

Factors Impacting Propensity and Influence Pathways Toward Violent Extremism in Jordan

Nationwide Study – Executive Summary



Outside Turkman neighborhood, Irbid Qasabah, Irbid governorate.

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PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

Project Objectives

The overarching objective of this project was to conduct theory and hypothesis-driven research and analysis in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter referred to as Jordan) in order to enhance understanding of the (primary) factors that influence propensity toward (Islamist) violent extremism (VE) in Jordan, focusing on the Influence Pathway(s) toward VE and VE behavior. The project was designed to provide empirical data and analysis (evidence) to help more effectively plan for current and emerging threats posed by VE and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and help inform future counter violent extremism (CVE) programming and strategic communications campaigns.

Key objectives included:

Identify the most prevalent factors that increase propensity toward VE. Results will be disaggregated by governorate, age grouping, and gender. The primary target audience involves those who exhibit extremist tendencies or some inclination to support extremism, yet who are not firmly committed and remain vulnerable and potentially responsive to VEO strategic communication.

Identify specific pathways and drivers leading to VEO recruitment within Jordan.

Identify motivators for individuals participating in VE for reasons other than radicalization (i.e., money, kinship, ties, and coercion).

Present Social Network Analysis (SNA) relevant to the facilitation of VEO recruitment.

Identify potential Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) in Jordan for future Civil-Military Operations and Non-Lethal Effects vulnerability assessments and engagement.

Research Approach

This project was designed in accordance with a Target Audience Analysis (TAA) and an Audience-Based Measurement of Effectiveness (AB-MOE) methodology,¹ which utilizes a multi-stage, mixed methods qualitative and quantitative design. The methodology follows a rigorous and planned approach to conducting audience research with a focus on designing effective and measurable interventions. Target Locations were initially selected with reference to existing administrative and governmental structures in Jordan as follows: the three regions (North, Central and South) and 12 governorates (*Mouhafazah*).

This project consisted of a total of 120 Depth Interviews (DIs), 4,800 Guided Questionnaires (GQs), and 20 Expert Interviews (EIs). A total of 10 DIs and 400 Guided Questionnaires were completed in each respective Target Location. In addition to primary research carried out on the ground, extensive secondary data research and analysis was undertaken to ensure the collection and triangulation of as many data points as possible. Jordanian nationals local to each assigned research location conducted primary research face-to-face with respondents.

¹ The AB-MOE methodology was used in the creation of the Violent Extremism Vulnerability Framework and Index.

Project Phases

The project consisted of three Phases:

Phase I: Project Planning

Phase I involved the process of conducting initial research on the Target Country, including Target Locations and relevant thematic issues, in order to enable the development of research hypotheses. These hypotheses were then tested by primary field research in order to generate insightful findings. The phase included an extensive and systematic collection of qualitative and quantitative secondary research data and experience from past projects in the Target Country. Phase I also involved the process of using initial research to inform the development of both quantitative (Guided Questionnaires) and qualitative (Depth and Expert Interviews) instruments, and the development of the Violent Extremism Vulnerability (VEV) Framework, including audience-based domains, themes, and indicators.

Phase II: Field Research

Phase II involved training the Field Research Teams in Target Audience Research (TAR) methodology and conducting research in the approved Target Locations using the mixed qualitative (Depth Interviews and Expert Interviews) and quantitative (Guided Questionnaires) data collection design identified during Phase I and outlined in the Research Plan.

Phase III: Analysis and Documentation

Phase III involved the process of analyzing the data generated by primary and secondary research and documenting all research findings and analyses derived from Phase II, including providing an in-depth understanding of each Target Location and Primary Target Audiences, and how the latter operate, what their primary motivators and aspirations are, and what factors cause it to alter their existing attitudes and behavior(s). Phase III also involved the identification and formulation of Campaign recommendations in order to achieve the Project Objectives.

SECTION I: INFLUENCE PATHWAY AND TARGET AUDIENCES

1.0 OVERARCHING FINDINGS

There is a key distinction between violent extremist mindset and behavior.

Violent Extremism (VE) was defined as violent extremist mindset insofar as it refers to a set of beliefs and thinking patterns that motivate individuals to condone or fully embrace the idea of violence to pursue specific goals and that may also compel them to engage in violent activities at a later point. Such views can be religiously/ideologically inspired or can have an exclusively political basis. VE behavior, meanwhile, was defined as the action of participating directly or indirectly in acts of violent extremism/violence (e.g., carrying out a violent attack on a specific group as well as providing logistical/financial support to carry out such an attack). It was also defined as traveling to Syria/Iraq to 'participate in jihad' or fight a designated enemy as a member of a VEO. Note that the first definition does not necessarily require membership of a VEO and helps explain how an advocate of, and participant in, VE may still retain nationalistic feelings and consider involvement in a (foreign) VEO a form of betrayal.

ISIS remains seen as a powerful VEO but garners limited popularity countrywide.

Respondents believed that the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS) has the largest supply of weapons and wealth compared to other VEOs and continues to dominate the media space. As such, even if locals do not actively support ISIS, its media machine can continue to drive awareness and knowledge of core VEO narratives and messages, some of which stimulate sympathy. Typical examples include claims that the Jordanian government system is corrupt, nepotistic, ineffective, un-Islamic, controlled by foreign agendas, etc. However, the ISIS murder of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh and the subsequent release of the video in February 2015 was a polarizing moment, with ISIS popularity dramatically falling in the aftermath. Not only was ISIS opposed for the brutality of the killing, but also for the way in which it was carried out. The ISIS brand has not managed to recover. In fact, subsequent small-scale attacks in Jordan have only worsened its image, although there has been a backlash against the Jordanian government's involvement in the international Coalition against VEOs among those who believe that non-participation would be better.

There is sympathy for JN for countering Assad.

Despite unwillingness to provide behavioral support to Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Nusra) (JN),² there remains a significant degree of attitudinal sympathy, in large part due to Syria's Bashar Al Assad and his regime's atrocities (perceived as unforgivable violence against innocent Muslim civilians). Furthermore, JN has ensured that operations remain almost exclusively focused on Syria. In addition, JN's smaller media profile has helped soften views and it mostly remains more palatable than Al Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS. An additional factor is that Jordanian Salafists (especially from Amman, Zarqa, Rusaifeh and cities in the south) have traditionally been supportive of JN and helped with recruitment, especially in the beginning of the Syrian conflict.

² In July 2016, Jabhat Al Nusra (Al Nusra) rebranded as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (Conquest of Syria Front). For the purposes of this report, the group is referred to as the former since primary research—including specific questions about Al Nusra—commenced prior to the group's rebranding.

AQ is largely irrelevant and Hamas is a resistance movement rather than a VEO.

Respondents viewed AQ as a more irrelevant organization than JN and ISIS because it has lost the battle for media coverage and does not appear to have the same resources, rewards and recognition that JN and ISIS can give, particularly in Syria. AQ also seems to operate along a more rigid hierarchical structure than JN and ISIS, making it less attractive to those driven by a more 'revolutionary' spirit. Supporters still associate AQ with resistance against the United States and the figure of Osama Bin Laden, however, the group is less salient today and residual sympathy should not be mistaken for proactive engagement. Meanwhile, Hamas continues to enjoy a lot of support and many refused to call it a VEO. Instead, they described it as a national liberation organization or resistance movement.

There is disagreement over links between Salafism and VE/VEOs.

Any link between Salafist communities and VEOs, or between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and VEOs, is a disputed one. Respondents who perceived a direct relationship between Salafist areas and VEO membership, and even those who believed that there was a predisposition rather than a relationship, argued that Salafists follow an extremist ideology (including that of a religious nature) with messages and narratives that bear striking similarities to those espoused by VEOs. Likewise, they pointed out that Salafist groups tend to generate strong support in refugee camps and other less-prosperous areas, where locals feel more frustrated and marginalized but tend to be less educated and critical in their thinking – elements respondents felt catalyze VEO membership. However, those who reject any correlation pointed out that few Salafists become actual recruits and that there are clear ideological differences, as evidenced in the thinking of Salafist Quietists. A sensible conclusion would be that unchecked membership of a Salafist group can accelerate a pre-existing disposition to join a VEO, but that it is dangerously incorrect to claim a perfect correlation between Salafism (particularly Quietist) and VE/VE behavior.

There is even more disagreement over links between the MB and VE/VEOs.

The same disagreement exists over any link between the MB and VEOs. For example, those who perceived such a link pointed to ambiguity in the organization's leadership and structure, and believed that the MB encourages sectarianism, political zeal, deep opposition toward Israel, the idea of obedience to religious leaders and duty to carry out jihad, even in a violent manner. Likewise, the MB also draws strength from more marginalized areas. However, those who rejected a link argued that the organization has overt political ambitions within the existing domestic government structure and that there is a low ratio of MB supporters to VEO recruits. In fact, the strong presence of the MB in VEO-prone areas may be as much a positive as it is a negative, in that it presents an alternative to otherwise disillusioned potential recruits. A sensible conclusion would be that the relationship between MB and VEO membership is a weak one, even if a few individuals 'slip' through the net. Nevertheless, the organization could improve its internal regulations and self-censorship in order to minimize this risk.

Jordanian government CVE efforts are recognized but excessively security-centric.

There is a strong positive perception regarding the efficacy and efficiency of the Jordanian government and its security services. Examples include efforts to monitor imams and mosques, securing the border with Syria, swift and successful action against sleeper cells, a rehabilitation program that understands the value of respecting the rights of former VEOs that have returned, discussions and other engagement activities at schools and university, and direct and indirect CVE messaging across the media. Indeed, even

fear of the Jordanian government and its security services has acted as a powerful barrier – not only the threat of punishment but also the risk of social marginalization and shame from the rest of the community and society. Nevertheless, many respondents agreed that the Jordanian government has placed excessive focus on security-centric activities and that effective tackling of VE and VEOs also requires dealing with the wider problem of extremism. Note that those less enthusiastic about the Jordanian government's CVE efforts also complained that there are many unregistered mosques and imams, incidents of security service and police heavy-handedness, and excessive focus on theory rather than reality when it comes to discussing the problem.

Local society places CVE responsibility on parents.

Local society places a great share of responsibility on parents to ensure that their children do not embrace VE and/or join VEOs, although the extended family and peers are also there to help and intervene where necessary. Although respondents maintained that they would report family members to the authorities, it was also clear that significant barriers exist. For example, in tribal communities there is a propensity to deal with problems internally rather than always reaching out to authorities first. Likewise, there is a risk of suffering from shame that prevents some parents from reporting suspicions. More widely, there was fear that reporting a loved one could be a form of betrayal and that with enough personal intervention it would be possible to persuade the loved one to give up his/her membership. Likewise, there was fear of the authorities themselves – that these would be too tough on loved ones and/or that drawing attention to the loved one would place the whole family under suspicion.

2.0 INFLUENCE PATHWAY AND TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

2.1 INFLUENCE PATHWAY ANALYSIS

There is no accurate standard model for pathways to violent extremism.

Research showed that individuals in Jordan follow a variety of pathways into violent extremism (or extremist mindset) and/or violent extremist behavior (or VEO membership/terrorism), often but not always through a process of ideological radicalization. The pathways to VE and/or VE behavior are affected by various factors – personal beliefs and motivations, socio-economic, political and cultural contexts, opportunity, enabling conditions and precipitants, the impact of which differs among individuals. Accepting violence as a solution to grievances, joining a VEO and/or engaging in extremist violence are the outcomes of very personal sets of circumstances for which there are no standard models.

Involvement in VE emerges from the interaction of three “super-factors”.

Individuals do not embrace and/or take part in VE in a vacuum. Their backgrounds, past experiences and opportunities increase or reduce their propensity to do so, while their local environment and the actions of VEOs influence their immediate and subsequent behavior. As such, involvement in VE and/or VE behavior, emerge from the interaction of three ‘super-factors’ – 1) individual dynamics (motivations and vulnerabilities), 2) local contexts (circumstances and grievances) and 3) VEO characteristics (ideology and organization). Each of these three varies over time, is difficult to measure and is open to interpretation. For example, motivations and vulnerabilities can change as an individual matures from a child to an adolescent to an adult. Likewise, local circumstances and grievances can morph over time. As for VEO

characteristics, much like any other social grouping, VEOs adapt over time as a result of decisions and actions taken by their leaders and members.


Three clusters of motivations help identify VE/VE behavior trajectories.

There is great diversity within the profiles of Jordanians embracing violent ideology and deciding to join VEOs (outside Jordan) and engage in extremist violence. For example, demographic factors such as age, gender, religious background, family status, location, education attainment, etc., do not in themselves allow for the creation of clear profiles of individuals/audiences at risk of radicalization. However, worldviews and personal motivations examined against a given environment are a much more useful approach and facilitate the identification of three clusters of motivations: opportunistic (remuneration, boredom, or purposelessness), retributive (a desire to redress an injustice and/or take revenge, effect political change, or achieve personal redemption) and ideological (yearnings of salvation and/or a desire to restore the 'true nature' of Islam).

Four common characteristics impact on each major influence pathway.

While each individual pathway to VE and/or VE behavior is unique and subject to adjustments, influence pathways as a whole often share four common characteristics that come together to produce violent extremism and, potentially, VE behavior. These are: view/group polarization, ideological radicalization, association with like-minded or radical communities, and engagement with enabling structures. These four characteristics form a continuum rather than a chronological sequence. They are not necessarily consecutive; some may overlap and some may be skipped. For instance, not all who decide to go fight in Syria are radicalized and not all who are radicalized become members of VEOs.

Figure 1. Influence Pathway Analysis Framework



There are three primary Influence Pathways: the first is the 'Opportunist' Pathway.

The three super-factors, three clusters of motivations and four common characteristics combine to create three primary Influence Pathways to VE and/or VE behavior including VEO recruitment. The first Influence Pathway type centers on individuals who embrace VE and/or engage in VE behavior out of a sense of opportunism. He or she perceives a greater chance to maximize previously prioritized rewards and judges the benefits of these rewards to outweigh the risks. It is important to note that rewards come in many guises: financial gain in the face of ongoing underemployment and unemployment at home, the promise of sex or marriage (with women in this life or the next), power, status, heroism, and a sense of belonging and purpose. It is incorrect to assume that those on an Opportunist Pathway come only from a marginalized, lower socio-economic background – some are educated, wealthy, married and even have children. This variety pays testament to the way that different perceived rewards have different impacts.

There are three primary Influence Pathways: the second is the 'Avenger' Pathway.

The second primary Influence Pathway type involves individuals who are open to revolutionary ideals, people who believe that they have a duty and responsibility to protect Syrian civilians from Assad regime atrocities, correct the unfair treatment they have been exposed to and both punish the groups deemed responsible and avenge their victims. Many 'Avengers' embrace VE and join a VEO out of frustration and bitterness but also in search of political empowerment and to effect political change at home or in the region. Once more, these feelings can be directed at a variety of groups and phenomena. The most worrying cohort consists of those exasperated at the stagnant job market and weak Jordanian economy that they feel has failed to meet expectations after years of expenditure on schooling and time spent studying. Another sub-group feels deep antipathy toward Israel and the West, perceiving an international agenda to serve the interests of these nations to the detriment of Muslims around the globe (note the overlap with the third Influence Pathway type). Also note that Avengers often come from higher socio-economic levels and that sensitivity to conspiracy is not restricted to those with poorer education levels.

There are three primary Influence Pathways: the third is the 'Ideologue' Pathway.

The third primary Influence Pathway type features individuals swayed by ideals and an accompanying degree of 'self-actualization' that spurs them on to try and attain such ideals. The most obvious example consists of those who have a particularly deep religious conviction, such as the need for a caliphate, an urgent drive to correct today's 'rotten' and 'corrupt' version of Islam, rejection of Shia Islam, etc. However, the 'Ideologue' Influence Pathway is not just about religion. It is also a pathway that provides more ideological and socio-political certainty to individuals suffering from an identity crisis and with a deep need for belonging. It also offers an honorable exit from life for desperate individuals resigned to escape their daily lives as well as an avenue for individuals who seek to make amends for past misdeeds.

Figure 2. Influence Pathway Types - Summary

FACTOR	OPPORTUNIST PATHWAY	AVENGER PATHWAY	IDEOLOGUE PATHWAY
Individual Dynamics	Youth, mostly males, identity confusion, uncertainty about future, taste for action.	Youth/young adults, educated, politically aware/active, feelings of empathy/solidarity with Syrians/Palestinians.	Youth, males & females, personal isolation, Salafist socialization/traditional religious education.
Local Contexts	Lack of opportunity, socio-economic marginalization, political disenfranchisement, exposure to violence.	Social, cultural, political and economic disconnect and/or discrimination but socio-political integration as well.	Conservative communities, incarceration, exposure to insecurity, facing repression/tight government controls.
VEO Characteristics	Bottom up structure, projection of power & excitement, social media use, Salafist identity.	Portrayals of co-religionists' suffering, designation of culprits, uprooting status quo.	Salafist identity, denouncing a campaign against Islam, promise of heroic redemption.
Grievances	Neglect, not being paid attention, low self-esteem, lack of success, no hope for improvements.	Political disillusionment, moral outrage at events/inaction in Syria/Gaza, unfair group treatment.	Indiscriminate targeting, Islam under attack, corrupt regimes, deviation from Sharia.
Motivations	Recognition, status elevation, material support, financial gain, belonging.	Political change/reform, justice or vengeance, defense and protection of the perceived victims.	Belonging, personal redemption, true Islamic governance, purification of Islam, defense of Islam.
View Polarization	Heightened fatalistic views about own personal situation vs. mainstream society. VE seen as 'cool' youth counterculture and/or socio-economic revolution for the 'underdogs'.	Exacerbated feelings of guilt/compassion, and/or group socio-political disaffection. VE seen as a way to even out unjust conflict and/or bring about real change (a realization or the result of exasperation).	Asserted communal religious identity, enhanced perceptions that the West threatens religious identity. VE seen as a necessity to defend and protect Muslims, consolidate Islam.

Ideological Radicalization	Newly found rebellious identity and value system: jihad/ performance of religious duty linked to notions of virility, honor and prestige. Appetite for violence normalized and legitimized (fighting for a cause).	Sense of moral superiority, demonization of society outside the 'superior' group, justifying violence against them. Idealized politico-religious reality (Caliphate), perceived duty to rapidly overthrow governments deemed un-Islamic.	Islam vs. apostasy conflict and victory of Islam framed as inevitable. Return to a purified version of Islam cast as the answer to the vows of Muslims worldwide. Personal sacrifice seen as steppingstone to eternal salvation and redemption.
Association with Like-Minded/ Radical Groups	Discovery of online community linking isolated individuals with broader goals and identities. Preexisting friendships.	Discovery of, or preexisting, activist networks (e.g., Hirak, MB, Fatah, student groups, campuses, refugee camps), online community.	Preexisting kinship and friendship, peer-pressure, Islamic organizations and charities, religious fallback in prison, online community.
	Intra-group similarities and inter-group differences emphasized, strengthened extremist beliefs, increased cohesion/interdependency through mutual encouragement, distancing from mainstream/existing relationships, group identity superior to individual identity, groupthink and compliance with group standards of behavior, receptive audience for charismatic leaders and VEO recruiters.		
Encounter with Enabling Structures	Friendship networks offline and online. Online VEO recruiter.	Networks of like-minded activists, friendships, kinship. VEO recruiter in refugee camp, on campus.	Kinship and friendship ties, peer pressure. VEO recruiter in local mosques, charities, and prisons.
	Social media platforms and existing radical networks offer a favorable recruitment environment: access to VE propaganda deepening ideological commitment, access to money/advice on how to make the journey to Syria/Iraq, engage in VE behavior. Process becomes clandestine: shift to private communications with VEO recruiter, cutting communications with closed ones, deepened resolve to join a VEO, engage in acts of VE.		
Choice of VEO	ISIS, other fighting groups (by chance rather than by choice).	JN, ISIS, other Islamist VEOs, Free Syrian Army (FSA) (also strong support for Hamas, some support for Hezbollah).	ISIS, JN, potentially other Islamist VEOs.

Overall Salience	Medium and decreasing with growing visibility of ISIS brutality and associated disillusion about 'life in the Caliphate/on the frontlines', reversals on the battlefield.	High in the first years of the Syrian crisis, currently Medium though particularly reactive to catalyst events abroad. JN's recent rebranding and apparent focus on Syria is likely to reinvigorate its appeal.	High and on the rise with government crackdown on Salafist community and other Islamist groups (including the MB) inside Jordan.
Primary Target Audiences	Marginalized Jordanian Youth, Young Women, Syrian Refugees, University Students and Underemployed Graduates.	Marginalized West Bank Jordanians, Hardline MB Members and Supporters, University Students and Underemployed Graduates, Syrian Refugees.	Salafist Youth, Young Women, Young Inmates, Marginalized Jordanian Youth, Marginalized West Bank Jordanians, Hardline MB Members and Supporters, Syrian Refugees.

2.2 TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

TAA revealed eight, non-mutually exclusive Primary Target Audiences (PTAs) within the overall population that are of special relevance to identified VE/VEO-related threats:

Marginalized (East Jordanian) Youth	Young Women	Salafist Youth	University Students and Underemployed Graduates
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Young, disaffected and socially isolated men in search of financial and/or material support and positive identity. •Come from inner city, low-income families, in a community context of disempowerment, limited access to resources, and violence, crime, and substance abuse. •Drawn to radical Islam/VEOs for ideological certainty, new identity, and associated rewards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Female youth who are unmarried and/or without children, unwilling and willing VE participants. •Can get radicalized due to pressure to conform in family/local community. •Some embrace VE as a way toward self-empowerment. •Drawn to supporting jihadist 'brothers' by marrying jihadist fighters and the spread of 'true Islam' by having jihadist children. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Jordanian youth who self-identify as Salafist or who have been brought up in a Salafist community and/or exposed to the Salafist ideology. •Believe that jihad in Syria is currently justifiable and/or necessary. •Object to Jordan's political system and demand the implementation of sharia law. •Support the implementation of ISIS' Caliphate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •University students and recent grads facing a dearth of employment opportunities matching their qualification levels. •Vulnerable to VE for alternative livelihoods/ outlet for their grievances •Perception that established institutions are not working in their interest/discriminate against them. •VE/VEOs channel desire for political engagement.

Marginalized West Bank Jordanians	Hardline MB Members/ Supporters (Youth)	Petty Criminals/Young Inmates	Syrian Refugees
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Marginalized Jordanians of Palestinian origin subject to discrimination, lacking opportunities, often in refugee camps. •Frustrated with their second-class citizen status in Jordan and facing systemic economic, social, and political restrictions and discrimination. •Strong supporters of Hamas / armed resistance against Israel. •Well-represented among the MB and Salafists. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Youth hardline members and/or traditional Jordanian MB supporters. •Committed to serve Muslim community (e.g., via Da'wa, grassroots social work, Islamic governance, jihad). •Perceived/actual government crackdowns, failure to affect change via legal means, events in Gaza, solidarity with Palestinian/Syrian brothers are triggers. •Support Palestinian 'resistance' against Israel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Young offenders vulnerable to radicalization due to negative effects of imprisonment (sense of marginalization, victimhood, exposure to Salafist/VEO proselytism). •Embrace religion to compensate or atone for past crimes/offenses. •Join Salafist Jihadists/VEO for physical and/or psychological protection; to overcome perceived threats to self-identity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Syrian refugee youth living in camps and/or urban areas. •May return to Syria to fight out of conviction or financial necessity. •May be the targets of VEO recruitment efforts inside camps/impooverished areas. •Will likely become an increasingly disenfranchised and neglected community, with its associated potential for radicalization/militancy/destabilization.

Each PTA can be categorized in one of the three main Influence Pathway Types, or can pertain to several Influence Pathway Types at once or in time, as the core motivations to engage and/or participate in VE and their manifestations can differ in specific areas and at different points of an individual's journey based on the varying confluence of individual dynamics, local contexts, and VEO characteristics.

Figure 3. PTAs and Most Common Influence Pathways

PRIMARY TARGET AUDIENCES	OPPORTUNIST PATHWAY	AVENGER PATHWAY	IDEOLOGUE PATHWAY
Marginalized Jordanian Youth	✓	✓	✓
Young Women	✓		✓
Salafist Youth			✓
University Students & Underemployed Graduates	✓	✓	
Marginalized West Bank Jordanians		✓	✓

PRIMARY TARGET AUDIENCES	OPPORTUNIST PATHWAY	AVENGER PATHWAY	IDEOLOGUE PATHWAY
Hardline MB Members/Supporters		✓	✓
Syrian Refugees	✓	✓	✓
Petty Criminals/Young Inmates	✓		✓

SECTION II: TARGET LOCATION ANALYSIS – KEY DRIVERS IMPACTING PROPENSITY TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1.0 NORTH REGION KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Irbid

Hamas was the most popular VEO in Irbid based on the perceived legitimacy of its struggle against a Jewish ‘oppressor’. As for VEOs focused on Syria, support has declined sharply since the early period of the conflict, due to increasing awareness of VEO violence toward civilians and territorial ambitions. JN has remained the most popular due mainly for combatting the Syrian regime. Although ISIS appears a more ‘foreign’, and therefore unpopular VEO, the organization has historically generated support among local Salafist Jihadists, and Irbid’s accommodation of a relatively large number of “Zarqawists” – the wing of Salafist Jihadism with which ISIS is associated – is consistent with ISIS’ appeal among the local movement. Indeed, Irbid is renowned for accommodating large numbers of Salafist Jihadists, most evidently Hashmi Street and Hanina neighborhood, both in Irbid Qasabah. Irbid Camp has also been a former VE hotspot. ISIS’ gains among the Salafist Jihadist community can also be explained by its domination of media output – both internal and external. Thus, while the media has marginalized the activities of other VEOs such as JN and AQ, ISIS has acquired a reputation as the most formidable and well resourced VEO in the region.

Quantitative scores implied that the danger of VE and VEO is relatively limited in the governorate. However, unemployment, healthcare, housing, debt and drug abuse are problematic and compound complaints at the lack of effective civil courts, the presence of government corruption and its lack of respect for human rights and freedoms, and the unreliability of the police. Likewise, there was frustration at the perceived lack of meritocracy, and a sense of social marginalization. The Jordanian government was not the only focus of dissatisfaction. Respondents also strongly opposed Russia and Israel, with many supporting violent jihad against the latter. Such results highlight potential vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway. Respondents in Irbid also demonstrated high levels of religiosity and a lack of tolerance to other sects and religions, indicating susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. However, in comparison to other locations, scores were of lesser concern. Irbid has become infamous for its past relationship with such groups. However, it would be a mistake to confuse increased awareness and concern about VEO for increased future propensity to engage in VE and VEOs.

Key drivers included the notion of a justified violent jihad against Israeli Jews, the perception of victimized Muslim civilians at the hands of the Syrian regime, Sunni-Shia sectarian attitudes, the media’s role in cultivating extremist attitudes (e.g., respondents blamed Al Jazeera for strengthening the appeal of ISIS to young men by broadcasting the organization’s battleground victories), VEO incorporation of religious text within their ideologies, anti-government grievances, and open display of support for VEOs (e.g., martyr funerals and extremist preachers using mosques) and rising numbers of Islamic schools and Qur’anic memorization centers operated by extremist Syrian refugees.

Ajloun

Ajloun has produced relatively few VEO recruits. However, those who have, successfully or unsuccessfully, sought to join VEOs have disproportionately come from Anjara (Ajloun district), Kufranjah district, Sakhras district, and Ayn Janna (Ajloun district). Evidence includes mosque gatherings to pray for deceased and active ISIS recruits in Syria, and pro-extremist imams supporting 'jihadist groups' in general. Respondents also described a notable presence of Salafist Jihadists in Ajloun, again concentrated within Anjara and Kufranjah district. Likewise, there were claims of travelling bands of Salafist Jihadist preachers and attempts to convert Salafist Quietist elements of the Salah Al Din Mosque (Qal'aa Street) congregation. Support of Hamas, AQ and JN was based mainly on the concept of justified Islamic resistance against malign foreign entities. Respondents claimed that JN support is concentrated in the Kufranjah district. ISIS, although extremely unpopular, reportedly has its largest support based among Syrian refugees in Sakhras district - specifically Ibbin and Sakhras town. Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence, albeit an inconspicuous one, and is known to have held private gatherings in Ajloun.

Respondents in Ajloun expressed concern about employment, debt and the lack of activities for youth. They largely placed blame for these failures on authorities such as the Royal Court and the Jordanian government, accusing the latter of perceived corruption and not caring enough about the people. However, respondents were also negative about the perceived influence of a wide array of foreign governments on Jordan. Such findings imply that potential recruits could be vulnerable to the Avenger Influence Pathway, as further evidenced by the belief in the narrative that the West is humiliating Islam as well as a high degree of sympathy for the concept of violent jihad in Europe. These last two findings show how the Avenger Influence Pathway somewhat interlinks with the Ideologue Influence Pathway, as further exemplified by high levels of religiosity, support for Sharia, and belief in the segregation of Muslims from Non-Muslims. Respondents from Ajloun also showed the least tolerance for freedom to practice any religion, indicating the presence of strong levels of religious extremism.

One key driver toward radicalization was poor religious education, including Sunni-Shia sectarian attitudes (aggravated by rumors of Shia sleeper cells and Shia resurgence across the country; the rhetoric of prominent Sunni clerics, particularly Gulf sheikhs on television channels; and Shia militia atrocities against Sunni civilians in Iraq). Another key driver was the promise of financial incentives, especially for young males (unemployed university graduates as well as those poorly educated), particularly in areas with a strong Syrian and/or West Bank representation. A third key driver is the narrative of Syrian regime violence against Muslim civilians, which has facilitated the self-portrayal of VEOs such as ISIS and JN as 'resistance movements'. The same applies to Hamas and the Israeli regime, as well as AQ and its past counter-US operations.

Jarash

Actual involvement in VEOs was not an ongoing behavioral concern. Respondents knew few locals that had joined VEOs, particularly recent recruits, and most had chosen to fight in Syria rather than remain in Jordan. Furthermore, locals showed very little desire to provide demonstrable support to VEOs. However, as elsewhere, some continued to identify VEOs (particularly JN) as legitimate Islamist opposition to the Assad regime. Meanwhile, they perceived ISIS to have the largest supply of weapons and wealth and to have generated the most media coverage. Respondents saw AQ as more irrelevant because it has lost the battle for media coverage and does not offer the rewards and recognition that others can give.

Finally, many respondents refused to consider Hamas a VEO, instead describing it a national liberation organization or resistance movement. They argued that Hamas is more respectful and humane than other VEOs, and had never struck against Jordan or carried out any related activities in Syria, Lebanon or Egypt.

Respondents from Jarash demonstrated few quantitative scores of concern and not one was the worst of its kind across the governorates. Nevertheless there were pockets of concern – such as particularly bad conditions found in refugee camps. In addition, the apparent religiosity of the local community is cause for concern, including high levels of support for the concept of a caliphate, justice through Islam, Takfirism, Sharia as the only source of law, and the inseparability of politics from religion. The governorate is a center for Salafist and MB activity, especially within and around refugee camps. This is not, in itself, a cause for worry. However, coexistence of religiosity with comparatively high levels of support for VEOs suggests vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

One key driver was relative economic wealth. For example, many camp dwellers in Jarash lack job opportunities and/or are forced into 'free businesses' - markets, vegetable shops, and mechanic shops. Likewise some rural areas also featured lower economic and employment levels, which make locals reportedly more susceptible to VEO recruitment out of a sense of opportunism and/or frustration at the lack of opportunities. A second, related key driver was a sense of victimization and marginalization. For example, many families in Gaza camp do not own a national identity number, which means that they do not have Jordanian citizenship, and so cannot be treated by, or educated in, government institutions. Gaza camp also reportedly has poor sewage and other infrastructure. A third key factor involved shortfalls in religious teaching, both at government schools and within religious centers. For some, this applied to Salafists and even the MB, although the role of the latter was more fiercely debated. Other factors included drug crime, the gap between skills and opportunities (more urban/educated recruits can be motivated by unfulfilled expectations and lack of opportunities) and even a perceived susceptibility for Jordanians to become emotional quickly.

Mafraq

Levels of support for VEOs in Mafraq were low. As elsewhere, many opposed ISIS for its perceived brutality toward civilians (especially women), which most residents considered to be un-Islamic. JN was more popular than ISIS, largely due to perceptions that the organization has a focused objective in tackling the Assad regime, but most still viewed JN as unacceptably violent. As for AQ, respondents regarded this group as less savage than both JN and ISIS. Its relative lack of media attention may also have played into its favor seeing as many locals were generally unaware of its recent activities. Despite low VEO support levels, in 2015 alone there were a reported 26 VEO sleeper cells uncovered in Za'atari Camp, and King Abdullah II has voiced concerns that VEO operatives are entering the country via Ruqban Camp and Hadalat Camp, both in Rwaished district. There have also been numerous Syrian preachers condoning or promoting VEOs in mosques and several "martyr's weddings" in Mafraq City. Such evidence implies that even if the majority rejects VEOs, the small minority is a powerful and capable one.

Quantitative scores for Mafraq were deeply worrying - all Influence Pathway types are of potential concern and there is a significant propensity for future VE attitude and behavior. Dissatisfaction over employment opportunities, running water and electricity, education and healthcare was the strongest across all locations, with additional strong dissatisfaction at the lack of affordable housing, high levels of debt, drug abuse, ethnic inequality, crime and the availability of weapons. Respondents also registered

the highest concern about bored youths and tribal inequality across all governorates. This deep social malaise triggered equally negative feelings about the authorities. Respondents believe most that the Royal Court does not care about the needs of the people, that the Jordanian government does what the West says, and that the Jordanian government does not want to, and lacks the power to, control VEOs. Respondents from Mafraq were most likely to believe that the Jordanian government does not listen to them, and expressed low confidence in voting, or in working hard, as ways to bring improvement. There is even alienation at the local levels with respondents from Mafraq most likely to report not feeling part of the community. These findings all point to a strong potential susceptibility to the Avenger Influence Pathway, confirmed by highest levels of belief that it is better to die in revenge than living in shame. VEOs could also exploit the Avenger Influence Pathway due to strong opposition to foreign 'interference'. This was domestic - respondents believed most that conflict between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is a problem. It was also international. For example, respondents believed most that Muslims and non-Muslims should avoid interaction, that religion and politics should not be kept separate, that the West is humiliating Islam, and that violent jihad in Syria and Europe, as well as against Shias, is justifiable. Belief that a caliphate would help restore Islam, that Sharia should be the only source of law, that Takfirism is justifiable, and that only Islam can guarantee justice point to a strong connection between the Avenger Influence Pathway and the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

Key drivers include the perception of government socio-economic neglect (especially in areas accommodating large numbers of unemployed young men such as Khaldiyyah district and Irhab district), loss of employment and/or the experience of a decline in purchasing power, a sense of injustice (at the Jordanian government and the Assad regime), a propensity to become emotional, access to VEO output on social media and other Internet platforms, and the prevalence of religious extremism.

2.0 CENTRAL REGION KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Balqa

Most denied popular support for VE and VEOs, with the only exception being Hamas (especially in the Baqa'a refugee camp) although others said Fatah was becoming more popular. Though AQ had historically counted on some support in Balqa, current levels were low and respondents claimed that many former supporters have shifted focus to other more active and publicized VEOs, such as JN and ISIS. These groups, though unpopular, have gained media attention (ISIS) and a better reputation for targeting the Assad regime (JN). More worryingly than VEO membership, several respondents warned that VE is on the rise in certain areas of the governorate (e.g., Fuhais, Mahes, Ain Al Basha, Baqa'a, and Salt Qasabah). In Salt alone, respondents named six communities, Aleayzaria, Qsam, Aalbaqie, Mansheyeh, Al Jada'a, and Al Ezareyye, as especially vulnerable to VE.

Quantitative scores were deeply worrying. Dissatisfaction with education, employment opportunities, healthcare and housing was evident. Likewise, tribal inequality, ethnic inequality, drug abuse, debt and the availability of weapons were all highlighted as problems. As elsewhere, social concern correlated with negativity toward the government. For example, agreement was strongest in Balqa that the government does not care about the needs of the people, that the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) lack the ability to keep locals safe and do not behave in a respectful way, that the civil courts are not effective, that the Jordanian government uses anti-terror laws as an excuse to control others, interferes too much in

controlling political parties and the media, and does not respect human rights and freedoms. Equally worrying was the propensity to place blame on international actors for their involvement in Syria and Jordan, all indicating vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway. Strong agreement that members of VEOs always look after each other, are skilled fighters, and that violent jihad is an easy way to earn money imply a vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway. Meanwhile, agreement that the Caliphate will help restore Islam and that the practice of Takfir is justifiable, coupled with disagreement that people should be free to practice whatever religion they choose, all point to vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

One key driver was high unemployment and cost of living. Prices for everyday commodities like food, gasoline, and water have gone up in recent years and despite government efforts locals reasoned that young people unable to find work may turn to violent crime or join VEOs. A second key driver was the presence of Syrian refugees in Balqa, placing a great strain on socio-economic resources. A third was perceived government corruption (e.g., privatization deals for the expansion of the potash, phosphate, cement, water, transportation, and banking industries). A fourth driver was concern with the national curriculum and a fifth was religious teaching (e.g., Salafist Jihadist religious leaders in Al Salalem and Salt are reported to patrol the streets late into the evening, encouraging youth to attend prayer times and threatening them with divine punishment).

Amman

The vast majority of respondents did not consider radicalization a significant issue. However certain areas, such as economically deprived neighborhoods (e.g., Wehdat, Hay Nazzal and Marka) were judged centers of radicalism and linked to Salafism. A few respondents also accused the MB of radicalizing youths and increasing the risk of involvement with VEOs through studying at one of many MB-run Qur'an centers in Amman. Radicalization was also believed to take place at mosques and universities in the governorate, as well as state-run schools, whose curriculum was condemned by some for containing material that encourages radical views. Though the majority remained critical of JN it was nonetheless regarded as a legitimate representative of Syrians oppressed by the Assad regime. Few considered AQ a significant or powerful organization, and support levels for ISIS were very low. Even a year after Al Kasasbeh's death graffiti and posters glorifying his memory exist in neighborhoods such as Downtown and Weibdeh. Support for Hamas was extremely pronounced - a reflection of the city's West Bank heritage, sympathy for Palestinians and hostility to Israel.

Quantitative scores were concerning. There was strong dissatisfaction over employment, healthcare, affordable housing, crime, drug abuse and boredom. This generated skepticism over the Jordanian government's commitment to caring for people, involvement in corruption, and use of anti-terror laws and control over political parties, the media and the people. Respondents also questioned the ability and respect shown by security apparatuses such as the police and the JAF, believed that the Jordanian government does not listen to them, that there is no point to voting as it does not change anything, and that working hard does not pay. People displayed the strongest belief that they did not feel part of their community. Attitudes to the outside were likewise negative – opposition to Israel and Syria were the highest across all locations, as was the belief that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable. These findings suggest vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway. Concern that the West is humiliating Islam, that Muslims should avoid interacting with non-Muslims, and that religion and politics should not be kept separate, also indicate susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

One key driver is the role of the media - respondents agreed the most compared to other governorates that the Internet and social media is fueling VE in Jordan. Another is unemployment and/or financial hardship. Note that most locals in poorer areas of Amman like Hay Nazzal are of West Bank origins, leading some to assume a link between VEO participation and West Bank ethnicity. This was reinforced by the impression that East Bank locals, particularly those from tribes like the Abu Zeid, support the government and Royal Court. A fourth factor was the curriculum and a fifth was exposure to the radical views of peers – both problems in universities. A sixth was unfulfilled expectations for new graduates and a seventh was the presence of Salafist Jihadists.

Zarqa

Despite its reputation as a jihadist hub and home governorate of former AQ in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the majority of respondents in Zarqa did not consider radicalization and VE to be serious issues, and even if Hamas was popular in the governorate (many locals are of West Bank heritage, especially areas such as Bierain), rival Palestinian political organization Fatah has gained popularity at its expense. Nevertheless, several locals from Zarqa have joined VEOs including ISIS and JN in Syria and Iraq, and the governorate is also home to the largest communities of Salafist Jihadists in the country, particularly in the Saifa neighborhood of Zarqa City and the town of Al Rusaifeh. Salafist Jihadists were strongly associated with VEO support and have been known to attend “martyr’s weddings” held to celebrate the deaths of locals killed fighting in Syria. There have also been a series of demonstrations and public gatherings in Zarqa City orchestrated by Salafist Jihadists that have either glorified VEOs, notably ISIS, or opposed the central government. Although the best known of these demonstrations was held as far back as 2011 it resulted in injuries to up to 80 members of the security forces and hundreds of arrests.

Quantitative scores were not very concerning. For example, social issues were not judged comparatively worse than in other locations, translating into an equivalent reduced level of criticism against the Jordanian government, although there was some concern over how the JAF relates to members of the public and the degree of government independence from the West. However, antipathy toward ‘external’ enemies (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Russia) was pronounced. Likewise there was agreement that Western and Iranian intervention in Syria is also fueling VE in Jordan. As a result of this sensitivity to foreign ‘agendas’ and influences, there is reason to suspect vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway, as further evidenced by strong agreement that violent jihad in Israel is justifiable, and agreement that the same is true of violent jihad in Europe. The support level for ISIS was concerning – even though it was still low, the historical presence of VE and VEO-related activity in the governorate, means there is still cause for concern.

One key driver was the high rate of unemployment for high school and university graduates, which in turn leads to other key drivers such as drug abuse, alcohol, and petty crime. A fifth driver was radicalization inside the prison system. A sixth was the ability of Salafists, both Quietists and Jihadists to play on the conservative atmosphere in Zarqa and persuade locals to become more radical and embrace an ideology that sees jihad as the duty of every Muslim. A seventh was strong sympathy for the suffering of Syrians and a sense of religious duty to help Sunni Syrians oppressed by the Alawite Assad regime. A final key driver was sectarian sentiment against Shia Muslims.

Madaba

Respondents maintained that all VEOs, even Hamas, were unpopular. Furthermore, although AQ was the most popular of the VEOs, they claimed that enthusiasm has diminished greatly. As for JN, some supported its decision to become independent as well as its continued focus against the Assad regime. But there was little evidence of successful recruitment in the governorate. Meanwhile, initial tolerance and even support for ISIS has given ground to opposition and antipathy in the wake of its brutality,

Despite local rejection of VEOs, there were a number of quantitative scores of concern. The worst scores were not related to economic or social issues, implying that vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway is not high. Rather, they related to high levels of support for AQ and for religious extremism, (e.g., Islam allows the killing of others, support for violent jihad in Syria and Europe, tolerance toward Takfirism, sympathy for combining religion with politics, sectarianism, intolerance toward other religions and disagreement over freedom of worship). These findings imply strong potential sensitivity toward the Ideologue Influence Pathway. There was also evidence of vulnerability toward the Avenger Influence Pathway, with antipathy expressed at the international community (especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey) and also at the Jordanian government and its security institutions (the Jordanian government does not want to control VE, the JAF can't keep locals safe, the JAF does not behave in a respectful way etc.). Even if locals do not actively support VEOs, the strong presence of extremism and violent extremism drivers means that there is potential for this to change in the future.

One key driver was underemployment/unemployment, particularly among the youth, with some respondents holding it as the sole cause of rising tensions. Note that it was not just the unemployment rate itself, but also the rate relative to other governorates. For example, many respondents complained that, unlike Amman, Madaba has never had a sophisticated economy. They cited several reasons, including the general lack of resources and the absence of domestic investment in local businesses that could employ more of the population. A second factor was the perception of government neglect and corruption, with discontent over government responses such as raising taxes and prices of key commodities like food and oil. A third factor was the increase in crime and perception that there is a link between antisocial activities and VEOs. A fourth was the proximity and impact of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, with some blaming these for government's perceived economic failures. Specifically, these conflicts have made commerce difficult and triggered price and tax hikes in a bid to solve issues related to the public debt.

3.0 SOUTH REGION KEY DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Karak

Respondents denied VE was a current problem, rejected VEOs and claimed support for government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) CVE efforts. Rejection of ISIS was almost unanimous, although there was concern that ISIS could infiltrate Jordanian borders with terrorist operatives or sleeper cells. Likely as a result of media focus on ISIS, locals did not have as much to say about other prominent VEOs, although most contended that AQ and JN do not enjoy any material support in Karak. Indeed, many felt that years of infighting, resulting in JN's break from AQ, was a sign that both groups are weaker. Hamas remained the most popular of the VEOs, particularly in districts closer to Israel and the West Bank such as Aghwar, Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Mazra. That said, respondents acknowledged there are a number of

communities in Karak where VE could become a problem. For example, Salafist Jihadists have recently given talks in several village mosques (e.g., Althaniah and Idr in Ayy Qasabah and Zahoum in Qasr) to collect money for terrorist operations in Syria. Moreover, there was concern about high unemployment and the generally poor economy. Finally, some areas in Karak (e.g., Ayy Qasabah, Mazar, and Qatraneh) have experienced increased crime rates and drug trafficking, precursors of VEO involvement in the minds of some.

There were few quantitative scores of concern relating to government provision of services and utilities. However, there was worry about crime, drug abuse, boredom and the availability of weapons. In other words, there was anxiety about security and the absence of opportunities, implying vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway. Respondents from Karak also demonstrated deep concern about the impact on Jordan and Syria from a wide range of countries including the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia and countries in Europe. This implies susceptibility to the Avenger Influence Pathway, and specifically narratives of how the international community is exploiting countries such as Jordan and Syria for its own benefit. This susceptibility was also evident in the high levels of tolerance to the concept of violent jihad in Europe. Furthermore, respondents also displayed potential vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway given the high levels of religious extremism such as belief in Sharia as the sole source of law, sectarianism, and the benefits of a caliphate. The existence of this wide range of potential triggers for recruitment means that Karak is more concerning than current levels of support for VEOs might imply.

Key drivers included: the weak financial situation in Karak, the perception of prevalent government corruption and nepotism, tribal inequality (e.g., richest tribes such as the Al Majali are able to secure more influence over local and national politics, leaving little room for the input of smaller, poorer tribes like the Btoush tribe, tribal violence and involvement in ISIS recruitment, a lack of opportunities for youth, strong opposition to Israel's occupation of Gaza and Palestine, and opposition to Western involvement in Syria and the Middle East.

Tafiela

Respondents claimed radicalization is not a significant issue in Tafiela but there have been protests against the central government, notably in Tafiela town (November 2012) over increases in fuel subsidies and in Hasa (February 2014) at the lack of available government employment. Although protests featured open criticism of the central government and the Royal Court, the largely East Bank tribal governorate has been traditionally loyal to the royal family and the government has tried not to alienate a core constituency. Religious extremism was not seen as a problem in the governorates – although Salafist Quietists are well regarded in Tafiela tribal groups have banned Salafist Jihadists entirely. Despite a relatively high level of support for JN, there were few examples of locals joining, leading to claims that support was more theoretical than practical. The same held true for AQ, Hamas and Hezbollah. As for ISIS, the vast majority of respondents opposed this group for its brutality. Finally, support levels for

Quantitative scores were not of great concern, although there were three areas to monitor. The first involves social challenges such as unemployment, debt, boredom, ethnic inequality and drug abuse, suggesting a degree of vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway. The second involves comparatively high support for VEOs including JN, AQ and Hezbollah. The third involves perceived inequalities and undesirable government (both domestic and international) imposition. Such findings suggest vulnerability to the Vengeance pathway. The additional presence of religious extremist markers,

such as support for Salafist Jihadists, Sharia as the only source of law, opposition toward freedom of worship and disagreement that religion and politics should be kept separate, also suggest susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway.

The most salient key driver was the high level of unemployment in the governorate and issue of poverty. Tafiela is largely made up of East Bank locals and has traditionally relied on the state sector to provide employment but there are limited jobs available and even those who can find government work are obliged to accept very low initial salaries, sometimes as little as 150 Jordanian dinars (JDs) per month. A second key driver was religious conservatism, leading many to share some theological concepts with VEOs, even if they oppose such groups in practice. As in other locations, research also uncovered barriers to radicalization. For example, respondents claimed that Tafiela has a near-total absence of Salafist Jihadists due to the impact of leading tribal groups like the Alshabatat and Alqatameen. The role of the family and tight-knit local communities also help quickly identify and eject suspicious outsiders. Another salient barrier was the fact that many locals are either working or have worked for the security forces or civil service.

Ma'an

In the first years of the Syrian conflict Ma'an was a potential hotbed of VE activity, but locals insisted that since then support for VEOs has waned. Ma'an also has a history of anti-government protests (1989, 1996, 1998 and 2002). The relationship between locals and the authorities has remained volatile with accusations of police heavy handedness and government neglect. Although ISIS support has reduced levels remain relatively significant. Furthermore, many former ISIS supporters have transferred their approval to JN, in part encouraged by local social networks within the Salafist Jihadist community. Even if locals do not support VEOs, an underlying propensity to sympathize with VEO and VE narratives, such as standing up to the government and the West, remains concerning.

Furthermore, quantitative scores were highly worrying. Boredom, debt, drug abuse, tribal inequality and ethnic inequality were all social concerns, accompanied by negative impressions of the authorities (e.g., that it is corrupt, doesn't care about people and that police are unreliable). It was noteworthy that the perception was not so much that the authorities are unable to resolve problems, but rather that they seek to control and oppress others. Subsequent strong agreement that there is no point in voting and that the people who work hardest are never rewarded provide strong foundations for vulnerability to an Avenger Influence Pathway. Adding to these foundations was strong antipathy over the international community's interference in Jordan and Syria. There was also evidence of susceptibility to the Ideologue Influence Pathway - Ma'an respondents felt strongest that only Islam can guarantee justice, and strongly agreed that a caliphate would help restore Islam and that Sharia should be the only source of law. Respondents in Ma'an gave the highest level of support for ISIS and Salafist Jihadism across all governorates, along with strong disagreement that Jordanian intervention against ISIS is justifiable.

One key driver is high unemployment due to low private and public investment. Indeed, unable to find adequate employment in the overcrowded public sector, many universities took to the streets in protest in 2016, demanding an end to government corruption and nepotism. A second driver was negative experience with police and security (e.g., between early 2013 and mid-2015, eight locals are estimated to have died during police raids or while in police custody. The media's portrayal of the Syrian conflict (stimulating a sense of outrage and desire to fight the Assad regime) was another key driver. A final key

factor is the influence of the Salafist community. Although government arrests of prominent Salafists and crackdowns have dramatically decreased the popularity of these recruiters, respondents worried that Ma'an could host more Salafist Jihadists than the Jordanian government suspects.

Aqaba

None of the principal VEOs attracted significant levels of support in Aqaba, but ISIS was by far the most unpopular. Intense hostility to ISIS was often linked to the VEO's brutal methods in Syria and Iraq, particularly the killing of captives and civilians, many of whom were Sunni Muslims. As in many places, the execution of Jordanian pilot Moath Al Kasasbeh was the most-cited reason for the group's unpopularity. Though it was widely described as a terrorist organization, JN was nonetheless better regarded than ISIS and more relevant and active than AQ. It attracted praise for militarily opposing the Assad regime's forces and protecting Sunni Syrian civilians, and in contrast to ISIS it was not believed to pose a direct threat to Jordan's national security as it limits its operations to Syrian territory. As in many locations, the majority of respondents was in favor of Hamas and praised the group for its military opposition to Israel.

Although the vast majority of respondents in Aqaba denied support for VEOs, they nevertheless displayed a number of deeply polarized and negative views on issues relating to violent extremism. This included concern about employment and debt and a perception that authorities are ineffective, as well as the highest belief across locations that the Jordanian government is corrupt. Respondents also perceived government repression and control over political parties, the press and even the people, and complained most that there was little point in voting or making efforts to work hard. Social problems such as tribal and ethnic inequality, crime, drug abuse and the availability of weapons all scored the highest out of all locations researched, suggesting vulnerability to the Avenger Influence Pathway and confirmed by the worst support levels for the US, European Union (EU), Russia and Western intervention in Jordan. Strong agreement that the West is humiliating Islam, combined with the highest levels of belief in Sharia as the only source of law, highlighted a natural religious conservatism within the area and was suggestive of vulnerability to the Ideologue Influence Pathway. Finally, respondents agreed the most that membership of a VEO was an easy way to make money, highlighting vulnerability to the Opportunist Influence Pathway.

The Internet and social media are considered the leading vehicle of radicalization among locals in Aqaba, and respondents repeatedly highlighted male youths between 16 and 30 years as the social group most vulnerable to VEO propaganda found online. This demographic was often described as bored and/or underemployed, particularly after graduation from high school or university. An inability to find work after graduation can lead to frustration, estrangement from friends and family, and drug and alcohol abuse, all of which were subsidiary factors believed to make youths more likely to see VEOs as an opportunity to escape from the tedium of daily life. Nevertheless, most cases of prior recruitment involved men between the ages of 25 and 35, all of whom were employed and at least one of whom was married with a young family. This demonstrates how local VEO participants also fight due to a sense of religious duty to help fellow Sunni Muslims in Syria, and not just due social and/or economic marginalization.

SECTION III: VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX

1.0 VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY FRAMEWORK

Summary

The quantitative Guided Questionnaire (GQ) was designed to facilitate the creation of a quantifiable assessment structure, referred to here as a Violent Extremism Vulnerability (VEV) Index. The function of this VEV Index is to facilitate the examination of the differences in vulnerability to VE among the Target Locations and provide a tool for comparison of pre and post Information Campaign datasets, in order to measure the extent to which a Campaign's objectives have been achieved, as indicated by VEV indicators. The Framework is based on the premise that the project objectives can be assessed and achieved through successfully monitoring and addressing the following domains and themes.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX FRAMEWORK		
DOMAIN	THEMES	DESCRIPTION
BASIC NEEDS	Financial Security; Essential Services.	Measures the degree to which respondents feel they have access to basic life sustaining/enhancing services.
GOVERNANCE	Central and Local Governance; Security Forces; Justice and Civil Liberties.	Measures the degree to which respondents have confidence in the system of central and local governance and governing institutions; Measures the degree to which respondents feel that human rights and civil liberties are protected and to which respondents are exposed to state repression.
SELF-VALUE	Locus of Control; Social Integration.	Measures the degree to which respondents feel that they are in control of their own social, political, and economic destiny; Measures how integrated respondents feel in their community.
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL VALUES	Religious Disposition and Attitudes; Social Equality.	Measures the extent to which respondents are religiously conservative and social integration between various groups is achieved in Jordan.
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT, AND VE	Exposure to Crime; Exposure to Conflict and Violence; Perceptions of VE.	Measures the degree to which respondents have been exposed to crime, conflict, and VE.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX FRAMEWORK

DOMAIN	THEMES	DESCRIPTION
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND VE	Regional Relations; Global Relations; Foreign Interventionism and VE.	Measures the extent to which respondents feel that foreign states have a positive or negative impact on Jordan. Measures the extent to which respondents feel that interference by the West, Iran, and Jordan in Syria is fuelling VE in Jordan; Measures the extent to which respondents feel that interference by the West and VEOs in Jordan is fueling VE in Jordan.
ISLAMIST GROUP AND VEO SUPPORT	Support for Islamist and non-Islamist Groups; Support for VEOs; VEO Threat.	Measures the level of support for key VEOs, political Islamist and non-violent Islamist groups (and the FSA), and the degree to which they are gaining in influence in Jordan; Measures the degree to which respondents perceive VEOs (ISIS) to pose a threat to their community, and the way in which Jordanian foreign fighters should be treated.
VEO NARRATIVES	External Influence; Islamic Principles, Violent Jihad; VEO Strength & Protection.	Measures the extent to which respondents support key VEO narratives.
COMMUNICATIONS AND VE	VEO Propaganda; Media and VE.	Measures the extent to which VE is exaggerated by the media and the degree to which VEO propaganda and the Internet are fueling VE in Jordan.

Calculating Indicator and VEV Scores

The VEV index uses color-coding to categorize the degree of vulnerability to VE, based on five score ranges. The cut-offs for VEV scale categories and color-coding scores are as follows:

- Scores between 0% and 20% indicate a 'critical' vulnerability to VE and are presented in RED;
- Scores between 21% and 40% indicate an 'important' vulnerability to VE and are presented in ORANGE;
- Scores between 41% and 60% indicate an 'average' vulnerability to VE and are presented in YELLOW;
- Scores between 61% and 80% indicate a 'moderate' vulnerability to VE and are presented in LIGHT GREEN;
- Scores between 81% and 100% indicate a 'low' vulnerability to VE and are presented in DARK GREEN.

VULNERABILITY:	CRITICAL	IMPORTANT	AVERAGE	MODERATE	LOW
SCORE:	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%

2.0 VIOLENT EXTREMISM VULNERABILITY INDEX: KEY FINDINGS

VEV: Cross-Location and Cross-Region Comparisons

Vulnerability to VE is average across all Target Locations and regions.

VEV was found to be 'average' across the 12 Target Locations and three regions. This means that in each Target Location (and in each region), the overarching, cumulative VEV measure presented as a composite of the total number of quantitative indicators used in the VEV Framework, ranged from 41% to 60%

Figure 4. Target Location VEV Measures

GENERAL VEV SCORES: 12 TLs





Figure 5. Region VEV Measures

GENERAL VEV SCORES: 3 REGIONS



Zarqa has the highest vulnerability to VE while Madaba has the lowest.

VEV ranking across Target Locations was achieved using a High-Low scale applied to the 'average' VEV scale category. High-Low scale categories and Target Location ranking are as follows:

- Very High Average VEV (lowest VEV score percentile: 41-44%): Zarqa;
- High Average VEV (low VEV score percentile: 45-48%): Mafraq, Balqa, Ma'an, Ajloun;
- Medium Average VEV (median VEV score percentile: 49-52%): Aqaba, Karak, Tafiela, Amman;
- Low Average VEV (high VEV score percentile: 53-56%): Irbid, Jarash;
- Very Low Average VEV (highest baseline score percentile: 57-60%): Madaba.

Figure 6. VEV Ranking across Target Locations organized by Region.





Figure 7. VEV Ranking across Target Locations from higher to lower vulnerability to VE.



Target Location VEV Scoring across Domains and Themes

Please refer to main report for a full breakdown and analysis of each Domain and Theme.

Figure 8. Target Location VEV across Themes

DOMAINS	THEMES	HIGHEST VEV	LOWEST VEV
BASIC NEEDS	Financial Security	Balqa (CRITICAL)	Madaba (AVERAGE)
	Essential Services	Ma'raq (IMPORTANT)	Aqaba (LOW)
GOVERNANCE	Central & Local Governance	Ma'raq (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
	Security Forces	Balqa (MODERATE)	Aqaba (LOW)
	Justice & Civil Liberties	Balqa (IMPORTANT)	Aqaba (MODERATE)
SELF-VALUE	Locus of Control	Ma'raq (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Social Integration	Ma'an (AVERAGE)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
RELIGIOUS & SOCIAL VALUES	Religious Disposition & Attitudes	Zarqa (AVERAGE)	Aqaba (MODERATE)
	Social Equality	Ma'an (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
EXPOSURE TO CRIME, CONFLICT & VE	Exposure to Crime	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Madaba (MODERATE)
	Exposure to Conflict & Violence	Zarqa (MODERATE)	Aqaba (LOW)
FOREIGN RELATIONS & VE	Regional Relations	Amman (IMPORTANT)	Tafiela (AVERAGE)
	Global Relations	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Foreign Interventionism & VE	Aqaba (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
ISLAMIST GROUP & VEO SUPPORT	Support for Islamist & non-Islamist Groups	Irbid (IMPORTANT)	Balqa (IMPORTANT)
	Support for VEOs	Ma'an (AVERAGE)	Ma'raq (MODERATE)
	VEO threat	Jarash (AVERAGE)	Ma'raq (LOW)
VEO NARRATIVES	External Influence	Zarqa (CRITICAL)	Jarash (AVERAGE)
	Islamic Principles	Ma'an (CRITICAL)	Madaba (AVERAGE)
	Violent Jihad	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (MODERATE)
	VEO Strength & Protection	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Irbid (MODERATE)
COMMUNICATIONS & VE	VEO Propaganda	Aqaba (CRITICAL)	Irbid (AVERAGE)
	Media & VE	Zarqa (IMPORTANT)	Ma'raq, Balqa (AVERAGE)

Figure 9. Region VEV Scores across Themes




Figure 10. North Region: Target Location VEV Scores across Domains




Figure 11. Central Region: Target Location VEV Scores across Domains




Figure 12. South Region: Target Location VEV Scores across Domains

SOUTH REGION: DOMAIN VEV SCORES BY TARGET LOCATION





Figure 13. Region VEV Scores across Domains

GENERAL VEV SCORES: 3 REGIONS



SECTION IV: PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

1.0 INTRODUCTION


Target Location and Audience Analysis enabled a better identification and understanding of the factors influencing propensity toward VE and/or VE behavior in Jordan (referred to as drivers), notably via establishing the most vulnerable audiences and most common Influence Pathways to VE and VE behavior. Project Recommendations, meanwhile, put forward activities designed to address those drivers and pathways in order to reduce propensity toward to VE and/or VE behavior and generally enhance the effectiveness of CVE interventions in Jordan.

As per the Influence Pathway Analysis Framework,³ Project Recommendations describe interventions designed to:

1. Reduce or remove the drivers that can lead vulnerable audiences (PTAs) to polarize and/or radicalize and/or to associate with like-minded, radical individuals and groups, and thereby to prevent the potential transition to VE in the first place;
2. Reduce or remove the drivers that can lead vulnerable audiences to engage in VE behavior (i.e., violent action and VEO membership) after they have been radicalized, and potentially instigate a process of de-radicalization.

Note, however, that Project Recommendations do not include interventions designed to withdraw recruits from VEOs (disengagement) and/or reintegrate returned fighters into Jordanian society, as both objectives were beyond the original scope of this project.

CVE INTERVENTION RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK



³ See Section I. Influence Pathway and Target Audience Analysis for a detailed description.

2.0 PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK

Project Recommendations highlight the need for proactive interventions that mitigate and/or counter the threats of VE and/or VE behavior (including VEO recruitment) in Jordan. The activities put forward therefore propose an integrated approach that addresses the motivators and grievances that make VE appealing, presents alternative narratives to those advanced in VEO propaganda, and hinders the practicalities of VEO recruitment/enlistment. This translates into three Operational Objectives: Foster Resilience to VE, Delegitimize VE/VEOs, and Expand CVE Community Engagement. These objectives are both interdependent and complementary, so successes in each objective are therefore mutually reinforcing (and failures are mutually damaging) with regards to the Overarching Project Objective (see table below).

PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK			
Overarching Project Objective	Reduce Propensity Towards VE/VEO Recruitment in Jordan (Prevention)		
Recommendations Strategic Objective	Minimize Drivers of, and Enhance Barriers to, VE/VEO Membership among PTAs		
Operational Objectives	1. Foster Resilience to VE	2. Delegitimize VE/VEOs	3. Expand CVE Community Engagement
1. Foster Resilience to VE	<p>The first Operational Objective is best achieved through the implementation of activities that address the original issues and drivers that can lead to radicalization and/or the adoption of violent ideology. Given the unique circumstances that direct the trajectory of each Influence Pathway toward VE and/or VE behavior, it is important for CVE interventions to be ‘customized’ as much as possible, i.e., by supporting those individuals, or in this case PTAs, with highest risk of radicalization.</p> <p>Activities are often focused on turning VE drivers into factors of resilience for PTAs, especially fostering a robust and secure educational and living environment that is supportive of ‘positive’ values and activities (including hobbies) and that encourages the development of trusting relationships with authority. This is because analysis revealed that isolation from supportive relationships is a critical step in the process of adopting a violent ideology. Activities should therefore encourage, form and cultivate strong relationships with a variety of community members who can represent effective potential checks against polarization/radicalization. This includes providing youth and families with the skills to recognize signs of polarization/radicalization early on, approach individuals in the process of embracing a violent ideology, and intervene effectively.</p> <p>Note that these activities are inseparable from others seeking to expand CVE community engagement (third Operational Objective) and that, for example, look to foster an environment where citizens can voice concerns about VE, and where friends and family can intervene without fear of retribution for themselves or the individuals concerned.</p>		

PROJECT RECOMMENDATION FRAMEWORK

2. Delegitimize VE/VEOs	<p>The second Operational Objective is best achieved via the implementation of activities designed to counter VEO messaging, notably by exposing VEOs' 'true nature' and promoting alternative narratives. This includes expanding media content, (social media as well as formal media) and fostering alternative or positive narratives to individuals susceptible to radicalization and/or VEO recruitment. While activities promoting alternative narratives and instilling 'positive' social values are particularly important for interventions designed to prevent polarization/radicalization, messaging aimed at disengaging members of PTA from VE and curbing their sympathy/support for VEOs, or desire to enlist, must also exist. This can be done by promoting negative views about specific VEOs but also by enhancing media access and freedom where appropriate.</p> <p>This approach is based on analysis that revealed a need for tailored counter-VEO messaging and narratives, especially targeting younger audiences and women so that these promote alternatives to recruitment and resist VEO propaganda. Activities put forward to achieve this Operational Objective also recognize the importance of CVE community engagement as a process to help inform content for messaging aimed at delegitimizing VE/VEOs (see third Operational Objective). Furthermore, it also entails creating awareness about VEO propaganda, and enhancing critical thinking, especially among youth, in order to develop resilience toward this type of content (first Operational Objective).</p>
3. Expand CVE Community Engagement	<p>The third Operational Objective is best achieved via the implementation of activities designed to strengthen the role and capacity of communities to counter and prevent polarization/radicalization, and to mitigate the risks associated with VEO recruitment. These activities look to involve and empower local actors (notably community and religious leaders, women and youth themselves, etc.) to affect change in their communities as well as to resolve community-level grievances that VEOs might exploit. Some of these activities also aim to encourage community members to share their experiences and stories to provide credible alternatives to voices found within VE/VEO narratives, as well as to form and maintain trusting relationships with authorities (local governments/municipalities, police, etc.).</p>
Target Locations	Irbid, Ajloun, Jarash, Mafrq, Balqa, Amman, Zarqa, Madaba, Karak, Tafiela, Ma'an, and Aqaba.
IP Types	Opportunist (IP 1), Avenger (IP 2) and Ideologue (IP 3)
PTAs	Marginalized (East Bank Jordanian) Youth; Young Women; Salafist Youth; University Students and Underemployed Graduates; Marginalized West Bank Jordanians; Hardline MB Members and Supporters; Syrian Refugees; Petty Criminals/Young Inmates.

3.0 CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES

CAMPAIGN PLANNING GUIDELINES	
THEME	EXPLANATION / JUSTIFICATION – GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Focus Narrowly on ‘at risk’ Audiences	CVE Interventions should focus as much as possible on narrowly defined subsets of the population, i.e., PTAs, as increased benefits can be gained from more precise targeting.
Address Individual Motivators	CVE Interventions should focus on individual motivations and vulnerabilities to address drivers increasing propensity toward VE and VE behavior.
Contextualize Geographically	CVE Interventions should be tailored specific locations and utilize locally specific references to increase message resonance among selected vulnerable audiences.
Emphasize the Grassroots	CVE Interventions should emphasize grassroots efforts and local partnerships wherever possible.
Involve the Community	CVE Interventions should utilize content informed by community members and empower them to contribute to, and lead CVE efforts. Local projects should be implemented by partnering with well-known and well-liked community leaders, including religious leaders, social workers, local businessmen, members of prominent local tribes, etc.
Avoid Stigmatization	CVE Interventions should appear to treat all Jordanians equally so as not to fuel radicalization and VE among stigmatized communities as well as among those who might need assistance but are not identified as radical.
Be Active Online	CVE Interventions should include, wherever possible, an online element, ideally one that can take advantage of widespread smartphone usage among Jordanian youths, where such activities should aim to counter, and present an alternative to, VEO messaging.
Avoid Generic Counter Narratives	CVE Interventions should tailor counter narrative to specific audiences and address their personal circumstances, motivations and values.
Feature the JAF	CVE Interventions should feature the JAF and highlight their efforts in countering the threat posed by VEOs to Jordan to keep the country safe.
Remember Kasasbeh	CVE Interventions should continue to feature Kasasbeh to sustain public anger and revulsion toward VEOs and highlight and VEOs continue to pose a direct threat to Jordan.
Play to National Pride	CVE Interventions should play to national pride wherever possible.

Highlight Security Threats	CVE Interventions should continue highlighting security threats.
Inform the Public of CVE Efforts	CVE Interventions should aim to regularly publicize the efforts of the central government in countering radicalization and VE within Jordan, in particular initiatives that are not related to the activities of the security and intelligence services.
Avoid Branding	CVE Interventions should avoid reference to foreign funding wherever possible.
Keep it Simple	CVE Interventions should aim to use similarly simple language in religious counter narratives that appeals to emotions rather than intellects.

4.0 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS - SUMMARY

4.1 FOSTER RESILIENCE AGAINST VE

KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'The Citizen Award'	
OBJECTIVE	Promote positive role models (either real life or fictitious heroes), particularly 'average' citizens who have made great achievements.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research demonstrated that one grievance among those tempted to support VEOs is that the central government is 'elitist' and neglects average citizens. Another related perception was that either the central government can/should handle the VEO problem and/or members of the public lack the qualities and abilities to make a significant difference - a feature described by social psychologists as an external locus of control. As such, efforts must be made to create and emphasize a new social contract between government and citizens where the latter feel that they have the tools, duty and desire to contribute to the nation's safety and security.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).
KEY ACTIVITY 2: 'If'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage citizens to consider the importance of remaining vigilant and of how small observations and actions can generate big results.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research demonstrated that Jordanians place great faith in the central government and its security services to combat the threat posed by VEOs. However, many also acknowledged that VE is a problem that the central government cannot tackle without public involvement. They provided two reasons – firstly the central government resources are finite and secondly the security services may be able to deal with the security aspect of the VEO phenomenon but they are unprepared to deal with the psychosocial aspects of social extremism. As such, there is a need for

	activities that maximize general public awareness and knowledge of the problem, and imbue a belief that even small actions taken by average citizens can have a large impact in securing the community and Jordanian society in general.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Young Women (PTA 2); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'First Defense'	
OBJECTIVE	Create a network of community counter-extremist leaders in specific locations.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Social science theory has shown, through the Bystander Effect, that it is easy for civilians to assume that those in charge will resolve problems and threats. It is only when specific roles are given to civilians that these 'self-actualize' and take on responsibility more quickly and emphatically. Within the Jordanian context, this is particularly true given a natural reluctance to get involved with VEOs at any level coupled with a strong tendency to assume that central government authorities know and deal with such domestic problems. In fact, several respondents referred to VE as a taboo topic that attracts too much attention precisely because it has not been tackled more overtly and directly. As such, although the central government should not generate alarm and fear within the community, there is value in optimizing civilian counter-extremism at the very grass-roots level.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6).
KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Idle Hands'	
OBJECTIVE	Combat youth idleness and facilitate community engagement by running a local design competition for a social facility (e.g., club, skills center, leisure complex).
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents claimed that one of the main indirect drivers of VEO recruitment is youth idleness and boredom. In addition to unemployment and underemployment, this stems predominantly from a paucity of recreational facilities including parks, sports facilities, amusement arcades etc. Respondents insisted that idle youth tend to have a heightened propensity toward negative influences, including drug abuse and excessive Internet activity, linking both with an increased likelihood that youth will encounter and engage with VEOs. Furthermore, a lack of youth leisure facilities can aggravate feelings of government neglect and thus generate anti-government hostility – a sentiment easily exploited by VEOs in their bid to win support.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'Anti-Drug Campaign'	
OBJECTIVE	Strengthen individual resilience to VE by tackling the spread of drugs and the ability of VEOs to operate under the cover of drug-related activity.

JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Many respondents described drug abuse as a significant problem within their communities, and claimed that links exist between narcotics and VE for two primary reasons. Firstly, many believed that those who abuse drugs are at a higher risk of becoming involved, willingly or unwillingly, with VEOs – for example out of a need for money to pay for their habit. Even those who doubted a direct link acknowledged that drug users have a higher propensity to become engaged in violence, which can act as a step along his/her Influence Pathway toward recruitment into a VEO. Secondly, VEOs have reportedly disguised their activities by operating under the guise of drug gangs and distributors. Although there was little detail provided, respondents felt that this was a particularly salient problem within refugee camps.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Syrian refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 6: 'Amman Message Part II'	
OBJECTIVE	Reinforce existing belief that the King should lead on VE and CVE, and generate discourse on religious reform to reject extremism.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents largely agreed that VEO groups have little support inside Jordan. However, many believed that there is a culture of extremism and provided examples from across a number of domains – such as a reluctance to consider changes in women's rights, a refusal to consider compromise with Israel, and a tendency to be influenced by polarizing religious discourse. Likewise, respondents provided a range of explanations for this phenomenon. For example, some believed that Jordanians are naturally emotional and react too dramatically. Others placed the blame on the education system or even central government reluctance to tackle religious reform. As such, they called on renewed efforts from the country's ultimate leader – the King – to address such failures.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6).
KEY ACTIVITY 7: 'Educational Reform'	
OBJECTIVE	Address concerns that the current school curriculum neither provides students with the teaching and skills that they need, nor does it actively seek to reject VE.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	In May 2015 Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour announced the government's strategic plan to counter extremism, which also involved promises to reform the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It was beyond the scope of the project to understand any central government efforts in this area. However, many respondents made it clear that they believed that the education system still requires reform. Indeed a June 2016 study by Thuqan Obaidat entitled 'The ISIS mentality in curriculums and syllabuses', heavily criticized the national curriculum for contributing to radicalization and increasing vulnerability to VEO messaging.

	An analysis of the approved texts in Jordanian schools in mid-2015 by the Associated Press also found that not only was there little mention of Christians in schoolbooks, despite their making up an estimated 2.8-6 percent of the population. There were also many examples of text that could be interpreted as extreme or encouraging extremist behavior, such as an eighth-grade Islamic Studies text that says "jihad is a must for every Muslim" and another for sixth-graders that states birth control contradicts Islam, stoning is the punishment for adultery, slavery is permissible and wives should not go outside the home without their husband's permission.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'Even better monitoring of imams'	
OBJECTIVE	Improve on existing central government efforts to catalogue and monitor imams and mosques in a bid to prevent extremist religious teaching.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	In 2014 the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced an initiative to counter extremism in the ministry, through improved monitoring of ministry-approved preachers, barring radical preachers from working, and encouraging the public to report preachers thought to hold radical religious views. A few respondents felt that the program has enjoyed some success. However, many remained concerned that there is much more to be done. In particular, they complained that some religious leaders with radical views have been approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and remain in positions of influence in their communities. Likewise, there are many mosques without central government-approved imams. Indeed, there are reportedly many mosques that have not been registered as official mosques.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2), Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Amplification'	
OBJECTIVE	Amplify and support existing counter-extremist efforts that could enjoy greater success through greater public awareness.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research revealed that, while confidence in the JAF, GID, and the ability of the central government to counter radicalization and VEOs in Jordan is strong, many members of the public are unsure of the effectiveness of the central government in countering extremism and VEOs through programs outside of the scope of the security and intelligence services. In fact, many were not aware of any programs at all, including journalists. Nevertheless, the existence of such activities implies that there is room for improvement in public communications efforts to raise awareness and knowledge.
SUSCEPTIBLE	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians

PTAs	(PTA 5); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
KEY ACTIVITY 10: 'Funeral Payments'	
OBJECTIVE	Address family wishes that recruits who die abroad should receive proper funerals, while simultaneously ensuring that the community does not glorify the death of the recruit.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research revealed mixed attitudes toward the idea of allowing families to carry out funerals for relatives who died abroad fighting as members of VEOs. On the one hand, some argued that it was repressive of the central government to prevent families from being able to grieve the loss of loved ones. On the other hand, there was concern that funerals would glorify the lives and deaths of foreign fighters and so contribute to increased levels of recruitment.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Marginalized Youth (PTA 1).
KEY ACTIVITY 11: 'Blue Collars'	
OBJECTIVE	Improve the perception of, and call for, blue-collar skills as a means of easing pressure on the oversubscribed white-collar market.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents claimed that perhaps the most important drivers influencing youth attitudes toward VE and VEO is the lack of employment opportunities. This problem manifests itself in two ways – the absence of jobs for the poorer and less employable part of the population, and the absence of employment for youth who have paid for, and studied at, schools and universities in the hope of getting higher-level jobs. This second issue highlights how resolving the VE problem in Jordan is not just about more education – to the contrary more schooling can lead to more frustration if the opportunities are not there for graduates.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4).
KEY ACTIVITY 12: 'Local Government Service'	
OBJECTIVE	Improve community perceptions of local government and encourage political engagement on a municipal level.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research indicated that many respondents had a low opinion of the quality, honesty and efficiency of local government, fuelling additional resentment against central administrations. For example 40 percent (Irbid, Jarash) to 70 percent (Mafrag) of GQ respondents countrywide agreed that the local government does not care about the needs of the people and 47 percent (Tafiela) to 73 percent (Aqaba) agreed that government officials are corrupt. If locals can be engaged in the process of local government it will not only provide an additional layer of oversight for elected municipal officials, but will also strengthen the links between ordinary citizens and

	the establishment, leading to improved confidence in the political system. By ensuring citizens feel they have a hand in local government decisions and that they are in a position to air their grievances to local officials, VEOs will be less able to exploit the situation with future anti-establishment messaging.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 13: 'MB Clarity'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage the Muslim Brotherhood to be clearer about its internal structure, leadership, and official position on issues such as VE and VEOs.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The Muslim Brotherhood's self-declared objective is to provide a moderate platform for Muslims who believe that Islam should play a decisive role in politics. However, respondents exhibited great variance in their view on whether or not the MB exacerbates or helps resolve problems linked to VE and VEOs. For example, those in support of the MB pointed out that it represents an alternative within the existing political framework, allowing individuals to share and express grievances without actually challenging the fabric of Jordanian society in the way that VEOs do. Meanwhile, those opposed to the MB felt that it was duplicitous, ambiguous and secretive, and that such qualities likely imply a relationship with, or at least tolerance of, VEOs.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).
KEY ACTIVITY 14: 'The Salafist Debate'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage a more open debate on the relationship of Salafism to both mainstream and extremist Islam, with a view to sensitizing the public of potential links.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA has revealed that Salafist Jihadists were considered the demographic most likely to support VEOs and to consider joining VEOs in Syria or Iraq, however Salafist Quietists were seen as more moderate in some governorates (notably Tafila) and were largely condemned as a stepping-stone to VEO participation as Quietists can go on to become Salafists. There is significant hostility between Quietists and Salafists in governorates where they both have a strong presence, particularly parts of Zarqa (Zarqa City and Rusaifeh), and this can be exploited to encourage the growth of Salafist Quietists at the expense of Salafist Jihadists. Quietists exhibit similar levels of religious observance and dedication, even viewing jihad as an important part of life for Muslims, but do not consider Syria and Iraq as acceptable locations for jihad and do not agree with VEOs. As such it may be possible to 'de-radicalize' Salafist Jihadists into Salafist Quietists by financially supporting Quietists on the basis that they aggressively proselytize Salafist Jihadists, with a focus on younger members of the Salafist Jihadist community. They would be given the tacit assistance of the police and GID, who would arrest/detain any Salafist Jihadists who

	became threatening or aggressive toward them
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 15: 'Horrible Histories'	
OBJECTIVE	Counter VE messaging and provide moderate alternatives to the youngest Jordanians through a popular television show that explores Islamic history.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Youth, and particularly children, are typically the most impressionable and malleable age group, making them a target for VEO support and recruitment. In particular, they demonstrate susceptibility to conspiracies and over-simplified and/or alternative interpretations of history and religion. This is particularly true of those who lack the education to generate strong enough critical thinking skills and/or the knowledge to refute VEO messages and narratives
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 16: 'Compare the Camp Market'	
OBJECTIVE	Strengthen socio-economic cohesion and familiarity within West Bank-populated peripheral, economically deprived camp communities by introducing localized platforms through which residents can exchange services and skills.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA identified densely populated communities located in refugee camp peripheries as especially susceptible to infiltration by VEO influences. It is here where poverty levels are exceptionally high, ethnicities are diverse, community cohesion is weak and governance is relatively absent. Each of these factors lends itself to the circulation of undetected pernicious influences, including the activities of VEO operatives scouting for potential recruits. For example, in Irbid, the outskirts of Irbid Camp emerged as one of the most at-risk locations in terms of VE and VEO recruitment. Indeed, members of the alleged ISIS cell targeted by the March 2016 Irbid raid are thought to have had strong links with Irbid Camp, and it is here where the prominent ISIS member, Omar Mahdi Al Zaydan, lived before joining the organization in one of its strongholds. In order to restrict the capacity for VEO affiliates to freely and successfully conduct their activities in these areas, it is necessary to strengthen community bonds, and to counter the prevalence of socio-economic marginalization that leaves disaffected youth receptive to the rewards of VEO membership.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).

4.2 DELEGITIMIZE VE/VEOS

KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'Ground Truth'	
OBJECTIVE	Amplify real stories of people affected by VE (with whom the audience can identify).
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents complained that much of the central government CVE debate and discussion tends to be conceptual and theoretical rather than an exploration of real cases. Although academics and the more educated elite have no problem with this, the grassroots reportedly has a harder time understanding and relating to the topic. Furthermore, respondents insisted that the use of authentic stories and people increases emotional appeal and identification.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	All PTAs.
KEY ACTIVITY 2: 'All I Got Was This T-Shirt'	
OBJECTIVE	Highlight the discrepancy between ISIS-reported rewards and benefits, and the reality of being a member of this organization.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Research revealed that though the majority of respondents across all governorates were hostile to ISIS and most considered it a terrorist organization, many nonetheless saw the VEO as resource-wealthy and militarily strong given past battlefield successes against the Iraqi and Syrian armies and rival armed groups in Syria. This has reportedly led some individuals to join ISIS because they see it as a strong and successful organization. The group's apparent wealth, reinforced in videos online showing fighters driving new vehicles and flaunting their military equipment, has also caused many to believe VEO membership offers a good way to earn money. Note that VEO rewards are not only wealth-oriented but also include access to women, divine redemption, paradise, status, power, etc. Nevertheless, the truth is that ISIS has lost significant amounts of its territory and leadership between the capture of Mosul in 2014 and late 2016. This has been widely covered on the national Jordanian and international media, but a national campaign to highlight the consequences of repeated defeats for the VEO would help further undermine it as a potentially attractive employer and/or patron.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Salafist Youth (PTA 3); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'Kharijites'	
OBJECTIVE	Draw from Islamic history and encourage Jordanians to interpret ISIS as the latest embodiment of an already recognized Islamic evil.
JUSTIFICATION	The vast majority of respondents across all governorates, even if they were

SUMMARY	conservative Muslims, disagreed that Islam and killing are compatible. Many particularly rejected claims by VEOs such as ISIS that it is permissible for Muslims to kill other Muslims, with one piece of proof being the depth of emotion in the aftermath of the murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh, and that still exists today. There is historical precedence for groups of Muslims acting in a dangerously un-Islamic way, enabling powerful comparisons to be drawn between these (known as Kharijites) and groups such as ISIS.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Salafist Youth (PTA 3); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Diseased "jihadi brides"'	
OBJECTIVE	Counter the sexual and marital appeal of VEO membership via a sexual health awareness campaign highlighting the prevalence of STDs among VEO fighters.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	For many disadvantaged young men, a driving factor of VEO membership is the desire for sexual encounters and/or access to cheap and guaranteed marriage. This desire has reportedly become increasingly urgent, as growing financial strains have inhibited the capacity of young men to afford marriage at home. Many respondents claimed that young men are postponing marriage as a coping mechanism for their economic woes, making them increasingly receptive to VEO recruitment campaigns that directly address and promise resolution for their unmet sexual and marital desires. ISIS for example, has gained a reputation in Mafrq, Irbid and Ajloun for its provision of wives and sex slaves to dissatisfied recruits. Indeed, it has gained this reputation by promoting its "jihadi brides" through social media – often alongside photographs of the girls in question.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'Half-time Proverbs'	
OBJECTIVE	To highlight VEO's opposition to the 'true' principles of Islam using common and well-known local and regional proverbs and sayings.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The vast majority of respondents described Islam as a religion that rejects violence and does not allow the killing of other people. Likewise, they described the Jordanian people as peace loving and opposed to VEOs. A campaign should therefore build upon these existing attitudes, using the power of readily accessible messaging and imagery found in local proverbs and religion, to deliver a more effective impact.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4).

KEY ACTIVITY 6: 'Children of Islam'	
OBJECTIVE	Undermine anti-Shia views and the corresponding sectarian appeal of VEOs, who claim to be fighting a "Shia expansion" in the region, by highlighting the link between Sunni and Shia Muslims and their mutual struggle against radicalism.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA revealed strong sectarian sentiment against Shias across governorates – for example roughly 40 percent or more of GQ respondents in Madaba, Mafraq, Irbid, Karak, Amman, Zarqa and Ma'an stating that the jihad against Shia Muslims specifically was justifiable. Many respondents identified Iran as a key player in what they perceived as an expansion of Shia control across the region at the expense of indigenous Sunnis in Syria and Iraq. The treatment of Sunni Syrians by the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, which was widely considered Shia, as well as perceived oppression of Sunni Iraqis by the Shia-run Iraqi government also contributed to sectarian views among respondents. However VEOs, especially ISIS, frequently depict themselves as a bulwark against Shia/Alawite expansionism and repression, and use this argument to attract new recruits.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4). Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7).
KEY ACTIVITY 7: ' Hamas is Bad for the Palestinian Cause and Bad for Jordan'	
OBJECTIVE	To deter West Bank Jordanians in particular from joining Hamas by suggesting that the group is both a hindrance to the Palestinian cause for statehood and a threat to the peace and prosperity of Arab countries.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Overall, support for Hamas was high in Jordan. This stems from locals' overwhelming support for the Palestinian cause for statehood, but is also informed by intense opposition to Israel and its involvement in the Middle East. That said, while East Bank Jordanians voiced support for Hamas, they are somewhat less likely to join the group than West Bank Jordanians and hardline supporters of the MB. Despite this, TAA revealed that, in some areas – most notably in Madaba – the 2006–2007 conflict between Hamas and Fatah over control of Gaza might have lowered overall support for Hamas.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4). Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'True resistance: the White Helmets'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage the celebration of the White Helmets organization based in Aleppo as an alternative "resistance" movement to VEOs by organizing a multidimensional campaign in support of the group.
JUSTIFICATION	One of the main narratives fueling support for VEOs is the idea that the Assad

SUMMARY	regime is exacting violent injustices on innocent Syrian civilians. VEOs – notably JN and ISIS - actively promote this narrative at the same time as portraying themselves – with some success – as the most capable and legitimate resistance movements. Even if Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan reject a VEO presence outside of Syria, many still hold the perception that VEOs are the only entities mounting a significant challenge against the Syrian regime. There is a strong need to provide an alternative group to support and/or through which to channel local resentment against President Assad.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Recasting and reclaiming Ibn Taymiyyah'	
OBJECTIVE	Promote reputable Islamic scholar-driven moderate interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah's works in a simple, accessible format that challenges the extreme interpretations advanced by VEOs.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The works of the 13-14th century Islamic scholar Sheikh Taqi Ibn Taymiyyah have long been popular across Jordan, where many have viewed him (and still do) as one of the foremost authorities on Islamic discourse. However, the acceptability of his works has more recently been thrown into question, as VEOs including AQ, and more infamously ISIS, have sought to justify their violent activities with reference to the scholar. For example, ISIS quoted Ibn Taymiyyah at the end of the 22-minute video detailing the murder of Moath Al Kasasbeh. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah is now commonly recognized as an advocate for violent jihad against other Muslims and Takfir (excommunication) of 'infidels'. Consequently, some countries such as Egypt and Tajikistan have banned his texts. Likewise, Jordan has begun discussing the possibility of comparable measures. ⁴ However, this may be counterproductive. First, banning the works of Ibn Taymiyyah on the grounds that VEOs have used them as justification for atrocities lends credence to such justifications: why ban the works unless considering such interpretations of them correct? Thus, this constitutes a victory for VEOs like ISIS – that is, it suggests that their interpretations have triumphed over more nuanced understandings of Ibn Taymiyyah's work. In other words, VEOs such as ISIS will have effectively been granted a supreme intellectual position, if not a discursive monopoly, over Ibn Taymiyyah's writings. Second, by banning Ibn Taymiyyah's texts, the Jordanian regime is likely to upset, if not alienate, some of the more religiously conservative – albeit peaceful – Jordanians (of which there are many across the country) who may have been more susceptible to VE in the first instance. Similarly, such an act of intellectual intolerance is likely to validate VEO propaganda that seeks to portray the current Jordanian regime as authoritarian and un-Islamic.

⁴ Medina Minds 2016. 'Is banning Salafi literature the answer?', Medina Minds, July 22, 2016.

SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
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4.3 EXPAND CVE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

KEY ACTIVITY 1: 'Mother Knows Best'	
OBJECTIVE	Equip mothers with the capacity and confidence to detect signs of radicalization and/or suspicious behavior in their children.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The vast majority of those who have joined VEOs have done so without arousing suspicion from their relatives. Indeed, many respondents lamented the inability of families to detect and/or respond to the development of radical tendencies in their relatives. Yet most agree that families should play a central role in VE surveillance in the home. Crucial to this end is the role of the mother in observing her children's behavior. Many believed that mothers have a superior capacity for detecting changes in children. However, mothers are often insufficiently equipped to interpret their observations and act appropriately on their suspicions. For example, some parents to respond to their children's inappropriate behavior with violence or denial rather than constructive dialogue.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 2: 'Intermediaries'	
OBJECTIVE	Facilitate the reporting of 'at risk' individuals to the authorities without fear of repercussions, through the creation of apolitical and trusted intermediaries.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The government Android and Apple application initiative, 'Jordan Knights', is aimed at providing an accessible platform for the public to report their suspicions directly to the GID via voice messaging or snapshots. Furthermore, the majority of respondents expressed a willingness to cooperate with the GID against their own family members if necessary. However, there was good reason to suspect that, in reality, many locals are often too afraid that the central government might suspect them and/or abuse the potential recruit. Secondly, a few respondents admitted that people would feel too ashamed if others knew their son had joined a VEO. Thirdly, many respondents claimed no knowledge of platforms such as Jordanian Knights, insisting that they had no idea how to report suspicious behavior.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	All PTAs.
KEY ACTIVITY 3: 'Integrated Responses'	
OBJECTIVE	Share CVE best practice among law enforcement bodies.

JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Although respondents acknowledged the abilities of the security services and other law enforcement bodies, they nevertheless felt that more could be done in this regard. This was not only due to occasional perceived failings (such as heavy handedness against civilians and a lack of caring) but also the perception that the law enforcement bodies are under heavy strain and need assistance of any kind. In a small number of cases, there were even reports of recruits coming from the law enforcement bodies themselves. Improved sharing of best practice could help address this and maximize the efficiency and impact of CVE efforts.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	NA
KEY ACTIVITY 4: 'Progress through Investment'	
OBJECTIVE	Narrow the gap between over-education and underemployment.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents across Jordan repeatedly identified unemployment as a leading issue in their communities and as a driver of frustration among the key demographic of male youths between the ages of 16 and 30 years, who were widely seen as the group most at risk of radicalization. Furthermore, research revealed that the majority of GQ respondents in Ajloun, Aqaba, Irbid, Mafraq, Tafiela, Amman, Zarqa, Balqa and Ma'an were dissatisfied with access to employment. Employment prospects in many governorates were limited to specific sectors (such as the state sector including JAF/police, state-owned industry (Tafiela, Zarqa), tourism (Aqaba) etc.), which are often unable to absorb the number of jobseekers. In addition, it was not just the level of unemployment but also the disparity between an individual's skill/education level and the availability of employment, which reportedly causes most frustration toward the central government. Efforts must be made to reduce this gap so that recruits are gainfully employed, have a sense of self-worth and purpose, and feel that they have dignity.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
KEY ACTIVITY 5: 'One Tribe, One Family, One Jordan'	
OBJECTIVE	To build up pride and a desire to identify with Jordan first rather than consider alternative affiliations of any kind.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents indicated that one of the factors contributing to VEO recruitment is the ability of young people, and especially young men, to sympathize with, and support, alternative affiliations to the detriment of national cohesion and unity. In particular, there is need to encourage members of this target audience to feel a sense of belonging and duty to their Jordanian identity, before any religious, tribal, and/or other type of identity (including toward Palestine). This is because

	potential recruits without a sense of loyalty toward Jordan are reportedly more easily attracted into VEO ranks. Note that it is not suggested that competing identities be removed, just that they be de-prioritized.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Salafist Youth (PTA 3).
KEY ACTIVITY 6: 'Park Debates'	
OBJECTIVE	Strengthen community resilience to VE by inviting average members of the community to debate on a CVE-related topic of interest.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	The central government relies on a series of debating and discussion events to spread CVE awareness and knowledge. Many respondents felt that these were positive initiatives although there were some reservations. Firstly, such events tend to feature educated elites rather and may not permeate down adequately to the grassroots. Secondly, they tend to be theory-based rather than based on actual cases. This makes it harder to engage and to develop useful lessons learned.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); University Students and Underemployed Graduates (PTA 4); Young Women (PTA 2); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8).
KEY ACTIVITY 7: 'Youth engagement through the arts'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage creativity among youth in marginalized neighborhoods, not only as a means to lessening their boredom, but also as a strategy for increasing civic engagement across demographics.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents felt that neighborhoods can become vulnerable to VE through the lack of activities and gradual erosion of civic engagement. In this regard, one of their chief concerns was that, with youth unemployment on the rise, young people might opt to leave home in search of work, or even join VEOs in search of the sense of community they cannot find at home. Proven behavioral theory shows that when people become involved in the design, creation, and upkeep of places, they develop an interest in maintaining these spaces. Furthermore, their shared feelings of pride in and responsibility for their shared space can generate greater social cohesion. By encouraging local youth to get creative with the spaces they see every day, such as town squares, Jordanian communities would not only be occupying the time of bored, unemployed youth; they would be strengthening local resolve to care for their communities.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Syrian Refugees (PTA 8); Petty Criminals/Young Inmates (PTA 7); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 8: 'People Soldiers'	
OBJECTIVE	Encourage a closer relationship between the central government authorities and

	the civilian population, so that the latter increase their understanding of the roles and challenges that the former face.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	Respondents generally displayed great faith in the central government authorities and security services to cope with the VEO problem within Jordan. Indeed, some respondents felt that the public places too much faith in bodies such as the JAF and the GID. However, the relationship between citizens and the authorities is not always positive. For example, there have been several cases of individuals carrying out VE attacks specifically against the security services. Likewise, locals have repeatedly made use of social media sites to share evidence of human rights abuses by the police, in some cases leading to occasional protests by demonstrators against perceived police brutality, corruption and disrespect. VEOs are able to exploit such negativity and build it into a narrative of central government abuse and immorality. As such, efforts should be made to counter this narrative through improved outreach between authorities and local communities.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized Youth (PTA 1); Marginalized West Bank Jordanians (PTA 5); Hardline MB Members and Supporters (PTA 6); Young Women (PTA 2).
KEY ACTIVITY 9: 'Conference of Tribes'	
OBJECTIVE	To give tribal leaders incentives to cooperate with security forces, play more of a role in CVE efforts, and resolve inter-tribal conflicts.
JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY	TAA revealed that, although the influence of tribes has waned in recent decades, tribalism remains a key part of the social fabric in Jordan. Indeed, although the central government has assumed more control over the affairs of districts in which tribes were once the primary actors, tribal politics can still shape not only a person's individual worldview, but also the nature of Jordanian national unity. As a result, the success of CVE efforts in Jordan continues to depend partly on the participation of tribal bodies. The extent to which tribes support security forces with information and/or manpower is relatively unknown, as are specifics on which tribes are least and most receptive to VE ideologies. As such, efforts should be made to understand how tribal leaders could be more definitively co-opted into CVE efforts.
SUSCEPTIBLE PTAs	Marginalized (East Bank Jordanian) Youth (PTA 1); Young Women (PTA 2), Salafist Youth (PTA 3).