruption	64% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
Civil courts	37% agreed that civil courts are not effective.
Ant-terror laws	41% agreed that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others.
Government political interference	59% agreed that the government interferes too much in controlling political parties.
Government human rights	38% agreed that the government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Government media interference	60% agreed that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press.
Government listening	77% agreed that it was useless trying to get the government to listen to them.
Political empowerment	71% agreed that they did not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything
Meritocracy	66% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Sense of community	40% agreed that they did not feel part of their community.
Revenge	52% agreed that it is better to die in revenge than live in shame.
Debt	83% agreed that debt is a problem.

Boredom	88% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Tribal inequality	78% agreed that inequality between tribes is a problem.
Ethnic inequality	55% agreed that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem.
Refugee conflict	77% agreed that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem.
Religious extremism	50% agreed that religious extremism is a problem.
Crime	55% agreed that crime is a problem
Drug abuse	77% agreed that crime is a problem.
Weapons	80% agreed that availability of weapons is a problem.
US	72% agreed that the US has a negative impact on Jordan.
European Union	60% agreed that the EU has a negative impact on Jordan.
Iran	92% agreed that Iran has a negative impact on Jordan.
Turkey	31% agreed that Turkey has a negative impact on Jordan.
Syria	85% agreed that Syria has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	84% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	58% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
The West in Syria	71% agreed that Western intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Iranian influence in Syria	71% agreed that Iranian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Involvement in Syria	66% agreed that Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
The West in Jordan	67% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISIS propaganda	75% agreed that ISIS propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	55% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	67% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan
Media exaggeration	74% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
Salafist Quietism	76% expressed support for Salafist Quietists.
ISIS threat	93% agreed that ISIS is a threat to Jordan.
West against Islam	90% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam
Jordan-Israel Peace	60% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs
Caliphate	56% agreed that the Caliphate will help restore Islam.

Religiosity	72% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Sharia	74% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Takfirism	18% agreed that the practice of Takfir is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Israel	78% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Syria	54% agreed that violent jihad in Syria is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Europe	46% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Sectarianism	57% agreed that violent jihad against Shias is justifiable.
Segregation	44% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims.
Religion in politics	66% disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate.

Qualitative Key Drivers

Respondents highlighted a number of drivers that they felt contribute to support for, and engagement in, VEO ideologies. One was the feeling that government socio-economic neglect was widespread, particularly in areas accommodating large numbers of unemployed young men such as Khaldiya district and Irbid district. Respondents explained that such feelings weaken confidence in the state and reinforce the appeal of radical alternatives. A second related factor was the loss of employment and/or the experience of a decline in purchasing power, with respondents explaining that this increases the attraction of VEOs promising generous financial rewards.

A third key factor related to both the first and second, was a sense of injustice. This exists in reference to the failing of the Jordanian government but also in reference to the Assad regime atrocities committed against civilians. A fourth factor impacting on a heightened sense of injustice was what many Jordanians referred to as a propensity to become emotional. For example, they explained that this makes it easier for individuals to suffer a sort of mental 'trauma' over events such as Assad regime's tyranny, whereby individuals experience a burning sense of duty to take action by any means necessary, including by supporting and joining VEOs. This was particularly the case in 2013 when JN and ISIS did not have the burdensome negative reputation that has emerged in more recent years. However, many respondents insisted that ongoing Assad regime attacks against civilians in Syria still generates 'trauma', which in turn drives sympathy (even if not support) for VEOs engaged in opposition.

A fifth key factor was access to VEO output on social media and other Internet platforms that perpetuate the notion of a legitimate jihad against an abusive Syrian regime. Indeed, in Mafrq, this emerged as possibly the chief recruitment narrative for VEOs operative via Facebook. As in other governorates, however, it should be noted that access to VEO output is a special type of driver, and is perhaps described better as a facilitator. Notably, online messaging helps accelerate individuals along an Influence Pathway but it does not necessarily trigger initial engagement in VEOs *per se*.

A sixth key factor was the prevalence of religious extremism, believed to be a pre-cursor for the adoption of radical ideologies. For example, there was respondent concern over religious extremist drivers such as radical Sunni-Shia sectarian attitudes, absolute Sharia law, and a belief

in 'honorable jihad'. Each of these concerns shares points of commonality with VEO messaging and narratives.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Living in close proximity to large numbers of Syrian refugees (Khaldiyah district, Za'atari village)	HIGH
Being an unemployed, discharged young soldier with a developed skill-set	MEDIUM
Being a former convict	MEDIUM
Having tribal links with Syrian communities	MEDIUM
Being a young bachelor struggling to secure a marriage	MEDIUM
Living in a remote area (Badia) that lacks a regular and affordable transport system	LOW
Living in a densely populated and ethnically diverse urban environment (Mafraq City, Khaldiyah district)	LOW
Living within a religiously conservative family	LOW
Being a male aged between 16-35 years	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Believing that VEOs provide generous financial rewards	HIGH
Feeling socio-economically neglected by central government and the local municipality	HIGH
Believing that Salafist Jihadists provide a strong spiritual and socio-economic support network	HIGH
Losing employment to Syrian refugees in the low-skilled sectors	HIGH
Struggling to secure accommodation due to the influx of refugees that has driven up prices	MEDIUM
Living in an area with an absence of recreational facilities (Khaldiyah district, Irbab district, Badia regions)	MEDIUM
Being unable to obtain employment commensurate with qualifications	MEDIUM
Believing that Syrian refugees are benefitting – from the government, local employers and NGOs - at the expense of Jordanian locals	MEDIUM
Being confronted with increasing prices for basic necessities following an influx of refugees	MEDIUM
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that the government has betrayed Islam by rejecting Sharia supremacy	MEDIUM
Decrying the lack of recreational facilities and supposedly exceptional degree of state disengagement from the governorate	MEDIUM
Resenting the absence of state economic regulation – particularly the failure to enforce minimum wages amid job competition from refugees	LOW
Objecting to the government's political and economic relationship with Israel	LOW
Believing that the royalty behaves in an excessively lavish manner	LOW
Deeming the government to be politically manipulative and undemocratic	LOW
Believing that the government's anti-terrorism laws are an abuse of power	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Believing in honorable and/or obligatory jihad against 'infidels' in Syria	HIGH
Having weak religious foundations and being exposed to extremist interpretations of Islam	MEDIUM
Holding Shia-Sunni sectarian attitudes	MEDIUM
Endorsing the establishment of an Islamic caliphate on the basis of strong objection to US global hegemony and nostalgia for Islamic empires of the past	MEDIUM
Being a drug addict – especially Captagon dependent	MEDIUM
Having experienced a weakening in local tribal cohesion	LOW
Failing to distinguish between Salafist Quietists and Salafist Jihadists	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Regarding JN and/or ISIS as liberation movements in Syria	HIGH
Fearing a regional Shia expansion	HIGH
Feeling anger at Syrian regime atrocities against Muslim civilians	MEDIUM
Feeling outrage at Shia atrocities toward Sunni civilians in Iraq and Syria	MEDIUM
Harboring strong antipathy to the US, mainly for its regional interventions	MEDIUM
Believing ISIS and/or JN to be more effective than the FSA in combatting the Syrian regime	MEDIUM
Objecting to the government's collaboration with Western powers in the region	LOW
Suspecting the West of seeking to disrupt the Middle East in order to benefit its perceived colonial ambitions.	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Frequently visiting ISIS websites and following ISIS social media activity	HIGH
Following extremist Gulfi sheikhs on Internet TV channels (Aloma Channel for example)	HIGH
Participating in VEO Internet Chat forums (Facebook, Shuhada'a Al Jannah and Khaledun)	HIGH
Being exposed to Salafist Jihadist rhetoric promoting the idea of an Islamic duty to perform jihad in Syria	HIGH
Following TV news channels that broadcast ISIS and JN battleground victories	MEDIUM
Being an enthusiastic follower of Amjad Qourshah	MEDIUM
Encountering images and videos of suffering Muslims in Syria	MEDIUM
Being regularly exposed to scenes of violence on TV from a young age	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- A young man was following Islamic groups on Facebook and reading written speeches posted by their members. He later received a Facebook friend request by an Iraqi ISIS affiliate living in Ramtha (Irbid), which he accepted. The protagonist communicated with the ISIS affiliate via Facebook Chat through and the two men established a relationship. Using photos and videos that showed Syrian regime atrocities against civilians, the ISIS affiliate convinced the protagonist to travel to Syria to combat President Assad's forces. Having agreed, the protagonist met the ISIS affiliate in Irbid, where he stayed for three days with a group of other recruits. He then travelled to Iraq where he received weapons and training before crossing the border to Syria with ease using his passport. He spent almost nine months with ISIS before escaping back to Jordan via Turkey after four to five attempts.
- A local man watched many lectures by Gulfi sheikhs on TV (Aloma Channel), as well as videos of ISIS operations. He also conversed with ISIS operatives over Skype. After four days of having disappeared, he called his mother to announce that he had joined ISIS.
- A student was studying medicine in Egypt. He was achieving poor grades much to his parents' disappointment. ISIS seduced him with money after which he travelled to Aleppo via Turkey. The student's parents later travelled to Deir Ezzor (Syria) to bring back their son, for which they were obliged to pay 30,000 JD to ISIS.

3.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: CENTRAL REGION FINDINGS

3.1 BALQA KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

The majority of respondents vehemently rejected the idea of popular support in Balqa for VE and VEOs. The only major VEO supported by Balqa locals was Hamas – a fact that was to be expected, given respondents' expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and opposition to Israel. Hamas support was strongest in the refugee camp at Baqa'a, likely due to the large population of West Bank Jordanians living there. However, even here Hamas did not receive as much support as what might have been expected. This was primarily due to the perception that, with the conflict with Fatah in 2006 and its subsequent involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hamas has lost its focus of liberating Palestinians and opposing Israel. The dip in support could also be a result of the group's alliances with questionable entities and organizations, namely, the regime of Bashar Al Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah.

Though AQ had historically counted on at least some fervent supporters in Balqa, current levels were low and respondents claimed that many former supporters have shifted focus to other more active and publicized VEOs, such as JN and ISIS. These groups, though unpopular, have reportedly gained some degree of support in the governorate, albeit in different ways. For example, respondents believed that media attention propelled ISIS to the heights of its prominence, and that JN has recently ventured to change its image in order to appeal to more people. However, ISIS brutality has led to the loss of many supporters who have switched to JN after the group has reportedly gone to great lengths to appeal to more moderate Muslims.

Although there was no indication that either JN or ISIS has been successful in convincing locals to support them, several respondents warned that VE is on the rise in certain areas of the governorate, and particularly in the districts of Fuhais, Mahes, Ain Al Basha, Baqa'a, and Salt Qasabah. In Salt alone, respondents named six communities, Aleayzaria, Qsam, Aalbaqie, Mansheyeh, Al Jada'a, and Al Ezareyye, as especially vulnerable to VE. For these respondents, the rise in VE is evident not only through increased crime in these areas, but also through increased instances of public support for fallen VEO members. For example, several claimed that as more Jordanians fall in battle in Iraq and Syria, their families continue to stage martyrdom ceremonies to honor them – events that are reportedly well attended not only by surviving family members but also prominent members of the community. The phenomenon emphasizes the ongoing threat posed by the glorification of fighters.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents from Balqa provided many responses that fell within the third quartile, many that fell within the fourth quartile, and many that were the worst of their kind across all of the locations tested. As a result, even if professed levels of support for VEO are low, Balqa presents significant concern with regards to future potential engagement in VE and VEOs. A first set of worrying scores revolved around perceived social failings. For example, many respondents were dissatisfied with education and strongly dissatisfied with employment opportunities, healthcare and housing. In the case of the last of these, scores were the highest across all locations. Likewise, there was agreement that tribal inequality between tribes is a problem, and strong agreement that the same was the case with ethnic inequality, drug abuse, debt and the availability of weapons. In fact, the last two of these yielded the highest scores across all governorates.

As seen in other locations, this deep level of social concern was accompanied by equally strong negative impressions of the authorities. For example, there was strong agreement that the Jordanian government is corrupt and agreement in Balqa was strongest compared to all other governorates that the Jordanian government does not care about the needs of the people. Even stronger condemnation was reserved for the Jordanian government's work in the security

domain. For example, scores were highest compared to all other locations that the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) lack the ability to keep locals safe and do not behave in a respectful way, that the civil courts are not effective, and that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others. Likewise, scores were highest for belief that the Jordanian government interferes too much in controlling political parties and the media, and that it does not respect human rights and freedoms. In other words, respondents were concerned about perceived government oppression and injustice – traditionally considered key triggers for potential VEO recruits.

These perceptions have also fueled frustration and the belief that it is useless trying to get the government to listen or to vote as it does not change anything – perhaps this result also helps explain why respondents from Balqa were the strongest supporters of the IAF. Equally worrying was the propensity to place blame on an array of international actors for their involvement in Syria and Jordan, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West more generally. All of these findings indicate vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway; a theory held up by results that included the strongest belief of all governorates that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs, and agreement that violent jihad in Israel and Europe is justifiable.

However, as in other governorates of particular concern, there is additional evidence of susceptibility to other Influence Pathways. For example, there was strong agreement that members of VEOs always look after each other and that they are skilled fighters. Likewise, there was agreement that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money. Such findings imply a vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway. Meanwhile, agreement that the Caliphate will help restore Islam and that the practice of Takfir is justifiable, coupled with disagreement that Islam does not allow the killing of other people and strong disagreement that people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose, all point to religious extremism and a subsequent vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

Respondents from Balqa showed the highest levels of support for JN, strong (relatively speaking) levels of support for ISIS and strongest disagreement that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable. Although there are ways to explain some of these levels, such as sympathy not equaling active support, the overall picture painted by these results suggests that Balqa should be one of the most concerning governorates researched.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	71% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Education	38% were dissatisfied with education.
Healthcare	42% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
Housing	75% were dissatisfied with affordable housing.
Central government care	78% agreed that the central government does not care about the needs of people.
Central government independence	59% agreed that the central government does what the West says.
Central government ability	41% agreed that the central government does not have the power to control VE.

Central government energy	41% agreed that the central government does not want to control VE.
Government official corruption	68% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
Police reliability	37% agreed that the police are not reliable.
Civil courts	48% agreed that the civil courts are not effective.
JAF ability	29% agree that the JAF lack the ability to keep locals safe.
JAF culture	28% agree that the JAF do not behave in a respectful way.
Anti-terror laws	58% agreed that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others.
Government political interference	63% agreed that the government interferes too much in controlling political parties.
Government human rights	62% agreed that the government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Government media interference	74% agreed that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press.
Government listening	75% agreed that it was useless trying to get the government to listen to them.
Political empowerment	66% agreed that they did not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything.
Meritocracy	66% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Sense of Community	36% agreed that they did not feel part of their community.
Debt	90% agreed that debt is a problem.
Tribal inequality	66% agreed that inequality between tribes is a problem.
Ethnic inequality	62% agreed that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem.
Drug abuse	74% agreed that crime is a problem.
Weapons	81% agreed that availability of weapons is a problem.
Saudi Arabia	35% agreed that Saudi Arabia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Turkey	50% agreed that Turkey has a negative impact on Jordan.
West in Syria	82% agreed that Western intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Involvement in Syria	59% agreed that Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
The West in Jordan	64% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	58% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.

Media exaggeration	60% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
JN	28% expressed support for JN.
ISIS	14% expressed support for ISIS.
FSA	54% expressed support for the FSA.
Hezbollah	33% expressed support for Hezbollah.
Salafist Quietism	53% expressed support for Salafist Quietists.
IAF	72% expressed support for the IAF.
ISIS threat	82% agreed that ISIS is a threat to Jordan.
Returned fighters	34% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS Intervention	45% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.
West against Islam	74% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Jordan-Israel Peace	69% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs
Caliphate	47% agreed that the Caliphate will help restore Islam.
Takfirism	19% agreed that the practice of Takfir is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Israel	74% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Europe	33% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Violent jihad for wealth	50% agreed that violent jihadism is an easy way to earn money.
VEO brotherhood	47% agreed that members of VEOs always look after each other.
VEO skills	47% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Segregation	42% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims.
Freedom of choice	33% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.
Religious violence	24% disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people.

Qualitative Key Drivers

Respondents claimed that one of the main factors increasing propensity toward VE in Balqa is high unemployment and cost of living. They explained that across Balqa thousands of residents are either without jobs, or anticipating the loss of their jobs. Likewise, prices for everyday commodities like food, gasoline, and water have gone up in recent years. Realizing the significance of the problem, the central government pledged more than seven million JD to fund development projects throughout the governorate in 2015. However, locals still complained about the lack of jobs in their neighborhood and reasoned that if nothing is done to help them,

young people who are not able to find work may either turn to violent crime, or join the ranks of VEOs such as ISIS, who reportedly promise high wages in return for membership.

A second key factor was the presence of Syrian refugees in Balqa. Locals worried that the influx is so large that Balqa cannot handle the socio-economic strain. Specifically, many were concerned that refugees are invading the job market, interfering with their access to basic services like healthcare, and taking a bigger share of the best houses available in the governorate. Many respondents believed that tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens will increase in the near future. A third key factor was perceived government corruption. Locals were convinced that, in order to get ahead in their society, one must have connections. However, they feared that the most powerful people in their country, members of the central government, do not care about the needs of the people. In particular, they cited recent privatization deals for the expansion of the potash, phosphate, cement, water, transportation, and banking industries as instances in which the richest Jordanians have used their influence to make a considerable amount of money, all while thousands go without work. They warned that should these crimes go unresolved Jordanian youth, the most politically astute in the country, may seek revenge either through open rebellion or through crime.

A fourth key factor was the concern that the national curriculum is somewhat out of touch with the times and unreasonably difficult. Respondents explained that this frustrates students and may also push them to religious extremism and VE. Several even claimed that literature classes still feature the works of ideologues praised by VEOs. Education is also a factor outside of schools. For instance, Salafist Jihadist religious leaders in Al Salalem and Salt are reported to patrol the Streets late into the evening, encouraging youth to attend prayer times and threatening them with divine punishment. A final key factor was fear that VEOs who portray themselves as defenders of Islam or opponents of Western hegemony, such as ISIS but also AQ, might be able to convince young people to join their ranks.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Having family members who joined VEOs in Syria/Iraq	HIGH
Having family members who previously fought in Afghanistan/Iraq	HIGH
Being a member of the local Salafist Jihadist community	HIGH
Living on minimum wage/below the poverty line	MEDIUM
Being unemployed/outside of the formal education system	MEDIUM
Being a convicted criminal / Involvement in petty crime	MEDIUM
Being a current or former drug addict	MEDIUM
Being male	LOW
Being young, especially aged 15 to 25 years	LOW
Being poorly educated	LOW
Being single	LOW
Being Sunni Muslim	LOW
Being a member of the MB/IAF	LOW
Being from Salt, Baqa'a refugee camp, or economically marginalized parts of the governorate.	LOW
Being a member of a politically marginalized and poorly integrated tribe or not a member of a local tribe at all	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Exposure radical religious messages at religious lessons and other subjects at mosques, schools, and universities	HIGH
Support from the Salafist Jihadist community in obtaining work and incomes, most notably in Baqa'a refugee camp	MEDIUM
Perceived absence of government services and that access to most government services (such as healthcare or garbage collection among others) is markedly worse in marginalized areas, such as Baqa'a refugee camp	MEDIUM
Perception that financial pressure is overly burdensome and inescapable, resulting from factors such as high prices, stagnant wages, and high household debt	MEDIUM
Lack of access to quality primary, secondary, and tertiary education	LOW
Lack of access to arts and cultural activities	LOW
Lack of access to extracurricular leisure, sports, and recreational activities	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Desire to fill free time and presence of religious activities as a main low cost option.	LOW
Perceived lack of access to employment opportunities and obstacles to entering the job market	LOW
Perceived pressure on government services such as access to healthcare and education as a result of the influx of Syrian refugees.	LOW
Perceived pressure on the housing market, leading to higher housing and other living costs, as a result of the influx of Syrian refugees	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Belief that joining VEOs in Syria/Iraq offers a means of directly engaging with issues, especially since the failure to implement political reforms, notably restrictions on the power of the King, fuel disappointment in the aftermath of Arab Spring inspired protests in 2011/2012	MEDIUM
Lack of confidence that the government has the desire and ability to control the recruitment of locals into VEOs in Syria/Iraq; perception that the government maintained loose border controls, tacitly supported locals joining VEOs in Syria/Iraq, and lack of confidence in the ability of the government to control the flow of local fighters into Syria/Iraq	MEDIUM
Perception that it is easy to join VEOs in Syria/Iraq without suffering consequences from the government	LOW
Perceived widespread corruption and nepotism among both central and local government and officials	LOW
Perception that the government has betrayed the people and that local government officials work to advance their personal wealth rather than address the needs and grievances of people	LOW
Limited/inadequate police presence and perception that the police are guilty of incidents of violence but able to act with impunity	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Exposure to radical religious views (e.g., the necessity of participating in justifiable jihad, the establishment of a caliphate, and the need for religion to play a greater role in the justice and governance systems)	HIGH
Exposure to radical religious views and desire to achieve religious goals	HIGH
Exposure to radical religious figures, for instance of Salafist Jihadist leaders in Salt and ISIS-affiliated individuals in Baqa'a refugee camp	HIGH
Involvement in drugs and crime and incarceration, especially if these activities involve contact with the Salafist Jihadist community	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Disillusionment with political processes and lack of confidence that voting/petitioning the government can achieve change	MEDIUM
Desire to feel empowered as a member of a community that achieves successful gains	MEDIUM
Belief that participation in legitimate jihad will yield religious benefits, ranging from martyrdom and access to the Hoor Al Ayn [chaste women in heaven] to being absolved from sins	MEDIUM
Perception that some tribes (most notably the Hiyari) are favored by the central government/Royal Court over others, are better represented within government, and therefore able achieve benefits for their members	LOW
Feeling socially disenfranchised and marginalized from the local tribal structure/community	LOW
Perception that Syrian refugees are putting high and rising pressure on limited government services and employment opportunities	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Anger toward the Assad regime for current and former aggression	HIGH
Perceptions that VEOs are powerful actors that have been successful in countering the Assad Regime and other actors	HIGH
Perception that the US/EU are targeting (Sunni) Muslims, humiliating Islam, and damaging the region, especially as a result of contact with locals who fought in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars	MEDIUM
Fear of Shia and Iranian expansionism in the region	MEDIUM
Fear of Israeli meddling in the region	MEDIUM
VEO narratives portraying Sunni Muslims as under attack and encouraging jihad against the Alawite Assad Regime, Iran, and Shia militias/VEOs	MEDIUM
Conviction that jihad against Israel is next on the agenda of VEOs and/or is a greater priority than participation in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq	MEDIUM
Belief that VEOs are capable of, and have been successful in, standing up to the West in Syria/Iraq	LOW
Perception that the West is interfering in Jordan and the region, worsening the situation, and is responsible for destroying Syria, Iraq, and other countries in the region	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP

DEFINITION	DEGREE
Access to an online social community of Salafist Jihadists and VEO members (active both locally and abroad) who promote VEO narratives	HIGH
Access to an online social community of Salafist Jihadists and VEO members (active both locally and abroad) who promote VEO narratives and facilitate recruitment into VEOs in Syria/Iraq	HIGH
Exposure to VEO propaganda online, on social media, and face-to-face	MEDIUM
Exposure to narratives that worsen tensions between the local Sunni Muslim and Christian communities	LOW
Exposure to sectarian narratives that contribute to hatred against Shias	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One man claimed to be a relative/descendent of one of the founding members of the Jordanian MB. He said that, though there are clear differences between the MB and Salafist Jihadists, the relationship between these two groups has blossomed in recent years, particularly in Salt. He reported that, as a result of this new dynamic, nearly all of his cousins – who, for years, were stringent supporters of the MB but had never associated with VEOs – have now joined the ranks of radical groups like AQ and JN. Two, he claimed, had even joined ISIS after the Arab Spring. That said, the older generation of MB members are reportedly not as comfortable with the support younger MB members are showing jihadists. For instance, the father of the two family members who joined ISIS was said to have paid a considerable amount of money to retrieve his sons after their departure. Once he discovered their location, they were transported back to Jordan and prohibited from socializing with the Salafists in Salt.
- One man claimed to have been acquainted with a young man who joined JN in 2014. He said that his friend had various mental handicaps that prevented him from blending in to Balqa society, and that people were apt to bully him. He reportedly found an outlet in the Salafist Jihadist community in Salt. They accepted him for who he was and told him that he could do great things for Islam by going on jihad. He was then connected to JN recruiters and eventually sent to Syria via Turkey. He remained there until his death in 2015 or 2016.
- One man reported that he knew of an entire family in Salt who radicalized within a couple of years. He said that their relationship dated back to 1996, and that they had always been normal, moderate Muslims. However, in 2012, he noticed that they started changing. One son, a lawyer, quit his job because it was haram and started a small business in town. He began dressing differently, wearing only Afghani attire, and began going to the mosque on a regular basis. The other son changed in a similar way and lost his normal sense of humor. In 2013, both brothers left Jordan for Syria, surprising the community. One joined ISIS; the other, JN. The one who joined JN returned to Jordan after a stint of fighting; however, Hamza, the one who joined ISIS, stayed in Syria. He rose through the ranks and was reported to have participated in a number of battles, including that in Homs, where he was reportedly aiding the efforts of the FSA to resist regime forces. He died there in 2015 and was declared a

martyr by those in his home community, including his parents, who radicalized but stayed behind in Jordan.

- A young man from the Al Ghneimat tribe joined ISIS. At the time, he was a third-year engineering student at the Hashemite University in Zarqa. He joined ISIS in Syria, but also fought in Iraq, where he died in 2015. He had a cousin who joined an unknown but rival VEO in Syria; however, because no one has heard from him in a year and a half, he is presumed to be dead.
- It was reported that two brothers who had developed connections with the Salafist Jihadists in Salt attempted to join JN in Syria in 2015. However, when their parents discovered their intentions, they reported them to security forces. The brothers were apprehended in Amman shortly before their final departure and were taken back to their families.

3.2 AMMAN KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

In general, the vast majority of respondents did not consider radicalization, VE and VEO support as significant issues in Amman. However certain areas of the city and certain groups were often associated with radical views and VEO participation. For example, respondents repeatedly identified economically deprived neighborhoods including Wehdat, Hay Nazzal and Marka as centers of radicalism in the governorate, which they often linked to the presence of Salafists, mainly those of the Jihadist grouping. Salafist Jihadists have been known to physically disrupt local cultural events in Wehdat on the basis that such behavior is not Islamic, and they were often viewed with suspicion and resentment. A few respondents also accused the MB of radicalizing youths and increasing the risk of involvement with VEOs through studying at one of many MB-run Qur'an centers in Amman. Radicalization was also believed to take place at mosques and universities in the governorate, as well as state-run schools, whose curriculum was condemned by some respondents for containing material that encourages radical views by glorifying jihad and martyrdom and discouraging mixing between faiths.

Though the majority remained critical of JN as a violent, Islamic non-state actor and some associated it with other VEOs including ISIS and AQ, it was nonetheless regarded as a legitimate representative of Syrians oppressed by the Assad regime by a significant minority. Its legitimacy derived from the belief that it was fighting against the Assad regime and some even described it as an organization with political, rather than purely military or ideological goals, in contrast to ISIS and its wishes to establish an Islamic caliphate. Indeed, JN was often positively contrasted with ISIS, which was considered far more brutal.

Though there was some support for AQ, few considered it a significant or powerful organization and as in any governorates the bulk of its support derived from residual respect and admiration either for former leader Osama Bin Laden or the group's opposition to the US. Furthermore, there was some confusion as to the exact relationship between AQ and other VEOs including ISIS, meaning that it was sometimes blamed for the behavior of these groups, including the murder of Kasasbeh. As for ISIS itself, support levels were very low and respondents identified the televised execution of Kasasbeh as the defining moment in which support for ISIS fell dramatically. Even a year after his death graffiti and posters glorifying his memory were still in evidence in various neighborhoods in Amman including Downtown and Weibdeh.

Finally, support for Hamas was extremely pronounced in Amman and the vast majority thought locals in their communities endorsed the armed Palestinian group. This was not solely a reflection of the significant proportion of Amman's population with West Bank heritage but also an indication of widespread sympathy for Palestinians and hostility to Israel. It may also have reflected the impact of MB support for Hamas. For example, the political party organized a rally in Amman in support of Hamas during Israel's bombing campaign against Gaza in October 2014 that attracted up to 15,000 people.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Amman scores generate considerable concern given that many sat within the third and fourth quartiles, and many of those in the latter were the worst scores across all the locations. Firstly, respondents expressed dissatisfaction over the Jordanian government provision of services and utilities, particularly employment healthcare and affordable housing. Likewise, there was concern over levels of crime, drug abuse and boredom. As in other locations featuring the same degree of social challenges, this was accompanied by strong suspicion about the Jordanian

government's level of commitment to caring for people, its involvement in corruption, and its use of anti-terror laws and other means to exert control over political parties, the media and the people. In Amman, this also included questioning the ability and respect shown by security apparatuses such as the police and the JAF. In fact, respondents in Amman agreed most strongly compared to other locations that police are not reliable. Secondly, this lack of confidence in authorities was accompanied by a sense of neglect, marginalization and hopelessness. For example, respondents believed that the Jordanian government does not listen to them, that there is no point to voting as it doesn't change anything, and that working hard does not pay. This marginalization even exists at the communal level – despite being the country's largest urban center, respondents from Amman displayed the strongest belief that they did not feel part of their community. Thirdly, there was evidence of profound antipathy toward the impact of foreign nations in both Jordan and Syria. This antipathy was Western-centric although belief in the negative impact of Israel and Syria were also the highest across all locations. Unsurprisingly, respondents therefore were also most likely to agree that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable, and also agreed strongly that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable and that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs. All of these findings strongly suggest that the Avenger Influence Pathway could resonate particularly strongly among potential recruits in Amman.

Unfortunately, there were also clear signs of susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway, especially given the evidence for religious extremism. For example, significant numbers believed that the West is humiliating Islam, agreed that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims, disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate, and disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people. In addition, there was also reason to suspect vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway. For example, respondents expressed the highest levels of conviction across all locations researched that members of VEOs are skilled fighters and always look after each other, implying that significant numbers of people still acknowledge the tangible and non-tangible rewards associated with VEOs even if they might reject the idea of actually joining such organizations.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the seriousness of other findings, there were significantly high levels of support for a range of VEOs including JN, ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In fact, the scores for the last three were the highest across all locations. Part of the problem – perhaps given the fact that Amman is the capital – is the role of the media. For example, respondents here also agreed the most compared to other governorates that the Internet and social media is fueling VE in Jordan. However, part of the problem is also any inequality and lack of social cohesion.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	58% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Healthcare	41% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
Housing	72% were dissatisfied with affordable housing.
Central government care	57% agreed that the central government does not care about the needs of people.
Central government independence	49% agreed that the central government does what the West says.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Government official corruption	62% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
Police reliability	42% agreed that the police are not reliable.
JAF ability	24% agree that the JAF lack the ability to keep locals safe.
JAF culture	21% agree that the JAF do not behave in a respectful way.
Anti-terror laws	38% agreed that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others.
Government political interference	61% agreed that the government interferes too much in controlling political parties.
Government human rights	56% agreed that the government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Government media interference	70% agreed that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press.
Government listening	59% agreed that it was useless trying to get the government to listen to them.
Political empowerment	63% agreed that they did not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything.
Meritocracy	63% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Sense of community	40% agreed that they did not feel part of their community.
Revenge	42% agreed that it is better to die in revenge than live in shame.
Boredom	76% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Refugee conflict	64% agreed that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem.
Religious extremism	40% agreed that religious extremism is a problem.
Crime	54% agreed that crime is a problem.
Drug abuse	68% agreed that crime is a problem.
The West in Jordan	57% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
Media exaggeration	64% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
US	64% agreed that the US has a negative impact on Jordan.
European Union	52% agreed that the EU has a negative impact on Jordan.
Syria	90% agreed that Syria has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	97% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
West in Syria	57% agreed that Western intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	71% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
Media exaggeration	64% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
JN	22% expressed support for JN.
ISIS	15% expressed support for ISIS.
Hezbollah	45% expressed support for Hezbollah.
Hamas	82% expressed support for Hamas.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir	41% expressed support for Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Salafist Jihadism	16% expressed support for Salafist Jihadists.
IAF	66% expressed support for the IAF.
Returned fighters	41% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS intervention	35% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.
West against Islam	73% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Jordan-Israel Peace	65% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs.
Takfirism	20% agreed that the practice of Takfir is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Israel	80% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Europe	44% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Violent jihad for wealth	55% agreed that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money.
VEO brotherhood	54% agreed that members of VEOs always look after each other.
VEO skills	53% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Segregation	32% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims.
Religion in politics	56% disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate.
Religious violence	26% disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people.

Qualitative Key Drivers

Many respondents identified a link between unemployment and/or financial hardship and VEO participation. Specifically, those from poorer areas such as Wehdad and Hay Nazzal were seen as more likely to consider VEO participation in order to earn money to support themselves and their families, and also to harbor a sense of resentment toward society and the establishment.

Furthermore, the majority of locals in poorer areas of Amman like Hay Nazzal are of West Bank origins, leading some to assume that there is a link between VEO participation and West Bank ethnicity. This was reinforced by the impression that East Bank locals, particularly those from tribes like the Abu Zeid, tend to be supportive of the central government and Royal Court and to oppose VEOs. As such, respondents felt they were less likely to join VEOs or become radicalized.

Despite the presumed link between poverty and vulnerability to radical ideologies, respondents were also keen to stress that graduates and those who enjoyed a stable financial situation were also be vulnerable to radicalization. In particular, several respondents highlighted how local universities including the University of Jordan are places where youths can become exposed to radical views. In some cases, fault was placed on the curriculum. In others, it was exposure to the radical views of peers, some of whom are Salafists and/or members of the MB. A further complication was that educated and relatively well-off youths have considerably high levels of expectation and when such levels are not met, the subsequent sense of frustration can be particularly acute.

Salafist Jihadists were more unpopular than Quietists for their heavy-handed behavior in some parts of the city, notably in Wehdat, where they have in the past established their own Sharia courts and tried to judge locals for their 'Islamic behavior'. Other respondents insisted that Salafists encourage their adherents to consider participation in jihad in Syria. Respondents clarified that they did not believe Salafist Quietists actively endorse or encourage jihad but nonetheless believed that this ideology could act as a gateway to Salafist Jihadism and subsequent VEO membership.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a self-identifying Salafist Jihadist	HIGH
Believing that the necessity of engaging in jihad currently applies to Syria and Iraq	HIGH
Being a male youth in the age bracket 16 to 30 years	MEDIUM
Being a self-identifying Salafist Quietist	MEDIUM
Coming from an economically deprived area of the governorate (e.g., Wehdat, Hay Nazzal)	MEDIUM
Coming from an area known for religious extremism (Inc. Wehdat, Hay Nazzal, Marka)	MEDIUM
Being single and having no dependents	MEDIUM
Being a convicted criminal and having been exposed to extreme religious views in prison	MEDIUM
Being poorly educated or not having completed secondary education	MEDIUM
Having a close friend who has joined a VEO in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM
Having a relative who has joined a VEO in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Being a member of the MB or being involved in MB social activities and/or Qur'an centers	LOW
Being religiously conservative and attending a mosque at least once a week	LOW
Being wealthy enough to afford travel to Turkey	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Struggling financially and believing that VEOs offer high salaries	HIGH
Being exposed to extreme religious messages within the school curriculum - Schoolbooks describe jihad as a religious obligation if Islamic lands are attacked and imply that it can be justified to kill captured enemies.	MEDIUM
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities and unable to find work abroad	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with poor municipal infrastructure including roads and water and electricity network, seeing poor service provision as evidence of local and central government failings.	LOW
Being frustrated with weak healthcare provision and/or being unable to afford expensive treatments (e.g., for cancer)	LOW
Receiving a poor education in the government-run system	LOW
Struggling to afford housing due to increased pressure from refugees and foreign buyers and workers	LOW
Struggling with personal debts	LOW
Believing that one's neighborhood receives worse and/or less frequent local service provision (e.g., garbage collection, water availability) than wealthier areas in West Amman (e.g., Abdoun, Sweifiyeh)	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Suffering from oppression by the security services, especially during protests	HIGH
Rejecting the system of monarchical democracy in Jordan, often as part of the Salafist belief structure	HIGH
Suffering from excessive surveillance by the security services	HIGH
Belief that the only way to bring change in Jordan is through violence	HIGH
Believing that the central government is beholden to Jordan's Western allies	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in the central and municipal governments	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that anti-terror laws are being used to stifle free speech	LOW
Believing that the freedom of the press is being constrained	LOW
Being frustrated with a closed political system (As MP candidates must be approved by the central government/King)	LOW
Anger at central government failure to respect human rights	LOW
Thinking that there is no point in voting and taking no part in the democratic process in Jordan	LOW
Being frustrated with the perceived indifference of King and/or Royal Court to issues facing locals	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Feeling estranged from one's community (especially male youths)	HIGH
Being incarcerated (after expressing support for perceived moderate Islamic groups including the MB)	HIGH
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities	MEDIUM
Being incarcerated (following involvement in criminal activity)	MEDIUM
Being incarcerated (following return from VEO participation abroad)	MEDIUM
Holding conservative religious views (without subscribing to Salafism)	LOW
Believing that Islam should have a greater role in the way that Jordan is governed or thinking that Sharia should be the sole source of law	LOW
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially in tribal areas	LOW
Being a drug addict/user as drugs are cheap and widely available in Amman, and some are made locally including the amphetamine Captagon and synthetic cannabis Joker	LOW
Believing the central government does not respond to locals' concerns	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Wanting to fight against the Assad regime in Syria due to its persecution of Sunni Syrians	HIGH
Believing that Iran is having a negative effect on Jordan and/or the region by persecuting Sunnis and supporting the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Being angry at the treatment of Syrians by the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region and linking it to US foreign policy, especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Being angry toward Israel for its persecution of Palestinians and historical occupation of Palestine.	MEDIUM
Viewing the FSA a corrupt and ineffective making VEOs more attractive for those wishing to fight against the Assad regime and/or its Iranian allies	MEDIUM
Belief that VEOs will ultimately free Palestine once they have defeated the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Having a positive view of both Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist ideology	MEDIUM
Disagreeing with Jordanian military involvement in Syria	LOW
Being angry toward Israel for its treatment of Palestinians, both historically in 1948 and subsequently, and more recently in the West Bank and Gaza	LOW
Being frustrated with Jordan's relationship with Israel, including the maintenance of the 1992 peace treaty.	LOW
Belief that jihad in Europe is justifiable	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Being exposed to VE messages online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	HIGH
Being exposed to ISIS propaganda over the Internet/social media	HIGH
Believing that jihad in Syria is justifiable	HIGH
Believing that jihad against Shia Muslims is justifiable	MEDIUM
Being exposed to images of suffering of Syrians via the Internet or television channels, especially Al Jazeera	MEDIUM
Being exposed to sectarian rhetoric that encourages fighting Shias (and Alawites) either online or through television or radio programs	MEDIUM
Believing that the West is insulting Islam and humiliating Muslims either actively through legislation like that banning the face veil in France or by tolerating actions including the publishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo and previously in Danish media outlets	MEDIUM
Believing that VEO members are good fighters and mutually supportive	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable due to its insults to Islam and Muslims and for European nations' support of US wars in the region, or their colonial pasts in the Middle East	LOW
Believing that jihad in Israel is justifiable	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One individual, a male youth from a West Bank family living in the Marka neighborhood, made contact with an ISIS recruiter through Twitter on his own initiative, then traveled to Syria via Turkey to join ISIS.
- One individual, a male youth from a West Bank family living in the Hay Nazzal neighborhood, was radicalized following contact with fellow students at the Sharia college in Amman and traveled to Syria via Egypt and Turkey to join JN.
- One individual, a male youth from the Wehdat neighborhood who attended the Science Faculty at the University of Jordan, traveled to Syria to join an unspecified VEO.
- One individual, a married father in his 50's from Amman Qasabah was a lifelong jihadist supporter who traveled to Syria via Egypt and Turkey to join ISIS in March 2013.
- One individual, a married 27-year-old father of West Bank origins from the Wehdat neighborhood, was recruited in person by a Salafist Jihadist in Wehdat and traveled to Syria to join JN.
- One individual, a male shopkeeper in his 40's from the Wehdat neighborhood, traveled to Syria in 2011 to join JN. He returned and was believed to act as a recruiter for JN in Wehdat.

3.3 ZARQA KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Despite its reputation as a jihadist hub and home governorate of former AQ in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the majority of respondents in Zarqa did not consider radicalization and VE to be serious issues in the governorate. However, several locals from Zarqa have joined VEOs including ISIS and JN in Syria and Iraq, and the governorate is also home to the largest communities of Salafist Jihadists in the country, particularly in the Saifa neighborhood of Zarqa City and the town of Rusaifeh. Salafist Jihadists were strongly associated with VEO support and have been known to attend “martyr’s weddings” in the governorate held to celebrate the deaths of locals killed fighting in Syria. There have also been a series of demonstrations and public gatherings in Zarqa City orchestrated by Salafist Jihadists that have either glorified VEOs, notably ISIS, or opposed the central government. Although the best known of these demonstrations was held as far back as 2011 it resulted in injuries to up to 80 members of the security forces and hundreds of arrests.

Although ISIS attracted the most support of any VEO in Zarqa, the vast majority still expressed opposition to this group as well as JN and AQ. Support for ISIS in the governorate was widely linked with the Salafist Jihadist community, who some respondents suspected not only of sympathizing with the VEO but also attempting to recruit locals to travel to Syria to join this group. However, outside of the Salafist Jihadist community support for ISIS was believed to have declined in recent years as many locals have turned against the VEO as a result of its brutal tactics. Despite being from the governorate, former AQI leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was not popular among respondents, many of whom strongly criticized him and referenced his past as a drug user and petty criminal prior to becoming a VEO member. Likewise, JN enjoys limited overall appeal, was frequently described as a “terrorist” organization, and often negatively associated with other VEOs and accused of perpetuating the Syrian conflict rather than helping to bring it to a conclusion. Respondents again claimed that mostly Salafist Jihadists have been involved in recruiting local youths, although a few acknowledged that JN’s opposition to the Assad regime and protection of Sunni civilians had won it some broad base appeal.

Hamas was popular in the governorate, largely because many locals are of West Bank heritage (at least half of the population according to some). Support was also especially pronounced in areas known to have many West Bank Jordanian residents, such as Bierain. However, Hamas’s influence in the West Bank community is limited by sympathies for rival Palestinian political organization Fatah, and its popularity has also declined in Zarqa given negative reactions to its style of governance in Gaza, which some felt was unnecessarily repressive.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents in Zarqa demonstrated few scores of concern in terms of the number of results within the third or fourth quartiles, or the small number of worst scores of their kind across the locations tested. Furthermore, although respondents in Zarqa expressed the highest levels of dissatisfaction with healthcare, and concern over housing and debt, there were fewer third and fourth quartile markers related to social issues than in some other locations. This subsequently translated into an equivalent reduced level of criticism against the Jordanian government, although there was some concern over how the JAF relates to members of the public and the degree of government independence from the West.

Despite less evidence for antipathy toward the Jordanian government, the same was not true of ‘external’ enemies; with respondents agreeing that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Russia all

have a negative impact on Jordan. Likewise, there was agreement that Western and Iranian intervention in Syria is also fueling VE in Jordan. Israel in particular was singled out and respondents complained that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs. As a result of this sensitivity to foreign 'agendas' and influences, there is reason to suspect vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway, as further evidenced by strong agreement that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable, and agreement that the same is true of violent jihad in Europe.

Although other markers of support for VE and VEO could have been higher, there were a few worrying scores. First and foremost was the support level for ISIS, but additional examples included scores for Salafist Jihadism and Takfirism. It is important to contextualize these scores – their absolute values remain low. However, given the historical presence of VE and VEO-related activity in the governorate, there is still some cause for concern. Another score of concern was the uneasy relationship with the media. For example, respondents agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan but also acknowledged that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan. The Jordanian government has taken steps to monitor and control online recruitment but it is clear that this remains a concern for many in Zarqa.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Healthcare	46% were dissatisfied with healthcare.
Housing	62% were dissatisfied with affordable housing.
Central government independence	44% agreed that the central government does what the West says.
JAF Culture	17% agree that the JAF do not behave in a respectful way.
Debt	71% agreed that debt is a problem.
Religious extremism	40% agreed that religious extremism is a problem.
Saudi Arabia	24% agreed that Saudi Arabia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Turkey	32% agreed that Turkey has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	81% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	62% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
West in Syria	63% agreed that Western intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Iranian in Syria	59% agreed that Iranian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	54% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	61% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
Media exaggeration	59% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
ISIS	15% expressed support for ISIS.
Salafist Jihadism	15% expressed support for Salafist Jihadists.
West against Islam	76% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Jordan-Israel Peace	64% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs
Violent jihad in Israel	72% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Takfirism	23% agreed that Takfirism is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Europe	30% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
VEO skills	43% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Religious violence	21% disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people.

Qualitative Key Drivers

Male youths between the ages of 16 and 30 were widely considered the demographic most at risk of radicalization in the governorate, not least because there is a high rate of unemployment for high school and university graduates. Consequently, respondents reasoned that many youths are unable to find work in the governorate and become bored and frustrated, further explaining that this is compounded by a lack of youth clubs or social activities to occupy their time. A scarcity of alternatives also reportedly leads youths to other key drivers such as to drug abuse, alcohol, and petty crime. Many respondents believed that not only was this a further stepping-stone toward engagement in VE but also that there had been several cases of criminals arrested and jailed only to become at even greater risk of radicalization inside the prison system.

A third key factor was that Salafists, both Quietists and Jihadists, have been able to play on the conservative atmosphere in Zarqa, as many locals are observant and religiously conservative Sunni Muslims, and while they represent a fraction of the population of the governorate, Jordan's second most populous, they have contributed to concerns among locals that religious extremism is an issue. Notably, many respondents were worried that the presence of Salafist Jihadists in the governorate can also lead youths and older locals to become more radical in their religious views and to embrace an ideology that sees jihad as the duty of every conscientious Muslim. Some respondents believed that this process of radicalization can start with membership of the more moderate MB and end in VEO sympathy and/or participation following the adoption of a Salafist belief structure.

Other than increasingly radical religious views, another key factor driving locals to support or join VEOs was strong sympathy for the suffering of Syrians and a sense of religious duty to help Sunni Syrians oppressed by the Alawite Assad regime. A final related key factor, given the depth and extent of fighting in Syria, was sectarian sentiment against Shia Muslims. For example, many respondents complained that the sect contains Alawites and is widespread in Zarqa. Several voiced fears of a "Shia expansion" in the region, while others agreed that those with a sectarian viewpoint are more likely to consider VEO participation to oppose Shias and protect fellow Sunnis.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a self-identifying Salafist Jihadist	HIGH
Believing that the necessity of engaging in jihad currently applies to Syria and Iraq	HIGH
Having been incarcerated and exposed to extreme religious views in prison	HIGH
Being a male youth in the age bracket 16-30 years	MEDIUM
Being a self-identifying Salafist Quietist	MEDIUM
Coming from an economically deprived area of the governorate (e.g., Rusaifeh, Hay Massoum)	MEDIUM
Coming from an area known for religious extremism (including Wehdat, Hay Nazzal, Marka)	MEDIUM
Being single and having no dependents	MEDIUM
Being poorly educated and/or having failed to complete mandatory schooling (to high school level)	MEDIUM
Having a close friend who has joined a VEO in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM
Having a relative who is a member of a VEO in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM
Having participated in jihadist activity in Iraq and/or Afghanistan in the past	MEDIUM
Being wealthy (so able to pay smugglers' fees to enter Syria illegally)	LOW
Being from an area with a high proportion of inhabitants of West Bank heritage	LOW
Being a member of the MB or being involved in MB social activities and/or Qur'an centers	LOW
Being religiously conservative and attending a mosque at least once a week	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Believing VEO participation offers the chance to make money	HIGH
Being exposed to extreme religious messages within the school curriculum (e.g., duty of performing jihad, Takfir)	MEDIUM
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities	MEDIUM
Receiving a poor education in the government-run system	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with poor municipal infrastructure including roads and water and electricity network	LOW
Seeing poor service provision as evidence of local and central government failings	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Being frustrated with the poor quality and/or cost of healthcare provision	LOW
Struggling to afford accommodation/rent	LOW
Struggling with personal debts (house and vehicle loans and personal loans)	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Suffering from oppression by the security services, especially during protests (mainly specific to Salafists)	HIGH
Rejecting the system of monarchical democracy in Jordan, often as part of the Salafist belief structure	HIGH
Suffering from excessive surveillance by the security services	HIGH
Belief that the only way to bring change in Jordan is through violence	HIGH
Believing that the central government is beholden to Jordan's Western allies (especially the US)	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in the central and municipal governments	LOW
Believing that anti-terror laws are being used to stifle free speech	LOW
Feeling that Zarqa is under-represented in Parliament	LOW
Believing that the central government does not respect basic human rights	LOW
Thinking that there is no point in voting and taking no part in the democratic process in Jordan	LOW
Believing that the press in Jordan is subject to excessive censorship	LOW
Believing that the King and/or Royal Court are indifferent to local issues	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Feeling estranged from one's community (especially male youths)	HIGH
Being incarcerated (following participation in Salafist Jihadist protests)	HIGH
Being exposed to attempted recruitment efforts by Salafist Jihadists (especially in the Saifa neighborhood of Zarqa City and the town of Rusaifeh)	HIGH
Being incarcerated (following involvement in criminal activity)	MEDIUM
Being incarcerated (following return from VEO participation abroad)	MEDIUM
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities	MEDIUM
Holding conservative religious views (without subscribing to Salafism)	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that Sharia should be the sole source of law	LOW
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially in tribal areas	LOW
Being a drug addict/user as drugs	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Believing that the Assad regime is persecuting Sunni Syrian civilians	HIGH
Believing that Jordan is not justified in fighting ISIS despite Kasasbeh's murder	HIGH
Believing that Iran is orchestrating a "Shia expansion" in the region at the expense of Sunni Muslims	MEDIUM
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region	MEDIUM
Being angry toward Israel for its persecution of Palestinians and historical occupation of Palestine	MEDIUM
Belief that VEOs will ultimately free Palestine once they have defeated the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Having a positive view of both Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist ideology	MEDIUM
Being angry toward Israel for its treatment of Palestinians, both historically in 1948 and subsequently, and more recently in the West Bank and Gaza	LOW
Being frustrated with Jordan's relationship with Israel, including the maintenance of the 1992 peace treaty	LOW
Seeing the FSA a corrupt and ineffective	LOW
Belief that jihad in Europe is justifiable	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Being exposed to VE messages online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	HIGH
Being exposed to ISIS propaganda over the Internet/social media	HIGH
Being exposed to JN propaganda over the Internet/social media	MEDIUM
Being exposed to images of suffering of Syrians via the Internet or television channels, especially Al Jazeera	MEDIUM
Being exposed to sectarian rhetoric that encourages fighting Shias (and Alawites) either online or through television or radio programs	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad against Shia Muslims is justifiable	MEDIUM
Believing that the West is insulting Islam and humiliating Muslims	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP

DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable due to its insults to Islam and Muslims and for European nations' support of US wars in the region, or their colonial pasts in the Middle East	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One individual, a male youth from Bierain, was recruited by a local Salafist Jihadist butcher in his neighborhood, who then helped smuggle him over the border between Syria and Jordan, at which point he joined JN.
- An unknown number of male youths were recruited at the Siham Mosque in Zarqa by a Salafist Jihadist called Sheikh Sufian, who facilitated their travel into Syria so they could join VEOs including JN. Sheikh Sufian's brother was killed fighting for an unspecified VEO in Syria and his son also joined a VEO there. All were reportedly smuggled across the Syria-Jordan border.
- A respondent stated that five male youths had gone from the Hashemiyeh neighborhood to fight in Syria with VEOs including JN and ISIS since 2013. He thought all were recruited by Salafist Jihadists with links to the Municipality Mosque in Hashemiyeh. Most were smuggled across the Syria-Jordan border but at least one entered Syria via Turkey. Of them: One was an engineering student at the Hashemite university, who went to Syria in 2013, joined JN, transferred to ISIS, and rejoined JN where he was killed. A second was a charity worker. A third was a farmer killed fighting for JN. A fourth was the 25 year-old son of Syrian immigrants who worked in a local supermarket and joined JN in Syria, and a fifth was a former criminal who was 35 years old when he was killed in Syria fighting for JN.
- One individual, a 22-year-old male Palestinian youth originally from Gaza but living in Rusaifeh was killed in Syria in 2013 fighting for an unspecified VEO. Respondents were not clear on how he had been recruited.
- The former emir of JN in Southern Syria, Iyad Toubasi, was from Zarqa City and had previously fought for AQI in Iraq.

3.4 MADABA KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Respondents maintained that all VEOs, even Hamas, were unpopular. Furthermore, although AQ was the most popular of the VEOs, it was only popular in comparison to other VEOs like ISIS and JN. Furthermore, respondents insisted that although AQ has served as a counterweight to American influence in Muslim countries, enthusiasm for the group has diminished greatly since the turn of the twenty-first century. Some blamed the group's new willingness to carry out attacks against innocent Muslims, such as the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman. Others claimed that JN's break from AQ in 2016 meant that the latter became a weakened 'brand' in competition with others.

As for JN, although scores were lower than AQ, many respondents believed that it had gained ground as a result of its decision to become independent. For example, some even claimed that the split was evidence that the group is more moderate than its mother organization. Furthermore, JN's continued focus against the Assad regime, a major topic of debate in the governorate, has historically garnered the VEO a degree of sympathy. That said, there was little information suggesting that the group has successfully recruited from Madaba, implying that even if the VEO enjoys attitudinal support the vast majority of Madaba residents are not prepared to covert this into behavioral support.

When ISIS first rose to prominence in 2014, locals accepted and even applauded its mission of establishing an Islamic state. However, since then, local opinion has changed, making ISIS the most unpopular of the main VEOs. As elsewhere, respondents stated that this process began as a result of media representation of the atrocities committed by ISIS and was augmented by the group's brutal killing of Karaki pilot, Moath Al Kasasbeh, in 2015. Now, locals freely refer to the group as 'Daesh' and criticize its claims to be an Islamic state. Despite rejecting ISIS, many conceded that the group poses a great threat to Jordan's national security, both for its military aggression and its propaganda campaigns on social media.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents in Madaba demonstrated few scores of concern in terms of the number of results within the third quartiles, but there was greater cause for worry given the higher number of results within the fourth quartile. Even more disquieting was the relatively high number of worst scores of their kind across the locations tested. These worst scores were not related to economic or social issues, implying that although these issues are salient, vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway is not high compared to other Pathways.

Rather, scores of greatest concern related to high levels of support for AQ and for religious extremism, such as the idea that Islam allows the killing of others or support for violent jihad in Syria and Europe. Likewise, respondents showed the highest tolerance toward Takfirism across all locations, as well as worrying levels of sympathy for combining religion with politics, sectarianism, intolerance toward other religions and disagreement over freedom of worship. These findings imply strong potential sensitivity toward the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

There was also evidence of some potential vulnerability toward the Avenger Influence Pathway. This was not just directed at the international community (especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey) but also at the Jordanian government and its security institutions. For example, respondents believed that the Jordanian government does not want to control VE. They also expressed a lack of confidence in the JAF's ability to keep locals safe, and questioned the degree to which the JAF behaves in a respectful way. Such findings show that even if locals do not actively

support VEOs such as JN and ISIS, the strong presence of some ‘ingredients’ that drive extremism and violent extremism means that there is potential for this to change in the future. Such a change would not manifest as support for these groups but rather support for their messages and narratives, perhaps under the guise of a new and more Jordan-centric VEO.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Central government energy	35% agreed that the central government does not want to control VE.
JAF ability	19% agree that the JAF lack the ability to keep locals safe.
JAF culture	20% agree that the JAF do not behave in a respectful way.
Saudi Arabia	37% agreed that Saudi Arabia has a negative influence in Jordan.
Turkey	39% agreed that Turkey has a negative influence in Jordan.
AQ	30% expressed support for AQ.
ISIS	9% expressed support for ISIS.
Hezbollah	32% expressed support for Hezbollah.
Salafist Jihadism	22% expressed support for Salafist Jihadists.
IAF	55% expressed support for the IAF
Returned fighters	31% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS Intervention	36% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Syria	41% agreed that violent jihad in Syria is justifiable.
Takfirism	25% agreed that Takfirism is justifiable.
Violent jihad in Europe	41% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Sectarianism	44% agreed that violent jihad against Shias is justifiable.
Segregation	36% agreed that others believe that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims.
Freedom of choice	31% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.
Religion in politics	52% disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate.
Religious violence	37% disagreed that Islam does not allow the killing of other people.

Qualitative Key Drivers

There were a number of factors that respondents believed could increase propensity toward VE in Madaba. One was unemployment, particularly among the youth, with some respondents holding it as the sole cause of rising tensions. Note that it was not just the unemployment rate itself, but also the rate relative to other governorates. For example, many respondents complained that, unlike areas such as Amman, Madaba has never had a sophisticated

economy. They cited several reasons, including the general lack of resources and the absence of domestic investment in local businesses that could employ more of the population.

A second related factor was the perception of government neglect and corruption. Respondents frequently expressed discontent with the government's response to their problems, complaining that rather than working to find a solution to rampant problems of unemployment and crime, the government makes these problems worse by raising taxes and prices of necessarily commodities like food and oil. Note that in some cases concerns were not just about the country's economic situation but also in reference to Madaba in particular. As such these helped drive suspicion of marginalization, neglect and victimhood at the hands of the Jordanian government.

A third factor involved the increase in crime and perception that there is a link between antisocial activities and VEOs. Respondents elsewhere referred to the difference as 'social extremism' and 'political extremism', with several claiming that the former provides the 'fuel' for the VE 'fire' and therefore poses a much greater threat than the latter, which is just an outward manifestation of dissatisfaction.

A fourth factor was the proximity and impact of conflicts in Iraq and Syria. In fact, some respondents felt that the central government's perceived economic failures were more the result of problems in other countries than domestic policy. Specifically, these conflicts have made commerce difficult and triggered price and tax hikes in a bid to solve issues related to the public debt. This was related to a fifth factor, which was concern over the Jordanian government's ability (as opposed to its intentions).

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a male youth in the age bracket 15-25 years	HIGH
Coming from an economically deprived area of the governorate (e.g., Madaba City, Mlaih district)	HIGH
Being in proximity to the border with the West Bank (especially for Hamas)	MEDIUM
Coming from an area dominated by tribalism (especially for Al Fasaliya)	MEDIUM
Holding conservative religious views (regardless of whether they condone violence)	MEDIUM
Being highly educated/trained but still not finding a job in Madaba as a result of a lack of employment opportunities, particularly in the private sector	MEDIUM
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities and unable to find work abroad	HIGH
Struggling with personal debts as a result of price increases (including increases in the price of basic commodities such as food and fuel)	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that one's neighborhood receives worse and/or less frequent local service provision (e.g., garbage collection, water availability) than wealthier areas in Jordan (e.g., Madaba City, Af'nan)	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with weak healthcare provision/lack of hospitals in neighborhood	MEDIUM
Struggling to afford housing due to increased pressure from refugees and migrant workers	LOW
Being frustrated with poor municipal infrastructure including roads and water and electricity network, seeing poor service provision as evidence of local and central government failings (e.g., Af'nan and Mlaih)	LOW
Not being able to afford a university education as a result of outstanding personal debts and increases in the cost of living	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in government (and the central government in particular)	HIGH
Believing that the central government has not done enough to create jobs for citizens, particularly in the private sector	HIGH
Suffering from excessive surveillance by the security services (e.g., in Dieban)	MEDIUM
Suffering from oppression by the security services, especially during protests (e.g., in Dieban)	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with the king and/or Royal Court's lack of generosity	MEDIUM
Believing that the freedom of the press is being constrained by anti-terrorism laws	MEDIUM
Thinking that there is no point in voting and taking no part in the democratic process in Jordan (especially since few reforms that are beneficial are actually enacted)	MEDIUM
Being a victim of judicial injustice (e.g., in Dieban)	MEDIUM
Believing that anti-terror laws are being used to stifle the free speech of private citizens	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities (especially for youth)	HIGH
Believing the central government does not respond to locals' concerns in a timely manner	HIGH
Holding conservative religious views that do not necessarily condone violence	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that Islam should have a greater role in the way that Jordan is governed or thinking that Sharia should be the sole source of law	MEDIUM
Feeling estranged from one's community because of a difference in religious and/or political opinion (especially for youth)	MEDIUM
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially in tribal areas, and that this explains an increase in tribal violence	MEDIUM
Coming from an area where crime is a significant problem (e.g., Madaba Camp, Al Faisaliya)	MEDIUM
Believing that Syrian refugees are bad for Madaba society because they strain local services and take jobs from citizens	MEDIUM
Believing that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem (especially in Madaba City)	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Being angry toward Israel for its treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank	HIGH
Being angry at the treatment of Syrians by the Assad regime and therefore believing that jihad in Syria is justifiable	MEDIUM
Explicitly supporting groups that oppose the Assad regime (e.g., the FSA and JN)	MEDIUM
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region and linking it to US foreign policy, especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq	MEDIUM
Believing that European countries are hostile to Muslims and therefore believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable	MEDIUM
Believing that Iran is having a negative effect on Jordan and/or the region by persecuting Sunnis and supporting the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Wanting to fight against the Assad regime in Syria due to its persecution of Sunni Syrians	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Believing that the conflicts in the Middle East are the result of a Western plot to divide Arabs	HIGH
Believing that the government-run media is biased	HIGH
Division over whether jihad in Syria is justifiable	HIGH
Being exposed to VE messages online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that a caliphate could help restore Islam (without supporting ISIS)	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad against Israel is necessary, given the country's treatment of Palestinians	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- A young man from Mlaih district joined Ahrar Al Sham in 2015. Before leaving, he was an important member of his local community of Dieban and was known to have participated in community service initiatives, including a soccer tournament for youth. Those who knew him described him as a good Muslim with a strong sense of duty and believed that he was moved to join Hamas as a result of Israel's siege of the Gaza Strip in 2014. Finding the borders closed to him, he decided to join Ahrar Al Sham a year later. His father said that, at the time, he claimed that he had gotten a job with the UNRWA and had used that as an excuse for his departure. It was not until his death in battle that they discovered that he had actually joined Ahrar Al Sham. He was believed to have traveled to Syria by plane from Amman, to Lebanon, then Turkey, before traveling by land to his destination in Syria.
- A young man from Mlaih district joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2014 or 2015. He was said to have been from a bad neighborhood and a poor family. After he joined, he began voicing his opinions of the state on his Facebook page, which was promptly taken down. Later, he was arrested and charged with conspiring against the government and belonging to an illegal group.
- In 2009, a 16-year-old boy from Madaba attempted to blow up a police station after the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs transferred his father, an imam, to a new mosque in Amman. Those who knew the boy said that he did not want to move from his home in Madaba, and they claimed that, when he did, he got involved with a group of Salafist Jihadists who convinced him to try to blow up the police station. The boy was arrested but, because of his father, was later released. While one respondent said that he later joined AQ and ISIS, field researchers refuted this claim, stating that he now lives peacefully in Amman and has not committed any further acts of domestic terrorism.
- A girl from Madaba almost joined ISIS affiliates in Turkey. She reportedly got in contact with recruiters after watching ISIS' videos on YouTube. Apparently, their plan was to escort her from Turkey to an undisclosed location in Syria. She did leave home; however, thanks to the efforts of security forces, she was brought back to her family before she could leave Jordan.

4.0 KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOUTH REGION FINDINGS

4.1 KARAK KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

VE was not considered a current problem in Karak. Indeed, respondents and field researchers alike insisted that the public remains opposed to most of the major VEOs and cooperative with the CVE efforts implemented by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the central government. As in many governorates, Hamas was the most popular of the VEOs given local unfavorable views of Israel and insistence that the group's resistance to the country's occupation of Palestine is just. This was particularly true of districts closer to Israel and the West Bank, such as Aghwar, Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Mazra.

By contrast, rejection of ISIS was almost unanimous, and respondents indicated that the VEO's murder of Karaki pilot, Moath Al Kasasbeh, which was widely discussed throughout the Middle East in the weeks and months following the event in January 2015, was the chief reason for local abhorrence of the group. The brutality of the attack and ISIS' ability to survive after a long period of US and coalition air strikes, concerned many that ISIS could infiltrate Jordanian borders with terrorist operative, or sleeper cells, and therefore encouraged direct military action against the VEO. Likely as a result of media focus on ISIS, locals did not have as much to say about other prominent VEOs, although most contended that AQ and JN do not enjoy any material support in Karak. Indeed, many were unsure whether these two VEOs have any future, arguing that years of infighting, compounding in JN's recent break from AQ, is a sign that both groups have been weakened by their enemies.

That said, respondents acknowledged there are a number of communities in Karak where VE could become a problem in the near or distant future. For example, Salafist Jihadists have recently given talks in several village mosques, namely, those in the villages of Althaniah and Idr in Ayy Qasabah and Zahoum in Qasr, in order to collect money for terrorist operations in Syria. Moreover, there was concern about high unemployment and the generally poor economy. Finally, some areas in Karak, primarily southern districts such as Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Qatraneh, have experienced increased crime rates and drug trafficking, precursors of VEO involvement in the minds of some.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents in Karak demonstrated few scores of concern in terms of the number of results within the third and fourth quartiles, and also in the fact that not one of these was the worst score of its kind across all governorates – with the sole exception of a very high belief that a caliphate would help restore Islam. More specifically, there were few social concerns about government provision of services and utilities. However, there was worry about crime, drug abuse, boredom and the availability of weapons. In other words, respondents in Karak were concerned about security and how an absence of opportunities can exacerbate the situation. The finding implies that any potential VEO recruits would be more vulnerable to the Opportunist Influence Pathway.

Respondents from Karak also demonstrated deep concern about the impact on Jordan and Syria from a wide range of countries including the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia and countries in Europe. This implies that potential VEO recruits could also demonstrate susceptibility to the Avenger Influence Pathway, and specifically narratives of how the international community is

exploiting countries such as Jordan and Syria for its own benefit. This susceptibility was also evident in the high levels of tolerance to the concept of violent jihad in Europe.

Furthermore, respondents also displayed potential vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway given the high levels of religious extremism such as belief in Sharia as the sole source of law, sectarianism, and the benefits of a caliphate. There was even the presence of non-religious ideological markers such as the perception of VEO fighter camaraderie and skill. In summary, the primary positive was that respondents from Karak did not provide very polarized results or worrying levels of support for VEOs. The primary negative is the existence of a wide range of potential triggers for recruitment that could be activated if the situation changes.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Royal Court	49% agreed that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of people.
Debt	75% agreed that debt is a problem.
Boredom	70% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Crime	52% agreed that crime is a problem.
Drug abuse	60% agreed that drug abuse is a problem.
Weapons	63% agreed that the availability of weapons is a problem.
US	61% agreed that the US has a negative impact on Jordan.
European Union	53% agreed that the EU has a negative impact on Jordan.
Saudi Arabia	25% agreed that Saudi Arabia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	84% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	68% agreed that the Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Iran in Syria	64% agreed that Iranian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
The West in Jordan	58% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISIS propaganda	65% agreed that ISIS propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	58% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	59% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISIS threat	75% agreed that ISIS is a threat to Jordan.
Media exaggeration	57% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
IAF	65% expressed support for the IAF.
Returned fighters	31% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS Intervention	29% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.
Jordan-Israel peace	58% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Caliphate	60% agreed that the Caliphate will help restore Islam.
Sharia	62% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Violent jihad in Europe	35% agreed that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable.
Sectarianism	47% agreed that violent jihad against Shias is justifiable.
VEO brotherhood	41% agreed that members of VEOs always look after each other.
VEO skills	41% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Freedom of choice	23% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.

Qualitative Key Drivers

Many respondents believed that the weak financial situation in Karak, made evident by high unemployment rates in nearly every district, was a key factor placing Karakis at a high risk of becoming radicalized. A second key factor was the perception of prevalent government corruption. Many argued that the nepotistic culture of Jordan favors people who are already wealthy, and they considered the government's opposition to some prominent political parties as proof of that fact. A third related factor was tribal inequality. For example, several maintained that, through Parliamentary victories, which already favor larger tribal entities over political parties, the richest tribes (such as the Al Majali tribe) are able to secure more influence over local and national politics, leaving little room for the input of smaller, poorer tribes (like the Btoush tribe). A fourth factor, again related, was tribal violence. This was cited as a growing concern given a series of violent clashes at Mutah University (just 22 miles south of Karak City). Additionally, members of the Majali tribe in Qasr were said to contribute to VE by recruiting for ISIS.

A fifth key factor was the lack of opportunities for youth and many respondents lamented that there is little to do in Karak for younger generations. Not only are there no jobs to occupy young people's time, there are also few opportunities for them to mix with others of their age, whether that be at cafés, sports clubs, etc. A sixth factor was strong opposition to Israel's occupation of Gaza and Palestine. Most respondents were supportive of a Palestinian state and, consequently, of Hamas, for its opposition to Israeli occupation. Finally, respondents claimed that Western involvement in Syria and the Middle East has been and remains an issue with the potential to draw Karakis to VEOs. They were concerned that VEOs, and particularly ISIS, often claim that Arabs and the religion of Islam are under attack from Western countries that aim to defame Islam and capture Arab oil.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a male youth in the age bracket 15 to 25 years	HIGH
Coming from an economically deprived area of the governorate (e.g., Ayy Qasabah and Mazar)	HIGH
Being in proximity to the border with Israel (especially for Hamas)	MEDIUM
Being poorly educated or among high school dropouts	MEDIUM
Being female in the age bracket 15 to 25 years	MEDIUM
Being a university student at Mutah University	MEDIUM
Coming from an area dominated by tribalism	MEDIUM
Being male over 25 years	LOW
Coming from an area where VE is a significant problem (e.g., Ayy Qasabah and Qatraneh)	LOW
Coming from an area where crime/drug abuse is a significant problem (e.g., Ayy Qasabah)	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities and unable to find work abroad	HIGH
Struggling with personal debts as a result of price increases (including increases in the price of basic commodities such as food and fuel)	HIGH
Being exposed to VE while at university (especially at Mutah)	MEDIUM
Struggling financially and believing that VEOs offer a solution to money problems	MEDIUM
Believing that one's neighborhood receives worse and/or less frequent local service provision (e.g., garbage collection, water availability) than urban areas (e.g., Karak City and Mutah)	MEDIUM
Receiving a poor education in the government-run system	MEDIUM
Being highly educated/trained but still not being able to find a job because of a lack of job growth (particularly in the private sector)	MEDIUM
Struggling to afford housing due to increased pressure from refugees and migrant workers	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in government (and the central government in particular)	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that the king and/or Royal Court does not do enough to help Jordanians through participation in local initiatives	HIGH
Being frustrated by the government's unwillingness to initiate the move toward a constitutional monarchy	MEDIUM
Believing that the government obstructs the free movement of political parties (particularly the MB)	MEDIUM
Believing that anti-terrorism laws obstruct the press' abilities to effectively and impartially report on events of concern to citizens	MEDIUM
Believing that the government disregards human rights and civil liberties	MEDIUM
Believing that the only way to bring change in Jordan is through violence	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities	HIGH
Believing the central government does not respond to locals' concerns in a timely manner	HIGH
Believing that Islam should have a greater role in the way that Jordan is governed or thinking that Sharia should be the sole source of law	MEDIUM
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially in tribal areas, and that tribal inequality has led to an increase in tribal violence	MEDIUM
Feeling estranged from one's community as a result of a difference in religious beliefs, political opinion, or ethnic identity	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region and linking it to US foreign policy, especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq	HIGH
Believing that Iran is having a negative effect on Jordan and/or the region by persecuting Sunnis and supporting the Assad regime	HIGH
Being angry toward Israel for its historic occupation of Palestine and/or treatment of Palestinians	HIGH
Being frustrated with Jordan's relationship with Israel, including the maintenance of the 1992 peace treaty.	HIGH
Being angry as a result of the behavior of the Syrian regime	MEDIUM
Disagreeing with Jordanian military involvement in Syria	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable because of Europeans' treatment of Muslims	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Believing that the conflicts in the Middle East are the result of a Western plot to divide Arabs	HIGH
Believing that the government-run media is biased	HIGH
Being exposed to VE messages online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	HIGH
Seeing membership in a VEO as a possible alternative to membership in local communities	MEDIUM
Believing that VEOs offer generous salaries in return for membership	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad in Israel is justifiable because of the country's treatment of Palestinians	MEDIUM
Believing that jihad in Syria is justifiable because of an opposition to the Syrian regime	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- A woman from Karak almost joined ISIS in 2015. She was in her thirties and was considered a spinster. Those who knew her believed she joined because she felt she had passed marrying age, and ISIS promised her marriage in return for service. Security forces caught her at Amman airport.
- A young military officer from Qasr district joined JN. He was a member of the Majali tribe, one of the most influential tribes in the governorate. One man who knew him as a boy said that he had a violent personality, got into fights as an elementary school student, and later became involved with drugs as a teenager. He attended the military academy at Mutah University and was later accepted into the armed forces. When he suddenly started attending the local mosque, people from his hometown were surprised. Within a few years, he joined JN in Syria via Turkey. He died fighting in Kobani in northern Syria in 2014 or 2015.
- A 27-year-old from Mazar district joined JN in 2015. Those who knew him said he joined the MB when he was 16 and remained a member until 2013, when he left. Soon after, he became involved with the Salafist Quietists, who introduced him to more radical Salafist Jihadists. His friends noted that at this time he became more distant from his usual circle of friends. They discovered that he was training with the Salafists – walking long distances in the desert to build up his endurance and learning martial arts. Within a month, they discovered he had left for Syria to fight for JN. He later returned to Mazar and remains there, ostracized by his community.
- A girl from Ayy Qasabah district almost joined ISIS. Because of the high cost of tuition at university, she had to leave before earning her degree. Afterwards, she did not seek employment. It was reported that, because she spent so much time indoors she became bored and began to research ISIS. After watching the group's videos on YouTube, she got in

contact with recruiters on social media. However, her family discovered what she was doing and prevented her from leaving home.

- A 23-year-old girl from Mutah almost joined ISIS. While at Mutah University, she reportedly fell in love with a boy involved in drugs. She neglected her studies and dropped out of school. When she returned home, her parents forbade her from seeking employment. As a result, she had nothing to do with her time and occupied herself on the Internet. As ISIS was constantly in the news, she researched their activities, found their YouTube videos, and soon began taking part in a pro-ISIS chatroom. A female recruiter then reached out to her and began discussing religion with her on a daily basis. Once, when the girl complained that she wanted to go out but had no money, the recruiter wired her funds and told her to buy some decent clothes to wear on her outing. Later, she convinced the girl to sneak away from her parents and travel to Amman, where she was to board a plane for Turkey. Eager to get away from her uneventful life at home, the girl agreed, but called her mother from the airport to say goodbye. The girl's brother, a doctor in Amman, was alarmed by this news and rushed to the airport just in time to prevent his sister from leaving.

4.2 TAFIELA KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Overall, respondents did not consider radicalization to be a significant issue in Tafiela and few were aware of locals who had traveled to Syria and/or Iraq to join VEOs. However, there have been a number of instances where locals have taken to the Streets to protest against the central government, notably one in Tafiela town over increases in fuel subsidies in November 2012, and another in Hasa in February 2014 where local youths protested at the lack of available government employment. Such protests have featured open criticism not just of the central government but also the Royal Court and the king himself. As a largely East Bank tribal governorate that has traditionally been loyal to the Hashemite royal family, and in which the state is the main employer, the central government seems wary of cracking down on dissent in a manner that might alienate a core constituency.

Much of the population of Tafiela is made up of conservative and observant Sunni Muslims, but despite the prevalence of overtly religious personal behavior like the wearing of beards, religious extremism was not seen as a problem in the governorate. Unlike in other governorates, Salafist Quietists are well regarded in Tafiela and many respondents commended them for their close observance of Islamic dress and codes of behavior. However, this did not extend to Salafist Jihadists, who were widely disliked and commonly associated with VE. In fact, this antipathy has led the main tribal groups to ban them entirely from the governorate, meaning that their presence has become much reduced.

Despite a relatively high level of support for JN, there were few if any examples of locals joining the VEO, leading respondents to claim that support expressed was more theoretical than practical. The same held true for AQ. For example, some locals praised its past activities fighting against the US but none found the idea of active engagement in AQ attractive. Besides, since the death of Bin Laden few thought the VEO was still active and some even questioned whether it continues to exist. As for ISIS, the vast majority of respondents opposed this group for its brutality. As in most other locations, however, locals remained wary of the dangers that the group poses in Jordan. Finally, support levels for Hamas and Hezbollah reflected the enduring appeal of military opposition to Israel and support for Palestinians rather than any desire for active engagement in such groups. However, once more respondents insisted that such support should not be taken as indication of willingness to challenge the Jordanian government or embrace VEO activity in Jordan.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents in Tafiela demonstrated few scores of concern in terms of the number of results within the third and fourth quartiles, and also in the fact that not one of these was the worst score of its kind across the locations tested. However, these findings masked three main underlying causes for concern. Firstly, scores demonstrated significant concern over social challenges such as unemployment, debt, boredom, ethnic inequality and drug abuse. The fact that bored youth and drug abuse were the only two fourth quartile results, suggests a degree of vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway.

Secondly, and perhaps more worryingly, respondents reported comparatively high (compared to other locations) support for VEOs including JN, AQ and Hezbollah. If respondents in Mafraq expressed loudly all the reasons to support VEOs and yet didn't confess such support, then respondents in Tafiela appeared to do the inverse. Thirdly, there was clear evidence of perceived inequalities and undesirable government imposition. For example, many respondents

felt that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others. Likewise, they felt that the West is humiliating Islam and that both Russia and Israel are having a negative impact on Jordan. Such findings suggest vulnerability to the Vengeance pathway, specifically a tendency to unite around narratives of those in authority being common enemies of the people and Islam.

Indeed, the additional presence of religious extremist markers, such as support for Salafist Jihadists, Sharia as the only source of law, opposition toward freedom of worship and disagreement that religion and politics should be kept separate, also suggest susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. As discussed earlier, it is possible that such religious extremism, and indeed examples of support for VEOs, were more conceptual and theoretical than practical. As such, it should always be remembered that there is a significant difference between attitudinal and behavioral support for VEOs.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	59% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Anti-terror laws	39% agreed that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others.
Debt	76% agreed that debt is a problem.
Boredom	79% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Ethnic inequality	52% agreed that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem.
Drug abuse	71% agreed that drug abuse is a problem.
AQ	20% expressed support for AQ.
JN	19% expressed support for JN.
ISIS	9% expressed support for ISIS.
FSA	37% expressed support for the FSA.
Hezbollah	27% expressed support for Hezbollah.
Salafist Jihadism	16% expressed support for Salafist Jihadists.
Salafist Quietism	48% expressed support for Salafist Quietists.
Israel	82% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	58% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Returned Fighters	30% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
West against Islam	74% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Sharia	73% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
VEO skills	38% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Freedom of choice	23% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.
Religion in politics	50% disagreed that religion and politics should be kept separate.

Qualitative Key Drivers

One of the leading factors identified by respondents as likely to lead locals to engage with radical ideologies in Tafiela was the high level of unemployment in the governorate and the consequent widespread issue of poverty. Tafiela is largely made up of East Bank locals and has traditionally relied on the state sector to provide employment but there are limited jobs available and even those who can find government work are obliged to accept very low initial salaries, sometimes as little as 150 JD per month. This has meant that youths in the governorate find it very difficult to secure employment on graduating either from high school or university, driving resentment against the central government and society in general and making them more vulnerable to radicalization.

VEO support and/or active participation among locals in Tafiela was rare and expressing open support was not considered socially acceptable given widespread opposition to these groups, especially among the dominant East Bank tribes in the governorate. Examples of active VEO participants were limited to men between the ages of 16 and 35 years, which was often identified as the key recruitment demographic by respondents given the likelihood that people in this age group would be unemployed and consequently living in poverty. Findings from Tafiela also indicated that many locals in Tafiela are religiously conservative, observant Muslims who thought Islam should play a prominent role in politics and some of whom agreed in principle that a caliphate would help restore Islam. This indicates that many share some theological concepts with VEOs, even if they oppose them, and could as a result be vulnerable to ideological radicalization.

Finally, although there was considerable expression of support for VEOs such as JN, this should be interpreted within a context. For example, respondents explained that JN's opposition to the Assad regime, which is highly unpopular in Tafiela, and the VEO's perceived desire to help and protect Sunni Muslim Syrians in the conflict were key reasons for such support. JN was also positively contrasted with ISIS, and it was not thought to share the brutal and violent methods of its local rival in Syria. JN was also complimented for limiting its activity to Syria and was not considered a threat to Jordan. As such, although it is important to identify key drivers, it is also necessary to differentiate between support for VEO activity abroad and activity within Jordan.

Likewise, it is important to identify and understand significant barriers to radicalization. For example, respondents claimed that Tafiela has a near-total absence of Salafist Jihadists, who are widely associated with radical religious views and promoting jihad participation and VEO membership. The leading tribal groups in Tafiela like the Alshabatat and Alqatameen, who play a powerful role in local society, have prevented Salafist Jihadists from establishing a foothold in Tafiela, meaning that locals are unlikely to encounter them unless they travel to other parts of Jordan, notably neighboring Ma'an. Supplementary to the broader tribal groups' opposition to radical religious groups was the role of the family and tight-knit local communities in Tafiela, both of which can quickly identify and eject outsiders who might look to radicalize locals. Another salient barrier was the fact that many locals are either working or have worked for the security forces or civil service.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a self-identifying Salafist Jihadist	HIGH
Believing that the conditions for jihad have been met in Syria and Iraq	HIGH
Being a male youth in the age bracket 16-30 years	MEDIUM
Coming from a poorer / economically deprived area within Tafiela governorate (e.g., Hasa, Bsaira)	MEDIUM
Being unmarried and having no dependents	MEDIUM
Having failed to complete mandatory state (high school) education	MEDIUM
Having a close friend who has joined a VEO in Syria or Iraq	MEDIUM
Being able to afford to travel to Turkey (in order to join a VEO)	LOW
Being a self-identifying Salafist Quietist	LOW
Being a member of the MB or being involved in MB social activities and/or Qur'an centers	LOW
Being involved with the MB through its Qur'an centers, schools or program of social activities	LOW
Being religiously conservative and attending a mosque at least once a week	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Seeing VEOs as a way to make money	HIGH
Being exposed to extreme religious messages at school, particularly those that portray jihad and martyrdom in a positive light	MEDIUM
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with poor municipal infrastructure including roads and water and electricity network, seeing poor service provision as evidence of local and central government failings.	LOW
Living in a district that suffers from periodic flooding due to poor drainage and/or water management systems	LOW
Being frustrated with the healthcare system (due to poor opening hours of clinics and/or a lack of specialists in the hospital in Tafiela town)	LOW
Living a long way from the closest medical center and/or the central hospital	LOW
Receiving a poor education in the government-run system	LOW
Being unable to afford housing/accommodation	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Struggling with repayment of debts (mortgage, personal loans etc.)	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Rejecting the system of monarchical democracy in Jordan and/or calling for a constitutional monarchy	HIGH
Suffering from excessive surveillance by the security services	HIGH
Believing that the only way to bring change in Jordan is through violence	HIGH
Suffering from oppression by the security services	MEDIUM
Believing that the central government is beholden to Jordan's Western allies	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with the perceived indifference of King and/or Royal Court to issues facing locals	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in the central and municipal governments	LOW
Believing that anti-terror laws are being used to stifle free speech	LOW
Believing that the press in Jordan is subject to government censorship	LOW
Feeling anger at central government failure to respect human rights	LOW
Being frustrated at the lack of opportunities for locals to engage in the political process	LOW
Losing faith in the democratic process in Jordan	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Feeling estranged from one's community and/or family (especially male youths)	HIGH
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities	HIGH
Being incarcerated (following return from VEO participation abroad)	MEDIUM
Believing that Tafiela is being neglected by the central government	MEDIUM
Holding conservative religious views (without subscribing to Salafism)	LOW
Believing that Islam should have a greater role in the way that Jordan is governed or thinking that Sharia should be the sole source of law	LOW
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially in tribal areas	LOW
Being a drug addict/user	LOW
Believing the central and/or local government does not respond to locals' concerns	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Wanting to fight against the Assad regime in Syria due to its treatment of Sunni Muslim Syrians	HIGH
Having a positive view of ISIS for its creation of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq	HIGH
Being angry at the treatment of Syrians by the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region	MEDIUM
Being angry toward Israel for its persecution of Palestinians and historical occupation of Palestine.	MEDIUM
Believing that VEOs will free Palestine once they have defeated the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Having a positive view of JN for its opposition to the Assad regime in Syria	HIGH
Having a positive view of both Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist ideology	LOW
Disagreeing with Jordanian military involvement in Syria	LOW
Believing that Iran is responsible for a "Shia expansion" in the region	LOW
Being angry toward Israel for its treatment of Palestinians	LOW
Being frustrated with Jordan's relationship with Israel, including the maintenance of the 1992 peace treaty.	LOW
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable due to insults to Islam by Western nations	LOW
Seeing the FSA a corrupt and ineffective organization	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Being exposed to VE messages/propaganda online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	HIGH
Being exposed to ISIS propaganda over the Internet/social media	HIGH
Believing that jihad in Syria is justifiable	HIGH
Believing that jihad against Shia Muslims is justifiable	MEDIUM
Being exposed to JN propaganda over the Internet/social media	MEDIUM
Being exposed to images of suffering of Syrians via the Internet or television channels, especially Al Jazeera	MEDIUM
Being exposed to sectarian rhetoric that encourages fighting Shias (and Alawites) either online or through television or radio programs	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP

DEFINITION	DEGREE
Believing that the West is insulting Islam and humiliating Muslims either actively through legislation like that banning the face veil in France or by tolerating actions including the publishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo and previously in Danish media outlets	MEDIUM
Believing that VEO members are good fighters and mutually supportive	LOW
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable due to its insults to Islam and Muslims and for European nations' support of US wars in the region, or their colonial pasts in the Middle East.	LOW
Believing that jihad in Israel is justifiable	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One individual, a 20-year-old male student at the university of Tafiela, was recruited online by a Jordanian friend who he met in person (as opposed to online) and who had already joined ISIS. In 2014 the student traveled to Syria via Turkey to join ISIS.
- One individual from Bsaira, a male teacher, traveled to Syria via Turkey in 2012 to join JN, where he was killed in 2014. He was known to be a Salafist and some speculated that this was what caused him to become radicalized.
- One individual, a 17 year-old male from Tafiela town, traveled to Syria via an unknown route and joined JN.
- One individual, a male of unknown age, joined JN in Syria after making contact with a recruiter on Facebook.

4.3 MA'AN KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

Although respondents and field researchers admitted that in the first years of the Syrian conflict Ma'an was a potential hotbed of VE activity, they maintained that as the war in Syria has dragged on, local support for the major VEOs has waned. As such, most denied that VE is a problem and were eager to dispel rumors that Ma'an is a center for religious extremism. For example, many claimed that if VE exists in the governorate it is limited to communities inhabited by Salafist Jihadists. Likewise, although they admitted that martyrdom ceremonies have been staged when one of Ma'an's young men died in Iraq or Syria, several claimed that these ceremonies, which were reported to have mainly taken place in Ma'an City, are not necessarily indicative of local support for VEOs. Rather, they believed that they are shows of solidarity with those who have lost loved ones in the wars across the border.

However, other respondents warned that, because they glorify the fallen, such ceremonies could increase VE and/or membership with VEOs, especially among youth who do not know any better. Furthermore, Ma'an has a history of anti-government protests with significant confrontation occurring in 1989, 1996, 1998, and 2002. The relationship between locals and the authorities has remained volatile since and persisting grievances have in recent years largely been tied to the perception that the behavior of the police forces has in many instances been heavy handed and that the government exclusively relies on a hard security approach in the governorate, while at the same time neglecting Ma'an both politically and economically. Together, these factors have fueled widespread resentment toward the central government and Royal Court.

Although ISIS has suffered the most, support for the group has remained relatively significant. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that former ISIS supporters have not abandoned their support but rather transferred it to other VEOs, notably JN. This process has been helped by local social networks within the Salafist Jihadist community facilitating recruitment into JN in Syria. The government has since been effective in co-opting some members of the local Salafist Jihadist community, and locals have begun to see both the Salafist Jihadists and the groups they sponsor as radicals and religious extremists. However, even if locals do not support VEOs, an underlying propensity to sympathize with VEO and VE narratives, such as standing up to the government and the West, remains compelling.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Respondents from Ma'an provided responses that yielded a high number of third and fourth quartile scores. Likewise, a considerable number of the fourth quartile scores were the worst of their kind across all locations. Given these results, Ma'an was one of the governorates of greatest concern. As with many other locations, there was evidence of perceived strong social challenges. For example, respondents were dissatisfied with employment opportunities, strongly agreed that boredom and debt were problems, and agreed that drug abuse, tribal inequality and ethnic inequality were additional social concerns. As seen in other governorates, these concerns were accompanied by negative impressions of the authorities. For example, there was strong agreement that the Jordanian government is corrupt and, relative to other locations, that the police are unreliable. Likewise, there was agreement that the Jordanian government does not care about the needs of people.

It was noteworthy that the perception was not so much that the authorities are unable to resolve problems, but rather that they seek to control and oppress others. For example, there was

significant agreement that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others, does not respect human rights and freedoms, and interferes too much in the Jordanian press. As elsewhere, this has caused considerable frustration as evidenced by strong agreement that respondents saw no point in voting, as it does not change anything, and that the people who work hardest are never rewarded. Such feelings provide strong foundations for vulnerability to an Avenger Influence Pathway.

The same pathway feeds on individuals who perceive that, and want to do something about, external enemies who are pursuing their own agendas at the expense of the local community. This was true of Ma'an were respondents agreed that Israel and Russia have a negative impact on Jordan. Additional antipathy toward the former was made evident through strong belief that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs, and agreement that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable. Meanwhile, respondents also felt that events in Syria are harming Jordanians. Specifically, they agreed that Western, Iranian, and Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan, and also believed the most strongly that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem. Respondents also felt that the West is humiliating Islam.

There was also evidence of susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. As in other areas, this was largely due to evidence of religious extremism. For example, Ma'an respondents felt strongest that only Islam can guarantee justice, and strongly agreed that a caliphate would help restore Islam and that Sharia should be the only source of law. VEOs could exploit these sentiments at opportune moments to present themselves as protectors and guarantors of the faith. Finally, there was evidence of vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway, with respondents strongly agreeing that members of VEOs are skilled fighters, and agreeing that members of VEOs always look after each other.

Respondents in Ma'an gave the highest level of support for ISIS and Salafist Jihadism across all governorates, along with strong disagreement that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable. Although the majority still opposed such groups, and despite the fact that a good percentage of these groups could be explained as attitudinal and/or conceptual support rather than active support, it is worth noting that these findings existed despite the highest conviction of all governorates that that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan. As such, Ma'an likely remains one of the locations of greatest concern for future VE and VEO-like activity.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	61% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Central government care	56% agreed that the central government does not care about the needs of people.
Central government independence	50% agreed that the central government does what the West says.
Government official corruption	70% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
Police reliability	33% agreed that the police are not reliable.
JAF ability	16% agree that the JAF lack the ability to keep locals safe.
Anti-terror laws	35% agreed that the government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Government human rights	38% agreed that the government does not respect human rights and freedoms.
Government media interference	61% agreed that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press.
Political empowerment	67% agreed that they did not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything.
Meritocracy	71% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Revenge	41% agreed that it is better to die in revenge than live on in shame.
Debt	86% agreed that debt is a problem.
Boredom	87% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Tribal inequality	65% agreed that inequality between tribes is a problem.
Ethnic inequality	54% agreed that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem.
Refugee conflict	77% agreed that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem.
Religious extremism	38% agreed that religious extremism is a problem.
Drug abuse	66% agreed that drug abuse is a problem.
Israel	85% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.
Russia	60% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
West in Syria	66% agreed that Western intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Iranian in Syria	68% agreed that Iranian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Involvement in Syria	62% agreed that Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
The West in Jordan	67% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	57% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	61% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
Media exaggeration	70% agreed that the media exaggerates the VE problem in Jordan.
JN	20% expressed support for JN.
ISIS	17% expressed support for ISIS.
Salafist Jihadism	23% expressed support for Salafist Jihadists.
Returned Fighters	37% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
Anti-ISIS Intervention	38% disagreed that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
West against Islam	73% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Jordan-Israel Peace	67% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs.
Caliphate	55% agreed that the Caliphate will help restore Islam.
Religiosity	89% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Sharia	83% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Violent jihad in Israel	66% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
VEO brotherhood	45% agreed that members of VEOs always look after each other.
VEO skills	45% agreed that members of VEOs are skilled fighters.
Freedom of choice	21% disagreed people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose.

Qualitative Key Drivers

A first set of factors increasing propensity toward VE includes high unemployment, and its effects on the daily lives of locals. At 16.7 percent, Ma'an had the highest unemployment in Jordan in 2016. Low private and public investment in the governorate was cited as the chief issue contributing to high unemployment, and marketing campaigns to attract business to Ma'an have been unsuccessful despite the passage of the 2008 Development Areas Act into law. This has led to increased public dissatisfaction with government efforts to both supply and create new jobs in the governorate. Indeed, unable to find adequate employment in the overcrowded public sector, many universities took to the Streets in protest in 2016. Together, they demanded an end to government corruption and nepotism, which they credited as one of the key reasons why unemployment is so high and qualified locals are finding it difficult to rise in public office.

Depth interviews also suggested that many locals have had a negative experience with police and security. Key grievances included the perception of excessive use of force during the arrests of criminals, evidence of human rights abuses during arrests and in police custody, and the demolition of homes. In fact, between early 2013 and mid-2015, eight locals are estimated to have died during police raids or while in police custody. As a result, there have been numerous incidents in which locals have traded gunfire with police officers, though numbers of these crimes fell markedly in 2016.

The media's portrayal of the Syrian conflict was another key factor that increased propensity toward VE in Ma'an and, more specifically, to push locals to join VEOs like AQ, JN and ISIS. In particular, through their use of scenes of devastation in Syria, news outlets like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were thought to have goaded local youths into mobilizing in favor of major VEOs that oppose Assad. Local enthusiasm for helping those who are suffering at the hands of the totalitarian Assad regime has played an important role in driving recruits across the border.

A final key factor has been the influence of the Salafist community. Respondents claimed that, in the early years of the Syrian conflict, this small portion of the city's population traveled the governorate, calling for citizens to unite against the Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad. Their efforts were, to a degree, successful, and many locals – and particularly the youth in more

marginalized neighborhoods of the governorate – traveled to Syria to take part in the mounting conflict. While respondents insisted that government arrests of prominent Salafists and crackdowns have dramatically decreased the popularity of these recruiters, they worried that Ma'an could host more Salafist Jihadists than the Jordanian government suspects.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a member of the local Salafist Jihadist community	HIGH
Having family members who previously fought in Afghanistan/Iraq	HIGH
Living on minimum wage/below the poverty line	MEDIUM
Being unemployed/outside of the formal education system	MEDIUM
Being a convicted criminal/ Having been involved in petty crime	MEDIUM
Being a current/former drug addict	MEDIUM
Having directly and/or indirectly suffered from police violence	MEDIUM
Being male	LOW
Being young, especially aged 15-25 years	LOW
Being poorly educated, especially merely high school educated	LOW
Being unmarried	LOW
Being a religious Sunni Muslim	LOW
Being from Ma'an City	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Belief that the government is not doing enough to create jobs, marginalizes Ma'an economically, and does not have the best interests of locals in mind in policymaking and distributing funds, in contrast to which VEOs are seen as offering opportunities and caring about their members	MEDIUM
Perception that government services, most notably healthcare, are poorly supplied and the government marginalizes Ma'an, while VEO members look out for each other and form a close knit and supportive community	MEDIUM
Belief that recruitment into a VEO is an easy way to escape, for instance as a socially and religiously acceptable means of committing suicide and guaranteeing access into heaven	MEDIUM
Perception that there are no viable opportunities for employment/income and that there is nothing to lose	MEDIUM

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Lack of access to education, quality education, and tertiary education and exposure to radical religious messages in the education system	LOW
Actual/perceived high youth unemployment, limited private/public sector employment opportunities, excessive financial pressures, and lacking government support for job seekers	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Perception that the central government does nothing to monitor and/or prosecute the police, resulting in excessive police authority and brutality in Ma'an	HIGH
Belief that locals are unfairly stigmatized and targeted by the central government and that this injustice needs to be rectified; desire for personal revenge or revenge on behalf of others	MEDIUM
Belief that the Royal Court is an apostate and authoritarian regime and should be overthrown by a religious authority	MEDIUM
Perception that the central government/Royal Court does not care about the needs of people, poorly regards local tribes, and excludes locals from jobs in the public sector	LOW
Belief that the government is corrupt and should be replaced with one that is more accountable and upstanding, preferably by providing a greater role to religion in governance	LOW
Perception that locals are poorly represented in the central government and that VE tactics, such as protests and voicing grievances by referencing VEOs, are a means through which to attract the attention of the government	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Belief that joining a VEO is a means through which to become empowered and become a member of a community where goals are set and achieved and grievances are heard and addressed	HIGH
Support for radical religious views and exposure to religious VEO narratives, for instance through membership in the Salafist Jihadist community	HIGH
Influence of radical religious leaders (such as Abu Sayyaf, Muhammad Al Oraify, and Muhammad Hassan as well as imams approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs) and lack of a platform for moderate religious leaders	HIGH
Desire to see the establishment of a caliphate and a greater role of religion in the justice and governance systems	HIGH
Conviction that jihad in Syria/Iraq is justifiable and sanctioned by prominent religious leaders who also encourage and support participation in jihad	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Perception that Ma'an is politically marginalized and that there are limited means through which to voice grievances or bring about change politically	HIGH
Perception that VEOs are a tightknit community, the members of which look after each other	MEDIUM
Perception that there is nothing to do and/or achieve in Ma'an and so nothing to lose by joining a VEO	MEDIUM
Involvement in drug taking and other petty crime and belief that VEOs can help criminals atone for previous sin (e.g., involvement in crime)	MEDIUM
Perception that locals are not part of their local community socially or politically	MEDIUM
Lack of sporting, leisure, and recreational activities	MEDIUM
Perception that access to women is easy through joining a VEO and/or being martyred and entering heaven	LOW
Feeling of frustration and hopelessness at lack of local opportunities to which the influx of Syrian refugees has contributed by reducing wages and further limited access to employment opportunities.	LOW
Perception that marriage is too expensive and unachievable.	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Belief that joining a VEO offers a means through which to counter Shia expansionism and protect Sunni Muslims in the region	HIGH
Desire to join a VEO to support Syrian (Sunni Muslim) civilians, fight the criminal Assad Regime, and achieve justice	HIGH
Belief that VEOs ultimately offer a means through which to stand up to an Israeli agenda in the region and empower the Muslim community	HIGH
Belief that the Royal Court and central government tacitly permit joining VEOs in Syria	HIGH
Belief that joining a VEO offers a means through which to stand up to the US/West, also on behalf of a wider Muslim community, which has suffered humiliation by the US/West	MEDIUM
Fear of Iranian and Shia expansionism in the region and perception that the Royal Court and central government are not able and/or willing to take action to counter that threat.	LOW
Anger toward the Assad Regime for current and former aggression.	LOW
Fear of Israeli influence in the region and perception that the Royal Court and central government participate in an Israeli agenda in the region.	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Perception that the US is targeting Muslims and aims to destroy the Middle East as well as belief that the Royal Court and central government participate in that US agenda	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Exposure to VEO propaganda online and on social media sites, especially video content featuring religious lessons and combat, but also debates and file sharing	HIGH
Access to social media communities and social networks on Facebook and WhatsApp that promote a VE mindset and/or support, encourage, and facilitate recruitment into VEOs	HIGH
Media content featuring atrocities suffered by civilians in Syria on international Arabic language channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya	MEDIUM

Brief Case Studies

- One respondent argued that JN has been the most popular VEO because of the many Salafist Jihadists in Ma'an who have advocated jihad from pulpits across the governorate, convincing both rich and poor that there is a need to defend Muslim brothers in Syria from Alawite Shias. One man claimed that, since the start of the conflicts in the country, as many as 40 young men from Ma'an have left home in order to fight for JN. He believed that, while most have since returned, mainly because of discrepancies between what was promised them and what they actually experienced while on jihad, some 16 of them died in battle. Most crossed into Syria on the back of large trucks.
- A male engineer joined JN. Those who knew him said that his departure for Syria was unexpected, considering that he was married with children and brought home decent pay. He left unexpectedly and was gone for two years before he returned to Jordan.
- A businessman from Ma'an joined JN, most likely in opposition to the Syrian regime. According to respondents, he owned a general store in downtown Ma'an City and had children to support. He left suddenly, but returned to Jordan after fighting for a period of two years.
- One man said that his brother, then a 16-year-old boy, joined JN. He claimed that his brother was compelled to leave, not out of hatred for Shias or because of radical religious views, but because of a belief that the Assad regime was terrorizing innocent Muslim civilians. The boy reportedly contacted JN recruiters through Salafist Jihadists in Ma'an City. He communicated with JN via phone and made plans to meet escorts in Turkey. He successfully exited Jordan but was unable to find his comrades. Instead, he met members of the FSA who transported him free of charge to JN. He was gone for about a year and half before he returned to his home. Upon his return, both his family and members of the community celebrated him as a hero.
- A 28-year-old claimed that he joined JN in 2014 after being recruited via Facebook and Twitter, where the VEO posts not only news of its progress in Syria, but also videos explaining its ideology and approach to the conflicts in the country. The man claimed to have traveled with two companions, who also joined JN. He avowed that no one lobbied them to go, but

that they had decided together that the war crimes of Bashar Al Assad could not be ignored. He said he came to this conclusion after reading articles authored by JN on a daily basis. He ultimately returned home after fighting for a year, mainly because of his parents, with whom he maintained contact throughout his time abroad. He denied he would go again on the basis that now there are too many armed groups in Syria. He explained that this makes the probability of killing an innocent Muslim and forfeiting an afterlife in paradise much higher.

- A 17-year-old named Mohammad joined ISIS in late 2012. He exited Jordan via the southern border with Saudi Arabia and traveled to ISIS-held territory. It was unclear how he was recruited. He stayed in Iraq for only a few months before returning home due to pressures from his family.
- Ussama A'ta Kreishan, a young man who was known for his involvement in community service initiatives, as well as for his participation in the HIRAK protests in Ma'an, reached the southern border of Syria in 2013. He fought with either the Islamic Front or with JN and was killed in December 2014. Apparently, he, like many others, was prompted to travel to Syria after being exposed to reports that the Syrian regime was terrorizing its own citizens.

4.4 AQABA KEY FINDINGS

General Summary

None of the principal VEOs attracted significant levels of support in Aqaba, but of them ISIS was by far the most unpopular. Intense hostility to ISIS was often linked to the VEO's brutal methods in Syria and Iraq, particularly the killing of captives and civilians, many of whom were Sunni Muslims. The execution of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh was the most-cited reason for the group's unpopularity. Prior to his death ISIS garnered more support in the governorate for its perceived opposition to the Assad regime and drew some praise for countering a perceived "Shia expansion" in the region. However, the VEO was later considered an avowed enemy of Jordan and a threat to national security, and while some respondents were concerned that the VEO might be developing sleeper cells inside Jordan to stage attacks, others refused to accept that they exist in Aqaba at all.

Though it was widely described as a terrorist organization and sometimes depicted as part of a symbiotic group of VEOs in Syria that included ISIS and AQ, JN was nonetheless better regarded than ISIS and generally considered more relevant and active an organization than AQ. It attracted praise for militarily opposing the Assad regime's forces and protecting Sunni Syrian civilians, and in contrast to ISIS it was not believed to pose a direct threat to Jordan's national security as it limits its operations to Syrian territory. AQ attracted similar levels of support to JN but this support was mainly tied to the VEO's historic opposition to the US, and was often associated with the person of former leader Osama Bin Laden. Despite residual sympathy, AQ was widely perceived to be obsolete or to have largely ceased to exist as an independent organization. As such, few believed it poses a threat to Jordan.

The majority of respondents was in favor of Hamas and praised the group for its military opposition to Israel, action that most considered legitimate in the wake of Israel dispossessing Palestinians. This level of support was not unusual compared to other governorates but respondents claimed that proximity to the Israeli border and the neighboring resort town of Eilat, exacerbate the issue.

Quantitative Scores of Greatest Concern

Although the vast majority of respondents in Aqaba denied support for VEOs, they nevertheless displayed a number of deeply polarized and negative views on issues relating to violent extremism. Firstly, at the economic level there was most concern about employment and debt. However, more worrying scores were found at the political level where there was a perception that authorities are ineffective, as well as the highest belief across locations that the Jordanian government is corrupt. Complaints also revolved around the Jordanian government's perceived repressiveness and control over political parties, the press and even the people. Such results indicated that respondents in Aqaba feel disempowered, as further evidenced by how they complained most that there was little point in voting or making efforts to work hard. The lack of confidence in the authorities largely stemmed from perceived social problems such as tribal and ethnic inequality, crime, drug abuse and the availability of weapons – all of which scored the highest out of all locations researched. These findings all suggested vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway.

Further evidence for this susceptibility was found in strong local reservations about the impact of traditional foreign Common Enemies such as the West and Israel. For example, support levels for the US, the European Union (EU) and Russia were the worst across governorates. Indeed, respondents in Aqaba expressed the highest negativity across all governorates over perceived

Western intervention in Jordan, and strongly agreed that the West is humiliating Islam. This last finding, combined with the highest levels of belief in Sharia as the only source of law, highlighted a natural religious conservatism within the area and was suggestive of vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

Respondents were also the most concerned of all those researched about the negative role of ISIS and JN propaganda in Jordan, associating both with the impact of the Internet and social media. However, it is important to note that these findings demonstrated sensitivity to the impact of VEO communications, and were not necessarily evidence of higher levels of support for VEOs. This same sensitivity expressed itself as the highest level of disagreement to imprisoning returned fighters. Finally, respondents in Aqaba agreed the most that membership of a VEO was an easy way to make money, highlighting how the perception of VEO financial strength can also entice individuals along the Opportunist Influence Pathway. These polarized results are additionally concerning given the fact that Aqaba is a tourist destination.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Employment	64% were dissatisfied with employment opportunities.
Government official corruption	73% agreed that government officials are corrupt.
Civil courts	39% agreed that civil courts are not effective.
Government political interference	57% agreed that the government interferes too much in controlling political parties.
Government media interference	61% agreed that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press.
Political empowerment	74% agreed that they did not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything.
Meritocracy	77% agreed that the people who work hardest are never rewarded.
Debt	82% agreed that debt is a problem.
Boredom	78% agreed that bored youths is a problem.
Tribal inequality	70% agreed that inequality between tribes is a problem.
Ethnic inequality	64% agreed that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem
Crime	73% agreed that crime is a problem.
Drug abuse	81% agreed that crime is a problem.
Weapons	83% agreed that availability of weapons is a problem.
US	80% agreed that the US has a negative impact on Jordan.
EU	66% agreed that the EU has a negative impact on Jordan.
Israel	92% agreed that Israel has a negative impact on Jordan.

SCORES OF GREATEST CONCERN	
Russia	77% agreed that Russia has a negative impact on Jordan.
Iranian in Syria	61% agreed that Iranian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
Involvement in Syria	71% agreed that Jordanian intervention in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan.
The West in Jordan	74% agreed that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISIS propaganda	88% agreed that ISIS propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
JN propaganda	66% agreed that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan.
Internet impact	67% agreed that the Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISIS threat	75% agreed that ISIS is a threat to Jordan.
Returned fighters	39% disagreed that returned fighters should be imprisoned.
West against Islam	81% agreed that the West is humiliating Islam.
Jordan-Israel Peace	55% agreed that the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a betrayal for Islam and Arabs.
Religiosity	75% agreed that only Islam can guarantee justice.
Sharia	85% agreed that Sharia should be the only source of law.
Violent jihad in Israel	65% agreed that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable.
Violent jihad for wealth	71% agreed that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money.

Qualitative Key Drivers

The Internet and social media are considered the leading vehicle of radicalization among locals in Aqaba, and respondents repeatedly highlighted male youths between 16 and 30 years as the social group most vulnerable to VEO propaganda found online. This demographic was often described as bored and/or underemployed, and the risk of radicalization was seen as heightened in the period following graduation from high school or university. At this time in their lives, male youths are unlikely to be as closely rooted in society through marriage, having children or holding a secure job. Marginalization and poverty were two additional key factors identified by respondents as likely to increase the likelihood that individuals from the governorate might come to support VEOs and/or physically join them in Syria or Iraq. An inability to find work after graduation can lead to frustration, estrangement from friends and family, and drug and alcohol abuse, all of which were subsidiary factors believed to make youths more likely to see VEOs as an opportunity to escape from the tedium of daily life.

However, despite this characterization of the ‘average’ local at risk of VEO recruitment, of the handful of examples of locals who have physically joined VEOs in Syria or have aspired to do so, the majority were men between the ages of 25 and 35, all of whom were employed and at least one of whom was married with a young family. In many of these cases local VEO participants were believed to have gone to fight due to a sense of religious duty to help fellow Sunni Muslims

in Syria, rather than as a result of social and/or economic marginalization. As such, and despite respondents' views prioritizing individual personal economic or employment circumstances, in Aqaba it seems that ideological radicalization can be an equally, or even more, significant factor.

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS	
Being a self-identifying Salafist Jihadist	HIGH
Believing that the necessity of engaging in jihad currently applies to Syria and Iraq	HIGH
Being a male youth in the age bracket 16-30 years	MEDIUM
Being a self-identifying Salafist Quietist	MEDIUM
Being an orphan	MEDIUM
Coming from an economically deprived area of the governorate (e.g., Quweira, Rabyeh, Wadi Araba)	MEDIUM
Being single and having no dependents	MEDIUM
Being able to afford to travel to join VEOs (mainly through Turkey)	MEDIUM
Being poorly educated or among high school dropouts	MEDIUM
Having a close friend who has joined a VEO in Syria or Iraq	LOW
Being a member of the MB or being involved in MB social activities and/or Qur'an centers	LOW
Being religiously conservative and attending a mosque at least once a week	LOW
BASIC NEEDS DRIVERS	
Struggling financially and believing that VEOs offer a solution to money problems	HIGH
Being unemployed due to a lack of local job opportunities and unable to find work abroad, especially in the Gulf States	MEDIUM
Being exposed to extreme religious messages within the school curriculum. Schoolbooks describe jihad as a religious obligation if Islamic lands are attacked and imply that it can be justified to kill captured enemies	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with corruption among government officials	LOW
Being frustrated with weak healthcare provision and/or being unable to afford expensive treatments (e.g., for cancer)	LOW
Receiving a poor education in the government-run system	LOW
Struggling to afford housing due to increased pressure from refugees and foreign buyers and workers	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Struggling with personal debts as credit is available from a number of local and international banks, often at rates of interest of 10 percent and higher	LOW
GOVERNANCE DRIVERS	
Rejecting the system of monarchical democracy in Jordan, often as part of the Salafist belief structure	HIGH
Belief that the only way to bring change in Jordan is through violence	HIGH
Suffering from excessive surveillance by the security services	MEDIUM
Believing that the central government is beholden to Jordan's Western allies	MEDIUM
Being frustrated with corruption and nepotism in the central and municipal governments	LOW
Believing that anti-terror laws are being used to stifle free speech	LOW
Believing that the freedom of the press is being constrained	LOW
Anger at central government failure to respect human rights	LOW
Thinking that there is no point in voting and taking no part in the democratic process in Jordan	LOW
Being frustrated with the perceived indifference of King and/or Royal Court to issues facing locals	LOW
PSYCHOSOCIAL DRIVERS	
Feeling estranged from one's community (especially male youths)	HIGH
Believing Takfir is justifiable	MEDIUM
Being bored due to unemployment and a lack of social programs and/or activities	MEDIUM
Being incarcerated (following return from VEO participation abroad)	LOW
Holding conservative religious views (without subscribing to Salafism)	LOW
Believing that Islam should have a greater role in the way that Jordan is governed or thinking that Sharia should be the sole source of law	LOW
Feeling that there is inequality between tribes, especially between larger tribes like the Howeitat and Ahyewat, and smaller tribes.	LOW
Being a drug addict/user	LOW
Believing the central government does not respond to locals' concerns	LOW
EXTERNAL DRIVERS	
Wanting to fight against the Assad regime in Syria due to its persecution of Sunni	HIGH

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
Syrians	
Being angry toward Israel for its persecution of Palestinians and historical occupation of Palestine	HIGH
Believing that Iran is having a negative effect on Jordan and/or the region by persecuting Sunnis and supporting the Assad regime	MEDIUM
Being angry at Western military involvement in the region and linking it to US foreign policy, especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq	MEDIUM
Seeing the FSA a corrupt and ineffective making VEOs more attractive for those wishing to fight against the Assad regime and/or its Iranian allies	MEDIUM
Belief that VEOs will ultimately free Palestine once they have defeated the Assad regime	LOW
Having a positive view of both Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist ideology	LOW
Disagreeing with Jordanian military involvement in Syria	LOW
Being angry toward Israel for its treatment of Palestinians, both historically in 1948 and subsequently, and more recently in the West Bank and Gaza	LOW
Being frustrated with Jordan's relationship with Israel, including the maintenance of the 1992 peace treaty.	LOW
Belief that jihad in Europe is justifiable	LOW
COMMUNICATIONS DRIVERS	
Being exposed to VE messages online or through social media via popular and widely used sites or applications like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter	HIGH
Being exposed to ISIS propaganda over the Internet/social media	HIGH
Believing that jihad in Syria is justifiable	HIGH
Being exposed to images of suffering of Syrians via the Internet or television channels, especially Al Jazeera	MEDIUM
Being exposed to sectarian rhetoric that encourages fighting Shias (and Alawites) either online or through television or radio programs	MEDIUM
Believing that the West is insulting Islam and humiliating Muslims either actively through legislation like that banning the face veil in France or by tolerating actions including the publishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo	MEDIUM
Believing that VEO members are good fighters and mutually supportive	LOW
Believing that jihad in Europe is justifiable due to its insults to Islam and Muslims and	LOW

DRIVERS OF PROPENSITY TOWARD VE / VEO MEMBERSHIP	
DEFINITION	DEGREE
for European nations' support of US wars in the region, or their colonial pasts in the Middle East.	
Believing that jihad in Israel is justifiable	LOW

Brief Case Studies

- One individual from Aqaba governorate, a married 29 year-old male chemistry teacher, became increasingly religious in his behavior and outlook and flew to Turkey to join the Army of Islam (Liwa' Al Islam) in Syria in 2012. He is believed to still be with this group.
- One individual from Aqaba City, a male of unknown age working as an electrical engineer, was radicalized by Salafist Jihadists and flew to Turkey to join ISIS but was arrested on the border with Syria.
- One individual from Aqaba City, a 23 year-old male medical student was a member of the MB prior to joining JN in Syria in 2013. He then returned to Jordan in 2014. It is believed that connections within the MB helped smuggle him across the Jordan-Syria border.
- One individual from Aqaba City, a male in his early 20's who was brought up at an orphanage managed by the charity SOS, was radicalized online (presumably by ISIS recruiters) and traveled to Syria via Turkey to join ISIS.

SECTION III: VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX



Hanina neighborhood, Irbid City, Irbid governorate.

1.0 THE VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The quantitative Guided Questionnaire (GQ) was designed to facilitate the creation of a quantifiable assessment structure, referred to here as a Violent Extremism Vulnerability (VEV) Framework. The function of this Framework is to provide a tool for comparison of pre and post Information Campaign datasets, in order to measure the extent to which a Campaign's objectives have been achieved, as indicated by VEV indicators (see section 2.0 The Violent Extremism Vulnerability Index).

The Framework is based on the premise that the project objectives can be assessed across a number of relevant domains, that each of these domains can be divided into themes, and that each theme consists of a series of related indicators. The layered structure of the Framework allows for the addition of future domains, themes, and indicators. Consequently, new depth to the assessment analysis can be introduced at any time, without disruption to the fundamental structure and approach to measuring the effectiveness of a Campaign.

The structure of the VEV Framework is based on the objectives of the project. The primary assumption, supported by previous research experience and the analysis of all of the qualitative and quantitative data collected and collated for this project, is that these objectives can be achieved through successfully monitoring and addressing the following domains and themes (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Violent Extremism Vulnerability Framework

VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK		
DOMAIN	THEMES	DESCRIPTION
BASIC NEEDS	Financial Security; Essential Services.	Measures the degree to which respondents feel they have access to basic life sustaining/enhancing services.
GOVERNANCE	Central and Local Governance; Security Forces; Justice and Civil Liberties.	Measures the degree to which respondents have confidence in the system of central and local governance and governing institutions; Measures the degree to which respondents feel that human rights and civil liberties are protected and to which respondents are exposed to state repression.
SELF-VALUE	Locus of Control; Social Integration.	Measures the degree to which respondents feel that they are in control of their own social, political, and economic destiny; Measures how integrated respondents feel in their community.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK		
DOMAIN	THEMES	DESCRIPTION
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL VALUES	Religious Disposition and Attitudes; Social Equality.	Measures the extent to which respondents are religiously conservative and social integration between various groups is achieved in Jordan.
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT, AND VE	Exposure to Crime; Exposure to Conflict and Violence; Perceptions of VE.	Measures the degree to which respondents have been exposed to crime, conflict, and VE.
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND VE	Regional Relations; Global Relations; Foreign Interventionism and VE.	Measures the extent to which respondents feel that foreign states have a positive or negative impact on Jordan. Measures the extent to which respondents feel that interference by the West, Iran, and Jordan in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan; Measures the extent to which respondents feel that interference by the West and VEOs in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISLAMIST GROUP AND VEO SUPPORT	Support for Islamist and non-Islamist Groups; Support for VEOs; VEO Threat.	Measures the level of support for key VEOs, political Islamist and non-violent Islamist groups (and the FSA), and the degree to which they are gaining in influence in Jordan; Measures the degree to which respondents perceive VEOs (ISIS) to pose a threat to their community, and the way in which Jordanian foreign fighters should be treated.
VEO NARRATIVES	External Influence; Islamic Principles, Violent Jihad; VEO Strength & Protection.	Measures the extent to which respondents support key VEO narratives.
COMMUNICATIONS AND VE	VEO Propaganda; Media and VE.	Measures the extent to which VE is exaggerated by the media and the degree to which VEO propaganda and the Internet are fueling VE in Jordan.

1.2 DOMAIN HYPOTHESES

Basic Needs

The Basic Needs domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of the severity of socio-economic problems and the level of access to public services. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that dissatisfaction with the economic environment and service provision is linked to a greater propensity to embrace and/or engage in VE, as well support/sympathize with organizations such as VEOs that deeply challenge the status quo and current government. Indicators for the domain are grouped under two themes:

1. Financial Security

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that local perception of adequate access to employment opportunities and affordable housing is linked to a reduced propensity to engage in VE or sympathize with organizations such as VEOs that deeply challenge the status quo and current government.

2. Essential Services

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that local perception of adequate essential public services such as running water and electricity, education, and healthcare is linked to a reduced propensity to engage in VE, or sympathize with organizations such as VEOs that deeply challenge the status quo and current government.

Governance

The Governance domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of the local and central governments and related institutions, including those that are justice and security-related, and citizens' full enjoyment of civil liberties. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that dissatisfaction with the local and central government and related institutions is linked to greater potential support of VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under three themes:

1. Central and Local Governance

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that local perception of (local and central) government attention to the needs of the people and belief that the central government is independent from the West, and has both the ability and the will to control violent extremism are linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

2. Security Forces

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the Jordanian security forces (the police and the Armed Forces) are reliable or respectful or have the ability to maintain security is linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

3. Justice and Civil Liberties

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the Jordanian justice system is effective or operates in the interests of the people or that the government does not restrict political and civil liberties is linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

Self-Value

The Self Value domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of whether or not they are in control of their own social, political, and economic destiny and of how they feel in their community. The

hypothesis underpinning this domain is that the perception of not being in control of one's own life and environment or not being integrated in one's community is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under two themes:

1. Locus of Control

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that it is not useless trying to get the government to listen to one's grievances or vote or disagreement that the people who work the hardest are never rewarded the most is linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

2. Social Integration

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception of feeling part of one's community and disagreement with the local proverb stating that 'it is better to die in revenge than live on in shame' is linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

Religious and Social Values

The Religious and Social Values domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of relevant social and religious values and concepts, specifically: attitudes toward religious freedom and co-existence, separation of religion and politics, non-violence, and social equality. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that negative attitudes toward the above-mentioned values and concepts is linked to greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under two themes:

1. Religious Disposition and Attitudes

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that religious coexistence, religious freedom, non-violent practice of Islam, and separation of religion and politics are important values or concepts is linked to lesser receptiveness toward VEO messaging and lesser propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs. Similarly, belief that religious extremism is not a problem in the local community is linked to reduced receptiveness toward VEO messaging and reduced propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

2. Social Equality

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that inequality between tribes, inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians, and many bored youths are not a problem in Jordan is linked to lesser receptiveness toward VEO messaging and lesser propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

Exposure to Crime, Conflict, and VE

The Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of security and stability and those factors contributing to them. Specifically, these include: the level of crime, drug abuse, and conflict, the availability of weapons, the level of VE and excessive police authority. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that perceived and actual exposure to crime, conflict and violence (including VE) is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under two themes:

1. Exposure to Crime

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that crime, drug abuse and weapon availability are not a problem in the local community is linked to a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

2. Exposure to Conflict and Violence

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that limited to no experience of violence (excessive police authority), conflict (between Jordanians and Syrian refugees), or VE is linked to the limited presence or absence of VEOs and/or a reduced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

Foreign Relations and VE

The Foreign Relations and VE domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of the impact that have foreign countries on Jordan as well as the link between foreign intervention and the level of VE in the country. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that belief that foreign countries have a negative impact on Jordan and that their interventionism fuels VE in Jordan is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under three themes. *Note that the best outcome for the indicators pertaining to themes 1 and 2 is 'positive', 'neutral', or 'no' impact from foreign countries on Jordan.*

1. Regional Relations

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that Syria, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia have a negative impact on Jordan is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

2. Global Relations

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that the US, the EU, Russia have a negative impact on Jordan is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

3. Foreign Interventionism and VE

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that Western, Iranian, Jordan's intervention/interventionism in Syria is fueling VE in Jordan or that Western intervention in Jordan is fueling VE in the country is linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs.

Islamist Group and VEO Support

The Islamist Group and VEO Support domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of local support for non-violent Islamist groups, the FSA, and VEOs as well as the level of VEO threat in Jordan and national measures to be adopted against VEOs and violent extremists. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that strong levels of support for VEOs and Islamist groups, and the belief that VEOs (ISIS) do not pose a threat that requires government action are linked to an enhanced desire to radically challenge the status quo (including with violence). Indicators for the domain are grouped under three themes:

1. Support for Islamist and non-Islamist Groups

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that moderate local support for, or neutrality toward, non-violent Islamist groups and the FSA is linked to a reduced desire to radically challenge the status quo via support and affiliation to VEOs. Note that moderate support for non-violent Islamist groups could both be an incentive and a barrier to support and affiliation to VEOs among those

dissatisfied with the status quo. As such, the best outcome for this indicator is neutrality or moderate opposition.

2. Support for VEOs

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that others in the area do not support VEOs (AQ, ISIS, JN, Hezbollah, Hamas, Salafist Jihadists) is linked to the belief that such groups are not prolific and/or appealing and so pose a reduced threat to the status quo. *Note that strong support or opposition toward Hezbollah could both breed higher levels of local support for VE or VEOs such as ISIS and JN. As such, the best outcome for this indicator is neutrality or moderate opposition. Similarly, note that 'little to no opposition' toward (i.e., 'some or strong support' for) Hamas is not necessarily linked to high levels of local support for VEOs such as ISIS and JN.*

3. VEO Threat

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that the perception that ISIS represents a serious threat to Jordan's national security, that Jordanians who go to fight abroad should be imprisoned on their return and that Jordan's intervention against ISIS in Syria is justifiable is linked to the belief that VEOs, and specifically ISIS, are not appealing and so pose a reduced threat to the status quo. *Note that the perception that ISIS represents a serious threat to Jordan's national security is not necessarily linked to perceptions of enhanced ISIS presence and/or strength or influence within Jordan. Additionally, note that the perception that Jordanians who go to fight abroad should be imprisoned on their return is linked to a desire to see government control over the issue rather than a belief that imprisonment is necessarily the best course of action in the deradicalization process.*

VEO Narratives

The VEO Narratives domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of various narratives used by VEOs to garner support and affiliation. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is strong levels of agreement with such narratives are linked to an enhanced desire to challenge the status quo – including through support and affiliation to VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under four themes:

1. External Influence

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the West is humiliating Islam or that the Jordan-Israel peace treaty is an act of betrayal for Islam and Arabs is linked to greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

2. Islamic Principles

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the Caliphate will help restore Islam, or that only Islam can guarantee justice, or that Sharia should be the only source of law is linked to greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

3. Violent Jihad

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the practice of Takfir is justifiable, or that violent jihad in Israel/Syria/Europe/against Shias is justifiable, or that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money is linked to greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

4. VEO Strength and Protection

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that members of violent jihadist groups always look after each other or that they are skilled fighters is linked to greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

Communications and VE

The Communications and VE domain is linked to the sample's perceptions of the impact of VEO propaganda, Internet/social media on the level of VE in Jordan and of media coverage of the problem of VE in the country. The hypothesis underpinning this domain is that perceptions that VEO propaganda and Internet/social media fuel VE in Jordan and that the media does not exaggerate the problem of VE in Jordan are linked to greater presence/influence of VEOs in Jordan and/or greater receptiveness toward VEO messaging and greater propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs. Indicators for the domain are grouped under two themes:

1. VEO Propaganda

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that ISIS and JN propaganda is not fueling VE in Jordan is linked to reduced receptiveness toward VEO messaging and reduced propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

2. Media and VE

The hypothesis underpinning this theme is that belief that the Internet/social media is not fueling VE in Jordan but that the media exaggerates the problem of VE in Jordan is linked to reduced receptiveness toward VEO messaging and reduced propensity to support and/or affiliate with VEOs.

2.0 THE VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The Violent Extremism Vulnerability (VEV) Index is a comparative tool that facilitates the examination of the differences in vulnerability to VE among the Target Locations (i.e., Jordan's 12 governorates). Making use of the VEV Framework (see section 1.0 The Violent Extremism Vulnerability Framework), it graphically illustrates the geographic variation in VEV based on a large number of indicators, organized according to themes and domains relevant to the Project Objectives (see 1.1 Introduction).

For each Target Location, an overarching, cumulative VEV measure is presented as a composite of the total number of quantitative indicators used in the VEV Framework. However, governorate-specific VEV can also be observed for each indicator, theme, and domain.

2.2 CALCULATING INDICATOR SCORES

Indicator scores are aggregate percentage scores, based on the addition of two (or three) response values for particular questions in the GQ. In order to facilitate ease of viewing and comparison across domains and themes, the response values used to create the scores vary according to the question. For example, in the Basic Needs domain, the scores for the first two indicators under the Financial Security theme are based on some and strong satisfaction with their corresponding GQ question, the scores for the third indicator under the same theme is based on some and strong disagreement with its corresponding GQ question.

The closer each indicator score is to 100%, the more it is supporting project objectives. Such scores are therefore positive as per the hypotheses defined above (see 1.2 Domain Hypotheses). By contrast, the closer each indicator score is to 0%, the more it is undermining project objectives. Such scores are therefore of concern.

2.3 VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX BASELINE TABLES

The tables below include the VEV baseline indicator scores for each indicator according to their domain and theme. As a means of comparison, scores are included for respondents from Irbid (IR.), Ajloun (AJ.), Jarash (JR.), Mafraq (MF.), Balqa (BA.), Amman (AM.), Zarqa (ZA.), Madaba (MD.), Karak (KA.), Tafiela (TA.), Ma'an (MA.), and respondents from Aqaba (Aq.).

For broader analytical purposes, the order in which the Target Location VEV baseline indicator scores are presented follows Jordan's regional division, as follows:

North Region	Irbid	Ajloun	Jarash	Mafraq
Central Region	Balqa	Amman	Zarqa	Madaba
South Region	Karak	Tafiela	Ma'an	Aqaba

2.4 VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX BASELINE CHARTS

For ease of viewing, these VEV Index baseline indicator scores are also included in line charts. For each domain, there is a line chart representing the VEV Index baseline indicator scores for all 12 Target Locations as well as a line chart representing the VEV Index baseline indicator scores for Jordan's three regions. For each domain, below the charts is a short analysis of these scores.

Following post-Campaign data collection, new VEV indicator scores can be incorporated into these charts. Analysis can then be conducted across the pre-Campaign (baseline) and post-Campaign datasets, in order to indicate the extent to which a Campaign has been effective in changing attitudes and behaviors among location-specific respondents, and the extent to which VEV has increased or decreased for a given indicator and a given Target Location or region.

2.5 VEV Scoring Key

The VEV index uses color-coding to categorize the degree of vulnerability to VE, based on five score ranges. The cut-offs for VEV scale categories and color-coding scores are as follows:

- Scores between 0% and 20% indicate a 'critical' vulnerability to VE and are presented in RED;
- Scores between 21% and 40% indicate an 'important' vulnerability to VE and are presented in ORANGE;
- Scores between 41% and 60% indicate an 'average' vulnerability to VE and are presented in YELLOW;
- Scores between 61% and 80% indicate a 'moderate' vulnerability to VE and are presented in LIGHT GREEN;
- Scores between 81% and 100% indicate a 'low' vulnerability to VE and are presented in DARK GREEN.


VULNERABILITY:	CRITICAL	IMPORTANT	AVERAGE	MODERATE	LOW
SCORE:	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%

2.6 FINDINGS: VEV INDEX BASELINE TABLES AND CHARTS BY DOMAIN

Basic Needs Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts


BASIC NEEDS DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Financial Security	Some or strong satisfaction with access to employment opportunities (very + somewhat satisfied) Q1	29%	24%	52%	22%	25%	41%	36%	57%	49%	30%	33%	31%
	Some or strong satisfaction with access to affordable housing (very + somewhat satisfied) Q5	41%	37%	48%	25%	22%	26%	29%	64%	57%	51%	39%	53%
	Some or strong disagreement that debt is a problem in [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q26	20%	21%	44%	16%	9%	34%	21%	41%	23%	20%	11%	16%
Essential Services	Some or strong satisfaction with access to running water and electricity (very + somewhat satisfied) Q2	65%	52%	62%	22%	64%	64%	52%	69%	58%	66%	71%	89%
	Some or strong satisfaction with access to education (very + somewhat satisfied) Q3	63%	63%	69%	46%	59%	69%	55%	67%	71%	75%	75%	81%
	Some or strong satisfaction with access to healthcare (very + somewhat satisfied) Q4	55%	61%	57%	49%	53%	58%	46%	72%	62%	62%	61%	79%

BASIC NEEDS INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION



BASIC NEEDS INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Basic Needs: VEV is stronger concerning poor Financial Security than access to Essential Services, which was deemed more satisfactory overall.

Overall, respondents were more satisfied with their access to Essential Services than with their level of Financial Security. Respondents across all locations expressed rather high levels of satisfaction with access to running water and electricity, education and healthcare. Overall, satisfaction with access to Essential Services was the strongest in the South Region, followed by the Central Region and the North Region. Specifically, satisfaction with access to running water and electricity was the highest in Aqaba (89%) while Mafraq governorate in the north registered the lowest level of satisfaction (22%) across the three regions. Respondents from Aqaba also found access to education more satisfactory overall (81%) while, once again, Mafraq registered the lowest level of satisfaction (46%) across the three regions. Finally, satisfaction with access to healthcare was strong in Central Region's Madaba (67%) although Aqaba once again registered the strongest level of satisfaction across the three regions (79%).

With regards to Financial Security, respondents from the Central Region, notably Madaba (57%), expressed more satisfaction with access to employment opportunities than respondents from the North and South Regions. The lowest level of satisfaction reported was found in the northern Mafraq governorate (22%). Access to affordable housing nevertheless garnered the highest level of satisfaction in the South Region, particularly in Karak (57%) although Central Region's Madaba governorate registered the strongest level of satisfaction in that regard (64%) while Balqa in the Central Region and Mafraq in the North Region garnered the lowest levels of satisfaction (respectively 22% and 25%). Finally, debt was considered more of a problem in the South Region, notably in Ma'an, than in the North and Central Regions. Nevertheless, respondents from Balqa in the Central Region expressed the least disagreement that debt is a problem in their community (9%) while the strongest disagreement was found in the northern Jarash governorate (44%).

Across the three regions, the indicators suggesting the strongest degree of vulnerability to VE (i.e., critical or important) were linked to respondents' sense of Financial Security, namely their levels of (dis)satisfaction with access to employment opportunities and affordable housing, and their (low) levels of disagreement that debt is a problem in the local community. All three regions were found to present an 'important' vulnerability to VE with regards to these three Financial Security indicators and the South Region even presented a 'critical' degree of vulnerability to VE in relation to the problematic nature of debt in the local community. However, the levels of respondent satisfaction concerning their access to running water and electricity, education and healthcare show that the three regions have only an 'average' to 'moderate' degree of vulnerability to VE in relation to the Essential Services Domain. At the Target Location level, the highest degree of vulnerability to VE (critical) was found in Balqa governorate concerning the extent of debt in the local community while the lowest degree of vulnerability to VE (low) could be noted in Aqaba with regards to satisfaction with access to all Essential Services.


Governance Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

GOVERNANCE DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Central & Local Governance	Some or strong disagreement that the central government does not care about the needs of the people (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q6	47%	36%	56%	22%	21%	43%	42%	61%	57%	50%	37%	62%
	Some or strong disagreement that the central government just does what the West says (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q7	64%	38%	56%	37%	37%	51%	39%	63%	57%	44%	40%	49%
	Some or strong disagreement that the central government does not have the power to control violent extremism (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q8	78%	48%	63%	47%	56%	68%	63%	58%	74%	63%	64%	82%
	Some or strong disagreement that the central government does not want to control violent extremism (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q9	78%	52%	67%	51%	55%	71%	64%	58%	70%	67%	60%	77%
	Some or strong disagreement that the local government does not care about the needs of the people (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q10	51%	31%	52%	29%	31%	38%	35%	47%	45%	39%	49%	45%

	Some or strong disagreement that government officials are corrupt (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q12	34%	32%	40%	35%	28%	38%	30%	41%	43%	34%	24%	19%
Security Forces	Some or strong disagreement that the police are not reliable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q13	65%	71%	70%	81%	51%	58%	60%	73%	77%	78%	57%	91%
	Some or strong disagreement that the Armed Forces don't have the ability to keep [them] safe (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q15	92%	81%	79%	92%	68%	76%	74%	76%	85%	87%	79%	96%
	Some or strong disagreement that the Armed Forces do not behave in a respectful way (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q16	93%	82%	79%	91%	69%	80%	69%	75%	84%	82%	79%	96%
Justice and Civil Liberties.	Some or strong disagreement that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of the people (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q11	80%	35%	64%	21%	54%	58%	59%	63%	45%	42%	52%	83%
	Some or strong disagreement that Civil Courts in Jordan are not effective (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q14	56%	68%	59%	61%	48%	69%	50%	62%	67%	57%	61%	48%
	Some or strong disagreement that the government uses its anti-terrorism laws as an excuse to control others (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q17	72%	54%	68%	56%	35%	61%	43%	61%	59%	49%	54%	82%

Some or strong disagreement that the government interferes too much in controlling political parties (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q18	56%	44%	49%	39%	31%	37%	35%	55%	47%	46%	41%	36%
Some or strong disagreement that government does not respect people's human rights and freedoms (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q19	59%	53%	59%	59%	32%	44%	45%	61%	70%	72%	55%	86%
Some or strong disagreement that the government interferes too much in the Jordanian press (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q20	43%	37%	46%	39%	23%	30%	34%	53%	39%	44%	31%	32%

GOVERNANCE INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION



Governance: VEV is average to moderate, largely due to satisfaction with Security Forces and positive views in the South and North Regions.

Overall, respondents from the South Region were more positive than respondents from the other two regions with regards to Central and Local Governance indicators, except concerning administrative corruption since South Region respondents – notably in Aqaba (9%) – expressed the least disagreement that government officials are corrupt. Overall, however, respondents from the South Region expressed the most disagreement that the central government does not care about the needs of the people, does not have the power to control VE, and does not want to control VE. Aqaba, in particular, registered the highest levels of disagreement for these indicators (respectively 62%, 82%, and 77%). The three regions had rather homogenous results regarding the level of disagreement that the central government just does what the West says, with the strongest disagreement level registered in the northern Irbid governorate (64%) and Central Region's Madaba governorate (63%) and the least disagreement found in both Balqa (Central Region) and Mafraq (North Region) with 37%. Irbid also registered the strongest disagreement that the local government does not care about the needs of the people (51%) while Ajloun (North Region) and Balqa (Central Region) registered the least disagreement (31%).

Views of the Security Forces were generally positive across all three regions, particularly in the North and South Regions, and notably in Aqaba, Tafila and Karak in the south as well as in Mafraq, Irbid and Ajloun in the north. Respondents from these Target Locations expressed the strongest disagreement that the police are not reliable, that the Armed Forces don't have the ability to keep them safe and do not behave in a respectful way (over 80%). The lowest disagreement (nevertheless over 50%) was found in the Central Region, particularly Balqa, Amman and Zarqa but also in the southern Ma'an governorate and related to the police reliability indicator.

Negative views regarding access to Justice and Civil Liberties were found more commonly in the Central Region, namely in relation to excessive government interference in the Jordanian press and political parties. With regards to these two indicators, the Balqa governorate registered the lowest disagreement levels (respectively 23% and 31%). Balqa also registered low disagreement in relation to government disrespect of people's human rights and freedoms (32%) and its use of anti-terrorism laws as an excuse to control others (35%). The South Region, especially Aqaba (with over 80% of disagreement over three indicators out of six), registered the most positive views in relation to the Jordanian and Civil Liberties domain. For example, respondents from Aqaba expressed great disagreement (83%) that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of the people while respondents from Mafraq and Ajloun (North Region) expressed the least disagreement with that statement (respectively 21% and 35%). Views were rather homogeneous (strong disagreement) across the three regions concerning the idea that civil courts in Jordan are not effective.

Overall, vulnerability to VE with regards to Governance is not particularly strong (average to moderate) across the three regions, except over negative views relating to government official corruption, local government's level of interest in people's needs, and government interference in the press for which vulnerability to VE is 'important' in the three regions. At the Target Location level, both the highest degree of vulnerability to VE (critical) and the lowest (low) were found in Aqaba; the former concerning official corruption and the latter concerning positive views of the Security Forces (all indicators), access to Justice and Civil Liberties (2 indicators), and satisfaction with Central and Local Governance (1 indicator).

Self-Value Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

SELF VALUE DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Locus of Control	Some or strong disagreement that it's useless trying to get the government to listen to [them] (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q21	41%	39%	61%	23%	23%	41%	36%	59%	57%	43%	40%	66%
	Some or strong disagreement that [they] do not feel that there is a point in voting, as it doesn't change anything (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q22	38%	34%	52%	27%	33%	36%	33%	52%	49%	44%	29%	24%
Social Integration	Some or strong disagreement that the people who work hardest are never rewarded the most (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q23	31%	39%	40%	31%	32%	37%	34%	44%	41%	33%	23%	21%
	Some or strong disagreement that [they] do not feel part of [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q24	60%	63%	66%	58%	62%	60%	59%	63%	64%	66%	65%	68%
	Some or strong disagreement that it is better to die in revenge than to live on in shame (proverb) (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q25	67%	55%	62%	45%	54%	55%	47%	61%	61%	55%	48%	56%

SELF-VALUE INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Self-Value: VEV increases with low Locus of Control and low Social Integration across the three regions.

Locus of Control was higher in the South Region than in the Central and North Regions, which registered rather homogenous results. While disagreement that it is useless trying to get the government to listen to them was quite high among respondents in the South Region, especially in Aqaba (66%) but also in the northern Jarash government (61%); it was lower in most northern and central governorates and particularly in Mafraq (North Region) and Balqa (Central Region) with 23%. Levels of disagreement that there is no point in voting, due to the belief that voting does not bring about change, were similar across the three regions.

Perceptions of Social Integration were more positive across the three regions. Generally, there was strong disagreement (over 60%) among respondents that they do not feel part of their community. Albeit to a lesser extent, disagreement with the proverb "it is better to die in revenge than to live on in shame" was also commonplace. However, respondents from all governorates, especially in Aqaba, expressed low levels of disagreement that the people who work hardest are never rewarded the most.

Vulnerability to VE increased with low Locus of Control, notably with views relating to the inefficacy or futility of political processes (voting) and hard work. Social Integration, however, reduces vulnerability to VE across the three regions. At the Target Location level, Aqaba had the highest degree of vulnerability to VE (critical) regarding Locus of Control and views of the voting process as well as the lowest degree of vulnerability to VE (low) regarding the first indicator (usefulness of trying to get the government to listen to [people]) and the indicator related to community integration (feeling part of one's community).


Religious and Social Values Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL VALUES DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Religious Disposition & Attitudes	Some or strong disagreement that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q84	65%	62%	72%	56%	55%	68%	59%	59%	78%	66%	76%	84%
	Some or strong agreement that all people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose (strongly + somewhat agree) Q85	75%	54%	62%	80%	65%	81%	69%	62%	70%	71%	75%	92%
	Some or strong agreement that religion and politics should be kept separate (strongly + somewhat agree) Q86	62%	35%	34%	26%	59%	42%	36%	39%	53%	41%	48%	48%
	Some or strong agreement that Islam does not allow the killing of other people (strongly + somewhat agree) Q87	92%	85%	75%	97%	74%	72%	67%	59%	83%	87%	91%	98%
	Some or strong disagreement that religious extremism is a problem in my community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q31	76%	64%	63%	47%	74%	58%	42%	63%	53%	62%	53%	66%

Social Equality	Some or strong disagreement that inequality between tribes is a problem in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q28	44%	23%	53%	21%	30%	49%	35%	41%	30%	30%	27%	26%
	Some or strong disagreement that inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians is a problem in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q29	49%	37%	58%	39%	32%	51%	35%	48%	39%	39%	33%	32%
	Some or strong disagreement that lots of bored youths is a problem in [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q27	21%	15%	39%	12%	31%	24%	18%	45%	22%	18%	7%	16%


RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Religious & Social Values: VEV is higher with issues related to Social Equality than issues related to Religious Disposition and Attitudes.

With regards to Religious Disposition & Attitudes, results were rather homogeneous across the three regions. In particular, disagreement that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims (religious coexistence) and agreement that all people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose (freedom of religion) were high across the three regions (from 55% to over 80%), and particularly in the South Region (and most notably Aqaba governorate). Agreement that Islam does not allow the killing of other people was extremely high across the three regions, especially in the South Region (over 80%) and the North Region (over 7%) while Madaba (Central Region) garnered the lowest level of agreement (59%) across all Target Locations. Agreement with separation between religion and politics was much lower across the three regions, with the lowest scores being registered in the North Region and particularly in Mafraq (26%), Ajloun (34%) and Jarash (35%). Views were once again homogeneous across all regions with regards to the incidence of religious extremism in the local community. While Zarqa respondents expressed the least disagreement that religious extremism is a problem in their community (42%), Irbid respondents expressed the strongest disagreement with that statement (76%).

Indicator scores relating to Social Equality revealed more issues likely to increase vulnerability to VE across the Target Locations. Specifically, inequality between tribes was seen as a problem across all three regions, particularly in the South Region. However, the lowest disagreement that inequality between tribes is a problem in their community was found among respondents from Mafraq (21%) and Ajloun (23%) in the North Region. Similarly, inequality between East and West Bank Jordanians was considered problematic primarily in the South and Central Regions. However, the most significant issue among the Social Equality indicators pertained to the presence of bored youth in the local community. In this regard, disagreement that lots of bored youth are a problem was extremely low across the three regions (except in Madaba governorate) and notably in the South Region and Ma'an governorate (7%), followed by the North Region and notably Mafraq governorate (12%).

Vulnerability to VE is higher in relation to problems of Social Equality than issues relating to Religious Disposition & Attitudes across the three regions. VEV is either 'important' (Central and North Regions mostly) or 'critical' (South Region primarily) when it comes to Social Equality indicators while VEV is either 'moderate' or 'low' for indicators relating to Religious Disposition & Attitudes across the three regions. However, VEV increases to 'average' when looking at the indicator measuring respondents' appetite for separation between religion and politics. At the Target Location level, the highest degree of vulnerability to VE (critical) was found in Ma'an governorate concerning the problematic presence of bored youth in the local community while the lowest degree of vulnerability to VE (low) could be noted in Aqaba with extremely high agreement that Islam does not allow the killing of other people.


Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT AND VE DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Exposure to Crime	Some or strong disagreement that crime is a problem in [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q32	50%	59%	64%	43%	46%	45%	39%	56%	41%	47%	54%	23%
	Some or strong disagreement that drug abuse is a problem in [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q33	24%	43%	60%	22%	24%	31%	30%	60%	33%	23%	29%	17%
	Some or strong disagreement that the availability of weapons is a problem in [their] community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q34	44%	53%	59%	18%	17%	47%	33%	62%	29%	35%	40%	15%
	Denial that "myself or my family" have suffered directly from crime (No) Q35	80%	87%	80%	96%	84%	87%	92%	87%	82%	85%	84%	79%
Exposure to Conflict & Violence	Some or strong disagreement that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem in my community (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q30	42%	40%	45%	22%	44%	36%	28%	53%	40%	40%	19%	61%
	Denial that "myself or my family" have suffered directly from violent extremism (No) Q36	89%	89%	79%	97%	85%	91%	93%	84%	86%	93%	86%	91%




EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Exposure to Crime, Conflict & VE: VEV is higher concerning perceptions of crime and conflict than direct exposure to, and/or experience of it.


Crime, drug abuse and the availability of weapons were considered problems across all regions, and particularly in the South Region where Aqaba respondents expressed the lowest disagreement that the above-mentioned issues were a problem in their community (respectively 23%, 17%, and 15%) across all Target Locations. Overall, Jarash governorate in the North Region and Madaba in the Central Region expressed the strongest disagreement regarding the problematic extent of local Exposure to Crime (between 56% and 64%). Despite this, very few respondents across all Target Locations reported that they or their family have suffered directly from crime, violent extremism, or excessive police authority. Indeed, respondents in every governorate strongly denied such statements (over 70%). Worthy of note, Zarqa governorate in the Central Region registered the lowest level of denial that respondents or their family have suffered directly from excessive police authority (62%). However, conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees was reported to be a problem across the three regions, especially in the North Region and notably in Mafraq governorate. Nevertheless, the lowest level disagreement with that statement was found in the southern Ma'an governorate (19% against 22% in Mafraq) while the strongest disagreement was registered in Aqaba (61%).

Perceived Exposure to Crime (crime, drug abuse, and weapon availability) and Exposure to Conflict & Violence (conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees) both contribute to increasing vulnerability to VE across all Target Locations: VEV is 'average' concerning perceptions that crime is a problem in the local community but rises to 'important' in relation to perceptions that drug abuse, weapon availability and conflict between Jordanian and Syrian refugees are a problem in the local community. However, respondents confessed limited direct experience of crime and violence (crime, VE, and excessive police authority), which reduces such vulnerability to 'low' across all Target Locations. The highest degree of vulnerability to VE (critical) was found in Aqaba governorate concerning the incidence of weapon availability (and drug abuse) in the local community while the lowest degree of vulnerability to VE (low) could be noted in Mafraq with regards to respondents' direct experience of VE.


Foreign Relations and VE Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND VE DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Regional Relations	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Syria (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q43	33%	38%	34%	15%	35%	11%	21%	36%	34%	47%	29%	38%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Israel (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q44	23%	18%	24%	16%	27%	3%	19%	36%	18%	17%	14%	8%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Turkey (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q42	74%	67%	73%	69%	50%	48%	67%	61%	72%	86%	86%	88%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Iran (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q40	26%	22%	41%	8%	36%	40%	28%	34%	31%	30%	25%	25%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Saudi Arabia (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q41	77%	69%	78%	77%	65%	76%	75%	63%	75%	85%	88%	86%

Global Relations	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from the US (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q38	64%	39%	63%	28%	48%	36%	50%	50%	39%	50%	50%	20%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from the EU (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q39	66%	39%	61%	40%	55%	48%	52%	58%	46%	64%	52%	34%
	Positive or neutral or no impact on Jordan from Russia (very positive + somewhat positive + neither positive nor negative + no impact) Q45	29%	30%	51%	32%	61%	66%	36%	63%	49%	42%	37%	23%
Foreign Interventionism & VE	Some or strong disagreement that Western intervention in Syria is fueling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q46	49%	38%	45%	28%	16%	48%	23%	51%	34%	41%	27%	32%
	Some or strong disagreement that Iranian interventionism in Syria is fueling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q47	49%	34%	38%	28%	42%	52%	22%	50%	24%	42%	23%	29%
	Some or strong disagreement that Jordan's intervention in Syria is fueling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q48	53%	41%	36%	33%	38%	51%	28%	45%	38%	50%	31%	21%




FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION



FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Foreign Relations & VE: VEV increases with perceived negative impact on Jordan from regional neighbors and general foreign interventionism in Jordan/Syria.

Concerning Regional Relations, perceptions of the positive, neutral or absence of impact from Syria, Israel, and Iran on Jordan are fewer than those of the positive, neutral or absence of impact from Turkey and Saudi Arabia on Jordan, across all three regions. Overall, Israel was deemed having the least positive impact on Jordan across all Target Locations, and particularly in Amman (3%) and Aqaba (8%). Amman respondents also believed the least that Syria has a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan (11%) though respondents from the southern Tafiela governorate believed it the most (47%). While Mafraq respondents in the North Region believed the least that Iran has a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan, respondents in neighboring Jarash governorate believed it the most (41%). Overall, the South Region respondents believed the least that Israel has a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan but believed the most that Syria and Iran as well as Turkey and Saudi Arabia have a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan (this was especially the case in Aqaba, Ma'an and Tafiela).

With regards to Global Relations, South Region respondents held the most negative views of the impact on Jordan from the US and the EU, while respondents from the Central Region held the most positive views of the impact on Jordan from the EU and Russia. The North Region respondents believed the most that the US has a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan (particularly Irbid and Jarash respondents) but believed the least that it is true of Russia. Aqaba respondents registered the weakest belief that the US, the EU and Russia have a positive, neutral or no impact on Jordan (respectively 20%, 34% and 23%). The most positive views of the impact (positive, neutral, or inexistent) from Russia on Jordan were found in Amman (66%).

Views on Foreign Interventionism in Syria and Jordan and how it fuels VE in Jordan were mostly negative across the three regions, and especially in the South Region. Disagreement that the Western intervention in Syria fuels VE in Jordan was the lowest among respondents from Balqa in the Central Region (16%) but the highest among respondents of Madaba (51%). Zarqa respondents expressed the lowest level of disagreement that Iranian interventionism in Syria fuels VE in Jordan (22%) while the strongest disagreement with that statement was found in Amman (52%). Interestingly, Aqaba respondents expressed the least disagreement that Jordan's own intervention in Syrian fuels VE in Jordan (21%), while Irbid registered the strongest disagreement with that statement (53%). Finally, Aqaba respondents also expressed the least disagreement that Western interventionism in Jordan fuels VE in the country (19%), while the strongest disagreement with that statement could be noted in both Irbid (North Region) and Tafiela (South Region) with 49%.

Vulnerability to VE is higher with perceptions of foreign interventionism in Syria/Jordan fueling VE at home and of negative impact on Jordan from foreign countries, especially Israel, Iran and Syria. At the Target Location level, vulnerability to VE was 'critical' in Amman regarding the impact on Jordan from Syria and Israel. It was also critical in Mafraq regarding the impact from Iran, as well as in Balqa with regards to the belief that Western intervention in Syria fuels VE in Jordan. However, vulnerability to VE was the weakest (low) in the southern Tafiela, Ma'an and Aqaba governorates in relation to the perceived impact on Jordan from Turkey and Saudi Arabia.


Islamist Group and VEO Support Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

ISLAMIST GROUP AND VEO SUPPORT DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
Support for Islamist & non-Islamist Groups	Some or strong support for the Free Syrian Army Q57	19%	22%	26%	25%	53%	25%	31%	32%	14%	37%	21%	25%
	Some support for or neutrality toward Hizb ut-Tahrir (some support + people are neutral) Q60	21%	23%	34%	10%	26%	40%	34%	25%	24%	26%	32%	34%
	Some support for or neutrality toward Salafist Quietists (some support + people are neutral) Q62	19%	36%	43%	45%	37%	31%	39%	34%	24%	31%	34%	26%
	Some support for or neutrality toward Islamic Action Front (some support + people are neutral) Q63	32%	20%	43%	21%	40%	56%	45%	42%	48%	46%	41%	58%
Support for VEOs	Some or strong opposition toward Al Qa'ida Q54	77%	76%	57%	87%	75%	71%	57%	65%	74%	64%	51%	68%
	Some or strong opposition toward Jabhat Al Nusra Q55	73%	72%	59%	89%	63%	67%	63%	73%	74%	64%	57%	72%
	Some or strong opposition toward ISIS Q56	92%	89%	80%	98%	80%	81%	67%	82%	88%	82%	69%	93%
	Some opposition or neutrality toward Hezbollah Q58	51%	48%	38%	38%	27%	36%	41%	43%	42%	40%	24%	22%
	Some or strong opposition toward Hamas Q59	50%	51%	47%	59%	38%	10%	32%	49%	36%	31%	37%	23%

	Some or strong opposition toward Salafist Jihadists Q61	76%	72%	62%	91%	71%	44%	52%	69%	71%	51%	46%	45%
VEO Threat	Some or strong agreement that ISIS is a threat to Jordan's national security (strongly + somewhat agree) Q64	61%	72%	50%	93%	82%	57%	66%	58%	63%	63%	65%	75%
	Some or strong agreement that Jordanians who go to fight abroad for example in Syria should be imprisoned on their return (strongly + somewhat agree) Q65	71%	51%	55%	77%	62%	58%	58%	62%	59%	59%	55%	54%
	Some or strong agreement that Jordan's intervention against ISIS in Syria is justifiable (strongly + somewhat agree) Q66	79%	61%	50%	84%	50%	64%	50%	58%	63%	71%	52%	82%


ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Islamist Group & VEO Support: VEV is stronger in relation to levels of support for Islamist groups than levels of support for VEOs, except for Hezbollah/Hamas.

Across all regions, opposition to Islamist and non-Islamist groups was considerably lower than opposition to VEOs, except for Hamas and Hezbollah, which garnered less opposition than other VEOs such as ISIS, JN, and AQ. Opposition (or neutrality) to Hezbollah and opposition to Hamas were the lowest in the South and Central Regions. In particular, Amman respondents expressed the least opposition to Hamas (10%) across all Target Locations while the lowest level of opposition to Hezbollah was registered in Aqaba (22%). Opposition to ISIS was the strongest across all Target Locations, particularly in the North Region, followed by the South Region and the Central Region. The strongest opposition to ISIS was observed in the northern Mafraq governorate (98%), followed by the southern Aqaba governorate (93%) and the northern Irbid governorate (92%). Zarqa respondents expressed the least opposition to ISIS among all Target Locations (67%). The strongest opposition to both JN and AQ was also observed in Mafraq (respectively 89% and 87%) while the lowest levels of opposition were found in the southern Ma'an governorate (57% and 51%). Opposition to Salafist Jihadists was the strongest in Mafraq (91%) and the weakest in Amman (44%) followed by Aqaba (45%) and Ma'an (46%).

With regards to Islamist and non-Islamist Groups, support for the FSA was generally higher than support for any other group, especially in the Central Region. As such, respondents from Balqa expressed the most positive views (support or neutrality) about the FSA (53%) while the southern Karak governorate and the northern Irbid governorate expressed the least positive views (respectively 14% and 19%). Support or neutrality toward Hizb ut-Tahrir was the weakest in the North Region where Mafraq respondents expressed the least positive views (10%). Support or neutrality toward Salafist Quietists was the weakest in the South Region although respondents from the northern Irbid governorate expressed the least positive views of the movement (19%). Finally, support or neutrality toward the IAF was particularly low in the North Region and higher in the Central and South Regions. Specifically, respondents from the northern Ajloun governorate expressed the least positive views about the IAF (20%) while the strongest support for (and/or neutrality toward) the IAF was found in Aqaba (58%) and Amman (56%).

In terms of VEO Threat perception, the North Region gathered the most agreement that ISIS is a threat to Jordan's national security, that Jordanians who go to fight abroad for example in Syria should be imprisoned on their return, and that Jordan's intervention against ISIS in Syria is justifiable. ISIS was particularly seen a threat to the country's security in the northern Mafraq governorate (93%), followed by Balqa in the Central Region (82%). Jarash respondents (North Region), however, expressed the least agreement with that statement (50%). Mafraq also garnered the strongest agreement that fighters should be imprisoned on their return and that the Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable (respectively 77% and 84%).

Vulnerability to VE was particularly high (important) in relation to support for some Islamist groups, notably Hizb ut-Tahrir, Salafist Quietists, and the IAF (and the FSA as a non-Islamist group) as well as support for the VEOs Hezbollah and Hamas. At the Target Location level, vulnerability to VE was 'critical' in Amman regarding the (low) level of opposition toward Hamas and in Mafraq concerning the (low) level of support and/or neutrality toward Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, Mafraq governorate also showed the lowest vulnerability to VE (low) with regards to its (strong) opposition levels to AQ, JN and ISIS and (strong) agreement that ISIS is a threat to Jordan's national security.

VEO Narratives Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

VEO NARRATIVES DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
External Influence	Some or strong disagreement that the West is humiliating Islam (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q71	41%	20%	54%	9%	25%	27%	15%	49%	31%	21%	23%	13%
	Some or strong disagreement that the Jordan-Israel peace treaty is an act of betrayal for Islam and Arabs (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q72	49%	41%	52%	38%	28%	35%	17%	51%	30%	52%	25%	28%
Islamic Principles	Some or strong disagreement that the Caliphate will help restore Islam (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q73	69%	38%	42%	39%	47%	70%	44%	55%	31%	48%	34%	55%
	Some or strong disagreement that only Islam can guarantee justice (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q74	22%	29%	21%	27%	44%	34%	26%	54%	28%	34%	8%	22%
	Some or strong disagreement that Sharia should be the only source of law (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q75	26%	28%	22%	26%	44%	45%	23%	58%	28%	21%	12%	12%
Violent Jihad	Some or strong disagreement that the practice of Takfir is justifiable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q76	86%	75%	72%	81%	73%	80%	61%	71%	75%	76%	75%	66%
	Some or strong disagreement that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q77	18%	41%	55%	21%	23%	20%	13%	46%	45%	35%	28%	33%

	Some or strong disagreement that violent jihad in Syria is justifiable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q78	72%	59%	65%	45%	63%	69%	41%	52%	57%	63%	58%	80%
	Some or strong disagreement that violent jihad in Europe is justifiable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q79	82%	54%	68%	52%	64%	54%	50%	52%	53%	66%	60%	76%
	Some or strong disagreement that violent jihad against Shias is justifiable (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q80	48%	51%	61%	43%	61%	59%	34%	51%	40%	48%	51%	64%
	Some or strong disagreement that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q81	66%	51%	43%	71%	43%	43%	31%	62%	42%	57%	47%	24%
VEO Strength & Protection	Some or strong disagreement that members of violent jihadist groups always look after each other (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q82	74%	49%	49%	69%	44%	44%	44%	75%	41%	49%	40%	66%
	Some or strong disagreement that members of violent jihadist groups are skilled fighters (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q83	71%	54%	46%	73%	45%	46%	32%	64%	44%	50%	41%	75%


VEO NARRATIVES INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



VEO NARRATIVES INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



VEO Narratives: VEV is overall average but increases with VEO narratives linked to External Influence, Islamic Principles and violent jihad in Israel.

Overall, the South Region expressed the least disagreement with the most VEO narratives, namely those relating to External Influence, Islamic Principles, and VEO Strength and Protection. The Central Region expressed the least disagreement with VEO narratives relating to Violent Jihad.

With regards to External Influence VEO narratives, the North Region, and particularly the governorates of Jarash and Irbid, expressed the strongest disagreement that the West is humiliating Islam and that the Jordan-Israel peace treaty is an act of betrayal for Islam and Arabs. However, Mafraq respondents expressed the least disagreement with the first statement (9%) followed by respondents from the southern Aqaba governorate (13%). Zarqa respondents (Central Region) expressed the least disagreement with the second statement (17%).

Concerning VEO narratives related to Islamic Principles, the southern Mafraq and Aqaba governorates garnered the least disagreement that Sharia should be the only source of law and that only Islam can guarantee justice. The strongest disagreement with those two statements came from respondents in Madaba (Central Region).

Views of VEO narratives related to Violent Jihad were fairly homogenous across the three regions. For example, disagreement that the practice of Takfir is justifiable was strong across the three regions, and particularly in the northern governorates of Irbid (86%) and Mafraq (81%). The VEO narrative stating that violent jihad against Israel is justifiable garnered the least disagreement among the Violent Jihad narratives, notably in Zarqa (13%), Irbid (18%), and Amman (20%). Central Region governorates – and most notably Zarqa – generally expressed weaker disagreement that violent jihad in Syria, Europe, and against Shias is justifiable. The North Region, especially Irbid and Mafraq, expressed stronger disagreement than the Central and South Regions that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money. Respondents from Aqaba (24%) and Zarqa (31%) expressed the least disagreement with that statement.

Finally, VEO narratives linked to VEO Strength and Protection garnered stronger disagreement in the North Region, notably in Irbid and Mafraq, while Ma'an respondents in the south expressed the least disagreement that members of violent jihadist groups always look after each other (40%) and respondents from Zarqa (Central Region) expressed the least disagreement that members of violent jihadist groups are skilled fighters (32%).


Vulnerability to VE was found to be 'important' for the three regions with regards to the (low) level of disagreement with External Influence and Islamic Principles VEO Narratives and the justifiability of violent jihad in Israel. It was even 'critical' in the South Region concerning the belief that Sharia should be the only source of law. VEV was overall 'average' for the remaining narratives and was even 'moderate' in relation to views on the practice of Takfir and the justifiability of violent jihad in Syria and Europe (at least for the North and South Regions). At the Target Location level, vulnerability to VE was found to be most 'critical' in Ma'an with the low disagreement that only Islam can guarantee justice and in Zarqa with regards to views of violent jihad in Israel. VEV was also found to be at its lowest in Irbid where disagreement that the practice of Takfir and violent jihad in Europe are justifiable was strong.

Communications and VE Domain: VEV Index Baseline Table and Charts

COMMUNICATIONS AND VE DOMAIN													
THEME	INDICATOR	NORTH REGION				CENTRAL REGION				SOUTH REGION			
		IR.	AJ.	JA.	MF.	BA.	AM.	ZA.	MD.	KA.	TA.	MA.	Aq.
VEO Propaganda	Some or strong disagreement that ISIS propaganda is fuelling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q50	54%	33%	36%	23%	34%	49%	22%	41%	24%	29%	29%	9%
	Some or strong disagreement that Jabhat Al Nusra propaganda is fuelling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q51	54%	40%	41%	43%	35%	51%	26%	56%	26%	37%	31%	13%
Media and VE	Some or strong disagreement that the Internet / social media is fuelling violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat disagree) Q52	36%	40%	43%	30%	43%	29%	19%	57%	31%	41%	27%	26%
	Some or strong agreement that the media exaggerates the problem of violent extremism in Jordan (strongly + somewhat agree) Q53	60%	53%	49%	74%	60%	64%	59%	39%	57%	46%	70%	55%


COMMUNICATIONS & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY RESEARCH LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



COMMUNICATIONS & VE INDICATOR SCORES BY REGION

— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION



Communications and VE: VEV is important in relation to media content believed to fuel VE in Jordan.

There was less disagreement in the South Region than in the Central and North regions that ISIS and JN propaganda are fueling VE in Jordan. In both cases, Aqaba respondents expressed the least disagreement with 9% and 13%. The strongest disagreement that ISIS propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan was found in Irbid (54%), followed by Amman (49%) and Madaba (41%). The three governorates also registered the strongest disagreement that JN propaganda is fueling VE in Jordan (respectively 54%, 51%, and 56%).

Similarly, disagreement that Internet/social media is fueling VE in Jordan was lower in the South Region than in the other two. Nevertheless, the lowest disagreement with that statement was observed in the central Zarqa governorate (19%). Agreement that the media exaggerates the problem of VE in Jordan was rather strong across the three regions, and notably in Mafraq (74%), Ma'an (70%), and Amman (64%).

Vulnerability to VE was 'important' in relation to media content believed to fuel VE in Jordan and 'average' with regards to the idea that the media exaggerates the problem of VE in the country. At the Target Location level, the highest vulnerability to VE (critical) was found in Aqaba and Zarqa with regards to VEO propaganda and Internet/social media fueling VE in Jordan while the lowest vulnerability (low) was observed in Mafraq, Ma'an, and Amman concerning media exaggeration of the problem of VE.

2.7 FINDINGS: OVERARCHING VEV MEASURES

Theme VEV Baseline Scores by Target Location

For each Theme, the following table and chart show the highest and lowest vulnerability to VE across all Target Locations.


DOMAINS	THEMES	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
BASIC NEEDS	Financial Security	Balqa (CRITICAL)	Madaba (AVERAGE)
	Essential Services	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Aqaba (LOW)
GOVERNANCE	Central & Local Governance	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
	Security Forces	Balqa (MODERATE)	Aqaba (LOW)
	Justice & Civil Liberties	Balqa (IMPORTANT)	Aqaba (MODERATE)
SELF-VALUE	Locus of Control	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Social Integration	Ma'an (AVERAGE)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES	Religious Disposition & Attitudes	Zarqa (AVERAGE)	Aqaba (MODERATE)
	Social Equality	Ma'an (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE	Exposure to Crime	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Madaba (MODERATE)
	Exposure to Conflict & Violence	Zarqa (MODERATE)	Aqaba (LOW)
FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE	Regional Relations	Amman (IMPORTANT)	Tafiela (AVERAGE)
	Global Relations	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Foreign Interventionism & VE	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT	Support for Islamist & non-Islamist Groups	Irbid (IMPORTANT)	Balqa (IMPORTANT)
	Support for VEOs	Ma'an (AVERAGE)	Mafraq (MODERATE)

DOMAINS	THEMES	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
	VEO threat	Jarash (AVERAGE)	Mafraq (LOW)
VEO NARRATIVES	External Influence	Zarqa (CRITICAL)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Islamic Principles	Ma'an (CRITICAL)	Madaba (AVERAGE)
	Violent Jihad	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (MODERATE)
	VEO Strength & Protection	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (MODERATE)
COMMUNICATIONS & VE	VEO Propaganda	Aqaba (CRITICAL)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
	Media & VE	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Mafraq, Balqa (AVERAGE)

The highest vulnerability to VE, i.e., 'critical' VEV, was observed in relation to four themes: Financial Security (Basic Needs Domain), External Influence (VEO Narratives Domain), Islamic Principles (VEO Narratives Domain), and VEO Propaganda (Communications and VE Domain). The Target Locations concerned were respectively: Balqa, Zarqa, Ma'an, and Aqaba.

The lowest vulnerability to VE, i.e., 'low' VEV, was also observed in relation to four themes: Essential Services (Basic Needs Domain), Security Forces (Governance Domain), Exposure to Conflict and Violence (Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain), and VEO Threat (Islamist Group and VEO Support Domain). The Target Locations concerned were respectively: Aqaba (for the first three Themes mentioned), and Mafraq.

THEME VEV BASELINE SCORES BY TARGET LOCATION



Theme VEV Baseline Scores by Region

For each Theme, the following table and chart show the highest and lowest vulnerability to VE across all Regions.


DOMAINS	THEMES	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
BASIC NEEDS	Financial Security	Central Region (IMPORTANT)	South Region (AVERAGE)
	Essential Services	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (MODERATE)
GOVERNANCE	Central & Local Governance	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
	Security Forces	Central Region (MODERATE)	South Region (LOW)
	Justice & Civil Liberties	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
SELF-VALUE	Locus of Control	Central Region, North Region (IMPORTANT)	South Region (AVERAGE)
	Social Integration	South Region (AVERAGE)	Central Region, North Region (AVERAGE)
RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES	Religious Disposition & Attitudes	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (MODERATE)
	Social Equality	South Region (IMPORTANT)	North Region (AVERAGE)
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE	Exposure to Crime	South Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (AVERAGE)
	Exposure to Conflict & Violence	Central Region (MODERATE)	South Region (MODERATE)
FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE	Regional Relations	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
	Global Relations	South Region (AVERAGE)	Central Region (AVERAGE)
	Foreign Interventionism & VE	South Region (IMPORTANT)	Central Region, North Region (IMPORTANT)
ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT	Support for Islamist & non-Islamist Groups	North Region (IMPORTANT)	Central Region (IMPORTANT)

DOMAINS	THEMES	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
	Support for VEOs	South Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (MODERATE)
	VEO threat	Central Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (MODERATE)
VEO NARRATIVES	External Influence	South Region (IMPORTANT)	North Region (IMPORTANT)
	Islamic Principles	South Region (IMPORTANT)	Central Region (AVERAGE)
	Violent Jihad	Central Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (AVERAGE)
	VEO Strength & Protection	Central Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (MODERATE)
COMMUNICATIONS & VE	VEO Propaganda	South Region (IMPORTANT)	North Region (AVERAGE)
	Media & VE	South Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (AVERAGE)

The highest vulnerability to VE, in this case 'important' VEV, was observed in relation to eight themes: Financial Security (Basic Needs Domain), Locus of Control (Self-Value Domain), Social Equality (Religious and Social Values Domain), Foreign Interventionism and VE (Foreign Relations and VE Domain), Support for Islamist and non-Islamist Groups (Islamist Group and VEO Support Domain), External Influence (VEO Narratives Domain), Islamic Principles (VEO Narratives Domain), and VEO Propaganda (Communications and VE Domain). The Regions concerned were respectively: the Central Region for the first two themes, the South Region for the next two, the North Region, and the South Region for the last three themes. *Note that for 13 out of 23 themes, the highest VEV registered was 'average' (score range between 41% and 60%).*

The lowest vulnerability to VE, i.e., 'low' VEV, was observed in relation to only one theme: Security Forces (Governance Domain) in the South Region. *Note that for 13 out of 23 themes, the lowest VEV registered was also 'average'.*

THEME VEV BASELINE SCORES BY REGION



Domain VEV Baseline Scores by Target Location

For each Domain, the following table and chart show the highest and lowest vulnerability to VE across all Target Locations.


DOMAINS	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
BASIC NEEDS	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Madaba (MODERATE)
GOVERNANCE	Balqa (AVERAGE)	Aqaba (MODERATE)
SELF-VALUE	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Jarash, Madaba (AVERAGE)
RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES	Zarqa (AVERAGE)	Irbid (MODERATE)
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE	Balqa (AVERAGE)	Madaba (MODERATE)
FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE	Mafraq (IMPORTANT)	Tafiela (AVERAGE)
ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT	Ma'an (AVERAGE)	Mafraq (AVERAGE)
VEO NARRATIVES	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Madaba (AVERAGE)
COMMUNICATIONS & VE	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (AVERAGE)

The highest vulnerability to VE, in this case 'Important' VEV, was observed in relation to five domains: Basic Needs, Self-Value, Foreign Relations and VE, VEO Narratives, and Communications and VE. The Target Locations concerned were respectively: Mafraq (for the first three domains mentioned), Zarqa, and Aqaba.

The lowest vulnerability to VE, in this case 'moderate' VEV, was observed in relation to four domains: Basic Needs, Governance, Religious and Social Values, and Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE. The Target Locations concerned were respectively: Madaba, Aqaba, Irbid, and Madaba once more.

DOMAIN VEV BASELINE SCORES BY TARGET LOCATION

IRBID AJLOUN JARASH MAFRAQ BALQA AMMAN ZARQA MADABA KARAK TAFIELA MA'AN AQABA



Domain VEV Baseline Scores by Region

For each Domain, the following table and chart show the highest and lowest vulnerability to VE across all Regions.

DOMAINS	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
BASIC NEEDS	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
GOVERNANCE	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (MODERATE)
SELF-VALUE	North Region, Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES	Central Region (AVERAGE)	South Region (AVERAGE)
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE	South Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (MODERATE)
FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE	South Region (AVERAGE)	Central Region (AVERAGE)
ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT	South Region (AVERAGE)	North Region (AVERAGE)
VEO NARRATIVES	South Region (IMPORTANT)	North Region (AVERAGE)
COMMUNICATIONS & VE	South Region (IMPORTANT)	North Region (AVERAGE)


The highest vulnerability to VE, in this case 'Important' VEV, was observed in relation to two domains: VEO Narratives and Communications and VE, both in the South Region.

The lowest vulnerability to VE, in this case 'moderate' VEV, was also observed in relation to two domains: Governance and Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE. The Regions concerned were respectively: the South Region and the North Region.

Note that, at the regional level, VEV was found to be 'average' across most domains (seven out of nine domains).

DOMAIN VEV BASELINE SCORES BY REGION


— NORTH REGION — CENTRAL REGION — SOUTH REGION




Overarching VEV Measures by Target Location and Region

NORTH REGION TARGET LOCATION COMPARISON


IRBID: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES




AJLOUN: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



JARASH: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



MAFRAQ: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



IRBID: Has the highest VEV (average) with regards to the Basic Needs Domain and the lowest Governance Domain.

MAFRAQ: Has the lowest VEV (average) with regards to the Self-Value Domain and the highest Exposure to Crime, Conflict & VE Domain.


AJLOUN: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Foreign Relations and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (moderate) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

JARASH: Has the highest VEV (average) with regards to the Communications and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (moderate) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

MAFRAQ: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Basic Needs Domain and the lowest VEV (moderate) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

General VEV Scores:

NORTH REGION TARGET LOCATIONS




In the North Region, Mafraq has the highest VEV (lowest baseline score) across all domains while both Irbid and Jarash have the lowest VEV (highest baseline scores).


Nevertheless, overarching VEV is only 'average' across the four Target Locations (score range between 41% and 60%)

CENTRAL REGION TARGET LOCATION COMPARISON


BALQA: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES




AMMAN: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



ZARQA: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



MADABA: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



BALQA: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Basic Needs Domain and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Religious and Social Values and Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domains.


AMMAN: Has the highest VEV (average) with regards to the Foreign Relations and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

ZARQA: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Communications and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Governance and Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domains.

MADABA: Has the highest VEV (average) with regards to the Communications and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (moderate) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

General VEV Baseline Scores:

CENTRAL REGIONS TARGET LOCATIONS




In the Central Region, Zarqa has the highest VEV (lowest baseline score) across all domains while Madaba has the lowest VEV (highest baseline scores).


Nevertheless, overarching VEV is only 'average' across the four Target Locations (score range between 41% and 60%)

SOUTH REGION TARGET LOCATION COMPARISON


KARAK: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES




TAFIELA: DOMAINS VEV SCORES



MA'AN: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



AQABA: DOMAINS VEV BASELINE SCORES



KARAK: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Communications and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (moderate) in relation to the Governance Domain.


TAFIELA: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Communications and VE Domains and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Governance and Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domains.

MA'AN: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Communications and VE and VEO Narratives Domains and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Exposure to Crime, Conflict and VE Domain.

AQABA: Has the highest VEV (important) with regards to the Communications and VE Domain and the lowest VEV (average) in relation to the Governance Domain.

General VEV Scores:

SOUTH REGION TARGET LOCATIONS




In the South Region, Ma'an has the highest VEV (lowest baseline score) across all domains while Madaba and Tafiela have the lowest VEV (highest baseline scores).


Nevertheless, overarching VEV is only 'average' across the four Target Locations (score range between 41% and 60%)

CROSS-LOCATION AND CROSS-REGION COMPARISONS

GENERAL VEV BASELINE SCORES: 12 Tls



GENERAL VEV BASELINE SCORES: 3 REGIONS



Across the 12 Target Locations, the highest VEV (average) was observed in Zarqa (lowest VEV baseline score) and the lowest VEV (also average) was observed in Madaba (highest VEV baseline score).


Across the three regions and 12 Target Locations, VEV is 'average' with general VEV baseline scores oscillating between 43% and 56%.

VEV Ranking Across Target Locations


Very High Average VEV (very low baseline score percentile: 41-44%): Zarqa;

High Average VEV (low baseline score percentile: 45-48%): Mafraq, Balqa, Ma'an, Ajloun;
 Medium Average VEV (median baseline score percentile: 49-52%): Aqaba, Karak, Tafiela, Amman;
 Low Average VEV (high baseline score percentile: 53-56%): Irbid, Jarash;
 Very Low Average VEV (very high baseline score percentile: 57-60%): Madaba.

VEV RANKING ACROSS TARGET LOCATIONS: FROM HIGHER TO LOWER ('AVERAGE') VULNERABILITY



VEV RANKING ACROSS TARGET LOCATIONS ORGANIZED BY REGION



SECTION IV: PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS



1.0 INTRODUCTION


Target Location and Audience Analysis enabled a better identification and understanding of the factors influencing propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior in Jordan (referred to as drivers), notably via establishing the most vulnerable audiences and most common Influence Pathways to VE and VE behavior. Project Recommendations, meanwhile, put forward activities designed to address those drivers and pathways in order to reduce propensity toward to VE and/or VE behavior and generally enhance the effectiveness of CVE interventions in Jordan.

As per the Influence Pathway Analysis Framework,⁷ Project Recommendations describe interventions designed to:

1. Reduce or remove the drivers that can lead vulnerable audiences (PTAs) to polarize and/or radicalize and/or to associate with like-minded, radical individuals and groups, and thereby to prevent the potential transition to VE in the first place;
2. Reduce or remove the drivers that can lead vulnerable audiences to engage in VE behavior (i.e., violent action and VEO membership) after they have been radicalized, and potentially instigate a process of de-radicalization.

Note, however, that Project Recommendations do not include interventions designed to withdraw recruits from VEOs (disengagement) and/or reintegrate returned fighters into Jordanian society, as both objectives were beyond the original scope of this project.

CVE INTERVENTION RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK



2.0 PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK

Project Recommendations highlight the need for proactive interventions that mitigate and/or counter the threats of VE and/or VE behavior (including VEO recruitment) in Jordan. The activities put forward therefore propose an integrated approach that addresses the motivators

⁷ See section I. Influence Pathway and Target Audience Analysis for a detailed description.

and grievances that make VE appealing, presents alternative narratives to those advanced in VEO propaganda, and hinders the practicalities of VEO recruitment/enlistment. This translates into three Operational Objectives: Foster Resilience to VE, Delegitimize VE/VEOs, and Expand CVE Community Engagement. These objectives are both interdependent and complementary, so successes in each objective are therefore mutually reinforcing (and failures are mutually damaging) with regards to the Overarching Project Objective (see table below).

As well as linking back to the Objective, Project Recommendations identify the PTAs most susceptible and provide, whenever relevant, examples of Target Locations (and sub-locations) in which the proposed interventions should be implemented.⁸

PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK			
Overarching Project Objective	Reduce Propensity Towards VE/VEO Recruitment in Jordan (Prevention)		
Recommendations Strategic Objective	Minimize Drivers of, and Enhance Barriers to, VE/VEO Membership among PTAs		
Operational Objectives	1. Foster Resilience to VE	2. Delegitimize VE/VEOs	3. Expand CVE Community Engagement
1. Foster Resilience to VE	<p>The first Operational Objective is best achieved through the implementation of activities that address the original issues and drivers that can lead to radicalization and/or the adoption of violent ideology. Given the unique circumstances that direct the trajectory of each Influence Pathway toward VE and/or VE behavior, it is important for CVE interventions to be 'customized' as much as possible, i.e., by supporting those individuals, or in this case PTAs, with highest risk of radicalization.</p> <p>Activities are often focused on turning VE drivers into factors of resilience for PTAs, especially fostering a robust and secure educational and living environment that is supportive of 'positive' values and activities (including hobbies) and that encourages the development of trusting relationships with authority. This is because analysis revealed that isolation from supportive relationships is a critical step in the process of adopting a violent ideology. Activities should therefore encourage, form and cultivate strong relationships with a variety of community members who can represent effective potential checks against polarization/radicalization. This includes providing youth and families with the skills to recognize signs of polarization/radicalization early on, approach individuals in the process of embracing a violent ideology, and intervene effectively.</p> <p>Note that these activities are inseparable from others seeking to expand CVE community engagement (third Operational Objective) and that, for example, look to foster an environment where citizens can voice concerns about VE, and where friends and family can intervene without fear of retribution for themselves or the individuals concerned.</p>		
2. Delegitimize	The second Operational Objective is best achieved via the implementation of		

⁸ See Section I. Influence Pathway and Target Audience Analysis of this report and standalone Target Location Analysis reports (separate deliverables).

PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK

<p>VE/VEOs</p>	<p>activities designed to counter VEO messaging, notably by exposing VEOs' 'true nature' and promoting alternative narratives. This includes expanding media content, (social media as well as formal media) and fostering alternative or positive narratives to individuals susceptible to radicalization and/or VEO recruitment. While activities promoting alternative narratives and instilling 'positive' social values are particularly important for interventions designed to prevent polarization/radicalization, messaging aimed at disengaging members of PTA from VE and curbing their sympathy/support for VEOs, or desire to enlist, must also exist. This can be done by promoting negative views about specific VEOs but also by enhancing media access and freedom where appropriate.</p> <p>This approach is based on analysis that revealed a need for tailored counter-VEO messaging and narratives, especially targeting younger audiences and women so that these promote alternatives to recruitment and resist VEO propaganda. Activities put forward to achieve this Operational Objective also recognize the importance of CVE community engagement as a process to help inform content for messaging aimed at delegitimizing VE/VEOs (see third Operational Objective). Furthermore, it also entails creating awareness about VEO propaganda, and enhancing critical thinking, especially among youth, in order to develop resilience toward this type of content (first Operational Objective).</p>
<p>3. Expand CVE Community Engagement</p>	<p>The third Operational Objective is best achieved via the implementation of activities designed to strengthen the role and capacity of communities to counter and prevent polarization/radicalization, and to mitigate the risks associated with VEO recruitment. These activities look to involve and empower local actors (notably community and religious leaders, women and youth themselves, etc.) to affect change in their communities as well as to resolve community-level grievances that VEOs might exploit. Some of these activities also aim to encourage community members to share their experiences and stories to provide credible alternatives to voices found within VE/VEO narratives, as well as to form and maintain trusting relationships with authorities (local governments/municipalities, police, etc.).</p>
<p>Target Locations</p>	<p>Irbid, Ajloun, Jarash, Mafraq, Balqa, Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Karak, Tafiela, Ma'an, and Aqaba.</p>
<p>IP Types</p>	<p>Opportunist (IP 1), Avenger (IP 2) and Ideologue (IP 3)</p>
<p>PTAs</p>	<p>Marginalized (East Bank Jordanian) Youth; Young Women; Salafist Youth; University Students and Underemployed Graduates; Marginalized West Bank Jordanians; Hardline MB Members and Supporters; Syrian Refugees; Petty Criminals/Young Inmates.</p>

3.0 CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES

CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES

THEME	EXPLANATION / JUSTIFICATION – GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
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CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES	
THEME	EXPLANATION / JUSTIFICATION – GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Focus Narrowly on ‘At Risk’ Audiences	<p>TAA facilitated the identification of most vulnerable audiences, or PTAs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should focus as much as possible on narrowly defined subsets of the population, i.e., PTAs, as increased benefits can be gained from more precise targeting.
Address Individual Motivators	<p>TAA indicates that factors that motivate at the individual-level, such as a desire for status, adventure and sense of belonging, revenge, material incentives, etc. are strong drivers of VE.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should focus on individual motivations and vulnerabilities to address drivers increasing propensity toward VE and VE behavior.
Contextualize Geographically	<p>TAA indicates that drivers of VE are most commonly context-specific.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should be tailored specific locations and utilize locally specific references to increase message resonance among selected vulnerable audiences.
Emphasize the Grassroots	<p>TAA indicates that support for foreign funded projects is greater when there is evidence of grassroots involvement and local representation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should emphasize grassroots efforts and local partnerships wherever possible.
Involve the Community	<p>TAA indicates that community members (especially family and friends) remain best positioned to identify growing propensity to VE among at risk individuals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should utilize content informed by community members and empower them to contribute to, and lead CVE efforts. Local projects should be implemented by partnering with well-known and well-liked community leaders, including religious leaders, social workers, local businessmen, members of prominent local tribes, etc.
Avoid Stigmatization	<p>TAA indicates that identifying and treating communities as radical can stigmatize those communities, further alienating them from the central government and CVE efforts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should appear to treat all Jordanians equally so as not to fuel radicalization and VE among stigmatized communities as well as among those who might need assistance but are not identified as radical.
Be Active Online	<p>TAA indicates that many male youths spend a lot of time online and are prolific users of sites and applications including Facebook and Twitter.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should include, wherever possible, an online element, ideally one that can take advantage of widespread smartphone usage among Jordanian youths, where such activities should aim to counter, and present an alternative to, VEO messaging.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES	
THEME	EXPLANATION / JUSTIFICATION – GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Avoid Generic Counter Narratives	<p>TAA indicates that generic religious and ideological counter-narratives are of limited effectiveness in reducing propensity to VE/VEO recruitment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should tailor counter narrative to specific audiences and address their personal circumstances, motivations and values.
Feature the JAF	<p>TAA indicates that there is widespread and strong support for the JAF, which are trusted more than other government institutions, and that messages related to the JAF generally reinforce confidence in the Royal Court and central government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should feature the JAF and highlight their efforts in countering the threat posed by VEOs to Jordan to keep the country safe.
Remember Kasasbeh	<p>TAA indicates that the murder of Jordanian pilot Moath Kasasbeh was a key turning point in views toward VEOs, with support for most VEOs active in Iraq/Syria, especially ISIS, radically declining among locals. TAA also found that the incident was linked to increased fear that VEOs pose a direct threat to Jordan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should continue to feature Kasasbeh to sustain public anger and revulsion toward VEOs and highlight and VEOs continue to pose a direct threat to Jordan.
Play to National Pride	<p>TAA indicates that, despite widespread grievances toward the central government and Royal Court, national pride remains strong across the country, reinforcement of which can, in turn, be linked to greater support for both the central government and the Royal Court.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should play to national pride wherever possible.
Highlight Security Threats	<p>TAA indicates widespread fear of deterioration in national security and stability but also strong confidence in the ability and desire of the JAF and central government to counter VE in Jordan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should continue highlighting security threats.
Inform the Public of CVE Efforts	<p>TAA found a lack of awareness of government activities to counter radicalization and VE beyond the JAF and GID, which risks undermining confidence in the ability and desire of the central government to keep Jordan safe.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should aim to regularly publicize the efforts of the central government in countering radicalization and VE within Jordan, in particular initiatives that are not related to the activities of the security and intelligence services.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES	
THEME	EXPLANATION / JUSTIFICATION – GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Avoid Branding	<p>TAA indicates that while views toward USAID are comparatively positive (for development purposes), US funded projects are generally viewed with suspicion and strongly risk undermining information campaigns and therefore project objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should avoid reference to foreign funding wherever possible.
Keep It Simple	<p>TAA indicates that simple and emotive religious VEO narratives resonate more strongly with locals than complex religious counter narratives that argue at a theological level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ CVE Interventions should aim to use similarly simple language in religious counter narratives that appeals to emotions rather than intellects.

4.0 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 FOSTER RESILIENCE AGAINST VE

OPERATIONAL	
OBJECTIVE	Foster Resilience against VE
TACTICAL	
KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'The Citizen Award'	
OBJECTIVE	Promote positive role models (either real life or fictitious heroes), particularly 'average' citizens who have made great achievements.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research demonstrated that one grievance among those tempted to support VEOs is that the central government is 'elitist' and neglects average citizens. Another related perception was that either the central government can/should handle the VEO problem and/or members of the public lack the qualities and abilities to make a significant difference - a feature described by social psychologists as an external locus of control. As such, efforts must be made to create and emphasize a new social contract between government and citizens where the latter feel that they have the tools, duty and desire to contribute to the nation's safety and security.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on the creation of a documentary that, in each installment, highlights the success of 'ordinary' citizens in building resilience, in its most general sense, against VE. For example, one episode could focus on sports activity leaders in refugee camps (note the popularity of soccer and martial arts in particular). Another could focus on success stories of locals who have established businesses known for being socially responsible. A third could highlight a day in the life of a particularly proactive imam or social worker, with particular focus on the individual's aspirations to make the community a better place rather than his/her religious credentials. There are too many individuals to list in full but each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) presents numerous examples of potential individuals. The format of the documentary could be designed in such a way that at the end of the episode, the main character receives some sort of citizen award. There is precedent for this – for example the International Global Citizen's Award – but not in this format. In the case that permission for such an activity is not granted, an alternative could be the creation of a cartoon or comic focused on a character from within one of the key governorates. This could follow the model of YouTube cartoon Abdullah X but, for example, be based on a young man from a refugee camp.</p> <p>Creation of this documentary could be awarded to a documentary and film making organization. However, even more effective would be to</p>

	encourage talented members of the public to submit their footage under a unifying title such as ‘Our Tapestry’ or ‘Jordanian Mosaic’, both references to the country’s rich social diversity. An appropriate body or institute would still have to preside over the activity and judge the footage, perhaps also providing marketing and training before the activity is launched. One candidate could be the Royal Film Commission Film Club in Zarqa, which has offered filmmaking workshops, movie screenings, and other film related activities to local youths in the past.
KEY ACTIVITY 2: ‘If’	
OBJECTIVE	To encourage citizens to consider the importance of remaining vigilant and of how small observations and actions can generate big results.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research demonstrated that Jordanians place great faith in the central government and its security services to combat the threat posed by VEOs. However, many also acknowledged that VE is a problem that the central government cannot tackle without public involvement. They provided two reasons – firstly the central government resources are finite and secondly the security services may be able to deal with the security aspect of the VEO phenomenon but they are unprepared to deal with the psychosocial aspects of social extremism. As such, there is a need for activities that maximize general public awareness and knowledge of the problem, and imbue a belief that even small actions taken by average citizens can have a large impact in securing the community and Jordanian society in general.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Young Women (PTA 2); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should be the creation of a series of adverts that begin with a VEO-related or antisocial extremist event, before then rewarding back in time to a citizen-related action (or lack of action) that put in motion the subsequent chain of events. The advert could show what would have happened both with and without this action – a format used in a highly popular and successful Nike soccer advert ⁹ . For example, one could describe how parents chose not to confront a suspicious individual who used to take their son to a mosque for prayer, culminating in that son’s departure for Syria. Another could highlight how reporting a local drugs ring succeeded in preventing the leader from later allowing a VEO from establishing a relationship with, and exploiting, members. A third could show how a charitable donation establishes a grant for new business ideas that generates employment opportunities, thereby preventing one young man from being targeted for recruitment into a Salafist Jihadist group. A fourth could focus on how the provision of a module on police training helps one officer not react in a heavy handed way to a protest, in turn encouraging his would-be victim to reconsider his/her attitude to authority. In each case, the chain of events should relate to one or more of the real

⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cl0IID4qLUM>

examples of recruitment uncovered in this report and others like it. In support of the series, a catchy and memorable logo such as a butterfly (a reference to the Butterfly Effect) could be used to brand the footage.

An alternative activity should seek to centralize the average Jordanian in the struggle against VEOs via the creation of a film, perhaps starring popular actors and actresses such as Ammar Daraiseh, Nabil Shaban, Suheir Hammad, and Kassem Gharaibeh. The film's depiction of life in Jordan should be as accurate and 'grassroots' as possible. For example, it could be set in a poor community, perhaps in the south of Karak, and should take a common Jordanian family as its focus. The exposition should be simple, yet contemporary, and as topical as possible. For example, unemployment is a major problem in the community, and a man, a father in his mid- to late- fifties, has recently lost his job with the local phosphate company. His son, an engineering student at Mutah University, is unable to finish his classes because he cannot pay the rising fees. With little in savings and no real hope of sorting out the father's employment situation, the family is nearing destitution. The mother is worried, but she prays earnestly for relief from God. Time passes. Nothing has changed for the father, and the mother worries that they may lose their home. Her only consolation is that her son has started attending Friday prayers again, and she thanks God for that. Little does she know that he has drawn closer to a group of renegade Salafists, who have been working secretly out of the local mosque for years. For a couple of months, she watches as he grows more religious; however, because she is occupied with her own problems, she may have taken a job in order to supplement her husband's low wage as a janitor, she thinks nothing of her son's changing behavior. Then, one day, she and her husband realize that he is gone. They suspected nothing. A week passes and they do not hear from him, until, one day, they receive a text message from an anonymous source: he is in Syria, fighting for JN. From here, the narrative style of the film changes. Scenes are split between the father and mother's experience at home and the son's experience behind the frontlines. More time passes, and though talk of the son's departure is prevalent in the small town, the family itself refrains from mentioning their son. In time, things begin to improve for the father; he finds another job (in another town) doing work that fulfills him. However, the mother is in decline and the son finds life in Syria more difficult and a lot less glamorous than he supposed. Though he says nothing to his comrades, he is disgusted by indiscriminate killings he is forced to commit in the name of religion. Then, one day, he hears that ISIS has shot down the plane of someone from his hometown. He remembers the man (Moath Al Kasasbeh). News of his death troubles him deeply. Finally, after much thought, he makes a decision: under cover of darkness he will escape from Syria and return home. This happens, and he feels free but upon his return to his hometown, he is shocked by what he finds. His mother, who has taken ill during his absence, is dead, and he cannot help but feel that he is to blame. Once discovered by security forces, he is placed in a high-security prison, where he accepts that only through his imprisonment can he be 'reborn'.

KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'First Defense'	
OBJECTIVE	Create a network of community counter-extremist leaders in specific locations.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Social science theory has shown, through the Bystander Effect, that it is easy for civilians to assume that those in charge will resolve problems and threats. It is only when specific roles are given to civilians that these 'self-actualize' and take on responsibility more quickly and emphatically. Within the Jordanian context, this is particularly true given a natural reluctance to get involved with VEOs at any level coupled with a strong tendency to assume that central government authorities know and deal with such domestic problems. In fact, several respondents referred to VE as a taboo topic that attracts too much attention precisely because it has not been tackled more overtly and directly. As such, although the central government should not generate alarm and fear within the community, there is value in optimizing civilian counter-extremism at the very grass-roots level.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should be the formation of a non-political cadre of individuals (for example called the First Defense Team) appointed directly, and empowered, by the royal family to act as social 'beacons of light' for their areas. Although some may have a religious background, this should not be a pre-requisite. Rather, the benchmark should be the individual's depth of connection with his/her local community. These individuals must not be bureaucrats – they should spend their time being able to mix with as many neighborhood and community members as possible. Note that this is a grassroots function and as such prioritizes engagement with average citizens rather than dignitaries. As such, backgrounds may include: street cleaners, taxi drivers or even local shop owners. These individuals should be trained in recognizing potential signs of radicalization, such as someone abruptly selling their belongings, greater religious observance, suddenly wearing conservative dress, dramatic isolation, conviction of moral superiority over mainstream Muslims, strong bitterness against the status quo etc. The position should be a paid one, recognized and supported by local institutions including the local council and prevalent civil society organizations. However, the primary reward should be a sense of elevated social status and recognition. As such, individuals should have some outward display of their position, perhaps a badge or armband.</p> <p>The remit of these social 'beacons' should not just be restricted to CVE. Individuals should be encouraged to identify, through discussion with average members of the community, small-scale 'quick-win' local gentrification and business stimulation projects. This is because the evidence strongly suggests that although most Jordanians reject VEOs, there is significant evidence of extremism in a broader sense exacerbated by a relative lack of opportunities, services and social integration. Once</p>

	<p>more, focus is not on the need for technical knowledge but rather an ability to absorb and faithfully transmit the needs and feelings of average citizens. As such, First Defense Team members should receive training in areas such as communication, engagement and reporting rather than more technical areas such as grants, project management, policy etc. Ideally the Team would consist of two individuals (one male and one female) per area to ensure local women have adequate representation.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Idle Hands'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	<p>Combat youth idleness and facilitate community engagement by running a local design competition for a social facility (e.g., club, skills center, leisure complex).</p>
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	<p>Respondents claimed that one of the main indirect drivers of VEO recruitment is youth idleness and boredom. In addition to unemployment and underemployment, this stems predominantly from a paucity of recreational facilities including parks, sports facilities, amusement arcades etc. Respondents insisted that idle youth tend to have a heightened propensity toward negative influences, including drug abuse and excessive Internet activity, linking both with an increased likelihood that youth will encounter and engage with VEOs. Furthermore, a lack of youth leisure facilities can aggravate feelings of government neglect and thus generate anti-government hostility – a sentiment easily exploited by VEOs in their bid to win support.</p>
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	<p>Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian refugees (PTA 8).</p>
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on the provision of fast-tracked government-funded (or at least government implemented) leisure facilities tailored according to local preferences and needs. For example, respondent-led ideas included football fields, swimming pools, parks and paintball facilities. The purpose, design and location of a facility should be community-led through a local design competition for young residents aged between 16-25 years. Applicants should be given a specified time period to create and submit their designs to local government. The application period should be sufficiently long (around 4-6 weeks) to allow various communication and marketing activities to take place around the initiative in order to develop and spread awareness. Likewise, prior to, and during the application process, the competition should be widely advertised using posters displayed along roadsides and on bus stops, as well as in a number of specific venues frequented by local youth such as popular cafés, restaurants, parks, gyms and others. These locations are presented in Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable), but by way of illustration in Mafraq this would include the Khaldiyyah male and female Youth Centers, the Princess Basma Center (Khaldiyyah Town) and Irbab Center for Social Development. An Internet advertising campaign should also be undertaken across popular Facebook pages. Again, by way of example in Mafraq this would include pages for the All Jordan Youth Committee, Princess Basma</p>

	<p>Center, Al Mafraq News and Al Badiya Jobs.</p> <p>Once submitted, all designs should be released to the public as a booklet and/or through a Facebook page dedicated to the project. Locals should then vote for their favorite design through an online portal. Once the votes have been gathered, a local government representative, as well as a central government MP or a member of the royal family could announce the winning design and estimated completion time in public. For added impact, the completed project could be named after a victim of violence as a statement of community solidarity against VEOs – for example the victims of the June 2016 Ruqban (Rwashed District, Mafraq) suicide attack. Note the value of this activity is in the perception of speedy delivery and civic involvement, as much as it is in the facility itself.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'Anti-Drug Campaign'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	To strengthen individual resilience to VE by tackling the spread of drugs and the ability of VEOs to operate under the cover of drug-related activity.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	<p>Many respondents described drug abuse as a significant problem within their communities, and claimed that links exist between narcotics and VE for two primary reasons. Firstly, many believed that those who abuse drugs are at a higher risk of becoming involved, willingly or unwillingly, with VEOs – for example out of a need for money to pay for their habit. Even those who doubted a direct link acknowledged that drug users have a higher propensity to become engaged in violence, which can act as a step along his/her Influence Pathway toward recruitment into a VEO. Secondly, VEOs have reportedly disguised their activities by operating under the guise of drug gangs and distributors. Although there was little detail provided, respondents felt that this was a particularly salient problem within refugee camps.</p>
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Syrian refugees (PTA 8).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on providing support to the families of those who are suffering from drug addiction, as well as to addicts themselves. As such, the activity should break down into a series of sub-activities. One should be, if these do not exist already, the provision of weekly support groups for the families of addicts. These could be held in local community centers, by way of example there are two youth centers located on Omar Bin Al Khattab Street in Madaba City. The sessions should feature guest speakers from the health sector (psychologists, session leaders from other governorates, doctors etc.).</p> <p>Meanwhile, a 24-hour telephone hotline, to which family members or the addicts themselves can turn to for advice, should be set up. Posters should be established inside, and/or at the entrances and exits of refugee camps, to raise awareness of the campaign. Rather than using macabre imagery as found in other anti-drug campaigns, the posters should follow the example set by the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids, using emoticons to express the struggles of life as a teenager (e.g., how to succeed in school,</p>

	<p>how to find a job, etc.), while emphasizing that drugs fail to alleviate and/or exacerbate the problem. For example, a typical poster could feature an amateurish drawing of a Jordanian teenager's face. One side of his face would look happy and be surrounded by thought bubbles with words like 'success', 'friends', 'family', and 'Allah'; while the other side of his face would be tired-looking, scarred and surrounded by words such as 'depression', 'alone', and 'disappointment'. Under the picture, a passage from the Qur'an that characterizes intoxicants as the beginning of physical, moral, and spiritual death could be included, along with offers to work together toward a solution via contact details provided.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 6: 'Amman Message Part II'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	<p>Reinforce existing belief that the King should lead on VE and CVE, and generate discourse on religious reform to reject extremism.</p>
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	<p>Respondents largely agreed that VEO groups have little support inside Jordan. However, many believed that there is a culture of extremism and provided examples from across a number of domains – such as a reluctance to consider changes in women's rights, a refusal to consider compromise with Israel, and a tendency to be influenced by polarizing religious discourse. Likewise, respondents provided a range of explanations for this phenomenon. For example, some believed that Jordanians are naturally emotional and react too dramatically. Others placed the blame on the education system or even central government reluctance to tackle religious reform. As such, they called on renewed efforts from the country's ultimate leader – the King – to address such failures.</p>
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	<p>University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6).</p>
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on generating public support for a second installment of the 2004 Amman Letter. The letter was the outcome of a gathering of credible and legitimate religious clerics invited by the King, and clarified the core values of Islam as well as highlighting the need to counter religious extremism. Given the subsequent emergence of VEOs such as JN and ISIS, and the saliency of renewed discussion on genuine and takfirist Islam, there is a need for religious authorities to provide guidance to imams and even average Jordanians. The guidance should not focus on VEOs themselves seeing as support levels are low, but rather on manifestations and drivers of social extremism and how VEOs mistakenly exploit these phenomena. The activity is not without risk as there is no guarantee that religious leaders will fall behind a moderate and tolerant message. However, Jordan has a unique opportunity to take the lead on this topic not just for Jordanians but also for Muslims across the region struggling with the same challenge. Each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) provides many personalities that should be involved with this activity. By way of example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amman: Mohammad Nouh Al Qudah (former Minister for Youth 2013, moderate preacher and host of a radio show on Islam), Ahmad As Sawi

	<p>(the Imam of Ar Rawda Mosque, a Sufi Mosque in Amman), Hamzeh Mansour, Saed Foudah, Dr. Mohammad Alnabulsi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zarqa: Ali Al Halabi (Salafist Quietist leader), Sheikh Hamza Alfar (Imam of the Al Kayal Mosque), Sheikh Mohammad Al Khawaldeh (representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Zarqa), Ali Alhalabi (Salafist Quietist leader), Sheikh Jamil Lafi (Al Rahman Mosque), Sheikh Ahmad Alz'obi (Al Arab Mosque) • Balqa: Abdullah Al Khateeb (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mahmoud Salah Abu Ruman (well-known local Imam), Ali Abu Sukkar (former general secretary of the MB), Sheik Mohammad Al Qanawi (Al Kabeer Mosque), Muthana Arabiat (spokesman of Da'she Alfujaieh initiative), Dr. Zghloul Alnajar, Hamzeh Ashaish, Khamis Kutkut • Ma'an: Ali Saud Kraishan (Imam of the Taibah Mosque), Yanal Abu Darweesh (Imam of Rawdat Al Moutaqeen Mosque), Ra'ed Dwaineh (Al Salheen Mosque), Husam Mustafa Kraishn (Al Kabeer Mosque), Soubhi Almoughrabi (imam of Al Salheen Mosque), Sheikh Abdusalm Drawij (head of Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ma'an) 
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KEY ACTIVITY 7: 'Educational Reform'

OBJECTIVE	Address concerns that the current school curriculum neither provides students with the teaching and skills that they need, nor does it actively seek to reject VE.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	In May 2015 Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour announced the government's strategic plan to counter extremism, which also involved promises to reform the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It was beyond the scope of the project to understand any central government efforts in this area. However, many respondents made it clear that they believed that the education system still requires reform. Indeed, a June 2016 study by Thuqan Obaidat entitled 'The ISIS mentality in curriculums and syllabuses', heavily criticized the national curriculum for contributing to radicalization and increasing vulnerability to VEO messaging. An analysis of the approved texts in Jordanian schools in mid-2015 by the Associated Press also found that not only was there little mention of Christians in schoolbooks, despite their making up an estimated 2.8-6 percent of the population. There were also many examples of text that could be interpreted as extreme or encouraging extremist behavior, such as an eighth-grade Islamic Studies text that says "jihad is a must for every Muslim" and another for sixth-graders that states birth control contradicts Islam, stoning is the punishment for adultery, slavery is permissible and wives should not go outside the home without their husband's permission.

SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should be to provide support to the central government so that it is able to implement necessary changes to its curriculum. Note that it is critical that such assistance be non-attributable due to the power of conspiracies that the West is attempting to control the Middle East and specifically Jordan. Also note that assistance should not just be limited to the material taught but also the way that it is taught. For example, training should be provided to teachers to help them understand the value of interactive learning, rather than forcing students to learn by rote – several respondents complained that the latter prevents the development of critical thinking, which in turns increases susceptibility to VE and VEO messaging. If the central government believes it has already implemented sufficient educational reform, then an alternative activity is to improve communication of these changes as well as funding for better Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of such changes. For example, a series of roadshow vehicles should be tailored to visit schools across the kingdom and distribute a message from the Ministry of Education on the changes and to leave teachers with opportunities to provide feedback. Such M&E is necessary given the fact that so many Jordanians doubt that the reform has taken place, and that more definitive proof could itself act as material for communication of central government progress.
KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'Even better monitoring of imams'	
OBJECTIVE	To improve on existing central government efforts to catalogue and monitor imams and mosques in a bid to prevent extremist religious teaching.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	In 2014 the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced an initiative to counter extremism in the ministry, through improved monitoring of ministry-approved preachers, barring radical preachers from working, and encouraging the public to report preachers thought to hold radical religious views. A few respondents felt that the program has enjoyed some success. However, many remained concerned that there is much more to be done. In particular, they complained that some religious leaders with radical views have been approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and remain in positions of influence in their communities. Likewise, there are many mosques without central government-approved imams. Indeed, there are reportedly many mosques that have not been registered as official mosques.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2), Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should focus on the provision of further support to the Hayat Center in its work to train religious leaders, given the urgent need for additional preachers and better-educated preachers. Another part of this

	<p>activity should focus on the royal appointment of an individual to lead a review of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, with a particular remit to understand what resources are required to update lists of mosques and clerics. It is unlikely that this activity will be successful without the support of authorities and, more importantly, the public. As such, the activity should try to integrate with others that recommend measures such as hotlines for reporting, empowerment of grassroots leaders, and awareness raising activities – particular in and around refugee camps and other areas known for the presence of radicalized Salafist preachers. The activity is a sensitive one and requires discretion and diplomacy given the ease with which VEOs and Salafists can claim government (including outside government) interference in religious affairs. Furthermore, the fact that some respondents believed that the Ministry of Religious Affairs may be implicit, means that additional care should be taken.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Amplification'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	To amplify and support existing counter-extremist efforts that could enjoy greater success through greater public awareness.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research revealed that, while confidence in the JAF, GID, and the ability of the central government to counter radicalization and VEOs in Jordan is strong, many members of the public are unsure of the effectiveness of the central government in countering extremism and VEOs through programs outside of the scope of the security and intelligence services. In fact, many were not aware of any programs at all, including journalists. Nevertheless, the existence of such activities implies that there is room for improvement in public communications efforts to raise awareness and knowledge.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should involve a thorough M&E (Monitoring and Evaluation) effort to understand which initiatives highlighting the dangers of VE and terrorism promise the most success, and what is needed by way of support to raise their profile. For instance, there is the platform Amn FM, launched by the Public Security Directorate to counter VEO messaging, which also makes use of the hashtag #electronic_team_for_protection_of_Jordan across social media outlets to raise awareness and counter VEO messaging. Another initiative, launched in Ma'an in 2015 by Reem Abu Hassan from the Ministry of Social Development, involved the creation of the online forum 'Our thoughts are positive, not terrorist', with the intention of encouraging open discussions about extremism and related matters. Despite the announcement of the forum, the ministry has not published a link to the forum or further promoted the initiative. A third example is the 'Call from the Homeland' initiative launched by local politicians and prominent individuals in Madaba in March 2015, the aim of which was also declared to be combatting extremism and terrorism, among other goals. A fourth is the Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah initiative to combat extremism

	<p>launched at the Youth and Peace Forum in August 2015, which aims to ensure youth participation in fighting extremism. A fifth was the conference 'Toward a comprehensive strategy to fight extremism', which was held at the Al Quds Center for Studies and Research in February 2016 and attended by public officials and academics to discuss political reform, religious discourse, security policies, community violence, the rule of law, and the role of religious groups in fighting extremism. As such, the M&E effort should first generate a complete list of these activities via a comprehensive scoping exercise, then categorize their effectiveness (based both on Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness) before identifying which failings, if corrected, would result in greatest impact (e.g., more funding, better logistical support, better communications support, better leadership, better linkages with central government etc.)</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 10: 'Funeral Payments'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	<p>To address family wishes that recruits who die abroad should receive proper funerals, while simultaneously ensuring that the community does not glorify the death of the recruit.</p>
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	<p>Research revealed mixed attitudes toward the idea of allowing families to carry out funerals for relatives who died abroad fighting as members of VEOs. On the one hand, some argued that it was repressive of the central government to prevent families from being able to grieve the loss of loved ones. On the other hand, there was concern that funerals would glorify the lives and deaths of foreign fighters and so contribute to increased levels of recruitment.</p>
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	<p>Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).</p>
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should mobilize tribes in rural areas and/or extended families in urban areas to take a more proactive role in preventing relatives and/or tribal members from going abroad to fight for VEOs. This could be done by informing tribes and/or extended families that funerals for loved ones who die fighting for VEOs will only be allowed through payment of a repatriation tax that the tribe/extended family must pay. All of this amount should go back into the local community from which the fighter comes, in the form of overt CVE investment – leafleting, conferences, public engagement events etc. As such, tribes and extended families will understand that not only must they pay for the return of loved ones, but also recruits will understand that their deaths will contribute directly to CVE efforts in their hometowns.</p> <p>Note that the central government has announced that it aims to rehabilitate returned fighters through the Community Safety Center in the Public Security Directorate, although respondents indicated that longer term regular rehabilitation, involving weekly attendance at meetings after completing an initial rehabilitation for instance, might be a positive alternative to what is perceived by some as excessive and intrusive monitoring by the security forces. Although rehabilitation of returned</p>

	fighters is beyond the scope of this project, the aforementioned funeral payments could help fund such activities.
KEY ACTIVITY 11: 'Blue Collars'	
OBJECTIVE	To improve the perception of, and call for, blue-collar skills as a means of easing pressure on the oversubscribed white-collar market.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents claimed that perhaps the most important drivers influencing youth attitudes toward VE and VEO is the lack of employment opportunities. This problem manifests itself in two ways – the absence of jobs for the poorer and less employable part of the population, and the absence of employment for youth who have paid for, and studied at, schools and universities in the hope of getting higher-level jobs. This second issue highlights how resolving the VE problem in Jordan is not just about more education – to the contrary more schooling can lead to more frustration if the opportunities are not there for graduates.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on generating new respect and desire for blue-collar jobs among school children aged 13-15 years as they begin to think about their future careers. One way to achieve this is to create a blue-collar alternative to, or new branch within, the All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC), which is part of the King Abdullah Fund for Development. The advantage of using the AJYC is that it already has ties to a number of ministries and local institutions as well as private companies such as the Umniah mobile telecommunications company. It has also been involved in micro-finance grants for a number of small companies established by youths and debating clubs in more than 75 schools across the country. As such it provides a proven model for funding and advice with which international donors can link. One note of caution, however, is that it is not clear whether the public considers the AJYC too elitist, which could impact negatively on new activities within the blue-collar sector.</p> <p>Regardless, the body responsible for the activity should focus on providing youth with opportunities for apprenticeships, volunteering placements, IT and computer training, tourism (especially in areas such as Aqaba, Tafiela, Ma'an, Petra/Wadi Musa region and Dana nature reserve), land management (especially in areas such as Quweira and Hasa) and entrepreneurial support. The body should also seek appropriate and useful partners. For example, many techniques and activities can be learnt from the Muslim Brotherhood, which carries out a network of social activities and study classes for those in typically more marginalized areas, especially in and around camps. A second partner could be the International Labor Organization, which has been implementing training programs in Amman to help jobseekers find employment in the informal economy and small businesses, such as the auto academy pilot program. A third is GEMM, which in Likewise, in March 2015 initiated a six-month course in Zarqa to</p>

	<p>teach students retail sales, the curriculum for which was created in cooperation with local employers and endorsed by the national vocational training corporation. A fourth is the Near East Foundation, which has partnered with local organizations in Zarqa to support poor locals in setting up micro enterprises. Finally, the Future Maker Center is a cultural institute that works with youths to develop their roles in their communities and increase legal awareness in Ma'an. The center hosts the monthly future maker forum which hosts national figures who talk about citizen issues and has initiated the 'For You' program that also involves activities in rural areas. Note that an important aspect of this activity is simply generating youth awareness and knowledge of the initiative so that there is a greater appreciation of central government attempts to address the challenges. This therefore requires communication planning, strategic communication support and help to some of the aforementioned potential partners.</p> <p>A sub-activity could be the creation of a volunteering branch (perhaps called 'Flash Flood') to encourage youth involvement in volunteering. The branch should start with the appointment of Representatives from selected areas, responsible for putting forward ideas for activities that would make a significant difference in their community. Each volunteering activity proposed would describe the activity, timeframe, materials needed, envisaged impact and the names of partner organizations from the local community to help manage and oversee the activities. For example, the Child Care Association in the Baqa'a refugee camp in Balqa, mentors orphans and refugee children and involves them in activities including music, sports, IT, and art. Meanwhile, the local NGO Zarqa is My City initiative works to repair sidewalks in Zarqa City and decorate underserved neighborhoods such as Hay Aleskan. And the Alqantara Center in Ma'an City works to promote volunteer work and youth participation across the governorate. Once an activity has been selected, it would be 'flash-flooded' with volunteers from around the country, with measures in place to ensure that appropriate media coverage is taken as part of an ongoing marketing drive. Note that a good model for a countrywide volunteering organization is vlnspired, an independent charity set up in the UK following a government review in 2004. It offers volunteering opportunities that can be tailored by location and by volunteers' interests (e.g., volunteering in groups, sports projects, outdoor projects, career-related volunteering, volunteering related to community projects, arts, etc.).</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 12: 'Local Government Service'	
OBJECTIVE	Improve community perceptions of local government and encourage political engagement on a municipal level.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research indicated that many respondents had a low opinion of the quality, honesty and efficiency of local government, fueling additional resentment against central administrations. For example, 40 percent (Irbid, Jarash) to 70 percent (Mafraq) of GQ respondents countrywide agreed that the local government does not care about the needs of the people and 47 percent (Tafiela) to 73 percent (Aqaba) agreed that government

	officials are corrupt. If locals can be engaged in the process of local government it will not only provide an additional layer of oversight for elected municipal officials, but will also strengthen the links between ordinary citizens and the establishment, leading to improved confidence in the political system. By ensuring citizens feel they have a hand in local government decisions and that they are in a position to air their grievances to local officials, VEOs will be less able exploit the situation with future anti-establishment messaging.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
DESCRIPTION	It is assumed (as it was outside the scope of this project) that each local council attempts to optimize the sharing of information, and its relationship, with citizens. One activity should test this assumption and identify which activities each local council undertakes, how often, and with how much success. Depending on the results, local councils should then be encouraged to reach out to their citizens in a number of other potentially useful ways that include: annual reports in easy-to-understand formats; board-community dialogs; brochures and newsletters featuring decisions, discussions and events; charettes; a dedicated online chat room and e-bulletin board; citizen advisory committees for ongoing consultation with a representative sample of the town; community fora; consensus conferences for civilian experts to challenge local councils openly; Focus Groups and polling efforts to show local council interest in citizen views; an information center perhaps with adjoining café; media-council meetings to advance relationships with local media; open days to showcase offices and other council buildings; suggestion boxes; a youth advisory council dedicated to youth initiatives etc. All of these, even if some seem dull and do not generate much interest, need to exist so that local administrations can highlight that they are doing everything possible to generate transparency and accountability to the people. Each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) provides examples of specific areas where such an activity should take place, but by way of example the list would include: Tafiela (Hasa, Bsaira), Zarqa (Zarqa City, Rusaifeh), Ma'an (Jafer, Al Husainiah, Mrigha, and Athruh), Amman (Hay Nazzal, Marka, and Wehdat), Aqaba (Al Quweira, Wadi Araba, Al Rabyeh, etc.
KEY ACTIVITY 13: 'MB clarity'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage the Muslim Brotherhood to be clearer about its internal structure, leadership, and official position on issues such as VE and VEOs.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The Muslim Brotherhood's self-declared objective is to provide a moderate platform for Muslims who believe that Islam should play a decisive role in politics. However, respondents exhibited great variance in their view on whether or not the MB exacerbates or helps resolve problems linked to VE and VEOs. For example, those in support of the MB pointed out that it represents an alternative within the existing political framework, allowing individuals to

	share and express grievances without actually challenging the fabric of Jordanian society in the way that VEOs do. Meanwhile, those opposed to the MB felt that it was duplicitous, ambiguous and secretive, and that such qualities likely imply a relationship with, or at least tolerance of, VEOs.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on encouraging greater MB self-regulation and indirect evidence of how the organization distances itself from VE ideology and individuals. This activity inevitably requires a level of diplomacy and negotiation beyond the scope of this study. However, the recommendation is included here to highlight the fact that alternative courses of actions, such as clamping down or promoting the MB, will be detrimental and could backfire. Rather this activity advocates improved clarity, awareness and knowledge, with the assumption that the official MB body doesn't advocate proximity to VE and VEOs. One way this activity could be achieved, for example, is via a series of televised Q&A sessions with prominent MB members on a widely watched news network, such as Al Jazeera. The sessions, in should be based on the submission of questions via social media, but follow a rough framework such as: structure, leadership, activities, ideology, collaboration on Jordanian unity, etc. The sessions should make it clear that the objective is neither to generate support or opposition to the MB but rather to help Jordanians understand the organization better. As such, there may even be no mention of VEOs at all, although references in passing should be encouraged (e.g., claims that Syria and Iraq are not valid locations for jihad, that VEOs are trying to undermine the MB by infecting it with their ideology and claiming a relationship etc.).</p> <p>Another, but more subversive, activity could be the unbranded creation of 'Top Trump' cards featuring MB leaders. Each MB leader would be scored across various domains such as Honesty, Intelligence, Respect, Opportunism, etc. Those MB leaders who have previously displayed sympathy to VE ideology would be allocated much lower scores than those who have not. Such cards would be introduced anonymously into areas with a strong MB presence, notably refugee camps.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 14: 'The Salafist Debate'	
OBJECTIVE	To encourage a more open debate on the relationship of Salafism to both mainstream and extremist Islam, with a view to sensitizing the public of potential links.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA has revealed that Salafist Jihadists were considered the demographic most likely to support VEOs and to consider joining VEOs in Syria or Iraq, however Salafist Quietists were seen as more moderate in some governorates (notably Tafiela) and were largely condemned as a stepping-stone to VEO participation as Quietists can go on to become Salafists. There is significant hostility between Quietists and Salafists in governorates where

	<p>they both have a strong presence, particularly parts of Zarqa (Zarqa City and Rusaifeh), and this can be exploited to encourage the growth of Salafist Quietists at the expense of Salafist Jihadists. Quietists exhibit similar levels of religious observance and dedication, even viewing jihad as an important part of life for Muslims, but do not consider Syria and Iraq as acceptable locations for jihad and do not agree with VEOs. As such it may be possible to 'de-radicalize' Salafist Jihadists into Salafist Quietists by financially supporting Quietists on the basis that they aggressively proselytize Salafist Jihadists, with a focus on younger members of the Salafist Jihadist community. They would be given the tacit assistance of the police and GID, who would arrest/detain any Salafist Jihadists who became threatening or aggressive toward them</p>
<p>SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs</p>	<p>Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).</p>
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	<p>One activity should involve the development of a radio show fronted by a combination of known current and former Salafists, including Ali Al Halabi and Abu Mohammad Al Maqdisi – note that Al Halabi has already publicly condemned VEOs in Syria and Iraq. The program should remain apolitical but rather focus on various relevant religious and social topics that show differences between Salafist and VEO ideology. Examples include: rejection of ISIS's declaration of a Caliphate, VEO activities in Syria/Iraq are not in accordance with Sharia law and other religious principles specified in the Qur'an, death as a result of fighting with VEOs in Syria/Iraq cannot lead to martyrdom; the activities of VEOs, killing other Sunni Muslims is contrary to Islam, etc.</p> <p>The program could encourage Salafist Quietists to approach Salafist Jihadists wherever possible and engage them in conversation or debate, as part of a new social responsibility places on the former. Alternatively, and/or in addition, the show could also be used to sow seeds of other activities such the 'Kharijites' activity, including the introduction of hints that VEOs are foreign controlled. An extension of the campaign could also involve lectures and panel debates with a mobile radio program van that could visit neighborhoods with a high density of adherents to Salafism to collect their comments and thoughts. The show could be aired on a number of possible radio stations including: Radio Albald, Mazzaj FM, Jordan University Radio Station, Hayat FM, Radio Sawa, JBC Radio, Sawt Al Zarqa or Sawt Alghad. Focus should be on areas more commonly associated with Salafism. These are listed in each TL section but by way of example in Jarash this would include Gaza and Souf refugee camps as well as Sakeb. Other locations in other governorates might include: Ma'an City; Al Khandaq and Aleayzaria neighborhoods of Salt; Zarqa refugee camp, Al Ghwariah and Hai Massoum (Zarqa City), Hai Al Hussain (Rusaifah); and Hashmi Al Shamali, Marka, and Wehdat neighborhoods of Amman City, etc.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 15: 'Horrible Histories'</p>	

OBJECTIVE	To counter VE messaging and provide moderate alternatives to the youngest Jordanians through a popular television show that explores Islamic history.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Youth, and particularly children, are typically the most impressionable and malleable age group, making them a target for VEO support and recruitment. In particular, they demonstrate susceptibility to conspiracies and over-simplified and/or alternative interpretations of history and religion. This is particularly true of those who lack the education to generate strong enough critical thinking skills and/or the knowledge to refute VEO messages and narratives
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Young Women (PTA 2).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should be the creation of a television series where young, school-age Muslims aged 6-12 years discover facts about the history of Islam. One possible format could be a mix of the American television classic, <i>The Magic School Bus</i> , in which a teacher takes her eager students on field trips to learn things they could not learn in the classroom (or anywhere else in the real world), and another classic, <i>Liberty's Kids</i> , which follows a group of young children as they navigate the fledgling United States during the American War for Independence. In this case, a whacky religious scholar and/or historian could transport his pupils back to the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Umayyads, and the Abbasids, showing them aspects of early Islamic societies that shaped the world. An alternative format is the <i>Horrible Histories</i> series that presents entertaining but educational insight and lessons into Jordan's (and Islam's) history). The benefit of the second format is that parents have proven as avid followers as their children. Regardless of the format, it could focus on religious moderation in the Islamic world – for example how early Muslim leaders were elected by members of the community, how forced conversion to Islam was generally rejected, etc.
KEY ACTIVITY 16: 'Compare the Camp Market'	
OBJECTIVE	Strengthen socio-economic cohesion and familiarity within West Bank-populated peripheral, economically deprived camp communities by introducing localized platforms through which residents can exchange services and skills.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA identified densely populated communities located in refugee camp peripheries as especially susceptible to infiltration by VEO influences. It is here where poverty levels are exceptionally high, ethnicities are diverse, community cohesion is weak and governance is relatively absent. Each of these factors lends itself to the circulation of undetected pernicious influences, including the activities of VEO operatives scouting for potential recruits. For example, in Irbid, the outskirts of Irbid Camp emerged as one of the most at-risk locations in terms of VE and VEO recruitment. Indeed, members of the alleged ISIS cell targeted by the March 2016 Irbid raid are

	<p>thought to have had strong links with Irbid Camp, and it is here where the prominent ISIS member, Omar Mahdi Al Zaydan, lived before joining the organization in one of its strongholds. In order to restrict the capacity for VEO affiliates to freely and successfully conduct their activities in these areas, it is necessary to strengthen community bonds, and to counter the prevalence of socio-economic marginalization that leaves disaffected youth receptive to the rewards of VEO membership.</p>
<p>SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs</p>	<p>Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).</p>
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	<p>One activity should create an exchange platform for residents living within close proximity to one another on the peripheries of West Bank-populated refugee camps. This platform should enable residents from the same community to locate skills or services that they wish to acquire from one another, while advertising their own such resources. This might include music lessons, cooking classes, handicraft classes, carpentry lessons, furniture restoration, IT repairs and car repairs etc. Following a similar model to the swap site, Swap a Skill, a website and cell phone application should be created that enables users to do this. To access these, users would have to create a profile, register their names, address, and contact information and perhaps upload a profile photograph. The site should then categorize participants into specific “community groupings” or “community blocks” according to the specific location. In exchanging their skills and services, residents would be free to choose the location, most likely one another’s homes. Successfully implemented, the initiative could strengthen familiarity and relationships between residents at the same time as fulfilling their needs and desires without incurring extra financial costs. It would also provide the potential for locals to exercise their particular capabilities thus helping to overcome the acute discord between skills and opportunities notable among university graduates. In the case of Irbid, the website could be effectively advertised in Irbid Camp Youth Center, Al Jalil Club (Irbid Camp) and around local mosques close to camp peripheries. Popular individuals and organizations within the relevant camps should also promote the website. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood would be an effective mouthpiece for the initiative in both Al Husn Camp and Irbid Camp. Similarly, the widely popular Imam, Abdullah Abu Al Hayja’, would be an obvious candidate for advertising the initiative in Irbid Camp, where he is actively engaged in CVE campaigning.</p>

4.2 DELEGITIMIZE VE/VEOS

OPERATIONAL	
OBJECTIVE	Delegitimize VE/VEOs
TACTICAL	
KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'Ground Truth'	
OBJECTIVE	Amplify real stories of people affected by VE (with whom the audience can identify).
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents complained that much of the central government CVE debate and discussion tends to be conceptual and theoretical rather than an exploration of real cases. Although academics and the more educated elite have no problem with this, the grassroots reportedly has a harder time understanding and relating to the topic. Furthermore, respondents insisted that the use of authentic stories and people increases emotional appeal and identification.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	All PTAs.
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should be the creation of a website (and linked social media platforms incl. YouTube) that features documentary-style video clips (and films) in which Jordanians (mothers, siblings, children) deeply affected by VE (e.g., the loss of a relative who left to fight in Syria) share their stories. Visitors to the site should be able to comment and discuss cases. The website should also contain an 'information' section designed to educate users on VE/VEOs (for example the provision of easy-to-understand markers of radicalization drawn from relevant case studies). Likewise, universities and schools should be encouraged to draw attention to the website (e.g., via leafleting and posters) and should encourage the use of the online material in on-campus CVE discussion and debating sessions.</p> <p>An alternative activity could be the creation of a series of billboards, each featuring a photo of a fictitious family posing for a family photograph. One of the members, in a prominent position within the photo, should take the form of a black silhouette, to represent the absence of a young man or woman who has left Jordan to fight on behalf of a VEO. The photo could feature the fictitious family member names, with one (the recruit) crossed out. Accompanying messages that encourage family unity and solidarity could also be included. The billboards should make oblique but not direct reference to VE and VEOs. For example, the inclusion of Qur'anic messages that undermine the legitimacy of extremism.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 2: 'All I Got Was This T-Shirt'	
OBJECTIVE	To highlight the discrepancy between ISIS-reported rewards and benefits, and the reality of being a member of this organization.

<p>JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY</p>	<p>Research revealed that though the majority of respondents across all governorates were hostile to ISIS and most considered it a terrorist organization, many nonetheless saw the VEO as resource-wealthy and militarily strong given past battlefield successes against the Iraqi and Syrian armies and rival armed groups in Syria. This has reportedly led some individuals to join ISIS because they see it as a strong and successful organization. The group's apparent wealth, reinforced in videos online showing fighters driving new vehicles and flaunting their military equipment, has also caused many to believe VEO membership offers a good way to earn money. Note that VEO rewards are not only wealth-oriented but also include access to women, divine redemption, paradise, status, power, etc. Nevertheless, the truth is that ISIS has lost significant amounts of its territory and leadership between the capture of Mosul in 2014 and late 2016. This has been widely covered on the national Jordanian and international media, but a national campaign to highlight the consequences of repeated defeats for the VEO would help further undermine it as a potentially attractive employer and/or patron.</p>
<p>SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs</p>	<p>Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).</p>
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	<p>One activity should be the interview and recording of former extremists willing to share their stories and highlight the negatives of VEO membership. Negatives would likely include: boredom, indiscriminate brutality and/or focused brutality against women and children, poverty, disease, dirtiness, internal corruption and nepotism within the ranks, hypocrisy of leaders making certain members (e.g., expendable Jordanians) fight and die first, absence of women, scaremongering to prevent members from leaving, costs of travel to/from the country through extortionate VEO networks, etc. The activity should also focus on recording testimonies from recruits who nearly joined but decided against it. Explanations would likely include: fear of shaming family, missing loved ones, discovery of the truth about VEOs, religious epiphany, support from loved ones, etc.</p> <p>A related activity should focus on posters and leaflets with two powerful graphics alongside each other. One depicts a VEO claim and the other depicts the true situation. For example, one popular ISIS slogan is "remaining and expanding" but the second image could show a map with the percentage of territory lost by ISIS in the past year. Another could show a front cover of ISIS publication Dabiq (such as the one with the accompanying text 'The Return of Khalifa'), with the second image depicting the joyous recent liberation of Dabiq from ISIS forces. A particularly powerful example would be the Arabic name of Daesh with the words 'Islamic State' in bold, with the second photo depicting the burning of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh (deemed a highly un-Islamic punishment) with the words 'un-Islamic State'.</p> <p>A third related activity could be the sudden distribution of large numbers of</p>

	<p>'postcards from Syria' with a series of 'messages' from fighters abroad that clearly depict the hypocrisies of the VEO groups to which they belong. Each postcard could feature satirical images linked to the messages sent. For example, one could depict an ISIS fighter smoking with a message from the sender describing how meals are poor and pay is meager, but fortunately some Hezbollah units dropped off some cigarettes for the troops. Another could feature ISIS brutality against civilians with the postcard message describing how even if the civilians were not guilty of anything this time, they would be guilty of something else in the future and so God's work is going well. A third could depict an ISIS fighter abusing a woman with a message directed to his sister or mother back home telling her how much he loves her.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'Kharijites'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	To draw from Islamic history and encourage Jordanians to interpret ISIS as the latest embodiment of an already recognized Islamic evil.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The vast majority of respondents across all governorates, even if they were conservative Muslims, disagreed that Islam and killing are compatible. Many particularly rejected claims by VEOs such as ISIS that it is permissible for Muslims to kill other Muslims, with one piece of proof being the depth of emotion in the aftermath of the murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh, and that still exists today. There is historical precedence for groups of Muslims acting in a dangerously un-Islamic way, enabling powerful comparisons to be drawn between these (known as Kharijites) and groups such as ISIS.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity could use top-level religious scholars to draw similarities between the Kharijites, violent anti-Islamic zealots opposed by the Prophet Mohammed, and VEO members. Note that many respondents celebrated the impact of the King's Amman Letter initiative. A second installment, as proposed in an earlier recommendation, could see the gathering of religious scholars to discuss officially whether the Prophet would have labeled JN and ISIS as Kharijites, and what this means in terms of religious duties for Muslims to avoid and/or actively oppose such groups as enemies of Islam. An alternative approach could be a graffiti campaign that draws parallels between the two groups. Examples could include a crude ISIS symbol with a religious quote such as "A people (the Kharijites) will come with beautiful words and evil deeds" (Anas Ibn Malik) or "If the Khawarij ever gained power, they would corrupt the entire earth, Iraq, and Syria." (Ibn Kathir), etc.</p> <p>A second independent, but thematically related, activity could involve the creation of a non-attributed campaign that highlights claims and conspiracies that VEOs have been infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies (a particularly bold example would be to amplify claims that ISIS's ongoing existence benefits Israel). This campaign should take the form of Twitter storms and short Facebook videos and links to such claims. As</p>

	Wikileaks and the Panama Papers have shown, the discovery of incriminating documents can have a strong impact on public attitudes. Indeed, ISIS has already suffered from leakage of its information and discovery of Iranian SIM cards at ISIS bases have even cemented suspicion of links with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The future 'discoveries' of documents and other 'evidence' linking the group to foreign intelligence agencies would not be difficult. The spread of these rumors should take place within neighborhoods known for religious extremism and/or a pronounced Salafist presence like. Each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) provides examples such as Zarqa (Rusaifeh, Hay Massoum, Zarqa City), Amman (Wehdat, Marka, Hay Nazzal), Tafiela (Tafiela Town, Hasa), Ma'an (Jafer, Al Husainiah, Mrigha, and Athruh) etc.
KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Diseased "jihadi brides"'	
OBJECTIVE	Counter the sexual and marital appeal of VEO membership via a sexual health awareness campaign highlighting the prevalence of STDs among VEO fighters.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	For many disadvantaged young men, a driving factor of VEO membership is the desire for sexual encounters and/or access to cheap and guaranteed marriage. This desire has reportedly become increasingly urgent as growing financial strains have inhibited the capacity of young men to afford marriage at home. Many respondents claimed that young men are postponing marriage as a coping mechanism for their economic woes, making them increasingly receptive to VEO recruitment campaigns that directly address and promise resolution for their unmet sexual and marital desires. ISIS for example, has gained a reputation in Mafraq, Irbid and Ajloun for its provision of wives and sex slaves to dissatisfied recruits. Indeed, it has gained this reputation by promoting its "jihadi brides" through social media – often alongside photographs of the girls in question.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should encourage caution in young men regarding sexual intercourse with strangers. Part of the activity could include providing examples of how STD transmission has been high among soldiers. For example, there is evidence that rates of STDs are historically high among those engaged in lengthy battles, such as British soldiers fighting in WW1. ¹⁰ This part of the activity should draw attention to such examples and imply the same applies to ISIS. For instance, in August 2015, there were suggestions that 16 ISIS combatants were forced to undertake suicide operations after contracting HIV from a Moroccan ISIS sex slave. ¹¹ The activity should duplicate and exaggerate such reports on a wide scale through numerous sources typically accessed by young men, especially

¹⁰ Farmer, Ben 2014. 'British soldiers' WW1 trench battles with STDs, rheumatism and wasp stings', The Telegraph, October 08 2014.

¹¹ Zavadski, Katie 2015. 'ISIS using HIV suicide bombers?', The Daily Beast, August 28 2015.

	<p>Facebook and Twitter. If possible, the activity should also make use of popular media personalities to promulgate the rumors, with examples such as Dr. Mohammed Noah Al Qudah and even stand-up comedian Rajae Qawas.</p> <p>The campaign should be aimed at young bachelors in a range of venues such as universities (e.g., Irbid's Yarmouk University and the University of Science and Technology), as well as youth centers and sports facilities (e.g., Ajloun Youth Center, Kufranjah Sports Club, Anjara Sports Club, Ibbin Sports Club, Irbid Camp Youth Center, Al Hussein Sports Club (Irbid), Al Jalil Club (Irbid Camp) and the Princess Basma Center. Note that sexual health campaigns have been implemented in Jordan in the past, with apparent success. One example is the ACTED campaign of 2012 that targeted eight universities across the country.¹² This implies a receptive audience and an appetite for learning.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'Half-time Proverbs'	
OBJECTIVE	To highlight VEO's opposition to the 'true' principles of Islam using common and well-known local and regional proverbs and sayings.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The vast majority of respondents described Islam as a religion that rejects violence and does not allow the killing of other people. Likewise, they described the Jordanian people as peace loving and opposed to VEOs. A campaign should therefore build upon these existing attitudes, using the power of readily accessible messaging and imagery found in local proverbs and religion, to deliver a more effective impact.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should involve the creation of very short adverts placed on television during half time of popular local and international soccer matches and other pauses during prominent sporting events. These adverts should feature a well-known proverb and encourage the viewer to interpret the lesson with reference to VEOs through accompany images. For example, the proverb "When a chicken digs a hole, it sprays some sand on its head" could appear alongside an image of a VEO member sitting in a desolate apartment, with no money or food, and a thought bubble over his head that depicts him with his hands over his ears as his parents try to give him advice. Another example could be "If you have no shame, then do whatever you want," used in conjunction with a picture of VEO members beating innocent Muslims, particularly women and children, during prayer. These proverbs could also provide hope. For example, "Tomorrow the snow will melt and grass will appear," a popular proverb that expresses hope, could be used along with a picture of successful-looking, well-dressed man in a suit carrying a Qur'an, while the background

¹² ACTED 2012. 'Fostering dialogue on sexual and reproductive health and rights', ACTED, July 18 2012.

	<p>shows a tattered Islamic State flag caked with mud.</p> <p>Another related activity could be the production of disposable cups or bags left at schools, universities, popular cafés, and local unemployment centers that feature the same messages and images. Alternatively, armbands and/or badges could feature Qur’anic verses and Hadith that inadvertently condemn the actions of VEOs. Most common examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely and whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely.” (Al Maeda Sura: no.32) • “A believer continues to guard his faith (and thus hope for Allah’s mercy) so long as he does not shed blood unjustly” (Hadith: Al Bukhari) • “The extinction of the whole world is less significant before Allah than killing a Muslim man.” (Hadith: the Book of Fighting) • “But whoever kills a believer intentionally - his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him and has cursed him and has prepared for him a great punishment.” (Al Sahih Sura: No.93) • “Those who have been driven out from their homes unjustly only because they said, ‘Our Lord is God’ — And if God did not repel some men by means of others, there would surely have been pulled down cloisters and churches and synagogues and mosques, wherein the name of God is often commemorated.” (Al Haj Sura: No.41) • “There shall be no compulsion in religion.” (Surah Al Baqarah: No. 257) • “And do not kill a soul that God has made sacrosanct, save lawfully” (Sura 6:151) • “Whoso kills a soul, unless it be for murder or for wreaking corruption in the land, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind; and he who saves a life, it shall be as if he had given life to all mankind.” (Sura 5:53)
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 6: ‘Children of Islam’</p>	
<p>OBJECTIVE</p>	<p>Undermine anti-Shia views and the corresponding sectarian appeal of VEOs, who claim to be fighting a “Shia expansion” in the region, by highlighting the link between Sunni and Shia Muslims and their mutual struggle against radicalism.</p>
<p>JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY</p>	<p>TAA revealed strong sectarian sentiment against Shias across governorates – for example roughly 40 percent or more of GQ respondents in Madaba, Mafraq, Irbid, Karak, Amman, Zarqa and Ma’an stating that the jihad against Shia Muslims specifically was justifiable. Many respondents identified Iran as a key player in what they perceived as an expansion of Shia control across the region at the expense of indigenous Sunnis in Syria and Iraq. The treatment of Sunni Syrians by the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, which was widely considered Shia, as well as perceived oppression of Sunni Iraqis by the Shia-run Iraqi government also contributed to sectarian views among respondents. However, VEOs, especially ISIS, frequently depict themselves as a bulwark against Shia/Alawite expansionism and</p>

	repression, and use this argument to attract new recruits.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4). Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7).
DESCRIPTION	The activity, if implemented in the wrong way, has the potential to cause controversy and exacerbate instability, particularly if it becomes political and involves groups such as the MB. As such, the activity should not overtly seek to promote equality with Shia but rather advocate the idea of moderation and tolerance of all types. One way to achieve this could be the adornment of, and creation of (where needed), archways over roads into cities. These archways would feature messages of tolerance. For example, one message could describe how the Prophet Mohammed appointed Hazrat Bilal, a freed African Slave to the highest position of calling Muslims to prayers. Another example could come from Sura 2, Aya 143 "We have made you a justly balanced community." However, perhaps an even more effective approach would be to run competitions among schools in each location for children to come up with a favorite slogan to be placed on such archways each year. This would not only shape local identity but also help infuse a sense of moral responsibility among a key target audience.
KEY ACTIVITY 7: ' Hamas is Bad for the Palestinian Cause and Bad for Jordan'	
OBJECTIVE	To deter West Bank Jordanians in particular from joining Hamas by suggesting that the group is both a hindrance to the Palestinian cause for statehood and a threat to the peace and prosperity of Arab countries.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Overall, support for Hamas was high in Jordan. This stems from locals' overwhelming support for the Palestinian cause for statehood, but is also informed by intense opposition to Israel and its involvement in the Middle East. That said, while East Bank Jordanians voiced support for Hamas, they are somewhat less likely to join the group than West Bank Jordanians and hardline supporters of the MB. Despite this, TAA revealed that, in some areas – most notably in Madaba – the 2006–2007 conflict between Hamas and Fatah over control of Gaza may have lowered overall support for Hamas.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4). Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should focus on further erosion of support for Hamas. However, considering that support for the VEO is so widespread in Jordan, a public campaign against the group would likely face rejection. Therefore, a more subtle approach to the issue is required. For example, one sub-activity could seek to introduce non-attributable claims of proximity between Hamas and ISIS. Such a proximity would be strongly rejected by local Jordanians, particularly if it was accompanied by highly polemic messaging such as attempted justification of ISIS killing of Sunni women and

	<p>children. This technique of making Hamas appear 'more extreme than extreme' would oblige everyday Hamas supporters to distance themselves from the group.</p> <p>Another sub-activity could be the non-attributed distribution of pamphlets outlining how Hamas has continued to lose support among Palestinians, preferably to Fatah. This could be in the form of graphs drawing from the 2014 Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey research on this issue, and updated to show an ongoing trend of declining support for Hamas. Such graphs could be accompanied by short pieces of text emphasizing how those in Palestine themselves increasingly reject Hamas.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'True resistance: the White Helmets'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage the celebration of the White Helmets organization based in Aleppo as an alternative "resistance" movement to VEOs by organizing a multidimensional campaign in support of the group.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	One of the main narratives fueling support for VEOs is the idea that the Assad regime is exacting violent injustices on innocent Syrian civilians. VEOs – notably JN and ISIS - actively promote this narrative at the same time as portraying themselves – with some success – as the most capable and legitimate resistance movements. Even if Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan reject a VEO presence outside of Syria, many still hold the perception that VEOs are the only entities mounting a significant challenge against the Syrian regime. There is a strong need to provide an alternative group to support and/or through which to channel local resentment against President Assad.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should be to simultaneously promote and celebrate the work of the White Helmets rescue team that is active in Aleppo. The aim should be to portray the organization repeatedly and across a number of communication media as a heroic resistance force against the Syrian regime. One medium could be state-appointed mosque imams and their weekly sermons. Indeed, qualitative findings revealed that many imams, to the frustration of local congregations, are avoiding discussion of events in Syria altogether due to the topic's sensitive links with VE. Perhaps this would be less of a problem, including for the central government, if it involved praise of the White Helmets and highlight their version of sacrifice and achievement</p> <p>Another activity could be a controlled fundraising street rally in one or more areas close to the Syrian borders where white hardhats are distributed as part of a drive to improve recognition and sympathy, and generate financial support for the organization. The rally could also see the distribution of stickers, badges, banners, posters and hand-held signs featuring the White Helmets' Facebook page and Twitter handle, along</p>

	<p>with slogans highlighting the organization's achievements. Such slogans should highlight the heroism of non-violent confrontation to the regime and how this approach has generated huge following and appeal in Syria and elsewhere across the globe. Likewise, leaflets could describe how White Helmet sympathizers can help by donating online at the White Helmet web page.</p> <p>An additional activity could be the public screening of the 40-minute Netflix production, "The White Helmets", which is available with Arabic audio. In the same way that ISIS' slick action-packed media productions are effective in generating support for the group among youth, so would a cinematic depiction of the White Helmet's activities in the battleground likely boost this organization's appeal. These screenings could be shown in local parks and popular cafés in the relevant Once more, the message may need to be 'tweaked' to encourage public assistance in the form of online donations and visible shows of support (as opposed to encouraging Jordanians to leave the country and enter Syria). Nevertheless, creating a new model of humanitarian heroism that is unrelated to VEOs and their activities, will help erode some of the VEO attraction.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Recasting and reclaiming Ibn Taymiyyah'</p>	
<p>OBJECTIVE</p>	<p>Promote reputable Islamic scholar-driven moderate interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah's works in a simple, accessible format that challenges the extreme interpretations advanced by VEOs.</p>
<p>JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY</p>	<p>The works of the 13-14th century Islamic scholar Sheikh Taqi Ibn Taymiyyah have long been popular across Jordan, where many have viewed him (and still do) as one of the foremost authorities on Islamic discourse. However, the acceptability of his works has more recently been thrown into question, as VEOs including AQ, and more infamously ISIS, have sought to justify their violent activities with reference to the scholar. For example, ISIS quoted Ibn Taymiyyah at the end of the 22-minute video detailing the murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah is now commonly recognized as an advocate for violent jihad against other Muslims and Takfir (excommunication) of 'infidels'. Consequently, some countries such as Egypt and Tajikistan have banned his texts. Likewise, Jordan has begun discussing the possibility of comparable measures.¹³ However, this may be counterproductive. First, banning the works of Ibn Taymiyyah on the grounds that VEOs have used them as justification for atrocities lends credence to such justifications: why ban the works unless considering such interpretations of them correct? Thus, this constitutes a victory for VEOs like ISIS – that is, it suggests that their interpretations have triumphed over more nuanced understandings of Ibn Taymiyyah's work. In other words, VEOs such as ISIS will have effectively been granted a supreme intellectual position, if not a discursive monopoly, over Ibn Taymiyyah's writings. Second, by banning Ibn Taymiyyah's texts, the Jordanian regime is likely to upset, if not alienate, some of the more religiously conservative – albeit</p>

¹³ Medina Minds 2016. 'Is banning Salafi literature the answer?', Medina Minds, July 22, 2016.

	peaceful – Jordanians (of which there are many across the country) who may have been more susceptible to VE in the first instance. Similarly, such an act of intellectual intolerance is likely to validate VEO propaganda that seeks to portray the current Jordanian regime as authoritarian and un-Islamic.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should undertake a diverse long-term strategy to recast the 13-14th century Islamic scholar Sheikh Taqi Ibn Taymiyyah in a moderate light by promoting non-extreme interpretations of his work and peaceful aspects of his life. The aim here should be to distance them from interpretations advanced by the likes of ISIS –not unlike the way that defendants of Friedrich Nietzsche seek to distance his concept of the Übermensch from Nazi interpretations. The activity will inevitably require the backing of reputable Islamic scholars from the region, including from Jordan itself. Indeed, there are numerous high-profile Islamic figures across the Middle East who have already demonstrated an enthusiasm for promoting moderate re-interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah. For example, in the March 2010 Mardin Conference 15 leading Islamic scholars and theologians from across the Islamic world met to challenge violent interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah's 'Mardin fatwa', which had hitherto claimed it as justification to wage jihad against supposedly heretic entities.¹⁴ This led to the 'New Mardin Declaration', which stated that extreme interpretations of the 'Mardin fatwa' are anachronistic, and thus incongruous with contemporary realities.¹⁵ As part of the proposed activity, similar initiatives should be encouraged on a regular basis, re-interpreting and re-applying numerous elements of Ibn Taymiyyah's catalogue of work. Conferences addressing such issues should be supplemented by public lectures across the various governorates by local religious authorities willing to partake in such a campaign. In Irbid for example, this might include Jamal Al Batayneh, Mohammad Yousef Abu Zaytoun, Gharabawi Abd Al Sattar Gharabawi, Abd Al Salam Nseirat, Nayef Duweir and Abdallah Abu Al Hayja'. By promoting Islamic interpretations endorsed by renowned regional Islamic figureheads, these local individuals may also strengthen their own reputation and renown – something that TAA revealed to be much needed among moderate Islamic figures across the governorates.</p> <p>To make the initiative more comprehensive and far-reaching, physical texts should be produced and distributed to accompany these new interpretations. Indeed, according to respondents, it is common for Ibn Taymiyyah's works to be found in homes across the country, highlighting the need to supplement or replace these with modified interpretations. To be most effective, such texts should be targeted toward children and youth, whose relative lack of rigid religious foundations allows more room</p>

¹⁴ Heneghan, Tom 2010. 'Muslim scholars recast jihadists' favorite fatwa', Reuters, March 31, 2010.

¹⁵ Barclay, Jack 2010. 'Anwar al-Awlaki attacks Mardin Conference's declaration on jihad', The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8 (42), November 18, 2010.

for ideological adjustment. In doing so, the format of these texts should prioritize simplicity. Indeed, respondents stressed the superior appeal of VEO messaging compared with classical Islamic texts based on their accessibility – especially for uneducated youths. Thus, a miniature book featuring images and short phrases would be appropriate. For example, one page might feature a drawing of Ibn Taymiyyah or his birthplace of Harran (Turkey), and on the opposite page one of his fatwas, followed by a written moderate interpretation by a popular Sunni religious figure. These books should then be distributed free of charge at location-specific access points. In Irbid for example, the highly popular and near-legendary book stall (soon to become 'Irbid Cultural Kiosk',¹⁶ located outside Yarmouk University would provide an ideal platform from which to distribute these works to students. Alternatively, an e-book, or indeed e-magazine released on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis should constitute an additional platform from which to promote moderate re-interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah's life and work. Note that this activity could also integrate well with the Horrible Histories activity to reach particularly young audiences.

¹⁶ Obeidat, Omar 2016. 'Irbid bookseller set to open 'dream kiosk' after social media campaign', The Jordan Times, October 16, 2016.

4.3 EXPAND CVE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

OPERATIONAL	
OBJECTIVE	Expand CVE Community Engagement
TACTICAL	
KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'Mother Knows Best'	
OBJECTIVE	Equip mothers with the capacity and confidence to detect signs of radicalization and/or suspicious behavior in their children.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The vast majority of those who have joined VEOs have done so without arousing suspicion from their relatives. Indeed, many respondents lamented the inability of families to detect and/or respond to the development of radical tendencies in their relatives. Yet most agree that families should play a central role in VE surveillance in the home. Crucial to this end is the role of the mother in observing her children's behavior. Many believed that mothers have a superior capacity for detecting changes in children. However, mothers are often insufficiently equipped to interpret their observations and act appropriately on their suspicions. For example, some parents to respond to their children's inappropriate behavior with violence or denial rather than constructive dialogue.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Young Women (PTA 2).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should seek to provide advice to family members on how best to recognize and respond to any perceived signs of radicalization among their kin, with priority given to the mothers aged 30-50 years. One option would be to share this advice on platforms created through the implementation of other recommended activities such as that described in 'Intermediaries' (see below). Alternatively, one of the most popular TV programs for women aged 15 and over is Green Apple, broadcast on MBC1. Using this platform would provide access to an already dedicated following thereby precluding the need for an advertising campaign, reducing time and resources. The program, broadcast every Friday at 18:00 currently focuses on providing personal health tips to its viewers. It could feature perhaps a single tip each week as a miniature feature in the middle or at the end of the show. There should also be space for viewers to make contributions to the content over time by sharing their own observations and experiences, failures and victories – note that viewers currently already send their problems to the program, some of which are addressed in each episode. ¹⁷ This can be done via an online submissions portal that enables

¹⁷ The Arabic Student 2016. 'The Green Apple: Health Program on MBC', The Arabic Student, 2016. Can be viewed at: <http://www.thearabicstudent.com/2009/10/green-apple-health-program-on-mbc.html>.

	<p>the contributor to remain anonymous, and can link to the program's existing Facebook page that already generates much activity,¹⁸ and where discussion of the proposed feature should be encouraged. Typical examples of the type of content that might be addressed are: ways to recognize the effects of certain drugs, in particular Captagon, in youth (drug abuse is recognized as a route toward VEO recruitment); how to identify ideological shifts in individuals, such as increasing sectarian attitudes or support for brutal Sharia punishments; and significant changes in appearance and behavior. This should be complimented with advice on how to react to such observations based on the experiences of viewers themselves.</p> <p>Another activity could seek to provide community-based training courses led and attended by women to coach local mothers on how to detect radical behavior both at home and in their neighborhood. The activity should be 'officialized' through the creation of a Board of 'Ambassadors' to represent the activity. These could be well-known female activists such as Aheda Kraishan and Rita Sawaged. The initiative should choose a local partner in each governorate. For example, the Anwar Charity run by Lana Ktaishan would be a suitable partner in Ma'an as it already aims to target children, youths, and mothers to prevent recruitment into VEOs. Another example is The Al Shua'a Association for Women and Children. Thirdly, the Board should seek to collect lessons learned, potential trainers and course material, by linking with existing attempts. For example, the NGO Women Without Borders has been tasked with extending its Mother Schools to some locations in Jordan, the aim of which is to empower women to take an active role in safeguarding their families against the threat of violent extremism. Likewise, the Higher Council of Family Affairs held a recent forum titled 'The role of family in extremist ideology'.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 2: 'Intermediaries'	
OBJECTIVE	Facilitate the reporting of 'at risk' individuals to the authorities without fear of repercussions, through the creation of apolitical and trusted intermediaries.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The government Android and Apple application initiative, 'Jordan Knights', is aimed at providing an accessible platform for the public to report their suspicions directly to the GID via voice messaging or snapshots. Furthermore, the majority of respondents expressed a willingness to cooperate with the GID against their own family members if necessary. However, there was good reason to suspect that, in reality, many locals are often too afraid that the central government might suspect them and/or abuse the potential recruit. Secondly, a few respondents admitted that people would feel too ashamed if others knew their son had joined a VEO. Thirdly, many respondents claimed no knowledge of platforms such as Jordanian Knights, insisting that they had no idea how to report suspicious


¹⁸ Facebook (2016). 'Green Apple Show,' 2016. Can be viewed at: <https://www.facebook.com/GreenAppleShow/>.

	behavior.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	All PTAs.
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should begin with a thorough evaluation of the Jordan Knights application. This should break down into three areas – awareness and knowledge of the application, ease of access and use, and local willingness to use it. Alternatively, new efforts should be made to create a platform that enables parents/relatives of potential and actual recruits to report their suspicions to an intermediary that is impartial and committed to ensuring that those reported have anonymity and their rights respected. Renewed efforts should be made for communication campaigns that advocate anonymous tips and information sharing, ensuring that all elements (from messages to hashtags) are simple, have emotive resonance, and coordinate with other government efforts, especially those of the Public Security Directorate, to help establish consistency in messaging. One example of a communication campaign could be an updated version of the 'Cats in The Cradle' advert, which became known as one of the most powerful anti-IRA communications due to the way it portrayed the dangers of sons wanting to grow up like their extremist fathers, to the loss of the whole family.¹⁹</p> <p>In addition, efforts should be made to introduce the platform and encourage vigilance and cooperation among the student body. Note that the security forces launched the initiative 'a homeland fighting violence' in cooperation with the University of Jordan in March 2016 with the aim of combating radicalization and violent extremism at universities. As such this campaign could be used as a basis for further extending this activity to university campuses across the country (e.g., Jordan University, German University of Jordan, Petra University, Open Arab University, Middle East University Balqa, Balqa Applied University, Amman Alahlieah University, King Hussein Bin Talal University, Tafila Technical University, Philadelphia University, and the Hashemite University).</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'Integrated Responses'	
OBJECTIVE	Share CVE best practice among law enforcement bodies.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Although respondents acknowledged the abilities of the security services and other law enforcement bodies, they nevertheless felt that more could be done in this regard. This was not only due to occasional perceived failings (such as heavy handedness against civilians and a lack of caring) but also the perception that the law enforcement bodies are under heavy strain and need assistance of any kind. In a small number of cases, there were even reports of recruits coming from the law enforcement bodies themselves. Improved sharing of best practice could help address this and maximize the efficiency and impact of CVE efforts.

¹⁹ Bogan, Billy Bob (2009). 'Powerful Anti-Terror Advert', September 08, 2009. Can be viewed at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2U4WprER7w>.

SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	NA
DESCRIPTION	One activity could be the creation of a specific and dedicated portal for law enforcement bodies in municipalities and governorates to share best CVE practices. Note, that the primary emphasis of this specific activity should be on IT and the mechanism for information sharing rather than the information itself. This is because it is assumed that some sort of information sharing database exists. The one exception is that there probably still lacks guidelines and practices on 'softer' issues such as how law enforcement bodies should interact with the parents of potential recruits, how these bodies can cooperate more effectively with each other and with security agencies, and how to support specific efforts carried out by average citizens - for example, this portal could link well with the First Defense activity or some of the aforementioned civil society organization efforts.
KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Progress through Investment'	
OBJECTIVE	Narrow the gap between over-education and underemployment.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents across Jordan repeatedly identified unemployment as a leading issue in their communities and as a driver of frustration among the key demographic of male youths between the ages of 16 and 30 years, who were widely seen as the group most at risk of radicalization. Furthermore, research revealed that the majority of GQ respondents in Ajloun, Aqaba, Irbid, Mafrqa, Tafiela, Amman, Zarqa, Balqa and Ma'an were dissatisfied with access to employment. Employment prospects in many governorates were limited to specific sectors (such as the state sector including JAF/police, state-owned industry (Tafiela, Zarqa), tourism (Aqaba) etc.), which are often unable to absorb the number of jobseekers. In addition, it was not just the level of unemployment but also the disparity between an individual's skill/education level and the availability of employment, which reportedly causes most frustration toward the central government. Efforts must be made to reduce this gap so that recruits are gainfully employed, have a sense of self-worth and purpose, and feel that they have dignity.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should focus on developing a 'Business Boost' program run from local community centers and/or municipal buildings including schools (outside normal school hours), advertised locally to attract community participants. The program would focus on providing practical advice on starting a business including company registration, accounting, and regulations, as well as creative advice from industry experts on how to find business opportunities. One section should be dedicated to helping locals understand online business models and lessons dedicated to training people on the use of popular professional programs including Microsoft Word and Excel, seeing as these are transferable skills not limited by

	<p>geography.</p> <p>Furthermore, the activity could involve the development of an employment application echoing the format, structure and utility of those applications designed to monitor and maximize user health. For example, this employment application would not only push adverts of relevant adverts and news, but also provide helpful tips on tailoring CVs, how to do well in interview, resources for entrepreneurs, how to access government and other grants, etc. In order to generate initial support and participation, the activity should provide incentives (such as tax breaks or awards) to businesses that sign up to this application and engage with potential employees – either by providing aforementioned advice or job opportunities.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'One Tribe, One Family, One Jordan'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	To build up pride and a desire to identify with Jordan first rather than consider alternative affiliations of any kind.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents indicated that one of the factors contributing to VEO recruitment is the ability of young people, and especially young men, to sympathize with, and support, alternative affiliations to the detriment of national cohesion and unity. In particular, there is need to encourage members of this target audience to feel a sense of belonging and duty to their Jordanian identity, before any religious, tribal, and/or other type of identity (including toward Palestine). This is because potential recruits without a sense of loyalty toward Jordan are reportedly more easily attracted into VEO ranks. Note that it is not suggested that competing identities be removed, just that they be de-prioritized.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
DESCRIPTION	One activity should focus on communicating the concept of 'oneness', drawing from symbols of Jordanian sovereignty. This already takes place to a degree, but the activity could be expanded. For example, in addition to large posters of King Abdullah II, other prominent national figures that are widely respected (e.g., Mohamed Nouh Al Qudah, the former Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of the Youth) could appear. Posters could also feature tribal chiefs in areas known for being more 'tribal' such as Marka, Quweira, Tafiela Town, Hasa, Bsaira, Quweira, and Aqaba City. These posters could figure the personality tracing a circle (to symbolize unity) with one figure (to symbolize oneness) alongside statements such as 'One Tribe, One Family, One Jordan'. Indeed, the circle with a line is similar to the universal symbol for power, and not dissimilar to the 'noon' letter of the Arabic alphabet often associated with the word 'nahnu' meaning 'us' or 'we'. As such, this logo will provide additional feelings of unity and strength, particularly if painted in the colors of the Jordanian flag. In videos, the logo could even be animated to depict an action of Jordan 'switching on'. The posters and billboards should be placed in areas of high traffic and

	<p>population density. Each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) provides examples but by way of illustration these would include the town squares of Mutah and Karak City in Karak, or the eastern and western portions of Madaba City in Madaba.</p> <p>As well as featuring individuals, posters and billboards should also depict recent improvements within Jordanian society – such as new schools or better access to basic services. Indeed, they could even share results of research from Jordan and even other countries showing how inhabitants there see Jordan in a positive light. This technique of providing statistics is an effective way identified by psychosocial theory and experimentation to convince others that if many other people believe something, it is more likely to be true. Also note that the activity could spread into a number of other less obvious sub-activities. For example, the creation of adverts featuring Russian dolls where the last doll is a visibly Jordanian figure, while inner dolls are other affiliations.</p>	
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 6: 'Park Debates'</p>		
<p>OBJECTIVE</p>	<p>Strengthen community resilience to VE by inviting average members of the community to debate on a CVE-related topic of interest.</p>	
<p>JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY</p>	<p>The central government relies on a series of debating and discussion events to spread CVE awareness and knowledge. Many respondents felt that these were positive initiatives although there were some reservations. Firstly, such events tend to feature educated elites rather and may not permeate down adequately to the grassroots. Secondly, they tend to be theory-based rather than based on actual cases. This makes it harder to engage and to develop useful lessons learned.</p>	
<p>SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs</p>	<p>Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).</p>	
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	<p>One activity could focus on the implementation of 'guerrilla' debates. Here, a media channel, or a civil society group with a strong reputation for its apolitical stance, should be provided with a van in which to fit two armchairs as well as necessary filming equipment. The van should travel to various parks on Friday and/or Saturday and the driver/presenter should install two armchairs with a small table and refreshments, inviting members of the public to join him for five-minute debates. These debates should focus more generally on extremism-related issues such as resilience and progress rather than tackling specifically VEOs. This is for two reasons – firstly, many will be reticent to speak openly about VEOs and secondly, the central government may be more reluctant to allow programming that is so VEO-centric. Examples include: "What business venture in your area would be most beneficial", "The Internet is a positive phenomenon", "Parents these days don't know their children", etc. Note that the objective of the debates is not only to collect civilian points of view at the time of the</p>	

	<p>debate, but rather to sensitize locals and stimulate local discussion about the event afterwards. As such, the van should also be equipped with branded materials to hand out to those interested – such as key fobs, pens, notepads, badges, etc. Note that each Target Location Analysis report (separate deliverable) provides examples of appropriate parks. For example, in Karak this would include Althaher Baibars Park and Habes Almajali Park.</p>
<p>KEY ACTIVITY 7: 'Youth engagement through the arts'</p>	
OBJECTIVE	<p>Encourage creativity among youth in marginalized neighborhoods, not only as a means to lessening their boredom, but also as a strategy for increasing civic engagement across demographics.</p>
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	<p>Respondents felt that neighborhoods can become vulnerable to VE through the lack of activities and gradual erosion of civic engagement. In this regard, one of their chief concerns was that, with youth unemployment on the rise, young people may opt to leave home in search of work, or even join VEOs in search of the sense of community they cannot find at home. Proven behavioral theory shows that when people become involved in the design, creation, and upkeep of places, they develop an interest in maintaining these spaces. Furthermore, their shared feelings of pride in and responsibility for their shared space can generate greater social cohesion. By encouraging local youth to get creative with the spaces they see every day, such as town squares, Jordanian communities would not only be occupying the time of bored, unemployed youth; they would be strengthening local resolve to care for their communities.</p>
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	<p>Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Young Women (PTA 2).</p>
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity could focus on extending branches of outdoor and indoor youth activities to other parts cities and the country more generally. For example, Located on Moath Bin Jabal Street in Jabal Amman (central Amman), Studio 8 is a popular art and dance collective. Likewise, located on Al Ameer Mohammad Street in central Amman, 7Hills Skate Park was built in 2014 by Philly Skateboards founder Mohammad Zakaria through a crowd funding campaign and in partnership with the NGO Make Life Skate Life that aims to make skateboarding accessible to underserved youths around the world. USAID has partners available to operate outside of the capital – for example it has piloted projects in Ma'an with Global Communities. Otherwise there are plenty of alternative partners. For example, staying with the focus on Ma'an, the initiative 'Youths say no to terrorism' was launched here in October 2015 by the Center for Societal Peace, which is part of the Security Prevention and Protection Forces in the Public Security Directorate, in cooperation with the NGO Commitment and Allegiances (Ahed and Wala'a Society). The initiative also aims to provide youth activities in the city of Ma'an to counter extremism.</p> <p>Another activity could focus more on art rather than on sport. For example,</p>

	<p>one idea could be the procurement of giant 'etch a sketch' screens²⁰ placed under the care of a selected civil society group. The group should be allowed to brand the screen and film how it is taken to public places where members of the public are encouraged to design and then sketch out an image relating to a CVE-related theme such as 'moderation' or 'tolerance'. In order to encourage candidates to take part, the civil society group could use spray chalk to draw arrows on streets leading to the screen where members will distribute leaflets (both here and in other popular places of congregation) informing that the best sketches will be submitted into a nation-wide competition adjudicated by famous national artists. Note, that as an alternative to the 'etch a sketch' screens, a clean wall could suffice with the civil society providing spray chalk (such as the UV variety provided by companies such as Rainbow Racing Systems), which disappears after around 10 days. Where possible, the media should be involved – both in advertising the competition and the work of the winners.</p> <p>Note there are plenty of other opportunities to work on existing art-centric projects. For example, the Jordan Rawaq Association for Arts and Culture in Salt provides music lessons (guitar, violin, piano, cello) as well as lessons in painting, filmmaking, theater performance, and storytelling to youths aged seven to 35. Although the center has received some funds from the King Abdullah Fund for Development it has struggled to finance its lessons as well as planned program to upgrade its filmmaking program by acquiring much needed equipment and constructing an outdoor cinema on site (estimated cost of 25,000 JD). Hiyari also has plans to build an event space and cooperate with the local NGO, Zikra Initiative, to construct a café to provide local women with employment opportunities and eventually the tools to open a catering service at the center (estimated cost of 15,000 JD). As such, this activity could integrate well with the 'Mother Knows Best' activity.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'People Soldiers'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage a closer relationship between the central government authorities and the civilian population, so that the latter increase their understanding of the roles and challenges that the former face.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents generally displayed great faith in the central government authorities and security services to cope with the VEO problem within Jordan. Indeed, some respondents felt that the public places too much faith in bodies such as the JAF and the GID. However, the relationship between citizens and the authorities is not always positive. For example, there have been several cases of individuals carrying out VE attacks specifically against the security services. Likewise, locals have repeatedly made use of social media sites to share evidence of human rights abuses by the police, in some cases leading to occasional protests by demonstrators against perceived police brutality, corruption and

²⁰ <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-13443238>

	disrespect. VEOs are able to exploit such negativity and build it into a narrative of central government abuse and immorality. As such, efforts should be made to counter this narrative through improved outreach between authorities and local communities.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Young Women (PTA 2).
DESCRIPTION	<p>One activity should focus on adjusting the 2016 Zain campaign, which featured the JAF and strong emotive and nationalistic slogans (e.g., 'you cannot defeat a nation if the first soldier is King'). This time greater emphasis should be given to a more equal relationship between the authorities and the public, for example with slogans such as 'you cannot defeat a nation if the first soldier is Ahmad', and an image of a Jordanian young man receiving recognition from the JAF for his efforts and bravery. Ideally, Ahmed and other named civilians would be real people singled out for real local achievement. For example, Ahmad could be Ahmad Abughaush, the 20 year-old who won Jordan's first gold medal in the 2016 Olympics for Taekwondo. A second example could be Maha Al Ashqar, recognized for her efforts in schooling Syrian refugees in her school on the outskirts of Amman. Each image should also feature a hashtag and links to a site that provide further information for those interested in learning what Ahmed, Maha and others have done. A third example could focus on young Jordanian inventors who have been developing life-saving devices such as heat-regulating, solar-powered baby tents.²¹ A fourth, more light-hearted example could celebrate achievements rather than people. For example, the advert could teach viewers how concrete was first used in North Jordan over 8,500 years ago, with a strapline such as "over 10,000 years of toughness and resilience".</p> <p>Although still some time away, the JAF will celebrate its centenary in 2020. As such, a number of activities could be organized in the lead up. For example, one could involve a musical competition aired on television where musical contestants compete to create a musical theme song to honor JAF work. The winning tune could be sung by favorites such as Kamal Khalil, Omar Alaballat, Hussain Alsalman, Omar Abdelat, Hussain Alsalman, or Mohammad Radideh to ensure greater media coverage. Another activity could be a youth competition to design a centenary badge for JAF uniform, with the winning design provided in a public format (e.g., a pin badge) for free to schoolchildren.</p>
KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Conference of Tribes'	
OBJECTIVE	To give tribal leaders incentives to cooperate with security forces, play more of a role in CVE efforts, and resolve inter-tribal conflicts.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA revealed that, although the influence of tribes has waned in recent decades, tribalism remains a key part of the social fabric in Jordan. Indeed,

²¹ Tabazah, Sawsan (2016). 'Young innovators design life-saving inventions,' The Jordan Times, October 16, 2016.

	<p>although the central government has assumed more control over the affairs of districts in which tribes were once the primary actors, tribal politics can still shape not only a person's individual worldview, but also the nature of Jordanian national unity. As a result, the success of CVE efforts in Jordan continues to depend partly on the participation of tribal bodies. The extent to which tribes support security forces with information and/or manpower is relatively unknown, as are specifics on which tribes are least and most receptive to VE ideologies. As such, efforts should be made to understand how tribal leaders can be more definitively co-opted into CVE efforts.</p>
<p>SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs</p>	<p>Marginalized (East Bank Jordanian) Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2), Salafist Youth (PTA 3).</p>
<p>DESCRIPTION</p>	<p>One activity could be an annual conference of tribes, featuring a number of formal seminars followed by time for roundtable discussion on the underlying causes of problems in Jordan – such as unemployment, crime, drug abuse, and radicalization. The emphasis of this activity is not so much on seeking solutions – although these would be warmly welcomed - but rather on messaging to tribal leaders that the central government requires and appreciates their involvement. As such, this will help foster a sense of tribal solidarity (or what Jordanians refer to as Asabiyya) to tackle problems together and in collaboration with the central government. Additional coverage from national media outlets and independent news networks, as well as recognition from important national leaders, including members of the royal family and Parliament, would also help encourage a sense of duty among attendees. Note that each TL section provides a number of salient tribes and tribal leaders for such an activity, although existing publications such as the Tribes of Jordan by Prince Ghazi Bin Muhammad will be more extensive.</p>

SECTION V: APPENDICES



1.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This sub-section details the theoretical and practical research and analysis approaches adopted during the course of the project, including: project design, project phases, Target Locations, sample frame, research instruments, and research procedures.

Research Terminology

For the purposes of the research, Violent Extremism (VE) was defined as an attitudinal attribute whereby an individual has come to fully embrace the idea of violent action or a violent ideology, which can integrate a process of view polarization and/or ideological radicalization. VE refers to advocating or supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives.

Violent Extremist Behavior (VE behavior) was defined as a behavioral attribute encompassing VEO membership and migration to Syria/Iraq to participate in 'jihad'. It refers to preparing, supporting and engaging in acts of violence to further social, economic and political objectives, whether as part of a group or individually.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) include formal jihadist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS), Al Qa'ida (AQ) or Jabhat Al Nusra (JN),²² but also Hamas and Hezbollah. Although they form a loose and informal movement, Salafist Jihadists have sometimes been associated with VEOs for the purposes of the analysis.

Project Objectives

The overarching objective of the project was to conduct theory and hypothesis-driven research and analysis in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter referred to as Jordan) in order to enhance understanding of the (primary) factors which influence propensity toward (Islamist) VE in Jordan, focusing on the Influence Pathway(s) toward VE behavior. The project was designed to provide empirical data and analysis (evidence) to help plan more effectively for current and emerging threats posed by VE and VEOs and help inform future counter violent extremism (CVE) programming and strategic communications campaigns.

Key objectives included -

Identify the most prevalent factors that increase propensity toward VE. Quantify numbers of individuals who are susceptible to take part in ideologically motivated acts of violence, as well as those who exhibit the willingness to support and sustain violent actors. Results shall be disaggregated by governorate, age grouping, and gender. The primary target audience involves those who exhibit extremist tendencies or some inclination to support extremism, yet who are not firmly committed and remain vulnerable and potentially responsive to VEO strategic communication.

Identify specific pathways and drivers leading to VEO recruitment within Jordan by location, disaggregated to the Governorate (District and Sub-district) level.

Identify motivators for individuals participating in VE for reasons other than radicalization (i.e., money, kinship, ties, and coercion).

²² Although the group rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham in July 2016, it was referred to as Jabhat Al Nusra (JN) in final reporting since primary research commenced prior to the rebranding effort.

Present Social Network Analysis (SNA) relevant to the facilitation of VEO recruitment.

Identify potential Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) in Jordan for future Civil-Military Operations and Non-Lethal Effects vulnerability assessments and engagement.

Research Design

This project was designed in accordance with a Target Audience Analysis (TAA) and an Audience-Based Measurement of Effectiveness (AB-MOE) methodology,²³ which utilizes a multi-stage, mixed methods qualitative and quantitative design. The methodology follows a rigorous and planned approach to conducting audience research with a focus on designing effective and measurable interventions.

The methodology has four basic functions, all of which are crucial to any communication planning and implementation effort, particularly one where the center of gravity is the population. First, the methodology facilitates the identification and justification of Target Audiences insofar as these are relevant to project objectives. Second, the methodology identifies the problems and opportunities that these Target Audiences perceive as related to project objectives. It does this through a thorough identification of both context and narrative within the selected Target Locations. Third, it determines the causes of the problems and opportunities identified. This provides indication on how implementation can be shaped and delivered, in some instances specific to a given Primary Target Audience (PTA), to improve the effect of communication. Fourth, it facilitates the emergence of an audience-based measurement Framework, initially populated by baseline measures, so that the degree of success enjoyed by future implementation can be gauged more accurately.

Project Phases

This project was initiated as a strategic and operational Target Audience Research and Analysis (TAR) study in one Target Country: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter referred to as Jordan). The project consisted of three Phases, which can be summarized as follows:

Phase I: Project Planning

Phase I involved the process of conducting initial research on the Target Country, including Target Locations and relevant thematic issues, in order to enable the development of research hypotheses. These hypotheses were then tested by primary field research in order to generate insightful findings in fulfillment of client objectives. The phase included an extensive and systematic collection of qualitative and quantitative secondary research data and experience from past projects in the Target Country. Phase I also involved the process of using initial research to inform the development of both quantitative (Guided Questionnaires) and qualitative (Depth and Expert Interviews (DI/EI)) instruments, and the development of the Violent Extremism Vulnerability (VEV) Framework, including audience-based domains, themes, and indicators.

Phase I Outcomes: The production of a Research Plan containing a detailed description of the proposed research and analysis methodology and its foundations in recognized postulates from the social and behavioral sciences, the sampling plan to be employed, as well as an outline of all logistical considerations required prior to the commencement of Phase II.

²³ The AB-MOE methodology was used in the creation of the Violent Extremism Vulnerability Framework and Index (see Section IV. Violent Extremism Vulnerability Index).

An initial Research Plan concerning Field Research in four Target Locations was submitted in February 2016 and an updated Research Plan concerning Field Research in the eight remaining Target Locations was submitted in May 2016

Phase II: Field Research

Phase II involved training the Field Research Teams in Target Audience Research (TAR) methodology and conducting research in the approved Target Locations using the mixed qualitative (Depth Interviews and Expert Interviews) and quantitative (Guided Questionnaires) data collection design identified during Phase I and outlined in the Research Plan.

Phase II Outcomes: Full training of the Field Research Teams in all aspects of primary field research instruments, procedures, practices, and protocols and the collection of qualitative and quantitative data in the approved Target Locations.

Field Research was conducted in two distinct stages. Field Research in the first four Target Locations approved took place between January and April 2016 while Field Research in the remaining eight Target Locations took place between July and September 2016, following approval of those Target Locations in May 2016.

Phase III: Analysis and Documentation

Phase III involved the process of analyzing the data generated by primary and secondary research and documenting all research findings and analyses derived from Phase II, including providing an in-depth understanding of each Target Location and Primary Target Audiences, and how the latter operate, what their primary motivators and aspirations are, and what factors cause it to alter their existing attitudes and behavior(s). Phase III also involved the identification and formulation of Campaign recommendations in order to achieve the Project Objectives.

Phase III Outcomes: Final technical report detailing TAA findings based on analyses of the qualitative and quantitative secondary and primary research data, including Campaign recommendations and a populated VEV Index designed for measuring Campaign effectiveness.

A first, interim report deliverable detailing findings for the first four Target Locations approved was submitted in June 2016. The present final technical report is to be submitted in November 2016.

Target Locations

Target Locations were initially selected with reference to existing administrative and governmental structures in Jordan as follows: the three regions (North, Central and South), 12 governorates (*Mouhafazah*) and a number of districts (*Liwa'*) or sub-districts (*Qda'*).

Jordan's 12 governorates (Irbid, Ajloun, Jarash, Mafraq, Balqa, Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Karak, Tafila, Ma'an and Aqaba) formed the main Target Locations. Within each Target Location, qualitative and quantitative primary research was conducted in a number of sub-locations districts and/or sub-districts (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Target Locations: Regions, Governorates and Districts/Sub-districts.

REGION	GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT AND/OR SUB-DISTRICT
NORTH REGION	1. IRBID	Iribid Qasabah, Ramtha, Koorah, Bani Kenanah, Aghwar Shamaliyah, Bani Obeid, Mazar Shamali, Taybeh, Wastiyah.
	2. AJLOUN	Ajloun, Sakhras, Orjan, Kufranjah.
	3. JARASH	Jarash, Mestabah, Borma
	4. MAFRAQ	Mafraq, Bal'ama, Irhab, Manshiyah, Salhiya, Sabha, Um Al-Jemal, Dair Al Khaf, Om-Elqotain, Badiyah Gharbiyah, Serhan, Hoshah, Khaldiyah, Rwaished.
CENTRAL REGION	5. BALQA	Salt, Al Ardha, Allan, Ira & Yargha, Shoonah Janoobiyah, Deir Alla, Ain Albasha, Fuhais & Mahes.
	6. AMMAN	Amman Qasabah, Marka, Quaismeh, Al Jami'ah, Wadi Essier, Sahab, Aljeezeh, Um Alrasas, Muaqqar, Rajm Al Shami, Na'oor, Um Elbasatien, Hosba'n.
	7. ZARQA	Zarqa, Bierai, Dhilail, Azraq, Rusaifeh, Alhashemieh.
	8. MADABA	Madab district, Jrainah, Maeen, Faisaliah, Dieban, Areedh, Mlaih.
SOUTH REGION	9. KARAK	Karak, Mazar, Mo'aab, Qasr, Mowjeb, Safi, Ghawr Almazra'a, Ayy Qasabah, Faqo'e, Qatraneh.
	10. TAFIELA	Tafiela, Bsaira, Hasa.
	11. MA'AN	Ma'an, Iel, Jafr, Mraighah, Athroh, Petra, Shobak Qasabah, Huseiniya.
	12. AQABA	Aqaba, Wadi Araba, Quairah, Diesah.

Sample Frame

A total of 4800 (complete) quantitative GQs (400 in each of the twelve governorates), 120 qualitative DIs (10 in each of the twelve governorates), and 20 EIs were conducted (see Figure 2).

Quantitative Research

The Field Research quantitative survey (Guided Questionnaires) utilized a quota sample administered using a random walk approach. The sample was divided proportionally over the twelve governorates, which acted as the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). The districts and/or sub-districts acted as the Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs). Within each SSU, between two and four recruitment points were randomly selected. These points were areas of high population flow (e.g., markets, shops, Streets, parts, etc.). At each recruitment point, every fifth person who passed the field researcher was selected at random to partake in the Guided Questionnaire. Field researchers would screen respondents and then conduct surveys until reaching the pre-established respondent sampling frame (based on the 2004 census).²⁴

²⁴ The publication of the latest population census (2015) remains pending.

If the invitee declined to participate, the researcher noted the rejection. If, however, the invitee agreed to participate, the invitee was then asked a number of screening questions in order to ensure that they met the necessary criteria (as defined below). Those invitees who failed to meet the criteria were informed that they could not participate and were thanked for their time.

Respondents who did meet the criteria were then asked for a suitable location and time to participate in the research. Where possible, GQs were undertaken immediately in the home of the respondent or at the earliest indicated available opportunity, in a quiet location that drew minimal outside attention and maximized respondents' ease of participation.

This method had methodological limitations in that responses were less random. However, such limitations were somewhat mitigated by the use of multiple locations for research, and subsequent segmentation of the data.

It should be noted that all researchers underwent training to deepen their understanding of the risks and limitations of selecting a bias sample. Indeed, for the purposes of this study, one of the primary tasks of the Field Research Team Leader was to closely monitor the progress of his/her researchers in order to ensure that they minimized the scope for the introduction of sources of bias into the sample.

In order to control for the heterogeneity of the sample and to ensure an accurate sample, a small number of sampling criteria had to be met prior to the respondent participation process:

- Respondents must be Jordanian nationals or Palestinian refugees; transients (non-Jordanians who have been in the country for less than 5 years, including Syrian refugees (whether in camps or elsewhere, who have left Syria since 2011) and foreign workers will be excluded.
- Respondents must be 16 years of age or more;
- Respondents must reside - whether permanently or during the academic year- in the identified Target Locations;
- Respondents will not be invited to participate if in institutionalized settings, such as prisons or hospitals;
- No respondent will be permitted to participate in both a GQ and DI/EI.

Qualitative Research

Potential respondents for EIs were identified through pre-existing and emergent networks and secondary research. This process, therefore, adopted a non-random sampling approach.

Potential respondents for DIs were identified through a snowball sampling approach. Local field research teams helped to select an initial sample of individuals from communities within their respective Target Locations pre-identified as vulnerable and potentially responsive to VEO strategic communication.

If the invitee declined to participate, the researcher asked the individual to identify another potential respondent to participate. If, however, the invitee agreed to participate, he/she was then asked a number of screening questions in order to ensure that they met the necessary criteria (as defined below). Household members and immediate relatives are excluded from the referral system. Those who failed to meet the criteria were informed that they could not participate and were thanked for their time. Before parting, the researcher asked the individual to identify another potential respondent to participate, who, in turn, was invited to take part.

However, those potential respondents who did meet the criteria were then asked for a suitable location and time to participate in the research. Where possible, DIs were undertaken at the earliest available opportunity, in a quiet location that drew minimal outside attention and

maximized respondents' ease of participation – for example, at the respondent's home. Upon completion of a DI, the researcher asked the participant to identify another potential respondent to participate, who, in turn, were invited to take part. The researchers noted down any DI that was prematurely terminated for whatever reason.

Figure 2. Sample distribution by Target Location and Instrument.

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION			
Target Location	Guided Questionnaires	Depth Interviews	Expert Interviews
1. IRBID	400	10	-
2. AJLOUN	400	10	-
3. JARASH	400	10	-
4. MAFRAQ	400	10	-
5. BALQA	400	10	-
6. AMMAN	400	10	20
7. ZARQA	400	10	-
8. MADABA	400	10	-
9. KARAK	400	10	-
10. TAFIELA	400	10	-
11. MA'AN	400	10	-
12. AQABA	400	10	-
TOTAL	4800	120	20

Research Instruments

Secondary Research

Systematic remote research and data collection was conducted on pre-existing available sources. As well as mainstream public sources, such as the Internet, secondary research also included obtaining locally produced publications and other relevant printed and digital material. Priority was given to trusted statistical sources, such as peer-reviewed journals, earlier studies, and reports commissioned by NGOs. Secondary research was used to develop contextual accounts of the Research Country and Target Locations. Strict standards of research were adhered to at all times.

Depth Interviews

Depth Interviews (DIs) are a qualitative research tool designed to facilitate the analysis of a broad range of political, economic, and social attitudes and behaviors. A total of 120 DIs were conducted to explore perceptions and attitudes on, and behaviors related to, specific ideas, events, and key issues relevant to, and/or impacting on, the Project Objectives.

The DI schedule consisted of a series of open-ended questions. The Research Team continuously revised specific questions as recurrent themes emerged in the data. This was done in order to refine and test specific hypotheses. Each DI lasted between 60-120 minutes approximately and

was conducted by a trained researcher. DIs were transcribed in Arabic and subsequently translated into English. Whenever possible, DIs will include members of the following groups, with a focus on examining drivers of and Influence Pathways toward VE.²⁵

- Friends, family members and peers of former Salafist Jihadists or VEO recruits;
- Individuals with a good knowledge of VE behavior or CVE engagement in their local community.

Expert Interviews

A series of qualitative subject matter Expert Interviews (EIs) were selectively conducted with local experts on indigenous culture, history, tradition, religion and the current economic, socio-political and VE environment during Phase I and Phase II of the project to gain insights into the subject matter. Specifically, EI data was used to develop contextual accounts of the Research Country, Target Locations and an in-depth understanding from as many perspectives as possible on factors that influence propensity toward VE and Influence Pathways toward VE. The information provided in EIs during Phase I was utilized in the conceptualization and development of the research instruments.

The EI schedule consisted of a series of open-ended questions. The Research Team tailored the schedule according to the area of expertise relevant to each EI. Each EI lasted between 60-90 minutes and were conducted by a trained researcher in Arabic. Where possible, EIs were audio recorded subject to informed consent and OPSEC protocols or transcribed in note form in Arabic,²⁶ and then translated into English. EIs included members of the following groups:²⁷

- Senior academic nationals who specialize in VE;
- Journalists who specialize in VE;
- Lawyers who specialize in VE, human rights or Islamic Law;
- Human rights, community and social activists;
- Representatives of local NGOs;
- Government officials who play a role in countering VE.

Guided Questionnaires

GQs are a quantitative research tool that contains closed-ended, scaled questions. A total of 4,800 GQs were conducted. Responses were recorded on Likert scales. In order to prevent automated responses, the order of the question clusters was intermittently varied. GQs were developed using prior subject matter knowledge and information obtained from secondary research. GQs were designed to generate data on a number of key research issues complementary to data collected through the DIs.

Over the course of the TAR phase, GQ data were regularly inputted into a Microsoft Excel data entry sheet. Once all data were inputted into the data entry sheet, they were subsequently transferred to, and analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (21.0).

²⁵ Opportunities to interview DI respondents were taken as they emerged.

²⁶ In the event that audio recording was not possible, the researcher took written notes and wrote up summaries immediately following the interview. While it is not possible to transcribe every word of an interview, Research Team training ensures that note taking focuses on the most salient aspects of the interview.

²⁷ Note that the final composition of the EI schedule was dependent on EI availability for interview.

Research Procedure

Field Research Training

The Field Research Teams were based in country and were responsible for all aspects of primary data collection. The Field Research Teams (interviewers) consisted of 36 experienced native speaking researchers who were local to and/or familiar with each location in which the field research was undertaken (three interviewers in each governorate). A designated Governorate Research Team Leader, who was responsible for overseeing all aspects of research, including quality control, within their respective governorate, oversaw primary research in each governorate. A Project Research Team Leader (project manager) who was responsible for all aspects of project management and quality control, headed the Field Research Teams. The Project Research Team Leader provided ongoing guidance to, and feedback on, the performance of the Field Research Teams as and when required to the Analysis Team and no less than two times per week. A senior member of the Analysis Team provided the Governorate and Project Research Team Leaders with a pre-field research refresher-training course over a five-day period in Amman on two occasions, once in February 2016 and once in July 2016. All Research Team members were trained in TAR methodology, and had a good knowledge of research protocols, quality control protocols, ethical protocols, qualitative and quantitative fieldwork practices, and OPSEC procedures.

Ethical Considerations

All research was conducted in an ethical manner in conformance with standard practices in social sciences. In particular, the following guidelines were adhered to:

- All respondents provided entirely voluntary informed consent.
- All respondents were provided with an adequate explanation of what their participation would involve.
- All respondents were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time.
- All respondents were guaranteed absolute confidentiality.
- All research methods were non-invasive and non-harmful.
- All researchers were polite and non-threatening.

Furthermore, careful attention was made to ensure that primary research was carried out in full compliance with local norms and customs and that the welfare of individual respondents and communities was given high regard throughout the research process.

Operational Security (OPSEC) Standards

All research was conducted in a secure manner in accordance with standard OPSEC protocols designed to guarantee the personal safety and security of all respondents and members of the Field Research Team, as well as the confidentiality of both qualitative and quantitative data sets. All interviews were completed in locations deemed safe by the respondent. All respondents were guaranteed confidentiality and personally identifiable information was removed at the point of data recording. All data were subject to strict discretionary data control and protection mechanisms at the data collection, recording, storage, transfer, back-up, and encryption stages.

Prior to project implementation, a full risk assessment was undertaken detailing all security, data, personnel, and medical considerations in terms of potential risk, consequence, mitigation, and contingency planning. The risk register was regularly reviewed throughout the course of the Research Project.

Translation of Research Instruments and DIs/EIs/GQs

Prior to use, all primary research instruments were translated into Arabic by experienced local translators and then back translated into English to control for inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies in the original translation. Careful attention was paid to ensure that all questions were conveyed in an accurate and consistent manner, in accordance with local terminology and cultural norms. Any anomalies in the translations or any uncertainty over meaning or nuance were checked by the Analysis Team through a pilot process and through a process of constant back referencing to the Field Research Team.

The data capture tool used to collate GQ data was designed in English. In order to reduce the scope for data input errors, those members of the Field Research Team responsible for data input were fluent in both Arabic and English. During Phase II, they regularly read the completed GQs (that were in Arabic) and inputted the scores into the data capture tool in English.

2.0 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This sub-section details the analysis approaches taken during the project, including: qualitative data capture and analysis; quantitative data processing; quantitative data analysis; sample descriptions; and project limitations.

Qualitative Data

Data Capture

Each DI and EI was audio recorded and/or transcribed in Arabic. Each Arabic transcript was then translated into English by an experienced translator, and uploaded to a secure server for analysis by members of the Analysis Team. A number of DIs and EIs from each translator were randomly selected for independent back-translation for quality control and assurance purposes.

Data Analysis

DI and EI data analysis was undertaken using a process of Thematic and Content Analysis, which utilized a mixture of confirmatory and exploratory data analysis techniques within an overall framework of Grounded Theory. Grounded Theory was applied systematically during the project to generate, and iteratively test, working theory as it emerged from the qualitative data. The approach involved a procedure of continuous comparison between data and working theories and hypotheses in order to allow for a theoretical elaboration of concepts and factors and a thorough exploration of emergent hypotheses and theories.

Following the completion of Phase I and Phase II, all qualitative primary research data were analyzed during Phase III of the Research Project. Thematic Analysis began with a process of familiarization, during which all qualitative data were initially read, re-read and discussed at length between members of the Analysis Team in order to gain familiarity and a thorough understanding of content.

Following familiarization, the Analysis Team initiated a process of data coding, which involved categorizing the data into small component parts of similar text. The system of coding allowed for the labeling, separation, organization, and quantification (see Figure 3) of data. Three modes of coding were used: open coding, where categories were broken down, compared, and concepts yielded; axial coding, where connections were made between categories; and selective coding, where core categories were identified around which all others were integrated. This process was monitored for theoretical saturation to the point where categories yielded no new data. At every stage of the coding process, members of the Analysis Team altered and modified the analysis as ideas developed and working hypotheses and theories were generated and tested. Codes were subsequently adjusted and refined on an emergent basis.

On the basis of the coding process, the Analysis Team identified broad concepts that incorporated sets of codes, which were subsequently refined and integrated into more specific themes. Themes were illustrated using selected quotes from the text. Throughout the process, codes and themes were categorized according to potential significance and saliency with respect to Project Objectives.

Figure 3. DI/FGD Data Coding: Numerical Indications

QUALITATIVE NUMERICAL SCALE	APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
No respondents / none	0%
One respondent	One respondent
Several respondents	More than one respondent but less than 5%
A few / some respondents	5% - 25%
Many respondents	25% - 49%
Approximately half of respondents	50%
The majority of respondents	> 50% - < 80%
The vast majority of /most respondents	> 80%
Almost all respondents	> 90%
All respondents	100%

Error Reduction and Generalizability

DI/EI questions were designed to yield responses that were indicators of a concept, such that each answer was a value of a variable that the research sought to measure. Standardization was thus employed in the delivery and analysis of DI/EI questions such that there was consistency and uniformity in: (a) the way the questions were asked; (b) the transcription process; (c) the translation process; (d) the training provided to the researchers (to reduce intra-interviewer and inter-interviewer variability), and; (e) the researchers' understanding of the broad (if opaque) research objectives.

The Analysis Team started the analysis of the DI and EI data as soon as they were received, ensuring that any changes to the research process were made quickly rather than delayed until the end of the data collection phase. Finally, dependability was achieved by adopting an auditing approach that ensured that complete records were kept of all phases of research and that these were accessible and available for scrutiny.

Quantitative Data Processing

The Analysis Team adopted a systematic approach to processing the GQ data, including cleaning and data validation. Firstly, the data sheet was cleaned by checking for missing data and data inputting errors such as the inclusion of 'impossible' scores. These were removed as appropriate. Secondly, cross-tabulations were run to reveal any unexpected or unlikely variations within the data. These revealed only a very small number of such variations, which were subsequently crosschecked for consistency with other primary and secondary data collected during the project.

Quantitative Data Analysis

Quantitative data from responses in the GQs were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (21.0). Analyses used include frequency comparisons, cross-tabulations, segmentation analysis, correlations and regressions. The key findings of such analyses were represented in words, tables

and charts in the Final Report. These were then used to formulate AB-MOE baseline scores for ongoing monitoring purposes in the country.

Bar Charts and Pie Charts

The most common form of GQ data representation in this report is the single-item response, displayed as a bar chart or a pie chart of the percentage of respondents that selected each answer. Some of the bar charts provide further insight by including data specific to certain demographic groups within the sample. Because of sampling error and for ease of display, all percentages in the report are reported to the nearest integer.

Line Charts

A number of line charts are included in the VEV Index Section of this report. The vast majority of scores for each indicator represented in the charts are based on an aggregate score of two responses – for example, the 'strongly agree' and 'somewhat agree' options.

Sample Descriptions

Quantitative GQ Sample Description

In total, 4,800 Quantitative GQs were conducted, weighted and analyzed. Based on the demographic data collected for each respondent, Figure 4 provides a breakdown of the gender, age, religious status, employment status, highest level of education status, and monthly income status of the sample.

Figure 4. GQ Sample by Demographic Categories

CATEGORY	SAMPLE PERCENTAGE	
GENDER	Male: 53%	Female: 47%
AGE GROUP	16-24: 34%	25-39: 36%
	40-59: 21%	60+: 9%
RELIGION	Sunni Muslim: 91%	Shia Muslim: 1%
	Christian: 7%	DK/RF: 1%
ETHNICITY	Palestinian origin (West Bank Jordanian): 28%	Transjordanian (East Bank Jordanian): 70%
	Other: 1%	DK/RF: 1%
EMPLOYMENT STATUS	Unemployed: 14%	Self-Employed: 11%
	Employer: 10%	Employed (Part Time): 11%
	Employed (Full Time): 19%	Student/apprentice/in training: 16%
	Retired: 6%	Unpaid Family Worker: 13%
	Other: 0%	DK/RF: 0%
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION	Illiterate: 4%	Read and Write: 7%
	Primary: 7%	Secondary: 30%
	Tertiary: 44%	Vocational Qualification: 8%
MONTHLY	<300 JD: 19%	301-550 JD: 41%

CATEGORY	SAMPLE PERCENTAGE	
INCOME	551-800 JD: 26%	801-1999 JD: 8%
	>2000 JD: 2%	DK/RF: 4%

Project Limitations

Phase I: Planning

Research Instrument limitations - Given the potentially large number of research questions, the quantitative and qualitative research instruments could not be designed to address each and every aspect of the Project Objectives in their totality. This limitation was addressed by the use of flexible EI and DI instruments, together with the application of emergent approaches within a framework of Grounded Theory.

Phase II: Field Research

OPSEC - The OPSEC environment in some parts of the Target Locations represented a challenge to the Field Research Teams, particularly given the sensitivity of the topic in Zarqa and Mafrqa but also following June 2016 security incidents in Irbid and Balqa. Research progress was slow at times, and delays occurred during data collection because of heightened respondent suspicion was observed in some of the GQs and the first EIs conducted.

Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr: Ramadan (June 07-July 07) and Eid al-Fitr (July 07-10) delayed commencement of Field Research for the last eight Target Locations following their approval.

Fear - The sensitivity of the topic - particularly questions on the Jordanian government, royal court and security institutions as well as on attitudes toward VEOs - meant that many respondents reported being afraid of repercussions for speaking their mind. However, these conditions were anticipated and successfully mitigated with minimal delays.

Ignorance - The Field Research Teams reported that some respondents did not know much about some aspects of VEO recruitment/activities/protagonists. The Research Team reported that unsubstantiated gossip, rumor, conspiracy and misreporting of events by the media meant that in some cases respondents answered questions without adequate (confirmed) knowledge of the question at hand. Similarly, the Field Research Teams reported that most respondents did not have a firm understanding of Islamist movements in Jordan, including, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Few were able to distinguish between Salafist Quietists and Salafist Jihadists.

Refusal rates - The Field Research Teams reported that the main reasons for non-participation were mistrust and fear. Some people were suspicious of the research. This fear impacted on willing respondents too, and was reflected on occasion in the lack of granularity of, or unwillingness to provide answers to, specific questions, notably those asking about the security forces and VEO activities in the local area. Such fears were somewhat mitigated by reemphasizing to respondents that their anonymity was guaranteed and that they were under no obligation to provide any names or information that they felt uncomfortable with.

Suspicion/fear resulted in a proportion of 'DK/RF/NR' responses - The Field Research Teams reported that there was some reluctance by GQ respondents to answer sensitive questions indicated by a proportion of 'Don't Know', 'Refuse to Answer' and 'Neither Agree nor Disagree' responses. The Research Team concluded that in the majority of cases this was because respondents were

afraid to answer some questions directly and in a small number of cases because of indifference.

Survey fatigue - The Research Teams reported some issues with survey fatigue, notably regarding the GQs.

Field Research Teams: In spite of extensive training and re-training, some researchers continued to face problems interviewing in practice primarily because of a lack of practical experience with investigating lines of questioning relating to VE/VEOs and respondents' reluctance to engage, particularly with regards to sensitive lines of questioning. In some cases, researchers failed to build sufficient rapport with the respondents to gain desirable levels of insight.

Phase III: Analysis and Documentation

Generalizability - The pathways to VE are multiple, highly complex and subject to change. While it is possible to draw conclusions from the data with regards to the role of specific factors or drivers of VE, such conclusions are at best 'partial' - care must be taken, therefore, when generalizing research findings, as there remain substantive limitations in terms of the ability of the methodology to accurately comprehend the causes of VE. Further, different Target Locations view and embrace or reject VE/VEOs differently therefore care must be taken when generalizing findings to the national level.

Representation - The sample under-represents the West Bank Jordanian population compared to the East Bank Jordanian population and somewhat under-represents Christians. The sample also over-represents tertiary level education. In addition, the sample covers predominantly urban areas and is less representative of rural areas. Care must be taken, therefore, when generalizing research findings to the national level.

False responses - The Field Research Teams reported that some respondents were reluctant to answer sensitive questions, which may have led to instances of false reporting. For example, some respondents chose to provide false information with regards to their education level, employment status, or even views about access to public services and general security.

Limited Respondent Knowledge - Respondents displayed limited knowledge and understanding of pathways toward VE/VE behavior, Islamist groups and VEOs, the concepts of extremism and radicalization, and local or national CVE programs.

Respondent Lack of Insight - Most respondents lacked insight into the pathways of Jordanian VEO recruits and radicalized individuals. Those who had and were willing to recount the storylines of such recruits and individuals generally did not give specifics, primarily because the paths and processes they were describing were not that well known to them and/or because they took place several years ago. In addition, some interviewees withheld information due to fear of repercussions (primarily from Jordanian authorities).

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