



PHOTO CREDIT: JACOB PATTERSON-STEIN

# LEARNING AGENDA QUESTIONS

## DATA ANALYSIS FROM THE JORDAN GENERAL POPULATION SURVEY

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This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Daniel Killian and Jacob Patterson-Stein for Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company.

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# LEARNING AGENDA QUESTIONS

## Data Analysis from the Jordan General Population Survey

Contracted under AID-278-C-13-00009

Jordan Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project

### **DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2017, USAID/Jordan commissioned a large-scale survey (the General Population Survey) to collect mission project and activity performance data.<sup>1</sup> The goal was to develop survey measures to cover six mission performance indicators from the following Development Objectives:

- DO 1: Broad-based, inclusive economic development accelerated
- DO 2: Democratic accountability strengthened
- DO 3: Social sector quality improved
- DO 4: Gender equality and female empowerment enhanced

As part of this research, survey data were to be used to:

- Examine Mission indicator data in the Jordanian population at-large;
- Examine Mission indicator data among a population of self-identified beneficiaries;
- Provide implementing partners with comparison group samples of non-beneficiaries;
- Cross-reference measures against a spatial and temporal mapping of mission inputs; and
- Explore a learning agenda to better understand the determinants of indicator performance.

This document outlines summary findings from the exploration of a learning agenda using General Population Survey data. Learning agenda questions and summary responses include:

*What are the factors that help determine unemployment or entrepreneurship? What are the greatest impediments to Jordanians starting new businesses?*

Unemployment is highest among men with no or low levels of education, while female unemployment tends to be higher among the more educated. There appears to be a ‘sweet spot’ of low unemployment for those with associate or vocational level education, suggesting a need for specific and targeted skills. However, this does not hold for those with university degrees, where unemployment is sharply higher.

While fewer than ten percent of respondents currently own their own business/revenue generation activity or have done so in the past, 38 percent of respondents have at least considered starting their business or revenue generation activity. The most common reasons cited for not pursuing such a course of action was lack of access to capital, unwilling or unable to bear the perceived risk involved, or confusion about how to navigate the administrative process behind starting a business.

*What is the level of citizen awareness and knowledge of Jordan’s decentralization agenda? At what level of governance does subsidiarity [decentralization] most effectively reside—local councils, municipal councils, or governorate councils?*

Both awareness and knowledge of government functions are respectably high at 60-64 percent. This figure is lower in Amman. Knowledge is increasing in measures of general welfare (age, education, income), but is less among women and Christians. Knowledge has little effect on governance measures of responsiveness, effectiveness, and confidence.

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<sup>1</sup> For information on the Survey’s methodology and summaries of findings across development sectors and themes, see the entries in the Jordan Knowledge Management Portal [here](#).

*What is the relationship between citizen engagement and citizen participation? Does stronger engagement and participation lead to improved government effectiveness and legitimacy?*

There is a modest effect on government responsiveness among respondents who are more active in municipal affairs, and this effect is strongest at the local level. There is little effect on measures of effectiveness or confidence.

*Are migrant population flows disrupting local governance institutions and economic livelihoods?*

Perceptions of the effect of migrant population flows have little or no effect on measures of perceptions of governance or livelihoods. There is a slight positive relation between migrant flows and perceptions of government responsiveness (suggesting an appreciative view of government efforts to address the problem), but perceptions of government effectiveness and confidence in government turn slightly negative with more negative views of migrant flows. There is no relation between negative perception of migrant flows and employment, but respondents with a more negative view of migrant flows report slightly lower incomes (six percent).

## **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Jordan has worked to help the Government of Jordan (GOJ) with its goals of broad political and economic reforms. In pursuit of these goals, USAID/Jordan developed the following development objectives (DO) to guide its programming:

- DO 1: Broad-based, inclusive economic development accelerated
- DO 2: Democratic accountability strengthened
- DO 3: Social sector quality improved
- DO 4: Gender equality and female empowerment enhanced

Each activity that USAID/Jordan manages to promote these DOs reports on relevant Mission indicators to show progress in implementation. Yet, there have been few efforts to broadly understand how USAID's activities have affected the Jordanian population across all of these DOs and the relevant indicators.

USAID/Jordan commissioned MSI to conduct a large-scale survey in order to collect mission project and activity performance data. The survey measures cover six mission performance indicators from Development Objectives 1, 2, and 4, while also measuring a selected number of activity performance indicators. Survey data were collected to measure mission indicator data in the Jordanian population at-large, measure mission indicator data among a population of self-identified beneficiaries, provide implementing partners with comparison group samples of non-beneficiaries, cross-reference measures against a spatial and temporal mapping of mission inputs, and explore a learning agenda to better understand the determinants of indicator performance.

## **LEARNING AGENDA**

The General Population Survey is also used to respond to a broader set of learning agenda questions. There are often questions arising out of the complex implementation environments facing USAID and its partners that may not bear directly on project or activity performance but would help the mission and

its partners better understand the environment it faces, adapt to fluid conditions on the ground, and design future activities more effectively. According to the Office of Management and Budget:

A learning agenda is a set of broad questions directly related to the work that an agency conducts that, when answered, enables the agency to work more effectively and efficiently, particularly pertaining to evaluation, evidence, and decision-making. Once the questions are identified, a learning agenda also prioritizes and establishes a plan to answer short- and long-term questions of the highest value across relevant program and policy areas.

The USAID Bureau of Program Planning and Learning (PPL) extends this definition to describe a learning agenda as 1) a set of questions, prioritized and often organized around thematic areas, 2) a set of learning activities such as research, evaluation, literature review, stocktaking sessions, etc., and 3) a set of learning products that review and synthesize the evidence. Learning products may be accompanied by targeted and pithy communications such as infographics to highlight specific findings.

The following table highlights illustrative Learning Agenda questions by sector. Each question is informed by USAID/Jordan Mission and activity indicators.

**TABLE 1: LEARNING AGENDA QUESTIONS BY SECTOR**


<b>Economic Development and Energy</b>
What are the factors that help determine unemployment or entrepreneurship? What are the greatest impediments to Jordanians starting new businesses?
<b>Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance</b>
What is the level of citizen awareness and knowledge of Jordan's decentralization agenda? At what level of governance does subsidiarity [decentralization] most effectively reside—local councils, municipal councils, or governorate councils? What is the locus of control for all three levels of government?
What is the relationship between citizen engagement and citizen participation? Does stronger engagement and participation lead to improved government effectiveness and legitimacy?
<b>Fragility / Resilience</b>
Are migrant population flows disrupting local governance institutions and economic livelihoods? How are local institutions, such as mosques, local meeting groups, CSOs, adapting and responding to the pressures of migrant population flows?

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY

### WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT HELP DETERMINE UNEMPLOYMENT OR ENTREPRENEURSHIP?


Age and gender appear to be the most significant determinants of unemployment. Unemployment in Jordan has been a consistent challenge, with an average unemployment rate of around 14 percent over the past ten years. Yet, the survey data suggest that around 30 percent of the population is employed full- or part-time, with those out of work describing a variety of reasons. As shown in the figure below, the weighted average of people working full-time is around 25 percent, with Mafrqa having the lowest rate of respondents fully employed at 19 percent and Ma'an having the highest at 31 percent.

FIGURE 1: WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS?




Unemployment is defined as respondents who are, “unemployed, but looking for work.” Under this definition, about eight percent (n = 958) of respondents are unemployed. Key factors that may affect unemployment include education level and gender. The following figure highlights which levels of education enjoy lowest unemployment.

**FIGURE 2: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATION LEVEL**



As shown in Figure 3, while patterns of unemployment vary across municipalities and levels of education, in general women have lower unemployment at lower and higher levels of education, but general parity at middle education levels.


**FIGURE 3: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY EDUCATION LEVEL AND MUNICIPALITY**



The data also suggest that for the approximately 4,284 women respondents who are homemakers, there is a large desire to enter the workforce. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, at a minimum, 1 in 5 women

would like to enter the workforce among those with no education, while nearly 90 percent of women with master's degree who reported being homemakers would like to enter the workforce.

**FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF HOMEMAKERS INTERESTED IN WORKING BY EDUCATION LEVEL**



Homemakers who reported that they would like to work were, on average, younger than those who said they were not interested in working. However, as shown in Figure 5, the age difference between homemakers who reported wanting to join the labor market and those that are uninterested varies by education level.


**FIGURE 5: HOMEMAKER AGE BY EDUCATION LEVEL AND WORK PREFERENCES**



Monthly household income does not appear to have a strong relationship with whether or not a homemaker reported a desire to enter the labor force. As shown in Figure 6, a little over a third of


homemakers in households earning 2501-3000 JOD a month reported interest in wanting to work, which is about the same rate as respondents living in the lowest household income bracket of less than 150 JOD a month.

**FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF HOMEMAKERS INTERESTED IN WORK BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME**



To understand how these factors—gender, education, location—determine unemployment, the MESP team developed a model to see what factors are most associated with unemployment. More formally, the MESP team ran a logistic regression with gender, nationality, education, household size, group membership, social media engagement, and job training control variables, and municipality fixed effects. The model results can be seen in Figure 7, with the municipality variable collapsed to make the figure easier to read. Annex I provides additional detail.

**FIGURE 7: MODEL ESTIMATES FOR UNEMPLOYMENT**



Unemployment is usually a function of several factors, including observable demographic measures. Based on the General Population Survey, the strongest determinates of unemployment in Jordan are age

and gender. As shown in the figure above, education, the number of household members, and municipality were not strongly associated with the odds of being unemployed. Yet, both descriptive and inferential analysis show that, on average, men are more likely to be unemployed than women. When controlling for key demographic features, on average, men are about 7 percent more likely than women to be unemployed. Age is also a significant factor in unemployment. MESP's analysis shows that each one-year increase in age has a negative relationship with the likelihood of unemployment. As people age, this relationship does appear to shift in a very minor way, with respondents over the age of 75 likely to see an increase in unemployment; however, the increased probability is not practically meaningful.


These data trends mirror general employment patterns globally. Younger people, particularly those just starting out in the workforce, globally tend to face higher rates of unemployment than those who are a bit older and have more experience. As people gain experience they may be more likely to hold on to secure new jobs. Those youths who are unable to find official employment after years of searching may become discouraged and leave the labor force all together. When they are discouraged and not seeking work, they are not included in traditional counts of the unemployed.

Geographical location was found to have a robust but low-magnitude relationship with entrepreneurship. We do not have data on the broader labor market context to specifically know if this is due to job opportunities in various localities, but strength of labor markets is likely *one* of the relevant location-specific factors that affect this relationship.

## WHAT ARE THE GREATEST IMPEDIMENTS TO JORDANIANS STARTING NEW BUSINESSES?

Education and gender appear to be most strongly related to entrepreneurship (Figure 8).


**FIGURE 8: ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATE BY GENDER AND EDUCATION**



Around 6 percent of respondents reported owning their own business or having a home-based income generating activity. The percentage of entrepreneurs varies by gender and education-level; however, as seen in Figure 9, men have a higher rate of business ownership at all levels of education, with no women with advanced degrees reporting business ownership.

For both men and women, across all education levels, the most frequently reported barrier to entrepreneurship was lack of capital, with an average of 75 percent of male respondents and 68 percent of female respondents reporting this constraint. Access to capital was most frequently mentioned among men without an education, with 96 percent of illiterate, uneducated respondents noting that this was a major barrier to running a business. For people with high education levels (that is, holding a bachelor's degree, higher diploma, or master's degree), the second most-cited reason for not owning a business (after the lack of capital) was the perception that entrepreneurship was too risky.

**FIGURE 9: CONSTRAINTS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP BY GENDER**




**TABLE 2: REASONS FOR NOT STARTING A BUSINESS**

	Freq.	Percent Cases	Percent Responses
<b>Content with current employment</b>	119	2.8%	3.5%
<b>Confused about the process/not sure how to start</b>	331	7.8%	9.7%
<b>No business idea</b>	119	2.8%	3.5%
<b>Not enough capital/financial resources</b>	2855	67.4%	83.6%

	Freq.	Percent Cases	Percent Responses
<b>Too risky given my personal responsibilities</b>	454	10.7%	13.3%
<b>Afraid of red tape, administrative difficulties</b>	174	4.1%	5.1%
<b>Afraid of legal and social consequences of failure</b>	180	4.3%	5.3%
<b>Total</b>	4233	100%	123.9%

To understand which factors contribute most to business ownership, the MESP team constructed a model based on the same general specification as the one used to explore unemployment. Figure 10 shows the model results, with each number suggesting the change in likelihood of entrepreneurship. The full model split out the variable of municipality to account for the effect of each individual location on entrepreneurship. One of the most significant determinants of whether someone has started their own business is education level, which was also noted in descriptive analysis as well. What Figure 10 suggests, however, is that even when controlling for other factors such as gender and age, people with master's degrees or higher are 16 percentage points less likely to be entrepreneurs. People with bachelor's degrees are about 9 percentage points less likely to be entrepreneurs, as well.

**FIGURE 10: COEFFICIENT PLOT FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP**




These results should not imply that education is an impediment to starting a business in Jordan. For both bachelor's degree and master's degree holders, access to capital was the most frequently cited issue, with risk aversion the second most cited impediment to starting a business. This may suggest that people with

advanced education have too much to lose and face barriers that are too high to entice them to start businesses.

As shown in Figure 11, Governorate location of the respondent also appears to have a strong relationship with the entrepreneurship rate. Amman, for example, has the lowest rate of business ownership in the country, yet has the highest rate of bachelor's degree holders and second highest rate of master's degree holders.


**FIGURE 11: ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES BY GOVERNORATE**



The team also investigated the relationship between perceptions of the respondent's current economic situation and whether respondents own or want to own a business. The team found a consistently negative relationship between entrepreneurship (whether reported or desired) and perceptions of the respondent's personal economic situation. Only two percent of respondents who own or would like to own their own business rated their current economic situation as "very comfortable." In contrast, 20 percent of the respondents who would like to own or do own a business rated their situation as low as possible, or "extremely poor."

The team attempted to understand how this relationship holds when accounting for other measures, such as age and education. There is a consistently negative relationship between owning or wanting to own a business and perceptions of one's current economic situation. This relationship is robust to specification and model; for example, the negative relationship exists whether controls (other possibly explanatory variables) are included or not.

**FIGURE 12: PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION BY PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO OWN OR WANT TO OWN A BUSINESS**




*Note: Percentages for the 9 ( "Very Comfortable") rating are very small. For respondents who own or want to own a business it is 0%, and for those who don't own or don't want to own a business, it is 1%.*

## DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE

### WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF CITIZEN AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF JORDAN'S DECENTRALIZATION AGENDA? AT WHAT LEVEL OF GOVERNANCE DOES SUBSIDIARITY [DECENTRALIZATION] MOST EFFECTIVELY RESIDE LOCAL COUNCILS, MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, OR GOVERNORATE COUNCILS? WHAT IS THE LOCUS OF CONTROL FOR ALL THREE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT?

Levels of citizen awareness and knowledge of Jordan's decentralization agenda are somewhat high among certain groups, but confusion around subsidiarity is also high. Around 64 percent of Jordanians are aware of the decentralization and municipalities laws. As shown in Figure 13, the distribution of this knowledge is not equal across the country, with only 55 percent of people in Amman expressing awareness of decentralization (the lowest rate), while citizen awareness in Tafileh governorate is around 88 percent (the highest rate).


**FIGURE 13: AVERAGE AWARENESS OF DECENTRALIZATION AND MUNICIPALITIES' LAWS BY MUNICIPALITY**



People with more education reported a higher rate of decentralization awareness, with 83 percent of master's degree holders reporting awareness of the relevant laws, while 46 percent of respondents with an elementary school education were aware. Respondents who voted in the 2017 elections reported a higher awareness of decentralization: 77 percent of those who voted were aware of the two decentralization-related laws compared to 58 percent of those who did not vote. Across all education levels, awareness of decentralization was higher among voters than non-voters; for example, 95 percent of voters with master's degrees were aware of Jordan's decentralization agenda, while 74 percent of non-voters with the same level of education were aware of the agenda.


There are two key areas for determining where decentralization is perceived to reside: government functions and government revenue. In four areas: public transportation, maintenance of local assets, local development planning, and electricity, most respondents thought the locus of control is with the national government (See Figure 14). In six out of ten domains, respondents believe their local municipality is primarily responsible for services. The case of electricity is notable in that 46 percent of respondents think their local municipality is responsible or do not know who is responsible, despite this falling under the purview of national service provision. Figure 14 highlights areas where additional outreach may be needed to inform citizen about government roles and responsibilities.

**FIGURE 14: PERCEPTIONS OF LOCUS OF CONTROL FOR SERVICE PROVISION RESPONSIBILITY BY DOMAIN**




There is more uncertainty around the locus of control for revenue collection, with about one in five respondents unsure about who is responsible for collecting fuel taxes. As shown in Figure 15, at least a fifth of respondents across six revenue sources reported that the national government is legally responsible for collecting funds.

**FIGURE 15: PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTING REVENUE**




When the above analysis is categorized by correct or incorrect knowledge about local government functions and revenue authorities based on relevant law, the 16 survey items can be aggregated into an overall knowledge score. On average, respondents correctly answered 9.7 of 16 knowledge items, or a mean of 60 percent. This score is slightly less than overall awareness of the decentralization and local governance laws (64 percent), and in both cases respondents in Amman score lower than those in other municipalities.

**FIGURE 16: PERCENTAGE OF MUNICIPAL POPULATION WITH GOVERNANCE FUNCTION KNOWLEDGE**



Among predictors of knowledge of government functions, respondents who were female or Christian typically scored less on the knowledge measures. Knowledge increased with age, education, income, internet use, and feelings of personal agency and empowerment. In Figure 17, red dots denote statistically significant coefficients.

**FIGURE 17: DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS**



Note: Red color indicates statistical significance, bars are the confidence interval


Knowledge of local government functions is not a strong predictor of perceived governance responsiveness, effectiveness, and confidence.

## WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION? DOES STRONGER ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION LEAD TO IMPROVED GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY?


Citizen engagement and participation are generally low, but these do appear to affect perceptions of effectiveness, with respondents who have made visits to their local officials perceiving local government as *less effective*. The relationship between perceptions of effectiveness and participation is complex but does not vary across levels of government. The data suggest that levels of citizen perception vary on a spectrum from responsiveness of local institutions to confidence in these same institutions.

Perceptions differ based on level of respondent engagement. As shown in Figure 18, meeting attendance appears to increase the rate at which people view their councils as “extremely effective.” This effect is most obvious at the municipality level, where 27 percent of respondents who attended a meeting in the past year said the municipality council was extremely effective compared to 13 percent of those who did not attend a meeting.

**FIGURE 18: PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO FEEL THEIR LOCAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS ARE RESPONSIVE, EFFECTIVE AND HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE INSTITUTION**




**FIGURE 19: PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS BY MEETING ATTENDANCE**



To better understand the relationship between participation and perceptions of effectiveness, we use a logistic model like that in the employment section, controlling for key demographic and geographic features. The effect of meeting attendance on perceptions of local government does appear to exist in the descriptive data, as shown above. To understand the strength of support, we augment the original model with a “dosage” effect for visiting a local official. The interaction of meeting attendance and visiting an official provides a measure of the severity of local engagement. This is based on the assumption that more engaged citizens visit their local government officials. Respondents who reported visiting a local official in the past 12 months reported more frequently that the government at all levels


(local, municipality, and governorate) are not at all effective. For example, more respondents who visited an official said their governorate council was not at all effective than any of the other response options combined. It may be the case that visiting local officials actually has a negative impact on perceptions of government. Indeed, across all levels of government there is a small and negative correlation between perceptions of effectiveness and visitation with officials. A more refined interpretation might be that some notable proportion of those who invest the time and energy to visit an official have some complaint in mind, so that when their issue is not resolved to their satisfaction they view the official as unresponsive. The survey does not provide data sufficiently detailed to confirm the validity of this interpretation.

**FIGURE 20: PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS BY WHETHER RESPONDENTS VISITED A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS**



For both visiting officials and attending meetings, more than a third and almost half of respondents tend to view their local government representatives as ineffective. To understand perceptions of effectiveness, a model was created to see what variables affect perceptions of local effectiveness at multiple levels of governance. People who attended public meetings perceived government at the local and municipality levels as more effective compared to those who did not attend a meeting in the previous 12 months controlling for various demographic features and other metrics, such as social media use. This model is consistent with disaggregated measures of effectiveness for each level, as shown in Figure 21.

**FIGURE 21: MODEL RESULTS SHOWING THE EFFECT OF ENGAGEMENT AND PERCEPTIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS**



Meeting attendance did not have a statistically significant relationship with perceptions of governorate councils, although there was still a positive relationship at this level of governance. The relationship between visiting an official and having a perception of effectiveness was consistently negative. Respondents who visited an official were less likely than those who had not done so to perceive their local council as effective. Put simply, there appears to be a strong relationship between making visits to local officials and perceptions of effectiveness, even after controlling for other factors.

The combination of engagement and participation (for example, visiting an official and attending a meeting), does not appear to have any statistically significant effect on perceptions of effectiveness. It may be that other measures of engagement frequency or severity are more relevant for determining whether more engagement affects perceptions. Alternative model specifications that combined meeting attendance with volunteering, social media use, and group membership, respectively, yielded similarly insignificant results.

A key takeaway from this analysis is that meeting attendance may be associated with improved perceptions of local and municipality councils more so than visits with local officials, social media engagement, or other forms of outreach. A larger percentage of respondents who attended meetings viewed councils at all local levels as extremely effective and, controlling for key metrics as well as other forms of engagement, suggests that meeting attendance almost doubles the odds of viewing the government as effective. The combination of non-meeting engagement mechanisms with meeting attendance does not appear to have a relationship with improved perceptions. While the data shows a positive relationship between meeting attendance and positive perceptions of governmental effectiveness, it does not reveal the nature of the relationship between the two indicators. Further research is needed to determine the strength of the correlation between the two variables and any causation.


## FRAGILITY / RESILIENCE

### ARE MIGRANT POPULATION FLOWS DISRUPTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS?

Views of migrants appear to have negligible effect on perceptions of local governance institutions and economic livelihoods, although people seem to have slightly less confidence in their local councils if they believe migrants are having a negative effect on their community. Overall, respondents in the General Population Survey do not have a positive view of refugees. Around 64 percent of the population on average views the effect of refugees in their municipality to be “very negative,” with only about 3 percent of the population in Jerash, Madaba, Tafleeh, and Zarqa reporting that the arrival of Syrians or other migrants and refugees has been somewhat or very positive. Of those who say the influx of refugees has been negative (very or somewhat), 90 percent on average reported that the effect on their municipality over the past 12 months is getting worse.

Respondents’ opinions of government services improving, worsening, or not changing over the past year do not appear to have much of a relationship with their views of migrants and refugees. As shown in Figure 22, regardless of perceptions of local service provision, more than 60 percent of respondents felt the influx of migrants was “very negative.” Those who felt local services had worsened a lot in the past year reported a lower rate of “somewhat negative” effects from recent migrants compared to those who reported local services improving a lot, 7 percent compared to 11 percent.

**FIGURE 22: PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF RECENT MIGRANTS**



Other measures of service provision reflect this trend: Respondents’ antipathy toward refugees and migrants transcends perceptions of local governance institutions. For example, 82 percent of respondents who reported no confidence in their municipality council said the effect of migrants and refugees in their municipality was negative, while 72 percent of respondents with a great deal of confidence felt similarly toward migrants and refugees. The perceptions of refugees appear to hold steady regardless of age, employment status, or education level, except for people with master’s and bachelor’s degrees. Around 45 percent of master’s degree holders who feel services have worsened a

lot perceive the effect of migrants and refugees as very negative, while 55 percent of bachelor's degree holders who feel similarly about local services perceive migrants and refugees very negatively. Respondents with higher monthly incomes reported more positive perceptions of migrants and refugees. Among Jordanians at the highest end of the economic spectrum, earning more than 5000 JOD a month, 21 percent viewed the effect of migrants and refugees as very positive. In Table 3, the darker red suggests a higher density of respondents, while blue suggests a lower density of respondents. Most respondents across all income groups, except the very highest earners and those earning between 3,000 and 4,000 JOD a month, view the effect of migrants and refugees very negatively. Notably, these two income groups (between 3,000 and 4,000 and more than 5,000 JOD a month) have generally moderate views of migrants and refugees, with a plurality seeing them as neither positively nor negatively.


**TABLE 3: PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRANTS BY INCOME GROUP**

Perceived Effect of Migrants/Refugees	Very positive	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	21%
	Very negative	71%	69%	67%	62%	55%	61%	66%	67%	82%	27%	79%	21%
	Somewhat positive	3%	2%	2%	3%	5%	4%	2%	11%	1%	0%	0%	0%
	Somewhat negative	9%	12%	13%	15%	16%	12%	14%	5%	7%	35%	10%	21%
	Neither positive or negative	16%	16%	16%	18%	21%	22%	18%	17%	9%	39%	11%	36%
		Monthly Income											
		Less than 150 JOD monthly											
		151-300 JOD											
		301-500 JOD											
		501-750 JOD											
		751-1000 JOD											
		1001-1500 JOD											
		1501-2000 JOD											
		2001-2500 JOD											
		2501-3000 JOD											
		3001-4000 JOD											
		4001-5000 JOD											
		5000+ JOD monthly											

Around 74 percent of business owners view the effects of migrants and refugees negatively, while 77 percent of non-entrepreneurs hold the same views. Perceptions of economic opportunity also appear to hold steady regardless of perceptions of migrants. While the perceived constraints to entrepreneurship vary, there does not appear to be any relationship between reported feasibility to start a business and perceptions of migrants and refugees.

Inferential analysis also shows a dynamic relationship between perceptions of local governance institutions. At the local council, municipality, and governorate level, there appears to be a positive relationship between perceptions of refugees and migrants and views of institutional responsiveness, controlling for other metrics such as age, education, and location. As shown in figure 24, the reported effects of migrants and refugees has a negative relationship with how respondents view the effectiveness of local institutions and an even stronger negative relationship with their confidence in these institutions, particularly at the governorate-level.

**FIGURE 23: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIEWS OF MIGRANTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS**




## HOW ARE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS MOSQUES, LOCAL MEETING GROUPS, CSOS, ADAPTING AND RESPONDING TO THE PRESSURES OF MIGRANT POPULATION FLOWS?

Respondents involved in local institutions appear to be pessimistic about the ongoing effect of migrant population flows. The General Population Survey asked respondents to reflect on how they feel things are changing in their community as a result of the arrival of Syrians and other migrants. Although the survey did not specifically seek out the leaders of local institutions and a single round of data collection cannot capture changes in perceptions of these institutions, we can see how participants and non-participants across local groups perceive the effect of migrants on their community.

It could be the case that people are generally pessimistic, so views of migrants and refugees are simply a function of this generally feeling. However, when asked about how things have generally changed in the past year, around 26 percent of respondents said they were getting worse. When asked about the effect of refugees and migrants specifically over the past year, 66 percent of respondents said their effect on the community is getting worse. The distribution of this pessimism about the effect of migrants and refugees is not consistent across Jordan. Interestingly, respondents located closer to Iraq or Syria report that things are getting worse at a lower rate than those in governorates that do not border these countries. Of respondents who were not part of a local community group, 68 percent said the effect of refugees and migrants is getting worse, while 61 percent of those who are part of a local group said the same.


**FIGURE 24: OVERALL PERCEPTION THAT THE EFFECT OF MIGRANTS IS GETTING WORSE BY GOVERNORATE**



There is some geographic variation within these perceptions, particularly among those involved in local institutions. For example, 72 percent of respondents in Ajloun who are members of a local group said the effect of migrants is getting worse, compared to 60 percent of people who are not members of a local group. In contrast, 55 percent of the respondents in Zarqa who are group members said the effect of migrants is getting worse compared to 64 percent of non-group members.

Similar to the previous section, respondents generally reported negative feelings about the situation in their municipality compared to the previous year as a result of the arrival of Syrians or other migrants and refugees. Respondents who acted on gender issues (i.e. through the creation of a gender-related CSO or community group) expressed the highest level of pessimism about the effect of migrants and refugees in their municipalities, with 73 percent saying the effect of migrants is getting worse compared to a year ago. Aside from involvement in local gender groups, descriptive statistics do not reveal a large difference in perceptions among local institution participants and non-participants.

**FIGURE 25: PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE DUE TO MIGRANT INFLOWS AND INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL INSTITUTIONS**



The relationship between survey measures of local involvement and perceptions of how migrant inflows are affecting respondents' local communities appears weak for most local involvement, with the exception of joining a gender-related group. Controlling for education, municipality, age, perceptions of changes over the past year generally, and other contextual metrics, respondents who feel things are getting worse in their municipality as a result of migrants and refugees are about 57 percent on average more likely to join other community members to take action on a gender-related issue (confidence interval of  $1.13 \pm 2.19$ ). This may suggest that in some cases a response among those who feel that the effect of migrants and refugees is getting worse is to form or join gender-related groups. Although this relationship holds over multiple specifications, it is important to note that this is an observed correlation and not a causal association. Indeed, there appears to be no relationship between involvement in other local institutions, such as trainings or volunteering, and a feeling that the effect of migrants and refugees is getting worse, controlling for other contextual factors. For example, local group membership (non-gender related) does not appear to have any meaningful relationship with perceptions of the ongoing effect of migrants and refugees. There may be additional analyses that can further investigate the correlation between gender-related groups and perceptions of the effect of refugees and migrants over the past year.

## ANNEX I: LEARNING AGENDA MODEL DETAILS

The survey team used a simple logistic model with survey weighted data to understand the relationship between the key learning agenda outcomes and relevant explanatory variables. The same variables were used as covariates for each model across learning agenda questions to control for various demographic metrics, such as education level and age.

The population survey sampled a selection of respondents across Jordan with a two percent margin of error nationally. Respondents were selected randomly using a Kish grid. Survey weights were developed based on the overall population per municipality.

The main estimation approach looks at the relationship between USAID indicators and activity exposure using the following basic model specification:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LA_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \gamma_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Where  $Y_{ij}$  is the indicator of interest measured for household  $i$  in survey block  $j$  at the time of the survey.  $LA_{ij}$  is a dummy which indicates that the individual participated in or received relevant activities or services. For example, in the perception of government model, this is an indicator for meeting attendance equal to 1 if the respondent attended a meeting and 0 otherwise.  $X_{ij}$  is a vector of covariates, including age, gender, and nationality;  $\gamma_{ij}$  is block fixed effects; and  $\epsilon_{ij}$  is the error term. Robust standard errors clustered by ID are also used.

The main explanatory variables used across all models were selected based on contextual knowledge, model specification tests, and the focus of the relevant learning agenda question. In general, the following metrics were included across models:

- Gender
- Age
  - The square of age was also included to estimate non-linear effects
- Nationality
- Household Members
- Group membership
- Social media use
- Education level
- Household income

Fixed effects models control for any variables that are constant over time and individuals. For example,  $\gamma$  in the model specification are fixed effects controlling for municipality. This approach is helpful to adjust for unobserved time-invariant confounders that may be correlated with our fixed effects. That is, there may be characteristics associated with each municipality that are constant, i.e. fixed, that are important to control for, but for which more detailed data are not available or are simply unobserved. Model output produces an estimate of log-odds, which is then exponentiated to obtain odd-ratios. Odds ratios provide the relative difference between two groups in a unit agnostic format, which is particularly helpful when absolute differences may not be meaningful.

The survey data used in this study were all weighted at the governorate level for national representativeness. The applied weights also normalize the data to the overall sample. To understand the effect of the survey weights on the statistics above and used throughout this analysis, the Survey

Team ran all of the frequencies with different weighting schemes and without weights to assess how sensitive the findings are to weighting.

The sampling weights are designed to adjust a sample of just under 12,000 to match the characteristics of a population of almost 10 million. Overall, however, there is little difference in the frequencies between the weighted and unweighted data.


For example, the table below shows the frequencies of respondents in each governorate who said they “strongly disagree” that men and women should be paid equally.

**ANNEX I TABLE I: FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSE FOR EQUAL PAY BY GOVERNORATE**

Governorate	Weighted	Unweighted
Ajloun	0.04	0.04
Al-Balqaa	0.10	0.10
Amman	0.07	0.08
Aqaba	0.13	0.11
Irbid	0.05	0.05
Jerash	0.02	0.02
Karak	0.10	0.10
Maan	0.04	0.04
Madaba	0.09	0.11
Mafrqa	0.08	0.08
Tafleh	0.07	0.06
Zarqa	0.07	0.06

There are, in some cases, differences that get removed due to rounding, but overall, the difference between the weighted and unweighted metrics is less than 0.01. For example, as shown in the figure below, the average time respondents reported being in their current jobs is similar for both the weighted and unweighted data, with an average difference for this metric of 0.003 across *all* of the job tenure categories.

## ANNEX I FIGURE I: TIME IN CURRENT JOBS – WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED



All of the analytical models explained above used survey weighted data and explicitly incorporate the survey sampling design and weights into the calculations of frequencies and their margins of error.