

# FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

## YOUTHLEAD INITIATIVE

### MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE AND LESSONS LEARNT



UNICEF SOUTH SUDAN

September 2015



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

### 1. Introduction

This report presents the findings of the end of programme evaluation of the YouthLEAD initiative, which took place between May 21<sup>st</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup> 2015 in South Sudan. The evaluation focused on generating good practices and lessons learnt from the intended and unintended impacts of the programme, including an assessment of the extent to which planned objectives were met. It was intended to measure the nature of the change that has taken place in the lives of youth, and to determine its significance on their development, as well as to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of the services and structures initiated under this pilot programme.

The evaluation covered all programme locations of the YouthLEAD initiative. Field visits were conducted in: Eastern Equatoria (Budi, Kapoeta South & Kapoeta East counties, Torit) and Jonglei (Bor). Security did not allow the consultants to travel to the programme localities in Upper Nile (Ulang & Nasir counties) and Jonglei (Uror & Nyirol Counties).

In total 399 people provided direct inputs to the evaluation through key informant interviews, Most Significant Change workshops, focus group discussions and an online survey. Respondents included youth beneficiaries, government officials, traditional leaders, community members, parents, implementing partners, service providers, and UNICEF and other UN staff.

The evaluation team encountered the following challenges:

- 1) Security risks and no access to Upper Nile State and Uror and Nyirol Counties in Jonglei;
- 2) Weak monitoring, including the lack of consolidated monitoring reports and no tracing of participants, thus difficulties tracing sampling;
- 3) The planned number of beneficiaries per age-group was difficult to reach for the youngest age-group (10-13). It seems that they were hardly involved in the programme, while many youth older than 24 were involved;
- 4) Very limited availability of UNICEF, Implementing Partner (IP) and Service Provider (SP) staff and non-availability of staff who had already left their positions before the evaluation;
- 5) The donor was not available, despite several efforts to get in contact them.

Despite the inherent challenges, this evaluation claims to have largely met the set purpose and objectives.

Below a summary of the key findings is presented per Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria: relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency, and consequently the findings on the programme design, management and coordination, and the Most Significant Change (MSC). After the findings, the main lessons learnt and recommendations are provided.

### 2. Findings

#### Relevance

All stakeholders, including county, state and national governments, participants, and community members, confirm the high relevance of the programme goals and activities and stress the need for


youth-programming in South Sudan. The programme was relatively well designed, key assessments were undertaken and a baseline and targets were established.

The intended target groups of the programme were *youth-at-risk aged 10-24, defined as*: out-of-school youth, youth associated with armed forces/groups, and, in particular, youth in need of special protection such as street youth, those with disabilities including disabilities due to mines and Unexploded Ordnances, youth living with HIV, and youth who are members of mobile populations including nomadic youth. Furthermore, the programme document states that YouthLEAD aims to prioritize girls' and young women's issues. While there are large populations of the intended target groups in the selected states, the intended target groups have hardly been reached by the programme. The majority of IPs lacked relevant strategies and made little effort to include vulnerable youth. Positive exceptions to this are the activities conducted by CINA and the Eastern Equatoria State (EES) peace-conferences that have developed strategies to include the intended target group in their activities.

### Effectiveness of the programme components

The programme logic model describes five intermediate outcomes. Per outcome a programme component was developed, although some activities have contributed to more than one component. The main insights on effectiveness per programme component are described below, and summarised in the info-graphics. The findings presented should be seen in the challenging circumstances of the South Sudanese context, which partly explains unreached goals.

#### **Component 1. *Improved access to youth friendly spaces and services, including those that address the particular needs of girls and young women.***



**Component 1**

1. Six centers planned, three constructed and one active
2. Building youth friendly space too risky in hostile environment
3. Youth friendly services in Bor successful
4. Lack of special focus on girls and women
5. Referral networks from the YFS are virtually non-existent
6. Youth did not attribute any change on their lives, because of these physical spaces

This component received approximately 19% of the total budget. Achievements include the building of three Youth Friendly Spaces (YFS) in Chukudum, Uror and Nassir. Due to financial constraints, only three of the planned six centres were constructed and the local authorities contributed to the construction of another centre in Ulang County. The centre in Upper Nile was demolished during the December 2013 violent outbreaks.

The planned referral networks that were to be managed from the YFS are virtually non-existent, taking into account that there are virtually no other youth services existing in Chukudum, to which could be referred to. The one active YFS in Chukudum offers only HIV services, operating without an official referral system. However, there are some known cases of referral to services in Chukudum hospital.

The voluntary HIV counselling and testing implemented in Chukudum did not flourish, therefore alternative outreach services were implemented, which were successful but lacked any special focus on girls and young women.

However, it is possible to make youth-centred services effective as shown in CINA's existing youth friendly centre in Bor, where community-based protection services and adolescent and youth-focused training, awareness-raising, and gender responsive psycho-social support is provided.

In conclusion, the building of the physical spaces proved to be very expensive, and they were found to be at great risk of vandalism in highly volatile areas. In addition, the physical spaces contributed, to a very limited extent, to the implementation of improved access to youth friendly services, especially in the case of gender sensitive services. The youth did not attribute any changes or impact on their lives to the creation of these physical spaces in their MSC stories, and attributions to services were very limited and not necessarily related to the existence of the YFS.

**Component 2 – Improved knowledge and skills of young people in: literacy, numeracy, employment and livelihoods, health, nutrition, food security, sustainable use of land and water, gender equality, and peace- building.**

This component received approximately 36% of the total budget. All of the planned activities have been implemented, although the activities varied greatly per programme location, per IP, and in delivery rate.

The vocational training was mostly implemented in EES. While a solid market assessment was undertaken, training was provided to a limited number of the identified skills areas, leading to market saturation, which reduced chances of youth actually using their skills. In total, 95% of the targeted 2000 youth received skills training in tailoring, auto-mechanics, bakery, bead making, computer-skills and entrepreneurship.

## Component 2



1. Vocational Training did not reach the intended target groups
2. Quality market assessment conducted, but not used for implementation
3. No post-training support such as starter kits, loans or grants
4. Lack of expertise in the field of economics
5. ALP successfully launched, but halted after the December 2013 crisis and was not relocated
6. Tree-planting failed due to bad logistics
7. Agro-businesses started very recently and cannot be evaluated

The agri-business activity included a very small number of participants, and although preparations were started by Plan in September 2014, the actual training started in May 2015, in line with the sowing season. During the evaluation, participants had just received the training and effectiveness could not be evaluated.

Overall, the trainings have been evaluated positively by the beneficiaries, but the intended target groups such as pastoralist groups, Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG), street children, and youth with disabilities were not reached, and half of the participants were above the targeted age of 24.

Only a very limited number of groups received some start-up materials, including the agribusiness group in Nagishot who received a limited number of barrels and raincoats, one tailoring group received two sewing machines, the auto-mechanics group received very basic repairing materials,

and the bakery group received an oven and some baking pans and spoons. Some materials were moreover still stored unused at the Youth Friendly Space in Budi.

None of the students received grants or loans, which had been an expectation of the target group. Therefore, the creation and support to Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) has been a serious weakness of the programme. Although five SACCOs have been officially registered and gathered their own money for shares, the promised additional funds were never provided. This resulted in high dissatisfaction amongst the SACCO members and also a big drop in the number of active members. In addition, SACCOs did not target Vocational Training (VT) graduates and actually included many adults.

In conclusion, market saturation has been problematic, due to the low diversification in course topics, despite a solid market assessment which proposed highly diversified courses, as well as the lack of post-training support and mentoring. The IPs lacked the necessary expertise and skills in the area of economic strengthening and reaching the intended target group, and UNICEF did not identify or correct the lack of monitoring of graduates by IPs.

Due to the lack of follow-up and therefore the difficulty to actually locate graduates for the evaluation, it is impossible to establish the number of people that are actually generating income from the trainings. The evaluation team estimates that a maximum of 15% of the participants have been able to find employment or become self-employed, which is extremely low compared to similar programmes.

Despite being launched successfully, the Alternative Learning Programme (ALP) has not met its targets due to the early halt of programme activities after the December 2013 crisis, and the consequent decision not to relocate the programme. The 150 trained teachers and 6450 enrolled students are likely to have gained very little impact from the efforts. Most stakeholders and the evaluation team regard the closure of the ALP instead of its relocation as a missed opportunity for the programme.

The one-youth-one-tree programme aimed to create awareness of sustainable land use and soil conservation, as well as add to the aesthetics of the area, and provide shade and food. The programme distributed 5200 trees of which very few survived. The planning and logistics of the activity were poor, resulting in planted seedlings dying during school holidays, and the lack of protective fences meant that the seedlings were eaten by animals. On a positive note, a small number of trees planted in towns were maintained by the government; a model showing possible sustainability for future efforts.

Despite the above, youth attributed new career opportunities, an increase in generation of income, and hope for the future to the activities deployed under component 2 in their MSC stories.

**Component 3 – Enhanced leadership and participation capacity of young people in peace-building, governance of youth initiatives, and other youth-centred programming (government, civil society), as well as in gender-responsive dialogues and advocacy on issues that are critical to the lives of youth.**

## Component 3



1. Participatory Revision of South Sudan Youth Development Policy is good practice
2. Extensive advocacy material produced but did not reach county level or programme locations
3. The creation of Peace Ambassadors led to the emergence of youth leaders
4. External and internal dynamics contributed to the failings of the National Youth Union
5. Media and journalism activities stopped soon after funding ended

This component received approximately 9% of the total budget and included a high variety of activities to achieve the outcome. Many activities were related to peace-building and applied several effective ways to include and reinforce messages of peace through sports activities, participatory two-to-three

day events centring on peace dialogue and cultural exchange. The 9-month long peace-building trajectory implemented by CRS/CRN/DOT led to positive changes. The activities facilitated a group of youth leaders to be trained, have cultural exchanges, visit different counties, and share their life experiences among youth. The intensive approach with a relatively small group resulted in the emergence of a group of youth leaders. This group of young people continue to be involved in peace dialogues, remain in contact with their fellow-trainees from other rival communities, and have a clear aim to listen to and hear each other, co-exist, and advocate for peace.

Youth-centred programming and the facilitation of youth participation were achieved during the revision process of the South Sudan Youth Development Policy (SSYDP). This facilitation included some media training and tangible products resulting from participatory interventions such as the creation of a “*Youth Communique*” and the development of over 10,000 SSYDP promotion materials that included an abridged version of SSYDP, posters on various themes, and banners and flyers which were distributed at the state level. Unfortunately, these materials remained largely in the office of the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (MOCYS) and did not reach the county level or the youth at the programme locations.

The media and journalism training was intensive and involved a smaller number of youth who produced programmes in Toposa and Didinga which were aired. Soon after the funding stopped, the activities of the participants also came to an end due to the lack of access to media.

Overall, the efforts of forming active and well-functioning youth groups – including the National Youth Union and EES Youth Union - have been underestimated throughout the whole programme. Youth groups have not received sufficient guidance on how to deal with both the internal and external dynamics that result from establishing a youth group, such as the national youth union. Youth groups need long-term guidance and support, which was not provided.

In conclusion, the high number of activities reached many youth, and tribes and governments were exposed to the voices of youth and encouraged to listen to them. Outputs have contributed to the creation of individual leadership; youth-centred approaches in the policy development process and




the content of that policy have been successfully implemented, and youth are now more empowered to speak out in front of their government. The main change youth themselves attributed to this component was ‘working together’, co-existing, and living in peace, with a few (3%) of the respondents mentioning a reduction in cattle-raiding.

**Component 4 – Enhanced knowledge and skills of targeted government ministries, CSOs, and young people on child protection systems and youth enabling environments, including gender-responsive policies, youth-centred policies, programmes, and services.**

This component received approximately 11% of the total budget. The implemented activities mainly focused on the revision of the SSYDP as an experiential method of capacity development, the creation of an enabling environment through the development of policy, and ensuring that the youth policy was youth-centred.

## Component 4



1. Positive experiential learning process and capacity development in the youth policy revision
2. Youth from payam level were involved in the policy, but the feedback loop was not closed
3. Child protection and gender trainings for government and CSO's highly appreciated
4. Development of the life skills manuals stimulated inter-ministerial cooperation
5. No visible increase in improved child protection or gender programming as a result of trainings which were one-off


The intensive participatory process included a youth policy multi-stakeholder task force, organisation of three inter-state consultations, a five-day youth policy study tour to Nairobi, and a review of the draft at a national validation workshop, resulting in a final SSYDP with a clear youth-centred focus which was then promoted and advocated for by the MOCYS for the Council of Ministers’ approval. The whole process was led by the MOCYS, which showed high ownership of the process. The policy development focused on state level input to the national level. A number of youth were selected from all counties with the cooperation of traditional leaders and youth groups, but the closing of the feedback loop back to the county level was missing.

In addition, under this component, formal trainings were conducted, some with a particular focus on child protection and gender issues. The more traditional trainings on child protection and gender were appreciated, but following these trainings there have been no visible changes in the approach and offer of services of the stakeholders.

Conclusions for this component are that the awareness of the importance and potential of the inclusion and participation of youth was raised, as well as the importance of creating an enabling environment to include youth. The highly participatory process can be considered to be an example of good practice of youth participation and could be applied to other UNICEF-guided policy development processes at different state levels and in different ministries in South Sudan, as well as in other countries. However, a more bottom-up approach is required, thereby involving more local youth in the design, revision, and dissemination. Another positive example was the development of the life skills manuals, which stimulated inter-ministerial cooperation.

**Component 5 – *Enhanced knowledge and skills of targeted government ministries and CSOs in core management, administrative and programming functions, including gender-responsive and environmentally sustainable programming.***

## Component 5



1. Trainings highly appreciated
2. No visible changes in the improved monitoring as a result of the trainings
3. Computers and cameras have been provided to CSO's and ministries and were highly appreciated
4. Movements in staff positions, within and between ministries limits effects of capacity development

This component received approximately 4% of the total budget. The programme implemented some core management trainings for ministry and CSO staff and in addition provided some material support, such as computers and cameras. No evidence of new activities which show improved gender-responsive and

environmentally sustainable programming have however been identified, except for the ones mentioned under component 4. In conclusion, the results of the activities under this component remained largely invisible, although beneficiaries expressed appreciation for the activities.

### **Impact**

The impact of the YouthLEAD initiative can only be assessed later, due to the fact that this end-of-programme evaluation took place while activities were still ongoing. Overall, the duration of YouthLEAD was 4 years, but many programme activities were only implemented for 6-9 months, which makes the likely impact small. The programme has created many opportunities for positive impact on the lives of youth within the context of South Sudan, but most of these opportunities have not been acted upon. Also, activities were not integrated but divided among IPs working in isolation which reduced the potential multiplier effect that was highlighted in the programme design.

The programme has been able to create some pockets of impact, especially through the creation of youth leaders in peace-building processes and dialogues, the creation of the SSYDP, which will remain the leading document for the MOCYS, and the introduction of a more intensive approach towards psychosocial support, which has impacted individuals greatly. Also, while the economic strengthening component was not implemented up to standard and therefore missed the opportunity to create much greater impact, it did foster hope and optimism among beneficiaries to start doing something productive in an environment where none such opportunities previously existed. According to several stakeholders it had the positive impact of keeping them occupied and reorienting their mind-set.

As stated above, unfortunately the programme had very little impact on the original target group of pastoralist youth, which also implies that intended impact of a reduction in cattle raiding is likely to be limited. However, no statements can be made on this as no post-activity monitoring took place.

### **Sustainability**

The main partners for YouthLEAD were the MOCYS and the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MOEST) at the national level as well as the Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile state level. These ministries have shown a good level of motivation and ownership and report that the YouthLEAD activities are clearly within their field of responsibilities. However, the MOCYS is the



most under-budgeted ministry and at no level has there been any budget made available to continue the activities.

The programme did not design or implement any exit strategy. Many activities have stopped already or are expected to come to a halt as soon as YouthLEAD financial support stops. The journalism project, which involved the production of broadcasts for radio programmes, has already ended as project funding stopped. On a more positive note, Plan South Sudan received EU funding to continue VT in Kapoeta, the CINA programme on Lifesaving and Conflict Resolution will continue, because they have diversified their funding source and practically institutionalised local ownership, and so will the agri-business activities conducted by CDSS.

The programme is, however, integrated into UNICEF's Peacebuilding and Adolescent programme which will support or build upon some of the YouthLEAD initiated activities and lessons learnt.

### **Efficiency and Value for Money**

UNICEF reported to have planned for a total programmable contribution of **USD 8,407,479** for years 1, 2 and 3 of the programme. The final figures show a total spending of **US\$ 9,244,916**. In addition to the funds made available through UNICEF, Plan South Sudan provided SSP 723,340 (equalling USD 250.00) to the programme. The evaluation team did not have access to consolidated financial information and calculated totals do not correspond with the total programmable contribution as presented in the final report to CIDA/DFATD.

As this evaluation did not include a detailed assessment of the efficiency of the programme and little financial information has been shared, only limited observations can be made in terms of value for money. While the programme has created a lot of opportunity and was implemented under challenging circumstances, with an overall spending of over 9 million USD, and an expectation of only a few lasting positive results, it must be concluded that the programme did not deliver sufficient lasting value for money.

### **Programme Design, Management and Coordination**

The programme design was solid, although it was never informed by a conflict analysis, a do-no-harm analysis, or a power analysis. The risk assessment indicated a high risk of violent outbreaks. However, no continuity plan was developed or approved beforehand with CIDA/DFATD, which resulted in a lack of flexibility in response to the changing context, especially after the December 2013 crisis. The decision to not relocate the activities implemented by BRAC in Jonglei and Upper Nile has been the most pressing result of this lack of flexibility.

Also, the lack of change to the VT courses after signs of market saturation emerged as well as the exclusion of intended target groups have been major failings. Neither the design nor the implementation modalities included the means to be sufficiently flexible to these contexts. UNICEF's programme management has not been focused enough on reaching out to the intended target groups and missed the opportunity to work more closely with the Child Protection section that traditionally targets vulnerable children and has developed the means to contact them. As soon as

problems appeared, UNICEF should have advised partners to intervene as this was within the appointed role of UNICEF.

Programme monitoring during YouthLEAD was insufficient, and many assessments such as perception surveys to measure change and draw comparisons to the baseline survey, were designed but not implemented. Overall, it can be concluded that very little learning or adaption has taken place based on basic programme monitoring.

In addition, for all components, it was reported that many activities suffered from late or failed delivery of supplies, e.g. the beads for the bead making course, the trees delivered to schools just before the holidays, the HIV/AIDS testing kits and condoms, etc. None of the programme staff took responsibility for these errors.

YouthLEAD partnered with the MOCYS and MOEST to realise the activities. The cooperation from UNICEF was mainly on the state and national level where ownership of the related ministries was high. The cooperation with UNICEF was considered positive, although local governments mentioned their lack of influence on the design of programme activities. Also, for the economic strengthening component, partnerships with the ministries of Labour and Commerce were missing.

YouthLEAD was implemented through five IPs who were selected based on their specific strengths. The combination of these IPs enabled the optimisation of results in their respective work areas. On the downside, the implementation of the different programme elements by different IPs in isolation affected the intended holistic approach of YouthLEAD in some areas. In its implementation, UNICEF missed the opportunity to make YouthLEAD a truly integrated programme and did not facilitate integration and knowledge sharing between the different IPs. In addition, some partners lacked crucial expertise, skills, and, in some cases, the right attitude to develop or work with the intended target groups, especially in the case of the inclusion of Toposa youth, youth with disabilities, and to some extent girls/young women. The knowledge on economic strengthening and youth group development was also insufficiently present, and there was no external expertise brought in to rectify this.

YouthLEAD had a clear cross-sectional approach on supporting youth, which cuts across all UNICEF sections, and YouthLEAD added the economic strengthening component to this. However, while the programme created some cross-sectoral linkages, it was largely implemented as a stand-alone programme that did not meet the standards of other UNICEF programmes, mainly due to the lack of technical support and cross-section monitoring.

Internationally lessons learnt have long been translated into specific measures to attract and include special at-risk groups, but none of these measures were applied in this programme by the IPs. The lack of these measures was neither noticed nor corrected by UNICEF programme staff, despite the fact that UNICEF South Sudan has a solid track record in identifying and assisting adolescents at risk.

The holistic and integrated approach could have benefitted much more from more intensive interagency cooperation. However, interagency cooperation was limited, despite the fact that the original programme document made references to a variety of UN agencies.


### Most Significant Change

At least 80% of the stories gathered among youth and other stakeholders are overwhelmingly positive and no significant changes were found between the responses of the stakeholder groups. The stories shared were characterised by hope and the respondents shared the need for follow-up on the programme's activities. The main areas of change mentioned in the stories are the creation of career opportunities and the behavioural change of individuals towards peace and co-existence.

The identified external drivers of change include the commitment of participants, government, and IPs. In addition, support from families and communities enabled participation in the vocational trainings and allowed girls and young women to take part in the peace-building activities.

### 3. Lessons learnt and recommendations

The main lessons learnt, clustered per DAC criteria are summarised in the infographic below and further elaborated underneath.



### Relevance of youth programming

YouthLEAD has demonstrated the potential of youth, and **youth programming remains highly relevant in South Sudan** and has a legitimate place within UNICEF. The programme gave the participants hope and created new ways of looking at their role in society. While many of the lessons learnt should be addressed, it is recommended that UNICEF launch a new programme on youth empowerment, building and capitalising upon activities started under YouthLEAD and expanding to more locations.

### Integrated programming

It is recommended that all future youth programmes within UNICEF should be cross-sectional, as all sections will need to be involved, and these programmes will require **structured and planned inter-sectional support and monitoring**.

Inter-ministerial work with youth should also be further encouraged. While relatively effective at a central level, the focus is currently on youth working with the MOCYS, a ministry with a relatively small budget and power. Future programmes should **ensure more active participation from other ministries** and ES should include the Ministry of Labour (MOL) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).

### Creating impact

The length of the programme was regarded as too short by IPs, local government, and participants alike. **Change takes time**, especially in peace-building. Pilots should be designed in three phases, piloting, learning, and consequent adaptations, followed by longer-term programmes. Also, it is recommended that the targets for expectations of success and long-term impact should be more modest.

The communication and collaboration between IPs and SPs should be strengthened during the implementation of the programme. This will lead to a more coherent approach, increase capacity development of the partners, and make better use of each other's strengths. It will ultimately lead to **more coherent programming creating multiplier effects and therefore have a further-reaching impact**.

### Reaching Youth at Risk

It is of specific importance for UNICEF to **find and assist youth at risk**. Input from UNICEF's Child Protection section, a section with solid expertise in supporting vulnerable children and adolescents, should be ensured in the future, including building on the good practice of case management and intensive monitoring of participants.

Gender specific strategies should also be incorporated from the start of the programme and gender impact should be specifically monitored. Within the context, **activities with family members need to be included to allow for participation of girls and young women**.

The decision to raise the target age-group to 35, in line with the South Sudan youth policy, was taken by IPs and programme staff without going through a formal approval process with UNICEF nor the donors. The result of this is that the programme only reached a limited number of adolescents. This

limited success to reach adolescents was also due to the public announcement of services, which made no special attempts to reach the adolescents.

### **Flexibility, monitoring and conflict sensitivity**

**Ensuring do-no-harm analysis and monitoring** during the planning and implementation stages is highly recommended. Additionally, programme staff must have the expertise and skills to develop, implement, and adapt appropriate strategies, as well as have a positive attitude towards working with specific target groups.

In the case of VT in Kapoeta South implemented through Plan International, the Toposa people were hardly involved in programme activities and no strategies were designed to adapt the courses to ensure the inclusion of Toposa youth. This **lack of flexibility created a widening of the socio-economic gap** that already exists between Toposa youth and youth of other tribes in the region, and therefore it potentially did do harm. It furthermore reduced the potential impact of peace building, as most of the youth that own cattle and are involved in cattle raiding were not reached. Relatively simple adaptations such as food for training, Toposa speaking trainers and a change in courses in skills closer related to Toposa youth livelihoods would have made a major difference.

In the future, **programmes in conflict-prone areas should allow for more flexibility** to respond to changing dynamics, such as changing locations and/or nature of activities and implementation modalities. Furthermore, in conditions such as those of the locations chosen for this programme there needs to be realistic and flexible planning that takes into account variables such as weather, road conditions, and insecurity.

As in other UNICEF-led programmes, **youth programmes should include case management and monitoring**. This will allow for timely adaptations based on results achieved.

Furthermore, it is recommended that **monitoring and feedback loops from the youth themselves are initiated** during the programme

### **Feedback and communication strategies for ownership**

The programme was highly appreciated by the government and by youth, and high levels of participation from youth and engagement from the government was reported. However, to ensure the continued engagement of local government staff and youth at the county level, carefully designed communication and feedback mechanisms need to be developed to ensure **ownership from local stakeholders**. Furthermore, a well-implemented **hand-over and exit strategy should be developed** and implemented from the beginning, increasing potential sustainability.

### **Capacity development**

The process of the revision of the SSYP has been an example of good practice in **developing capacities through learning-by-doing, youth inclusion, and the creation of an enabling environment**. Such successes should be used to further policy development within UNICEF, other ministries, and in other countries as well.

Trainings of stakeholders in gender, child protection, and programme management should be based on **training needs assessments and consequent design of a tailor-made capacity development package** per stakeholder with several interventions, instead of the one-off trainings implemented through this programme.

### Youth leadership in peace building

The programme created **role models** through its transformative peace-ambassadors project. The creation of strong youth role models could have been made a more explicit direct outcome in the programme design, and could have been more capitalised upon for follow-up activities.

Integrating **peace-messages** in VT courses and in sports activities have been very effective and efficient tactics and contributed to the holistic approach of the programme. This approach can easily be adopted in future programming.

The YouthLEAD initiative underestimated the risks of **politicising the formation of youth groups**. Youth are an important electoral power and therefore the democratic processes are highly susceptible to inappropriate politicisation or corruption. Programme staff must have the expertise and skills to develop and implement activities focused on the creation of **independent youth groups** and need to include the building of **good governance skills** and provide longer-term support to these groups.

### Economic Strengthening

Economic Strengthening of youth in the context of South Sudan is highly relevant. The design of the programme included market-responsive training and the fostering of entrepreneurship; however, the implementation of this has been weak. Future programmes should **ensure that market surveys are actually used by IPs and updated**, vocational training courses should focus on sectors that are closely related to their target group's livelihoods, and trainers should be capable of speaking the local language and, if needed, should be able to provide food for their students during training in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP).

Furthermore, programmes should **monitor the progress and mentoring of participants after training, ensuring the provision of start-up kits and long-term mentoring support**.

### Youth Friendly Spaces

The creation of YFS that offer youth friendly services requires much more than simply the building of a physical space. The building of such YFS is a high-cost and high-risk investment in highly volatile areas; such was experienced in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Without proper planning, these investments will lead to little impact. International lessons should be researched to provide more suitable alternatives. **The YFS in South Sudan should be built in more urban centres from which mobile outreach services to rural communities can be organised.**



## SWOT

To summarise, the most important Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) as identified by the evaluation team are presented below.



### STRENGTHS

- ☐ Highly relevant programme activities
- ☐ Coherent and holistic programme design
- ☐ Positive change attributed to achieved skills, knowledge, and attitudes
- ☐ Ownership at relevant ministries
- ☐ Policy revision and peace-ambassadors activities good practices

### WEAKNESSES



- ☐ Intended target groups not reached
- ☐ Not market responsive
- ☐ No proper monitoring of programme activities
- ☐ Lack of follow up
- ☐ Not flexible
- ☐ Politicisation of youth groups



### OPPORTUNITIES

- ☐ Youth programming is highly relevant
- ☐ High potential
- ☐ Highly motivated youth
- ☐ Highly motivated ministries

### THREATS



- ☐ Limited lasting change
- ☐ Ongoing humanitarian crisis
- ☐ Challenges in capacity building due to high staff movement

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

Executive Summary .....	ii
Abbreviations .....	1
1. Background .....	3
1.1 The YouthLEAD initiative .....	3
1.2 Purpose of the evaluation .....	3
1.3 About the evaluators.....	4
1.4 Scope of the evaluation.....	4
2. Methodology.....	6
2.1 Evaluation questions .....	6
2.2 Sampling and reliability .....	7
2.3 Tools and analysis.....	8
2.4 Challenges and limitations of the evaluation process.....	9
3. Relevant YouthLEAD initiative details .....	11
3.1 Programme intended results.....	11
3.2 Target Groups.....	11
3.3 Partners and their roles.....	12
4. Key findings and lessons learnt.....	16
4.1 Main findings on relevance .....	16
4.1.1 Lessons learnt on the relevance of YouthLEAD .....	22
4.2 Findings on effectiveness .....	23
4.2.1 Lessons learnt on effectiveness of YouthLEAD .....	48
4.3 Findings on impact .....	50
4.3.1 Lessons learnt on the impact of YouthLEAD.....	56
4.4 Findings on sustainability .....	57
4.4.1 Lessons learnt on the sustainability of YouthLEAD.....	60
4.5 Efficiency and value for money .....	61
4.6 Unintended results.....	63
4.7 Programme management and coordination.....	63
5. Findings Most Significant Change .....	67
5.1 Change areas .....	67
5.2 Drivers of change.....	70
5.3 Disappointments .....	71
6. Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations.....	73

6.1	Conclusions.....	73
6.1.1	Conclusions on relevance .....	73
6.1.2	Conclusions on the effectiveness and impact of the programme components.....	73
6.1.3	Conclusions on impact.....	76
6.1.4	Conclusions on sustainability.....	76
6.1.5	Conclusions on programme design, management, and coordination .....	76
6.1.6	Conclusions on efficiency.....	78
6.2	Recommendations.....	78
	Annexes .....	82
Annex A.	Programme Logic Model .....	82
Annex B.	Request for Proposals.....	82
Annex C.	People consulted for this evaluation.....	82
Annex D.	Evaluation tools .....	82
Annex E.	Output results.....	82
Annex F.	SWOT analysis .....	82
Annex G.	Secondary sources consulted .....	82

## ABBREVIATIONS

---

AES	Alternative Education Services
AL	Accelerated Learning
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
BEST	Basic Employability Skills Training
BRAC	International Non-Government Organisation based in Bangladesh
CAAFAG	Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDSS	Community Development Support Services
CFS	Child Friendly Space
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency – now DFATD
CINA	Community in Need Aid
CP	Child Protection
CRN	Catholic Radio Network
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (Canada)
DOM	(Catholic) Diocese of Malakal
DOT	(Catholic) Diocese of Torit
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GRSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IP	Implementing Partner
KI	Key Informant
LRDA	Losolia Relief & Rehabilitation Association
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOARF	Ministry of Animal Resources and Fishery
MOC	Ministry of Commerce
MOCYS	Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology
MOGCSW	Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare
MOLPSHRD	Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development
MSC	Most Significant Change
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAD	Programme Approval Document
PMF	Programme Monitoring Framework
PPT	PowerPoint Presentation
PSA	Public Service Announcement
RH	Reproductive Health
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative Society
SfCG	Search for Common Ground
SMECOSS	Small & Medium Entrepreneurship Consultants in South Sudan
SP	Service Provider
SPLA	South Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
SSFA	South Sudanese Football Association

SSP	South Sudanese Pounds
SSYDP	South Sudan Youth Development Policy
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TI	Transition International
TVET	Technical, Vocational and Educational Training
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Action Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Programme Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VCT	Voluntary Counselling and Testing (for HIV/AIDS)
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
VT	Vocational Training
VTC	Vocational Training Centre
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
YFS	Youth Friendly Space
YouthLEAD	Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development

## 1. BACKGROUND

---

### 1.1 THE YOUTHLEAD INITIATIVE

---

South Sudan's population is predominantly youth with 70 per cent of the population under 30. The protracted struggle for independence resulted in low-level service delivery, including in education and vocational training, which still affects the ability of youth to fully participate in their communities. This is visible in the high prevalence of out-of-school youth, their low literacy and numeracy skill levels, and a lack of employable skills. In addition, youth participation in decision-making has traditionally been low in South Sudan, and even more so for girls.

In response to the above, the YouthLEAD initiative was formulated. The "YouthLEAD initiative" (Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development) was a three-year, with one-year budget neutral extension, programme running from 1<sup>st</sup> June 2011 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2015 and was supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), now the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development- Canada (DFATD), in partnership with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), UNICEF and communities. The Government of Canada has contributed to UNICEF South Sudan a total programmable amount of US\$8,407,479 for the implementation of YouthLEAD activities.

The purpose of YouthLEAD was formulated as follows: to enable children and youth (aged 10-24 years) to become productive members of their communities and to reduce conflict-related vulnerabilities in selected counties in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile states. The YouthLEAD initiative intended to support broader access to quality education, life skills, and healthcare, clean water, and food security, and to increase sustainable livelihoods and participatory processes focused on youth to achieve good governance and peace promotion. YouthLEAD also aimed to build the technical capacity of state and non-state youth service providers and support the development and reform of demand-driven youth-centred policies, strategies, and services. The initiative was coordinated by the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (MOCYS).

### 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

---

The YouthLEAD initiative came to an end - after a one-year budget neutral extension - in June 2015. This end of initiative evaluation is an opportunity to better understand the effect of the programme on the youth in the targeted areas of South Sudan; to support the transition of youth programming into UNICEF's wider Country Programme; and to support knowledge building and the promotion of organisational learning. The evaluation thus focused on generating good practices and lessons learnt from the intended and unintended impacts of the YouthLEAD initiative, including an assessment of the extent to which planned objectives were met and the relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of the services and structures initiated under this programme. No full efficiency evaluation was planned for, but the evaluation did assess the extent to which the initiative delivered value for money.

This evaluation focused on measuring the nature of the change that has taken place in the lives of youth, and its significance on their development, by using the Most Significant Change method as the



main tool, complemented by focus group discussions, Key Informant interviews and programme documentation analyses.

The following deliverables have been produced:

- Inception Report and PPT to the evaluation reference group
- Interim summary of key findings and PPT to the reference group
- Draft Evaluation Report
- Final Evaluation Report and PPT

### 1.3 ABOUT THE EVALUATORS

---

This independent evaluation was undertaken by Transition International (TI), a Netherlands based international consultancy firm. TI promotes positive change through knowledge development, training, and advisory services. TI has implemented several evaluation assessments, including on empowerment programming for children and youth, and has extensive experience in conflict affected countries, including South Sudan. The evaluation has been undertaken by Lisette Gast and Irma Specht, two international specialists of TI, and was supported by three national experts: Catherine Pita-Mark, Audelio Obur and Julius Nyanbur Wani.

### 1.4 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

---

This evaluation took place from the 20<sup>th</sup> May 2015 to the 30<sup>th</sup> July 2015.


It covered all programme locations (Kapoeta South, Kapoeta East, Budi, Nasir, Ulang, Nyirol, and Uror) of the YouthLEAD initiative and the state capitals of Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile States. Within these states, the evaluation covered the following localities with field visits: in Eastern Equatoria: Budi, Kapoeta South & Kapoeta East Counties, Torit; and in Jonglei: Bor. Since security did not allow the consultants to travel to the programme localities in Upper Nile State (Ulang & Nasir counties) and Jonglei State (Uror & Nyirol counties), the team consulted the maximum number of stakeholders and implementing partners from Juba by telephone.

The team had initially identified the list of stakeholders and beneficiaries to include in the evaluation, which was approved by the Evaluation Reference Group during the inception phase (see annex C). In total 399 people provided direct input to the evaluation through Key Informant interviews, Most Significant Change workshops, focus group discussions, and an online survey. The evaluation consulted with the following groups of respondents:

- 321 Youth beneficiaries
- 33 Government officials
- 8 Traditional leaders
- 10 UNICEF or other UN staff members
- 17 Implementing partners' and service providers staff members
- 24 Family and community members

However, the participation of the younger age group in this evaluation was challenging, most probably because they were not reached by the programme, and could not be located as schools were closed. The age-range of the programme is indicated as 10 – 24 years old. For EES the age group

of 10 – 13 was only available at very limited times, and a request to the IPs and SPs to involve these participants did not help make them more available. Among the vocational training participants the majority were over 18 years of age, and in Kapoeta South about 43% of the beneficiary respondents were above 24. The graph below shows the distribution of activities and the gender of respondents.



During the evaluation, the team took into account that the interventions were implemented at a time of intense conflict and high instability. The team therefore considered all unforeseen contingencies, both within the political, economic, and social contexts of the project locations, as well as other internal and external factors which may have affected the achievement of the initiative's objectives. The team also examined the relevance and effectiveness of the solutions and adaptations put forward by the programme and implementing partners.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

---

### 2.1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

---

The team evaluated the programme against the indicators presented in the programme Logic Model (see annex A) and the standard Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, and sustainability. Further, the team developed the evaluation questions below, which were presented, and agreed upon by the Evaluation Reference Group.

#### Relevance

1. *Was the design of the programme responsive to the context?*
2. *Was the Logic Model coherent?*
3. *Do youth consider the programme relevant to their lives?*
4. *Do communities consider the programme relevant to their lives?*
5. *Do government staff consider the programme relevant to their functioning?*
6. *Do CSOs consider the programme relevant to their work?*
7. *To which MDGs did the programme contribute?*
8. *Given the on-going conflict and need for recovery and resilience programming, which areas of the YouthLEAD initiative remain the most relevant?*

#### Effectiveness

9. *How many of the planned activities and outputs of the 5 components were effectively implemented?*
10. *What approximate proportion of relevant beneficiary groups has been reached?*
11. *To what extent have girls and other targeted subpopulations been reached?*
12. *What is the perception of programme participation by beneficiaries, local authorities and other stakeholders?*
13. *What key internal and external factors have influenced the initiatives ability to achieve the immediate outcomes and how responsive has the programme been to these?*
14. *Has monitoring been done effectively and programme activities adapted accordingly?*
15. *How can some of the challenges be creatively resolved for future interventions?*

#### Impact

16. *To what extent has the programme reduced the vulnerability of boys and girls at risk to engage in conflict and harmful practices?*
17. *To what extent have youth friendly spaces and services empowered young people?*
18. *To what extent has ALP raised the education levels and future prospect of the youth?*
19. *To what extent have income and career opportunities for youth increased?*
20. *How successful has the initiative been in increasing environmentally sustainable livelihoods and broader environmental awareness?*
21. *To what extent are there more opportunities for the voices of youth to be heard in society and in media?*
22. *To what extent are youth leading in peace building, dialogues and advocacy for peace?*
23. *To what extent are youth more organised?*
24. *To what extent are youth involved in policy development and advocacy?*
25. *To what extent did policies, strategies and services become more youth-centred?*

26. *To what extent did policies, strategies and services become more gender responsive?*
27. *To what extent have the capacities and functionalities of the targeted ministries increased?*
28. *To what extent have the capacities and functionalities of the CSOs increased?*
29. *How successful has the initiative been in boosting ministerial representatives' ability and willingness to advocate and engage with youth?*
30. *What unintended outcomes, if any, have resulted from the programme?*

### **Sustainability**

31. *How effectively has UNICEF coordinated with other key actors to ensure that further building blocks, partnerships for youth development, and participation, are in place?*
32. *To what extent have the stakeholders, in particular youth, taken a lead in the planning, implementation and decision making of the programme?*
33. *Overall, how successful has the initiative been in increasing on-the-ground ownership (national and state level) to deliver and maintain broad youth participation, development and other related components?*
34. *What is the likelihood of youth groups and youth centres to continue functioning after the closure of the programme?*
35. *To what extent have relationships between local stakeholders and youth improved?*
36. *What are the lessons and opportunities that have been capitalised upon or missed?*

## **2.2 SAMPLING AND RELIABILITY**

---

A serious attempt has been made to collect a valid and mostly comparable sampling of informants, covering all (relevant) stakeholder groups per county including participants of varied age and sex, IPs, SPs, government staff, partners, and non-state service providers, with a strong focus on a gender balanced input. The evaluation among direct beneficiaries took place in three counties in Eastern Equatoria State and Bor and the team ensured that enough respondents per activity were involved in order to discover trends and patterns. See annex C for the table of planned and achieved distribution of respondents per category.

The team suggested a combination of random, purposive, and snowball sampling approaches in order to reach the direct and indirect beneficiaries. In the field, random sampling proved to be impossible as the monitoring information was incomplete and not up-to-date. For example, participant lists did not include age, sex, or original place of residence. Furthermore, most IPs had no monitoring or follow-up system in place so beneficiaries were impossible to trace. Also, many graduates were no longer in the area as they had come from other states to receive the VT, which was confirmed by Plan programme staff and local government officials in Kapoeta South.

Therefore, the IPs arranged for the identification of the respondents. This had an effect on the representativeness of the data, as participants were selected that were available within the county and known to the programme team. The evaluation team and programme manager did instruct and urge the partners to take broad samples of participants, including drop-outs.

In addition to the sampling of the beneficiaries, a selection of key-stakeholders and Key Informant (group) interviews were held. The Key Informants were proposed by the Evaluation Reference Group, and complemented by the evaluation team. Furthermore, EES and Bor programme sites were visited,

including the Youth Friendly Centres in Budi county and Bor, schools, sports-clubs, tree-planting areas, agriculture sites, and the Vocational Training Centres.

Although the respondents were selected by the IPs and SPs, there was a bias towards bringing in respondents that remained in the area, could be traced, and were probably better known by the programme implementers. However, the high number of respondents and the good spread over activities as well as locations has limited this bias.

Despite the inherent challenges, this evaluation claims to have a clear understanding of the outputs achieved, the lessons to be learnt, the types of changes which can be attributed to the YouthLEAD initiative, and the extent to which these changes in the lives of youth and other stakeholders have occurred. Yet, direct and indirect beneficiaries were only involved in EES and in Bor, not Jonglei. Therefore, the reporting on YouthLEAD activities in Jonglei and Upper Nile states relied upon the monitoring information available, but this information could not be verified on the ground due to security constraints. Additional information was gathered among available key informants with the state government, and implementing partners.

## 2.3 TOOLS AND ANALYSIS

---

To ensure that this evaluation would serve its purpose, the team adhered to several basic principles in choosing the methodologies:

- The data collection gathering was adapted to the age and literacy-level of the participants;
- The methods were flexible and took into consideration unforeseen changes on the ground, such as political, economic, and social contexts, and internal and external factors that had affected the programme's objectives;
- The evaluation included girls, boys and their meaningful participation;
- Making use of existing monitoring (output) information;
- The evaluation developed mixed methods in order to apply triangulation to strengthen the validity of the findings, and therefore their accountability.

During a short inception phase, the tools were tested and adapted. See annex D for the full set of tools. Separate tools were developed for the different stakeholder groups and all tools were developed to explicitly document the sex and age ranges of the interviewees to account for different gender and age perspectives and experiences.

An important focus in this evaluation was the MSC method. The MSC method seeks either positive or negative changes that are attributed by the respondents to the programme activities. The indicated changes by the respondents are then elaborated upon through questions about the driving factors of the change and disappointments that were faced, to have a better understanding of the relationship between the programme activities and the attributed change. To enable quantitative analyses as well as the qualitative aspect of the MSC technique, a self-signification survey was added. The self-signification survey contained a standard set of questions that was asked to all interviewed respondents. In total 168 MSC narratives and stories have been recorded.

In addition, several other methods were applied to address the evaluation questions, including Key Informant interviews, observation and focus group discussions, programme site visits, an online survey for stakeholders that were no longer physically present, and a desk review.

## 2.4 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION PROCESS

---

During the implementation of the evaluation several challenges were encountered, which influenced the data-collection process and to a certain extent the reliability of the evaluation outcomes. The following challenges and mitigating measures were identified:

### **Limited output and process monitoring during the programme**

The programme provided very limited output monitoring documentation. These include activity reports that were not yet finished for the final months, no collation of results on outputs by UNICEF, and no consolidated report on targets reached against the Logic Model. Monitoring documents also did not include consolidated and age and sex segregated participant lists and there was a complete lack of follow-up and tracing of participants. This limitation resulted in the lack of possibility to implement random sampling, which in turn resulted in a bias in the selection of participants. Limited numbers of drop-outs were included and some respondents seemed to have been influenced regarding their role and experience within the programme.

To minimise the risk of bias, the evaluation covered a large number of beneficiaries and reported back regularly to UNICEF. The programme manager attempted to collate results during the process, guided by the evaluation team (see annex E for output results).

In addition, mainly due to the December 2013 crisis, many activities were only implemented within the last nine months of the programme, or were still ongoing, output documents were not yet provided, and as a result the outcomes and impacts are difficult to assess. Taking this into consideration, the impact and sustainability dimensions presented in chapter 4 should be interpreted as the “likely” impacts and levels of sustainability.

### **Limited availability of UNICEF, IP and SP staff**

The IP staff were insufficiently available to support the evaluation process due to the fact that some were evacuated, left the programme due to the closure of activities or because they were no longer deployed to the programme locations. Also the majority of UNICEF YouthLEAD programme staff, with the exception of the programme manager, were no longer employed by the programme and senior management in UNICEF was relatively new.

### **Limited understanding and preparation for the evaluation**

While the focus of the evaluation was on gathering lessons learnt for future programming, as specified in the TOR, this was not clearly understood and communicated to the IPs. During the fieldwork the team interviewed some respondents who were seemingly influenced and instructed by the IPs on their experience, which was reported to UNICEF who consequently urged partners to see this evaluation as a learning exercise.



Furthermore, the perception of the evaluation team was that the evaluation activities were considered *additional* work and neither financial resources, for hospitality and the mobilisation of participants, nor human resources, were dedicated to the facilitation of the evaluation sessions. Also, there was insufficient preparation for the evaluation by the Programme Manager, as highlighted above (no consolidated reporting, no beneficiaries lists etc.), which is partly due to the fact that all staff had already left the programme.

**DTAFD Canada (former CIDA) staff not available**

Although several requests were sent to DTAFD Canada to engage in the evaluation, no staff were available, requests were sent by both TI and UNICEF. Therefore the donor views are not included in this evaluation.

**Insecurity in Upper Nile and Jonglei**

The team was informed that IPs left in 2013 due to insecurity stemming from the current conflict. Insecurity is still a major issue in the selected counties. This resulted in the decision to exclude the beneficiaries of the activities in the counties Ulang, Nasir, Uror and Nyirol from the evaluation. Activities implemented by CINA in Bor and Jonglei have been included to some extent.

### 3. RELEVANT YOUTHLEAD INITIATIVE DETAILS

#### 3.1 PROGRAMME INTENDED RESULTS

---

The YouthLEAD Initiative had the following intended results:

The purpose of YouthLEAD was to enable children and youth (aged 10-24 years) to become productive members of their communities and to reduce conflict related vulnerabilities in selected counties in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile states<sup>1</sup>.

The initiative intended to support broader access to: quality education, life skills and health care, clean water, food security, as well as to increase sustainable livelihoods, and introduce participatory processes focused on youth for good governance and peace promotion.

YouthLEAD also aimed to: build the technical capacity of state and non-state youth service providers and support the development and reform of demand-driven, youth centred policies, strategies, and services.

YouthLEAD was furthermore designed to contribute to:

- The South Sudan States development priorities as enshrined in the South Sudan Development Plan (2011-2016);
- Key targets set out in the UN development action framework of co-operation (UNDAF): outcomes 1 (Core governance and civil service functions), 2 (Chronic food insecurity reduced and livelihood opportunities increased), and 3 (Key basic service delivery systems in place);
- MDGs 1 (End poverty and hunger), 2 (Universal education), 3 (Gender equality), 6 (Combat HIV/AIDS), and 5 (Global Partnership).

#### 3.2 TARGET GROUPS

---

The target group of the programme was defined as: *youth-at-risk aged 10-24*. *Youth-at-risk* was further defined as: out-of-school youth, youth associated with armed forces/groups, and especially youth in need of special protection such as street youth, those with disabilities including disabilities due to mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), youth living with HIV, and youth who are members of mobile populations including nomadic youth. Furthermore, the programme monitoring document<sup>2</sup> states that 'YouthLEAD aims to prioritise girls and young women's issues, out of school youth, and youth who are members of nomadic and pastoralist populations'. During programme implementation IPs however adapted the age of the target group to be in line with the new youth policy, therefore assisting people up to the age of 35. This important change has not been documented or approved by UNICEF, and was also not flagged as problematic for UNICEF during the monitoring.

---

<sup>1</sup> The PAD: Sudan Youth Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (YouthLEAD) Project.

Project Number: A-035101 ANNEX A – PROJECT SUMMARY

<sup>2</sup> SC/110139/South Sudan GRSS-UNICEF YouthLEAD initiative CIDA Supported Project  
Progress Report April 2011-May 2012 / June 2012-May 2013/ June 2013 – May 2014

In addition to youth-at-risk, line ministries from MOCYS, MOEST, and The Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MOGCSW) on the national, state, and county level, and CSOs were target groups for the provision of capacity development on effective youth-centred policy and programme development and implementation. The MOCYS and CSO partners and Youth Friendly Services involved in the implementation were also defined as the target groups for receiving capacity development on advocacy and trainings around core management, administrative, and programming functions, including: computer literacy, financial management, gender sensitivity, environmental sensitivity, conflict resolution, team member roles and responsibilities, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), strategic internal and external communication, partnership development, advocacy, strategic planning, resource mobilisation and donor relations, work planning, and report writing.

### 3.3 PARTNERS AND THEIR ROLES

---

The programme was led by UNICEF in partnership with the MOCYS and implemented with selected Implementing Partners and their Service Providers.

#### UNICEF

---

UNICEF is traditionally mandated to work with children (under 18) and women. Since 2009 UNICEF has been moving into secondary education and livelihoods, with a special focus on out-of-school youth, reaching out to the age group of 15-24. YouthLEAD fit this new focus and brought the additions of livelihood and peace building components. Youth projects are delivered through traditional UNICEF sections, which implies that youth projects are financed and recorded as contributing to result areas set in the UNICEF South Sudan country programme.

YouthLEAD was directly placed under the deputy representative of UNICEF in South Sudan; as it was considered a cross-cutting programme. Although it was considered by some as a 'stand-alone' programme, several key informants indicated that the widened approach towards youth was seen as an opportunity and very relevant in the South Sudanese context.

*"YouthLEAD provided us with an opportunity for livelihood programming, while Child Protection cannot continue above 18, the children then joined YouthLEAD...so that's very good!"*

Abrham Kur, UNICEF child protection (CP)

The role of UNICEF within YouthLEAD was to:

- Monitor and support implementation;
- Establish effective partnerships and advise partners;
- Monitor funds;
- Coordinate partners / IPs / beneficiaries;
- Directly implement capacity development activities and policy review.

Recently UNICEF has reviewed the changing and concerning situation in the country and developed its vision for the remaining country programme (ending June 2016) with an added focus on adolescents within its education programme, whereby it is now called Education and Adolescent Development. This will see targeted education interventions for out-of-school adolescents and

increased support towards broader involvement of young people in social dialogue and community initiatives.

### **Government partners**

---

The principle government partner in the YouthLEAD initiative was the MOCYS. The design of the programme included the MOCYS and the MOEST. The MOGCSW was not reported to be involved in the programme design, which would have been logical in terms of gender sensitive approaches.

The national MOCYS was responsible for the coordination of the programme. All education related activities – such as the use and development of school curriculums and ALP activities – were implemented in partnership with the MOEST.

At the state and county level, the MOCYS was the main programme partner, while the Ministry of Education coordinated the ALP activities – including ensuring that the ALP teachers were on payroll. The department of Social Development in Kapoeta South was very active in the implementation of the VT activities. Furthermore, the commissioners played a crucial role in supporting the implementation on the ground.

### **Implementation partners and service providers**

---

In the first year of implementation, two partnerships with non-government organisations were developed to support the delivery and realisation of the programme results, particularly at community levels.

**BRAC** was selected to support programme activities in Upper Nile and Jonglei States. BRAC is known for its promotion of out of school initiatives, teacher training, ALP, and innovative micro-enterprise initiatives that have contributed to growth and development at community level. BRAC channelled the programme through two state offices - Bor and Malakal.

UNICEF selected the IPs for Eastern Equatoria State through a public announcement and through consultations with the state government.

**Plan International South Sudan** was selected to implement activities in Eastern Equatoria State. The partnership with Plan leveraged additional resources from their Plan Canada counterparts. The additional funds were to be invested in the renovation of one extra youth centre. Plan's main means of implementation was the tested BEST model (Basic Employability Skills Training), which intended to ensure youth in Eastern Equatoria were able to benefit from market oriented skills training leading to enhanced livelihood skills development. Plan South Sudan operated through their office based in the VT premises in Kapoeta South.

Plan collaborated with the SPs; Losolia Rural Development Association (LRDA), Community Development Support Services (CDSS), and Small and Medium Entrepreneurship Consult South Sudan (SMECOSS). EUREKA was contracted as a training provider.

In year three an additional partnership was developed with **Catholic Relief Services (CRS)** for the youth and media component and the peace building campaigns. CRS channelled all activities through

the Catholic Radio Network (CRN) and the Diocese of Torit. The partnership of only six months focused on the development of a young journalist-training initiative, the production and airing of media programmes developed by young people for their peers, and peace-building activities involving youth as peace ambassadors. CRS operated from its office in Torit EES, which has now been closed down due to lack of funding.

**CDSS** was already implementing a programme for Plan as an SP and were directly contracted by UNICEF in year three for the agribusiness and HIV/AIDS awareness component of the YouthLEAD initiative. CDSS has over two decades experience in implementing projects in Budi County and has its headquarters in Chukudum as well as an agricultural plot in Nagishot.

**CINA** was contracted by UNICEF in 2013 to conduct child protection, youth, and adolescent programmes in Duk County. As a national organisation CINA is legally registered and possesses the following qualities: experience in tracing of separated families, excellent field experience, and a strong bond and connection with local communities. CINA was already established in Bor with offices and capacity, and possess strategic techniques and approaches appropriate for working with target groups as intended by the YouthLEAD initiative. CINA operates from its headquarters in Bor, Jonglei State.

**Search for Common Ground (SfCG)** was only contracted in the last stage of the programme to conduct the Participatory Action Research, and although they were formally contracted through CDSS, contacts and negotiations were directly between UNICEF and SfCG, whereas the role of CDSS was to mobilise the youth researchers.

Below an overview is provided of the IPs and their SPs who have been involved for short and long-term periods over the past four years:

Implementing partner	Service provider	State / Counties
Plan South Sudan	CDSS LRDA SMECOSS	EES: Budi EES: Budi, Narus, Kapoeta South EES: Kapoeta South, Narus
BRAC		Upper Nile state: Ulang, Nasir Jonglei State: Urur, Nyirol
CINA		Jonglei State: Bor town, Duk, Twic East Lakes State: Awerial County
CDSS	Search for Common Ground	EES: Budi
CRS	CRN / DOT	EES: Budi, Narus

All partners were selected based on an existing programme plan and therefore had not been involved in the design of the programme.

In addition, the **South Sudan Football Association (SSFA)** - based in Juba - partnered with MOYS in Eastern Equatoria. Funding for this was directly provided to the MOYS by YouthLEAD for the training of football coaches and trainers.

## UN Partners

**United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)** was contracted to cover the design, site supervision, and contract management for the three Youth Friendly Centres in Budi, Uror, and Nasir. The scope of work UNOPS was expected to carry out included architectural and construction design for the proposed Youth Friendly Centre Facilities. This encompassed:

- An environmental impact assessment;
- Preparation of design, technical specification and engineering estimates;
- Procurement of suppliers;
- Programme implementation management, quality control and works supervision;
- Programme reporting, budget control and financial accountability.

In the original Programme Approval Document (PAD) the role of other UN agencies have been described as follows:

- 'UNICEF will draw on the expertise, knowledge, and programming of several other UN agencies to ensure a holistic approach to youth development. UNICEF will work collaboratively with the FAO on youth and food security issues (i.e. selected youth will be referred to FAO's Junior Farmer Field program) and with UNIDO in the development of sustainable livelihoods opportunities and related training for youth entrepreneurs. UNDP will provide threat and risk mapping, as well as support to microfinance, micro-enterprise capacity building, youth employment schemes, and linkages with its National Volunteers Scheme. UNFPA will provide training for MOH staff in areas of adolescent RH and collaborate in the provision of condoms, etc.'
- 'UNICEF will also work with partner UN agencies, including UNDP, FAO, Joint Youth Employment program, International Labour Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), to facilitate vocational training for youth. [...] Partnership with and guidance from the ILO and Sudanese labour authorities will ensure conformity with international and local labour standards.'

UNFPA's role was specified as: to support youth-centred reproductive health services. Based on further assessment, strategies to ensure equitable access to services for adolescent girls and young women may include home visits, mobile centres, or the provision of access to transportation or child care. Within the psycho-social support: [...] UNFPA's Youth Peer Education Network (Y-PEER) will also partner with UNICEF in this service area.

FAO support was specified as within the Education, Livelihoods and Employment Counselling and Vocational Training: [...] Referrals will be made to [...], FAO farming programs, computer training, health academies, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) pump mechanics trainings, entrepreneur and vocational schools, and apprenticeships. Partnerships with local labour and vocational unions will be made.

Note: Except for FAO, none of the UN agencies have been mentioned in the final revised logic model developed for South Sudan. FAO is mentioned as an indicator under outcome: Increased equitable engagement in sustainable livelihoods and peace building, and use of economic and social services, by young people aged 10-24 in targeted project areas. Indicator iii) # of people referred to FAO's food security programming (m/f).



## 4. KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT

---

This chapter gives answers to the evaluation questions as agreed with the Evaluation Reference Group and presented above. It also reports on the planned and achieved results of the programme. The evaluation questions (in red) are grouped as per DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability. In addition, the unintended results are reported upon as well as observations on the programme design and management of the YouthLEAD initiative.

### 4.1 MAIN FINDINGS ON RELEVANCE

---

#### 1. Was the design of the programme responsive to the context?

The responsiveness to the context is described in terms of the goals, locations, and target groups. The original YouthLEAD initiative was designed in 2010 in Khartoum, before the creation of an independent South Sudan at the end of 2011.

- **Goals**

The programme intended to address core issues including youth unemployment, tribal divides, cattle raiding, lack of access to information, and lack of youth empowerment, with a special focus on youth-at-risk. In particular, the peace-building approaches, vocational training, and the inclusion of youth in the definition of youth policy, are considered relevant and necessary to the context of South Sudan.

*“The ministry was not involved. All programme design and administrative decisions were made and decided in Juba. We were just informed about next step. But regarding SSYDP, yes we were consulted and even participated. On other programme designs, youth were not consulted, but they were informed and took part in the formulation of SSYDP.”*

William Garang Majok, Former Acting DG, MOYS -  
Kapoeta.

- **Locations**

The programme was formulated as a pilot programme and a limited number of locations were selected with the intention to scale-up the activities after the pilot had been proven successful.

A committee that was based in Juba selected the locations for the implementation of the pilot programme. The committee consisted of UNICEF, UNFPA and donor representatives and government bodies, such as the DDR committee, and applied the following criteria:

- The possibility of linking to other donor programmes;
- The possibility of linking to other UNICEF or UN agency initiatives;
- Indicators around illiteracy, poverty, and under-development;
- Conflicting communities (hot spots) in need of peace-building.

The activities and approaches planned are – especially in the selected counties in EES – rather unique to the area. Only DOT and the Red Cross are known for other peace-building initiatives in the area.

- **Target groups between ages 10 -24**

The target group of the programme– youth-at-risk between the ages of 10-24 – is deeply involved in the current conflict in South Sudan. The target groups within the youth-at-risk group were defined in the programme document as: out-of-school youth, youth associated with armed forces/groups, youth in need of special protection such as street youth, those with disabilities including disabilities

due to mines and UXOs, youth living with HIV, and youth who are members of mobile populations, including nomadic and pastoralist populations.

The target group was defined as 10-24 year olds, while in reality few children of a young age were reached and results show that several people over the age of 35 took part in activities intended for the target group. Programme staff and IPs report that this was done to put the programme in line with the South Sudan youth policy. However, no records have been found that show that this was officially approved and agreed upon by UNICEF, nor by the programme donor DTAFD Canada. In addition, it raises questions on the mandate of UNICEF, as to why the organisation would involve people as old as 35.

The activities that did attract younger participants mainly involved youth groups in schools, and centred on playing sports and other activities, but were less focused on economic empowerment.

Overall, the activities run by CINA were the one exception to this, with many younger participants and children with a clear vulnerability profile participating.

- **Women and Girls**

During the programme, a gender analysis was conducted and the focus on girls and young women was made more explicit. This analysis validated other research, that South Sudan is a patriarchal society where gender and age play an important role in shaping the experiences of people. Women and girls are often seen as inferior to men and boys, and are disadvantaged in many respects. As a result, glaring inequalities persist between women and men, and girls and boys. Therefore, it was of great importance that YouthLEAD activities maintained a focus on gender. As the analysis informed the programme team: 'Although a patriarchal culture dominates in South Sudan, gender-related constraints and customary impediments affecting women and girls vary from one state to another, and within states from one ethnic community to another. YouthLEAD staff and partners should be conscious of this fact and seek to understand the specific social and cultural dynamics of the communities they serve.'

There were attempts made to include girls and young women. Many respondents reported on a good number of girls and young women present in the activities, with the exception of the auto-mechanics course. By contrast, the numbers reported for ALP show a positive balance towards girls. However, the general view is that gender is only about equal numbers in participation, in fact this is only one indicator of gender equality in a programme.

- **Crisis response**

In May 2013, EES suffered from high levels of insecurity, resulting in a temporary evacuation of Plan staff. However, the staff of SP LRDA remained in the area. On December 15<sup>th</sup> 2013, there was an eruption of political unrest and subsequent violent conflict with massive displacement of populations, looting, and killing, and despite the fact that active fighting was not witnessed in all counties, the hostilities were still reported to have created fear. Eastern Equatoria State later remained relatively calm though the unrest did affect the population due to the influx of displaced people. Therefore, Eastern Equatoria State seemed to present a viable case for continuing programme activities, which resulted in a re-start of the programme in May 2014.

In contrary, BRAC, one of the YouthLEAD partners, lost a member of staff in unclear circumstances, and furthermore, the BRAC state offices in Bor were completely looted and vandalised. Due to these circumstances, BRAC completely closed the programme in Upper Nile and Jonglei and returned the remaining programme money to UNICEF. Although reports indicated that it remained safe to continue programme activities in Nasir with another IP, this was not done.

All in all, the crisis has impacted the programme on a high level regarding the implementation and continuity of activities, staff spirit, and the focus of the context towards emergency and relief activities. No continuity plan was developed or approved beforehand with DFATD. Highly volatile areas should have had a continuity strategy in place in case of a further outbreak of violence.

After BRAC ended their activities, CINA were approached to continue some of these activities in other counties in Jonglei.

The UNICEF programme manager reported that a request was made to the donor to relocate activities for Upper Nile and Jonglei. According to the programme manager in January 2014, YouthLEAD developed a strategy that was shared with CIDA highlighting possible scenarios and proposals. Follow-up by the UNICEF Representative did not lead to any formal feedback from CIDA. The evaluation team requested a copy of the appeal sent to the donor, which outlined the suggested changes of locations and activities in the Jonglei and Upper Nile States, and included the proposal to follow IDPs with services, but the team was informed by the programme manager that the letter could not be shared.

In early 2015 another crisis arose. The country found itself in economic crisis, resulting in massive inflation, fuel shortages, and increased insecurity due to looting and robberies. This crisis has particularly impacted income-generating activities, as prices for all goods and services have gone up. So far, the crisis has had less of an impact on the overall programme. However, it is a good indication of the vulnerable context in which the programme is operating.

## **2. Was the logic model coherent?**

The logic model includes targets and indicators, and an extensive Programme Model Framework (PMF) was developed as well. The indicators and means of verification were, however, rather abstract and included remarks such as ‘to be defined’, even in the final version of the programme proposal. Also, in several instances the sum of outputs and related targets did not lead to the intended outcome, and in some instances targets were not quantified.

As the programme was defined as a pilot programme, the logic model was intended to be a guiding document for the implementation and monitoring of activities. However, only one version of the logic model was provided – and a finalised version of the original was not available. Additionally, during the programme, targets were not amended when circumstances changed, even following developments such as the end of all ALP activities.

Due to the range of activities under the programme, the coherent and holistic approach as foreseen in the logic model was undermined. The programme activities were not all implemented in all locations and therefore the cross fertilisation of the activities was less than anticipated.

### 3. Do youth consider the programme relevant to their lives?

As presented in the previous chapter, the involved participants regarded the programme as highly relevant to the context and their lives. Reflecting on the intended target groups, several notes can be made according to the relevance of the programme.

- **Relevance to the beneficiaries**

The youth that participated in activities have been extremely positive about the relevance of these activities to their lives. This is particularly true for the participants that have been empowered to begin income-generating activities, as well as the youth that have been involved in peace dialogues as youth leaders and those that received direct relief services, like clothing and financial support to go to school. However, the majority have been highly disappointed with the follow-up to the activities. Most of the activities were one-off and needed longer support to remain relevant. Some examples include: the majority of VT participants complained about the lack of follow up support in terms of the provision of start-up kits, and the lack of provisions of loans; the peace-ambassadors reported that shortly after the peace initiatives some communities still harboured (an intent) to conduct cattle raids; and the formation of youth unions was successful only for a limited period, as many dissolved soon after formation.

- **Relevance to the intended target groups**

The intended target groups, such as youth in need of special protection including street youth, those with disabilities (including disabilities due to mines and UXOs), youth living with HIV, and nomadic youth – have hardly benefitted from the programme. This is largely due to the fact that some IPs would simply make public announcements of services but make no specific effort to search for, find, mobilise, and support these groups of youth that are known not to come to publicly announced services. For example, youth with disabilities are known to need additional support (psycho-social, transport etc.) to be included. This support was not provided and therefore the participation of these groups was low.

A special issue of concern, acknowledged by programme and IP staff and highlighted by local government officials, was the failure to attract youth from nomadic and pastoralist groups, in particular Toposa youth, to the vocational training in Kapoeta South. A combination of factors led to this, including the lack of Taposa-speaking trainers, the lack of food provided in the training centre, as well as the fact that the provided courses shared no relevance to Toposa livelihoods.

*‘Yes we know what is going on [in the VT centre] and that is fine. They can do what they want and we do what we want.’*

Toposa Youth  
Participants in entrepreneurship  
training SMECOSS

However there were successes, such as the involvement in programme activities of the youth associated with armed forces/groups. Collaboration between YouthLEAD and UNICEF’s Child Protection section led to the explicit referral of released children to YouthLEAD, who then benefited from the programme. In addition to this, the activities of CINA related to CAAFAG were also in line with the goals of the programme and the peace summits in EES also included pastoralist/nomadic youth.

An exception to the inability of the programme to reach the intended target group has been the work of CINA. All of CINA’s activities within this programme have focused on street-children, orphans, and CAAFAG and these groups were also included in the peace conferences in Kapoeta and Budi implemented by CRS/CRN.

**4. Do communities consider the programme relevant to their lives?**

Community members, including county government officials, indicate that the programme is relevant to youth and that it is also positively affecting the community. The most mentioned reason is the youth ‘not being idle’, but being able to care for themselves, or being too busy to be involved with harmful practices such as cattle raiding<sup>3</sup>.

*‘The auto-mechanic and beads making outcomes surprised everybody in the area. Nobody ever thought there was market for these things.’*  
FGD Traditional leader in Narus


With regards to the action research, the community responded with more reservations. Even though the youth had contacted the communities via their traditional leaders and chiefs at the start-up of the programme, community members still reacted with suspicion to the initial research activities and asked many questions. This programme component has only recently ended and further developments have not been included in this evaluation.

**5. Do relevant government staff consider the programme in line with their functioning?**

Particularly at the state and national level, the government confirms that the programme facilitated their staff with the skills to work constructively with youth. All government actors agreed that youth are an important target group who require more specific attention. However, many recognised that the intended target group was left out.

*“The project filled in gap of what we could not offer”*  
Second Alim Solomon,  
Executive Director, Kapoeta East County

At the county level, government officials furthermore report the relevance of the provided capacity-building activities for their staff, such as child protection training and the sports refereeing and coaching. However, the remark was made that the trained individuals have been unable to improve the functioning of their ministries because of a lack of resources.



<sup>3</sup> Cattle-raiding has a long history in South Sudan, but the vast supply of small arms in civilian hands has led to the raids becoming more violent in recent years. In remote areas, the South Sudan Police Service lacks the capacity to protect communities and so many cattle herders keep arms to defend themselves.

Interestingly, staff of the coordinating ministry recommended that youth should be engaged further in productive activities and stay away from politics. Which leads to the question: to what extent is the need for youth participation appreciated and will it be taken up in the future?

**6. Do local CSOs and CBOs consider the *programme* relevant to their work?**

CSOs and CBOs have not been a major focus in the capacity development component of the YouthLEAD initiative. The main CSO and service provider LRDA reported that the offered capacity development opportunities and programme activities were rather new and therefore they provided many opportunities to learn and improve as a local CSO.

**7. To which MDGs did the *programme* contribute?**

The programme was holistic in its approach. It covered social, economic, and political aspects, and contributed towards the following MDGs:

- MDG 1: The number of newly-employed youth as a result of programme activities is low, therefore there has been little contribution to MDG 1B (see section 4.2 component 2): 'Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people';
- MDG 2: Through the ALP activities, the programme contributed to the development of primary education and prepared out-of-school youth to reintegrate into formal education. The short time span of the implementation of ALP indicates low contributions to MDG 2 (see section 4.2 component 2): to achieve universal primary education;
- MDG 3: Overall, the programme has targeted girls and young women as key participants in the programme activities. The sports and ALP activities have been particularly positive examples of involvement of girls and young women, thus contributing to MDG 3: promote equality and empower women.
- MDG 6: The HIV/AIDS awareness activities and Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) within the programme have contributed to combating HIV/AIDS. This is especially true in Budi county where the level of HIV/AIDS awareness is extremely low and prevalence indicates the approach of an epidemic.

**8. *Given the on-going conflict and the need for recovery and resilience programming, which areas of the YouthLEAD programme remain the most relevant, according to the different stakeholders?***

Overall the programme components remain highly relevant in the current context of South Sudan, as confirmed by all stakeholders during fieldwork and feedback. The programme focused on core issues including: youth unemployment, tribal divides, cattle raiding, a lack of access to information, and a need for a voice for youth.

Although the programme has many formative elements, such as ALP and VT, in its approach it has utilised innovative approaches to reach its objectives. In particular, the peace-building approaches and the inclusion of youth in the definition of the SSYDP are considered both innovative and relevant.

The stakeholder groups confirmed during the feedback session that the following programme components remain relevant to the communities of the programme locations: vocational skills

training, HIV/AIDS awareness raising, the creation of youth-friendly spaces, environmental awareness, peace-building, ALP, literacy and numeracy, economic empowerment (SACCO & VSLA), and capacity building.

---

#### 4.1.1 LESSONS LEARNT ON THE RELEVANCE OF YOUTHLEAD

---

All stakeholders – including county, state and national government, participants and community members - confirm the **high relevance of the programme goals**. Involved youth who were reached by the programme consider the programme very relevant to them. Most activities are also reflected in the revised SSYDP and youth programming remains highly relevant in South Sudan.

**The logic model was largely coherent**, although the quality of the logic model was in some parts very abstract, and elements overlapped, such as components 4 and 5. More importantly, the logic model was meant as a guiding document, but was **never updated/amended** on recommendations resulting from the mid-term review or the gender study, nor was it updated/amended as a response to the cancellation of the activities in Upper Nile and Jonglei locations.

**The programme design was not informed by a conflict analysis, a do-no-harm analysis, or a power analysis.** Although UNICEF as a whole did conduct a conflict analysis, this did not involve any special focus on the specific dynamics around youth in the programme locations. However, similar programmes can in the future benefit from UNICEFs Peace building programming, which is guided by context specific conflict analysis.

The risk assessment indicated a high risk of violent outbreaks. However, **no continuity plan** was developed or approved beforehand with CIDA. Highly volatile areas should have had an adapted strategy in case of an outbreak of violence. Neither the design, nor the implementation modalities included means to be sufficiently flexible to these contexts. This was a **missed opportunity in terms of the possible relocation and subsequent continuation of activities** implemented in the Upper Nile and Jonglei states.

The identified means of verification and the PMF were not used, and were not implemented to monitor and measure changes. While the design was solid, there was an **almost complete lack of consolidated monitoring against the targets-set**, and this is a serious weakness in the programme implementation.

In addition, IPs, SPs, and beneficiaries reported that the programme design was set and no reviews and changes were made or allowed. The programme seems to have **lacked flexibility for response to the changing context**, and was not built upon identified needs and successes.

None of the stakeholder groups present at the feedback meeting – including those in the government - identified the development of youth-centred policies as remaining relevant. However, the under-secretary of MOCYS indicated this as one of the key outputs of the initiative and a key component that MOCYS is utilising to influence government decisions on youth. Although the SSYDP has been revised, **many other policies could also be revised to involve and include the needs and priorities of youth.**

## 4.2 FINDINGS ON EFFECTIVENESS

---

### 9. How many of the planned activities and outputs of the 5 components were effectively implemented?

As stated in the above section on 'challenges', the problem faced by this evaluation was obtaining consolidated reporting on the numbers of targeted individuals reached per output. Annex F provides an overview of the challenges. Another issue was that a number of targets were not quantified, operationalized, or monitored, and therefore they are difficult to make reference to. Below is a summary of the planned activities that took place and some observations on the effectiveness of these.

It should be noted that some of the activities could fit under several components, and reporting to DFATD has also changed in terms of set-up. The evaluation team decided to use the structure as provided in the logic model and output monitoring, assuming that the financial reporting also follows this structure.

#### **Component 1. Improved access to youth friendly spaces and services, including those that address the particular needs of girls and young women.**

Roughly 19% (approximately USD 1.800.000) of the total funding was allocated for this outcome. This section describes the main outputs of the programme and the effectiveness of the implementation of the planned activities.

- **Construction and rehabilitation of Youth Friendly Spaces**

Due to the enormous increase of prices of building materials after independence, the budget allowed for three out of six planned youth centres to be constructed. This resulted in a delivery rate of 50% of the target output.

Prior to the construction, an environmental screening and analysis of provision for construction was conducted. Although recommendations regarding ownership are within that document, this important component of the recommended process was not implemented. The youth centres were built by UNOPS, with coordination from the local communities in which they were being built. The local government or the community provided the land for the youth centres in all cases. The planning and construction was completed without any active involvement from youth, this is a missed opportunity to create ownership and build skills such as carpentry and brick-laying.

All centres do have at least one environmental resilience measure, such as raised ventilations, solar panels, and a rain harvesting system in Urur.

Of the three youth friendly centres that were built, one was vandalised and destroyed during the December 2013 crisis and one is no longer being used as a result of the conflict. There is no evidence of the youth or the local community attempting to continue activities.

The centre in Budi EES remains active, it holds functions such as meetings, bakery courses, and local youth use the sports field. For security reasons, it has a fence and guards. It is well maintained and



has some garden elements, planted trees, a latrine, and a kitchen to prepare meals, although it should be noted that the kitchen is in very bad condition. A generator was installed by Plan South Sudan, although the central management committee requested solar panels as their energy source. Solar panels are used widely in South Sudan and would have been a more durable solution, especially in light of the high fuel prices and ongoing fuel shortage. The main hall is rented out an average of four times a month, at the price of 150 SSP per day, which is similar to the prices of two other local venues that can be rented. The Budi youth centre also holds an HIV/AIDS referral service, and a voluntary youth centre was opened there at the end of 2014. The centre is run by a youth management committee that is fully responsible for the centre. The management committee requested some simple games and resources – such as a television – to ensure the centre remains attractive to youth.



*Youth Friendly Spaces – Soccer Field*

The rehabilitated centre in Kapoeta South was found to be in poor condition when visited by the evaluation team. In Ulang County the local authorities provided a youth friendly centre, the current state of this centre has not been assessed.

The Vocational Training Centres and agri-businesses that were established by the programme in Kapoeta South and Narus are considered to be youth friendly spaces, although no additional activities beyond VT are known to have been organised there.

Furthermore, the 150 ALP centres that BRAC opened have not been monitored, and the level of accessibility to youth of these centres could not be assessed as part of this evaluation. When the programme was initially set up and assessed it was reported that the local youth owned these ALP centres, however it is not known if this is still the case.

In Bor, CINA has maximally capitalised upon the use of already-existing youth friendly spaces. The Child Friendly Space (CFS) that CINA had previously established, separately from YouthLEAD, has become a comfort zone for children who feel out of place, distressed, and/or were unaccompanied. Many YouthLEAD activities have been organised in this CFS. Despite YouthLEAD activities taking place in these spaces, YouthLEAD was not involved in the actual construction or management of these centres.

- **Functional youth networks established**

The programme aimed for each youth friendly space to have a strong youth network and a youth-run central management committee. After four years of programme implementation the only example of

a successful and functional youth network has been observed in the YFS in Chukudum, Budi County. In Chukudum the YFS has a youth management committee that is responsible for the centre. This committee receives a small stipend, which will stop after the programme ends.

**Component 2. Improved knowledge and skills of young people in literacy, numeracy, employment and livelihoods, health, nutrition, food security, sustainable use of land and water, gender equality, and peace building.**

36% of the total programme funding (approximately USD 3.500.000) was allocated for this outcome. All of the planned activities have been implemented, although the effectiveness of the activities varied highly per programme location and IP, as presented below.

- **Accelerated learning and basic education**

The Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) was mainly implemented by BRAC South Sudan.

The ALP focuses on completing learning in a shorter period of time. ALPs are a form of complementary education. As opposed to alternative education, they have the same end-point of formal education systems but reach it in less time. The ALP is complementary both in providing an alternative route, and in matching its curriculum to the 'official' curriculum, thus allowing learners to return to formal schooling at some stage. The Government of South Sudan runs a massive ALP programme to which YouthLEAD contributed.

*"ALP is our programme, partners come as support, it was developed in 2002. We went to Bangladesh (saw girls school) then designed in context of South Sudan. So we designed it, the MOEST, not UNICEF. UNICEF helps us to implement ALP, such as through YouthLEAD"*

Odur Nelson Hussein, Ministry of Education.  
Director General for Alternative Education System

In total 6.540 youths were enrolled in ALPs and 118 youths received an informal basic education. After the unrest, the ALP component of the programme ended as it was run by BRAC, who as stated above, ended their involvement in the programme due to high security risks. The set target of youths to be enrolled in ALP was 10.000, and therefore ALP has a delivery rate of 66%. However, the reported figure of 6.540 must be reconsidered, as this only presents the enrolment rate and not the completion rate. The completion rate is expected to be 0% due to the early end of programme activities.

There was a strong focus on female participation in the ALP component of YouthLEAD, BRAC reported in May 2013 that 3.550 females were enrolled in the programme, out of 6.550 participants overall, which equals 51%. About 4% of those enrolled were reported to be CAAFAG's, although exact figures are not available<sup>4</sup>. Based on recommendations from the stakeholders, ALP classes were changed to the afternoon, which demonstrated a flexible and adaptive attitude from the partner.

---

<sup>4</sup> Only incomplete files have been delivered to the evaluation team. The destruction and hastily leave of the BRAC offices were reported causes of incomplete information.

One reported weakness of the ALP was the lack of appropriate incentives provided to teachers. According to Lemor William Joseph – the Director of Youth Training and Empowerment – MOCYS Juba: *‘They [the teachers] were unhappy with incentives and left’*

This issue with teachers was also reported by BRAC in their progress reports. Other difficulties reported by BRAC were the late delivery of materials, which resulted in a delay in ALP implementation, and the poor conditions within the actual learning centres. No further evidence from the field was gathered in relation to these weaknesses, as no fieldwork by the evaluation team took place in the areas where ALP was held.

The numeracy and literacy component of the programme, which was implemented by Plan, lasted for only three months. This course focused on the participants’ ability to read, write, and develop numeracy skills, to enable the students to participate in the training and to be better equipped to set up their own business.

- **Vocational training and business start-up**

The VT was implemented by Plan, BRAC, CDSS, and LRDA.

- 824 youths were trained in agri-business in Ulang, Nyirol, Nasir, and Nagishot;
- 924 youths received VT-skills, including tailoring, auto-mechanics, baking, and bead-making;
- youths received a two month ‘skins and hides treatment and use’ training in Kenya;
- 164 youths received entrepreneurship training.

The target set for this component was to reach 2.000 youth; therefore this component has a 96% delivery rate. However, it is important to note that 41% of the participants were above the age of 24 and therefore cannot be defined as ‘youth’ according to the definition used within the programme document.



*Nagishot Market*

Programme activities that took place in EES required a market assessment, which was conducted by CAP. The market assessment was thorough, although slightly biased towards more urban professions and less geared towards the rural context. Despite the market assessment, a very small number of courses were selected by the IPs, which caused market saturation within a very short period of time. Due to the lack of follow-up on graduates, the problem could not be quantified. According to IP staff, the issue of high competition was known to them and when individuals requested a change in courses they were told that the courses could not be changed. This lack of flexibility has seriously impacted the results of the training.

Plan SS used the BEST method to implement the courses in EES. Although Plan International reported good results from the BEST method in other regions, the business model that was implemented in this programme was weak. Hardly any post-training support was provided. Business training was not given to VT graduates but to other groups, which resulted in VT graduates without business skills and business groups without vocational skills. Furthermore, the only post-training support provided was the set-up of a few small workshops on the market, but the equipment and premises are Plan-owned and therefore this is unsustainable.

The trainers who took part in EES activities came from all over South Sudan and were, in most cases, not local and therefore not able to speak the local dialects. This is an obvious weakness as it prevented the participation of local tribe members, who were an explicit target population for YouthLEAD in EES. The one exception to this issue was the two trainers from the Narus area who conducted the bead-making course.

No official drop-out rates have been reported to the evaluators. Plan reported that, directly after the first registration, there was a high drop-out rate but no numbers were available and there were no ways to trace those that dropped out. It was furthermore reported that the majority of individuals who did not drop out, graduated.

For the agri-business sector, the drop-out rate was reported to be around 20%. This contradicts some information from government officials that states that in Narus drop-out rates were high, however no exact numbers have been captured. Reasons for leaving these courses were reported however, and these include: courses clashed with school classes, a long walk to and from classes, and also heavy rainfall.

It was noted that youth from poor families dropped out because there was no food provided during school. Plan attempted to amend this and lobbied the WFP to provide food for participants of the trainings, but unfortunately failed to obtain any. UNICEF was never informed of this issue by the IP, and Plan did not raise this issue during monitoring. This can be considered to be a missed opportunity within the programme, as food for training was provided in other parts of the country after being negotiated for in a UN inter-agency fashion.

Most of the trainings were between two to five hours per day for a period of three to four months. There were two shifts of classes per day. This facilitated the participants with two options for attendance and ensured the provision of sufficient tools for the group to work with. However, this also resulted in low training hours overall and thus very basic skills levels.

Overall, the trainings are reported to have been very much appreciated, even though few resulted in long-term income-generating activities. This was largely due to the fact that there was a lack of diversification of activities, and that most participants did not receive a start-up kit following the training, with the exceptions of the agri-business and bakery trainings.

For the agri-business trainings in Budi, the youth in Nagishot received land from the community to facilitate their agricultural activities. The training reached 48 youth within a three-week training

period. Youth were attracted from surrounding Payams, where participants sometimes had to walk for over three hours per day in order to participate. The training included the support of the local government, who provided expertise, which was appreciated by the participants. This activity started close to the programme end date, which proved problematic to the follow-up with created youth groups.



*Nagishot Crops*

The auto-mechanics and driving courses attracted many young men. In Kapoeta South the local commissioner donated a personal vehicle to facilitate the auto-mechanic course. The training resulted in a small group of newly-trained mechanics, who were then provided with roles in a very small garage run by the IP, starting with a very basic set of tools. However, this modality is not sustainable. Other participants of the training, who were not given a place in the garage, were reported to be conducting self-employed mechanical work following the end of the course. The total number of trained auto-mechanics (over 150) caused a serious saturation in the market, as Kapoeta South has very few cars. The auto-mechanic training in Narus was mentioned together with the bead-making as the most successful and as having a suitable market. Although the auto-mechanics trainings had planned for the possibility of providing apprenticeships at the end of the course, this proved difficult. If the centre managed to place graduates in existing garages (mainly run by non-South Sudanese), the skills transfer was low. The auto-mechanic group requested that Plan provide a trainer in each garage, however this request was denied due to a lack of funding.

Tailoring courses were reported to be received positively by the students, who were mostly young women. However, it is important to note that the numbers of sewing machines made available during the training were few, and as a result up to five students were required to share one machine per session. In Kapoeta South, Plan opened a small tailor shop, which is still active and generating some income, but is unlikely to become sustainable as no hand-over mechanism to the graduates is in place.

The bead-making has been a good example of where a smaller and more localised programme can be very effective. The course attracted only young women, who were trained by two local trainers. Beads are bought in the market and the women then use these to make accessories. The traditional and modern designs are sold in town and in the cattle camps. Overall, the women are very positive about the existing market for their creative products. The bead-making group reportedly remained active even after such setbacks as the theft of their beads and moneybox.



Narus bead-making group

A short baking course was provided in Budi County. The 25 participants learnt how to bake bread, sweet buns, and cakes. The market for bread, buns, and cakes was indicated to be good. However, the ingredients for the sweet buns and cakes are very difficult to buy in the market in Budi County and have become very expensive due to the recent inflation. The respondents indicated that the community members were not willing to pay more or receive a smaller bun for the same price, which immediately affected the client base and reflects a failing of this programme activity based on inflation rates. However, the respondents indicated that several participants have obtained jobs with hotels as bread-makers, meaning that the training did result in employment for some. In Kapoeta South too many bread-making groups were started which led to oversupply on the market and consequent close down of the majority of the groups.

Both Plan and BRAC offered trainings in multiple skills to the students, i.e. VT with literacy and numeracy, or an additional computer course, which is considered good practice.

The content of the VT courses was focused on urban areas and therefore was less relevant for mobile nomadic youth, who were in fact a priority target group of the programme. Attempts to include Toposa youth in the activities implemented in EES were not successful. There was an attempt to include skins and hides training, an experiment focusing on the needs and demands of the Toposa people. Unfortunately the experiment failed. Training was conducted in Kenya and facilitated by Plan SS. The training was planned for three months, but was cut short to just two months without a clear explanation as to why. The training was supposed to have a learning-by-doing approach on skin and hide conservation, but the respondents of this element of the programme reported that the factory that hosted the 6 students merely instructed the youth to watch. After returning to South Sudan they did not have sufficient skills, inputs such as the necessary chemicals, nor guidance for accessing markets, to continue the profession. The IP argued that the market for this skills area is too small, however, this was not confirmed by experts or participants.

- **Savings and Credit Cooperative Society and or village banks**

The programme intended to provide 800 participants with micro-credit and other resources (50% of those participants were intended to be young women).

*"Empty promises should be avoided to prevent frustrations in the young people, especially those who do not have little money to start a business. We say this because beside the disappointment SACCO put in us, UNICEF personnel also came to us and told us Plan is going to give some money to start with the business"*

FGD beneficiaries from the Business VT  
in Narus

In reality, 490 individuals received material support, and nobody had received micro-credit at the time of this evaluation. In detail:

- 328 youths received farm tools and seeds;
- 47 youths received small ruminants;
- 75 youths received livestock (such as chickens);
- 25 youths received bakery tools, including an oven, after the bakery training, through the youth centre in Budi;
- 9 youths received 3 sewing machines;
- Basic auto-mechanic tools and beads for start-up were also provided.

The programme had set out to stimulate self-employment and the formation of SACCOs and village banks. None of the beneficiary groups, not even the two SACCOs that were formed, are reported to have received any financial loans. Many youth refer to the promises made by the programme, of money to start their business, without clear information on interest rates, heights of loans, payback terms or when the money would become available. Confusion was expressed as to whether this was to be a loan or a grant.

One group of Toposa cattle traders were reported to be aggressive about the fact that they still had not received their money after many promises, and having raised the shares and formed a proper SACCO. As this actually concerns the intended target group, it should be regarded as a serious flaw in the programme.

Although the programme component formally has a delivery rate of 61%, the total lack of provision of micro-credit is a missed opportunity.

- **Counselling and services**

Psychosocial support was implemented by CINA and HIV/AIDS counselling was implemented by CDSS:

- 1.298 youths – mainly male – received voluntary HIV/AIDS counselling and testing at the youth centre and through creative outreach services;
- Condoms were handed out to young men only;
- 1.590 adolescents, 446 adults, and 263 children received psychosocial support;
- 60 adolescent girls received dignity kits and 140 vulnerable children received clothes;
- 44.170 adolescents and youths received HIV/AIDS information through outreach activities in schools and communities. Awareness activities included, drama, sports events, cultural dances, community sessions, and the VCT;
- UNFPA trained peer educators in GBV and HIV/AIDS, developed the Y-network and South Sudan peer education standards.

The programme intended to reach 2.000 youth for social counselling. Having reached 3.151 adolescents and children, this equates a delivery rate of around 158%. In addition, many youth were reached by awareness raising activities, for which no targets were set.

In South Sudan no reliable HIV/AIDS prevalence figures are available. The suspicion is that Budi County has one of the highest prevalence rates in EES. The suggestion was to open a voluntary counselling and testing centre for HIV/AIDS in the youth centre in Budi. In addition, 18 community

mobilisers were recruited and trained to engage in community awareness events including drama, sports-events, and community sessions. The fear of the social stigma a positive HIV diagnosis creates still proved to be too high to attract many youth for a longer period to the VCT centre. Therefore outreach activities were held. In total 1.298 youth received VCT, of which 10 tested positive and were referred to Chukudum hospital, which also holds VCT sessions, but these are not focused on youth. The counsellors appreciated their work, but the provision of testing kits was considered insufficient, as was the provision of condoms.

CINA focused more on emergency relief activities, including the provision of psychosocial support. Beneficiaries have reported CINA to be 'a safe haven', to go to 'when I'm overwhelmed'. The level and quality of the psychosocial support has not been assessed in detail, but was highly praised by respondents.

- **Reintegration services**

A small number of CAAFAG have received reintegration services in the Upper Nile and Jonglei region. Reports show that CINA has been providing long-term support to CAAFAG. This is a very intensive and high-impact approach but only reached:

- 43 CAAFAG receiving reintegration services through participating in ALP;
- 20 CAAFAG receiving ongoing support, incl. PSS, clothes, and recreational services.

The programme aimed to reintegrate 200 CAAFAG, with initial results showing a delivery of 31%, however the ALP activities stopped, therefore those CAAFAG who joined ALPs will not have fully benefitted from this activity as intended. In addition, the indicator for this output is problematic as it states 'reintegrated' however, only with long-term and intense monitoring can the final state of reintegration be determined.

- **Environmental awareness**

The YouthLEAD initiative intended to raise environmental awareness. No targets were set and in the final output monitoring no outputs were reported on, although the original PAD already included the One-Youth-One-Tree approach. The reported outputs below are taken from the annual reports of UNICEF and the IPs.

- 30 teachers were trained in tree planting;
- 5.340 tree seedlings were distributed and planted.

The chosen strategy was to train teachers in tree planting and plant trees around schools, youth friendly spaces, government buildings, and homes.

For the training a state government official was approached to conduct a three-day training to 30 teachers on how to plant and care for the seedlings in the schools. The government official was not involved in the selection of seedlings or present during the planting. The seedlings were distributed to schools just before the holiday, so almost all died during the summer. The reported trees that were planted on household premises lacked fencing and were destroyed by animals.



*'I thought I was going to train farmers. But training teachers is better. So they can teach others..... it is very difficult in Kapoeta. Many initiatives have failed already.'*

Daniel Alua

State Government EES MoA

Out of the 5,340 seedlings planted, less than 100 survived. The few trees that did survive have taken root and are likely to grow. For example, in Kapoeta South the ministry of forestry was involved in the selection of the sites where the trees should be planted. The street close to the market in Kapoeta South – next to the Governor's premises – now has 8 trees that are fenced and have grown 1,5 meters high. They are cared for from the governor's house and considered a success of the tree-planting initiative.

In addition to the tree planting, the agribusiness training raised awareness on the sustainable use of land and water through its organic approach and agronomy classes. One agribusiness participant even requested CDSS to provide some seedlings, so they could plant them. The seedlings were not yet provided.

### **Component 3. Enhanced leadership and participation capacity of young people in peace building, governance of youth initiatives and other youth-centred programming (government, civil society), and in gender-responsive dialogue and advocacy on issues that are critical to their lives**

Component three encompassed a wide range of activities, with both individual skills development and group related skills. This component received 9% of the total funding (approximately USD 900,000).

- **Peace Ambassadors**

The establishment of peace ambassadors was a trajectory led by CRS and implemented with the SPs DOT/CRN and DOM. Major activities implemented were: conducting a baseline assessment, the development of a South Sudan youth peace-building facilitation manual, training of peace ambassadors in peace-building, youth group sensitisation in peace-building, youth cultural exchanges, and youth summits. The details of each programme activity implemented are further described below.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Catholic Dioceses of Malakal (CDoM) and Torit (CDoT) undertook a baseline assessment aimed at understanding the programme context and ensuring that future initiatives were relevant. This assessment facilitated consultation and collaborative planning with key stakeholders such as youth groups, and programmes and associations of young people in the four counties of Budi and Kapoeta East in EES and Nasir and Ulang in Upper Nile State. The team consulted county authorities, churches, and local and international NGOs with programmes and activities for young people. No target was provided in the logic model for this specific activity. According to the final report provided by CRS, the activity intended to have 1 baseline completed and according to the report 1 baseline has been provided. This gives this activity a delivery of 100%.

Based on the findings from the baseline assessment, CRS developed and field-tested a youth peace-building training and facilitation manual during this programme. The content of this manual holds the vision that youth should be integrated into peace-building and that peace-building should be holistic in nature and scope. The main focus of the training manual is on the attitudes, values, and actions for appropriate relations in communities between individuals and groups.

CRS implemented a total of four peace-building trainings of peace ambassadors in the two states. The main objectives of the trainings were to promote understanding within and between youth groups from different areas and backgrounds beyond the confines of their own communities, to increase awareness and comprehension of the issues that both divide, and more importantly, unify youth. The aim was for the newly trained youth to return to their home communities with an improved understanding of the potential for cohesion in their counties in particular and in South Sudan in general. The participants were chosen from youth groups as representatives and each of the four trainings lasted for five consecutive days. These trainings were also attended by adults. The adults who participated comprised of pastors, teachers, a woman/mother, police, and an administrator nominated by the Office of the County Executive Director to participate. The programme trained 65 young people as peace ambassadors in total; this achievement exceeds the number of 60 youth planned in the proposal. Besides the training of young people, CRS also included 23 adults who received peace-building training in order to act as mentors to the trained young people during and after programme conclusion.

No targets are provided in the logic model for this specific activity. According to the final report provided by CRS, the activity intended to train 60, and according to the report 65 were trained which gives this programme component a delivery of 108%.

Among the key topics discussed were: understanding leadership, elements of governance, advocacy, youth engagement, understanding conflict analysis, stakeholder mapping, understanding violent behaviour, non-violent options, conflict handling skills, negotiation, mediation, understanding peace-building, gender, human rights, trauma, justice, mobilising and organising for peace, reconciliation, designing peace-building interventions, taking learning to communities through advocacy, and lobbying tools. Various methodologies were used to deliver the trainings. The use of local examples and the experiences of the learners kept the classes interesting and relevant. Among them were: brainstorming, discussion groups, questioning, storytelling, presenting, and real classroom teaching.

After the training, members of Kapoeta East County Youth Association embarked on an initiative for peace with the youth of the cattle camps, which they named “peace to the kraals campaign”. The association chairperson, Sylvester Meri Lomor, is a trained peace ambassador. The initiative fits within the overall efforts of young people in Greater Kapoeta to contribute to peace and development. They used their knowledge, skills, dynamism, and creativity to impress the governor’s office, which supported the initiative logistically.

Up to 20 youth groups were educated on peace-building skills in 4 counties, but no targets are provided in the logic model for this specific activity and therefore the % of delivery cannot be established.

After the peace-building training mentioned above, the trained youth ambassadors returned to their communities and debriefed their youth associations on the peace-building and conflict transformation training, as well as informing them of upcoming activities such as the youth cultural exchanges and the youth summit. Through these consultations, youth groups were given the responsibility of nominating participants for the youth cultural exchanges and summit.

Youth actively participate in cross community exchanges and joint meetings. According to the final report provided by CRS, the activity intended to have 60 participating youth. According to the monitoring report 141 youth participated and this gives this activity a delivery rate of 235%. However, no targets are provided in the logic model for this specific activity. Two activities were carried out under this output, youth cultural exchanges and youth summits. Though the target number of youth attending the exchange visits and youth summit was 60, these two activities attracted great participation and CRS was able to exceed the target number to 141 young people despite the limited funds available.

The youth exchange visits were perceived to be very successful by CRS and implementing partners. It was perceived as a great opportunity for young people from two different counties to share their life experiences, including the challenges facing them as young people. Young people have now created a network by sharing their contact details with one another, and remained in contact at the time of this evaluation.

No targets are provided in the logic model for the youth cultural exchanges. According to the final report provided by CRS, the activity intended to have 4 exchanges, and according to the report 3 exchanges took place. This gives this activity a delivery rate of 75%; however the indicated number of participants reached a delivery rate of 108%. CRS facilitated three cultural exchange visits for young people from the Upper Nile (Ulang and Nassir) and Eastern Equatoria States (Budi and Kapoeta East). The cultural exchanges brought together youth from conflicting communities with a history of revenge attacks against one another, exacerbated by cattle rustling. During this programme, three exchanges were conducted instead of the proposed four. In Eastern Equatoria State only one cultural exchange was conducted instead of two as previously planned. The youth agreed to organise one exchange visit in Kapoeta South instead of two, based on the concerns of some participants who were students who did not want to miss class. The participants mutually agreed to hold one cultural exchange, and increase the number of participants to 35 per each county instead of 15, as originally planned.

The main objective was to bring young people together from different sides of the conflict as ambassadors for peace who would denounce violence and foster a more peaceful co-existence between Budi and Kapoeta East. During this exchange, young people shared their views on how to bridge the gap that has long existed between them, through the exchange of items as a sign of friendship and through the dishonouring of violence. Some of the main outputs included the giving of tobacco by the Budi group to their counterparts, the surrendering of war shields and spears by Toposa youth, and a friendly football competition. This exchange was recalled as positive by many peace ambassadors.

In Upper Nile State CRS reported that in collaboration with CDoM they had facilitated two exchange visits in Ulang and Nasir counties. In total, 15 participants who were trained as peace ambassadors visited their peers in the two respective counties. Each exchange lasted 3 days in each location and the youth explored different opportunities of forging cordial relations among themselves. Throughout their 3-day stay in each of the two counties, the youth increased their levels of awareness and understanding of issues that threaten their unity, and also learnt the need for them

to remain undivided. On the last day of the exchange in Ulang, the youth were divided into two teams of 15 and conducted public peace awareness sessions in two different villages. The results of which showed there were great levels of interest among the youth who did not have the opportunity to participate.

No targets are provided in the logic model for the Youth Summits activity. According to the final report provided by CRS, the activity intended to have 2 youth summits, and according to the report 2 were organised, which would give this programme activity a delivery of 100%. The youth summit was the last activity under the peace-building component. The summit brought together young people through associations and groups to share their insights following the peace-building training. Activities at the camp depicted participants understanding of practical peace-building. This understanding was creatively presented through the forms of music, dance, drama, and debates on issues that potentially create violence in the community. Participants discussed how they, together with other community members, could contribute to building and maintaining peace in their community. Physical community work that involved cleaning the airfield and planting trees provided space for bonding and relationship-building between the young people. The summit provided a climax of YouthLEAD peace-building activities, as was highlighted in the baseline assessment. The main objective of the summit was to bring young people together from the two counties for a series of social events, and to build relationships between young people for a lasting peace through various activities. The summit was attended by state government dignitaries, including members of the State Peace Commission, the Ministry of Youth and Social Welfare, and a delegation from UNICEF headed by the Country Representative. CRS in partnership with DOT facilitated the summit.

Overall, the activities met the expected level of performance for the different outputs. The activities were instrumental in creating cohesion between young people from different counties.

- **Journalism and Radio Production**

The programme intended to train 60 youth, and 44 youth have been trained according to the output monitoring, which gives this activity a delivery rate of 73%. The programme furthermore intended to produce 90 peace-related radio programmes, and, according to the output monitoring, 23 radio programmes were produced in the Didinga and Taposa languages and aired on CRN radio partner stations. Additionally, UNICEF produced 6 Public Service Announcement (PSA) videos in Dinka, Juba Arabic, and Nuer languages, which were aired on SSTV. This gives this activity a delivery rate of 32%.

The radio production training was several weeks long and included reporting, production, and broadcasting. In the end the activity suffered from a period when airing was not possible, as the CRN tower was hit by lightning. The peace reporting and the organised listener groups were considered a relevant component. However, after funding for this particular component ran out, no follow-up activities were reported, and no listener surveys have been conducted.

- **Cultural Exhibits**

The programme intended to hold 30 cultural and artistic exhibits prepared and shown at local, state, and national levels. According to the output monitoring, 42 dances and dramas have been performed at county level, and 15 presentations have been given on a national level, giving this programme activity a delivery rate of 200%. Plan and CDSS have been building on existing school dance groups,

and these groups were included in the performance of peace dances. During the 'PEACE letters' dance, the letters of the word 'peace' were formed by the dancers. The respondents group reported to have performed their dances many times with good public response. In addition to this, youth performed during the International Youth Day in Juba.

- **Youth groups established and formed**

On most occasions the IPs and SPs built upon existing youth groups, as CRS reports: 'It should be noted that CRS did not establish new youth groups during this programme. It instead revitalised already-existing youth groups as the target beneficiaries of this programme. All youth who participated in this programme were selected from 22 youth associations. These associations include county youth associations, youth programmes, political youth associations, school youth associations, sport associations, and young peoples church associations. An exception has been the active forming of:

- Five county sports associations for 10 – 16 year olds formed by EE MOCYS;
- The National Youth Union and 3 youth associations, which were supported by EES;
- Peace clubs in schools: 5 schools in Kapoeta South and 5 in Narus, of which many did not last, due to lack of mentoring.

The forming of the state Youth Unions and National Youth Unions has not resulted in strong political youth groups so far. Although the structures are in place, the unions have been suffering severe instability. A lack of knowledge on how to govern Youth Unions, and the dynamics that are influencing the functioning of these groups, has led to this instability.


The programme intended to establish 6 functioning youth networks, and according to the output monitoring 15 functioning youth networks have been established, which gives this programme activity a delivery rate of 250%.

- **Advocating on issues that are critical to youth**

An important result that stems from youth speaking up as one voice and advocating for their rights, has been the review of the South Sudan Youth Development Policy and the Youth Peace Conference, leading to the formation of the EES Youth Union.

The revision of the SSYD policy (which is also part of component 4, see below) entailed 5 elements, of which the first 4 are important for making the voices of youth heard, and for giving youth the floor to participate. The carefully designed and implemented process was more important than the result for this component. In the following ways youth were provided the opportunity to make their voices heard:

1) The Youth Policy Review Taskforce was comprised of 25 representatives including youth, ministries such as MOCYS, MOEST, and the MOGCSW, commissioners, UNICEF, ILO, and other NGOs. Depending on their action plan, the taskforce held regular meetings, discussed policy issues, provided overall direction, and solved emerging problems. It had a



Secretariat Office, which was co-chaired by the National Youth Union and the Under Secretary for the National MOCYS.

2) The taskforce identified and proposed the number and distribution of its participants (both male and female); youth, line ministries, commissioners, UN agencies, NGOs, traditional leaders, and faith-based organisations among others. These were chosen from 10 states across South Sudan and they organised inter-state consultative workshops in three locations (Juba, Wau, and Malakal). A consultant, together with the taskforce, facilitated the consultations using participatory tools. Each consultation included 30 – 50 youth per workshop, with representation from all over the states, selected through a democratic process of representations from Payam level to county level.

3) There were constructive dialogues held on youth policy advocacy issues such as vocational training and youth entrepreneurship development, gender equality, and fighting against Harmful Traditional Practices (e.g. child marriage, high dowry/bride price, domestic violence etc.). Throughout the process, the voices of young men and women were very dynamic and highly influential.

4) The voices of the youth in the youth policy consultative process became the cornerstones for redrafting the policy. The draft policy was later presented at a national validation workshop that comprised national and states representatives including youth and key stakeholders (line ministries, commissioners, UN agencies, NGOs, and Faith Based Organisations).

*“...it has brought youth together to dialogue issues that concern us. And how we can deal with all these important issues. It has narrowed the gap. During the process they would gather about 30 - 50 youth forward. It is now up to the youth to hold the government accountable”*

Participant in the youth development policy, Juba

- **Eastern Equatoria Youth Peace Conference**

The conference brought together 58 youth from all eight counties of Eastern Equatoria to hold dialogue, debate, and cultivate mechanisms to enhance youth participation for peace and development. The conference guided youth in analysing their situation, allowed them to share knowledge, and enabled them to constitute their state level youth participation platform.

At the conference, the youth engaged with state governance structures including the Acting Governor, Commissioner, and Minister for Gender and Social Welfare. A key outcome of the conference was the *“Youth Communique”* which called for the creation of a dedicated youth ministry among other issues. This advocacy successfully saw the creation of the Eastern Equatoria Ministry of Youth and Sports in 2014.

The programme intended to engage 50 youth leaders in dialogue and advocacy on the needs and interests of young people according to the findings of the peace ambassadors, recent revision of the SSDYP, and the involvement of peace-ambassadors in peace-dialogues. In reality at least 150 youth leaders were engaged in these activities, which gives this programme component a delivery rate of at least 300%.

- **Life Skills Manuals**

YouthLEAD supported the development of out-of-school youth life skills curriculum guidelines. These guidelines were based upon the learner and facilitator support materials, and were created as a means to enhance the capacity of government actors (both MOEST and MOCYS) in engaging out-of-school youth in knowledge and skills-based activities that facilitate their life skills, including the resolution of conflict through non-violent ways. YouthLEAD supported the printing of the first 40.000 copies of these guidelines that will be distributed and utilised in YouthLEAD target counties and others. The product was finished in the summer of 2015 and no copies have been distributed yet, the product is awaiting completion of support materials.

**Component 4. Capacity development of youth enabling environments, including gender-responsive, youth-centred policies, programmes and services**

Component four received 11% of the total programme funding (approximately USD 1.000.000).

- **Capacity Development**

The enabling environment for youth development has been interpreted as the capacity development of ministries, CBOs, and youth groups on gender and child protection issues. Within this environment it is vital to ensure policies, programmes, and services are gender responsive and youth-centred.

The YouthLEAD initiative has mostly taken an experiential approach to achieve this component. Capacities were built through the inter-country youth policy educational trip (jointly organised with the Kenya Country Office). Kenya showcased its youth development policy and youth union structure. These inputs enriched the proposals in the South Sudan Youth Development Policy.

The actual intention of the revision of the SSYDP was to make it more youth-centred. Here, the process contributed to the capacity development of the enabling environment, as it demonstrated how to enable meaningful youth participation. UNICEF sensitised the youth policy taskforce members on child protection related issues during the development of the SSYDP.


YouthLEAD supported the development of promotion materials that included an abridged version of SSYDP, posters on various themes, banners, and flyers. Unfortunately, many of the abridged versions of these documents remained in the state government offices, where the responsible officials failed to distribute them to the counties and relevant youth groups.

Traditional capacity development was achieved in the following areas:

- National and state-level staff from the MOCYS, MOGCSW, MOEST on gender and child protection issues implemented by UNICEF;
- Trainings for CBOs on child protection, including IPs and SPs such as CINA and LRDA, and also implemented by UNICEF;
- Trainings of youth peer educators by CINA on outreach, self-protection, adolescent/youth demobilisation, and peer messaging amongst CAAFAG in Duk.

The delivery of outputs vs. targets is unclear as the outputs are measured in individuals rather than CSOs, and no target number was provided for the total number of ministries.

The programme aimed to stimulate inter-ministerial collaborations. Experiences that were reported were not necessarily different from other experiences and could not be attributed to YouthLEAD. The positive cooperation shown in the graph below was reported between the MOCYS and MOEST on national and state level, while at county level the department of social development was also closely cooperating.



- Youth - centred participatory research and studies**

During the programme many reports were produced. However, many recommendations made in these reports were not used to inform changes in the programme approach. In addition, youth were the object of study in many parts of the analysis, but were not meaningfully engaged when conducting the study, with the one exception of the youth action-research in Budi County that only started in May 2015, towards the end of the programme.

The programme intended to conduct three separate research investigations into the output monitoring reports. In reality 15 of these investigations were carried out which gives this activity a delivery rate of 500%. The effectiveness of producing such an amount of research without proper follow-up is questionable.

**Component 5. Enhanced knowledge and skills of targeted government ministries and CSOs in core management, administrative, and programming functions, including gender-responsive and environmentally sustainable programming**

Of all programme components, this component received the least (financial and human) resources. The component received 4% of the total programme funding (approximately USD 385.000).

Training related to this component was a combination of material support and courses.

- Material support to stakeholders**

The material support included the provision of computers to the MOCYS in Juba, and the CSO LRDA reported receiving computers and cameras. No numbers have been included in the final output monitoring.



- **Training**

The training courses conducted included lessons on e-record keeping. A five-day course on computer applications and electronic record management was undertaken in Kapoeta South. 30 participants (6 women) from the State Ministry of Education, State Ministry of Youth and Social Development, State Youth Union, County Authority representatives from Budi, Kapoeta South and Kapoeta East, youth groups from the three counties, as well as the YouthLEAD programme partners, LRDA, SMECOSS, and CDSS all benefitted.

Through partnership with Plan, EUREKA consultants trained over 32 staff from MOCYS, and civil society partners (LRDA, SMECOSS and youth representatives) with an intensive computer course, which also included report writing skills.

A second intensive residential course saw MOCYS, MOEST and local partners' participants trained on key management topics such as inter-personal skills, time management, coaching and mentoring, communication, and documentation management.

Additionally, MOCYS was involved in joint monitoring missions to enable them to conduct practical programme monitoring and enhance their engagement with state and county counterparts.

At state level, three *"Gender equality and Youth Participation trainings"* were held in Malakal, Torit and Bor. A total of 90 participants from key ministries, local CSOs, as well as youth group representatives from the three target states, participated. Participants were equipped with knowledge on gender awareness, gender sensitivity, and application of gender in their programmes as well as on principles of youth participation, including mechanisms to measure the quality of youth participation within their programmes.

UNICEF supported MOCYS in convening programme coordination meetings involving IPs. MOCYS also took on a facilitating role to coordinate state level youth activities. In both Upper Nile and Jonglei the meetings doubled up as "State Youth Forum" meetings providing participants with the opportunity to learn from each other and share programmatic experiences to a range of partners. There was no dedicated youth ministry in Eastern Equatoria, instead the Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare hosted the consultative quarterly meetings. However, these were challenged as the Youth Directorate was earlier moved to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology before a dedicated Ministry of Youth was created. These disruptions in governance structure in Eastern Equatoria hampered continuous and progressive coordination efforts.

YouthLEAD, together with MOEST and MOCYS, supported the development of the out-of-school life skills curriculum as a systematic way of enhancing the capacity and delivery of life-skills based education for out-of-school youth. This emerged as a collaborative initiative between Peace Building, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) and the YouthLEAD initiative in strengthening programmatic synergy. The MOEST Teacher Education training Institute in Maridi (Western Equatoria) hosted the consultative sessions and the subsequent initial outline development and related content for the Out-of-School Life Skills Manual. UNICEF supported the final design and printing of 60,000 copies of the manuals. None had been distributed at the time of the evaluation fieldwork.

While to some extent the capacities of both ministries and CSOs involved in YouthLEAD have grown, the many movements in staff positions, within and between ministries and between national, state, and county levels was given as the main cause for the slow capacity development of ministry staff.

*10. What approximate proportion of relevant beneficiary groups has been reached?*

Recent and detailed figures that are necessary to define the intended target groups are missing. As a result, the evaluation team cannot give an accurate proportion of relevant groups who benefitted from the YouthLEAD initiative. To provide some insights into the actual beneficiaries, the evaluation team calculated the number of youth aged between 10 and 24 in the respective counties and divided that number by the beneficiaries as reported by the YouthLEAD initiative.

According to the formal numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics<sup>5</sup>, the Budi, Kapoeta South, and Kapoeta East counties in EES have a total youth population of around 135.000, this means that 1.5% of the population of youth were programme beneficiaries.

It is reported that under the HIV/AIDS and peace awareness-raising activities in Budi county, 75% of youth benefitted from one or more activities.

For the ALP in Jonglei and Upper Nile, 6.450 youth originally enrolled, and the estimated beneficiary group is around 4%. The achieved target group in Duk and Twic East counties and Bor town is around 3%.

*11. To what extent have girls and other targeted sub-populations been reached?*

The targeted sub-populations can be split into three categories: gender, age and youth-at-risk i.e. pastoralist youth, youth with disabilities and out-of-school youth. As mentioned before, many different activities were implemented with different distributions in age, gender and youth-at-risk.

Where consolidated information was provided, quantifications are described in the relevant components.

- **Gender**

Involving girls and young women is still a major challenge in the South Sudanese context. All IPs reported the intention to actively include girls and young women in their programme activities, which focused on the participation of equal numbers of women and girls, although in EES no gender specific strategies were applied. IPs did not report gender distribution in the output monitoring (see annex E), so overall numbers are not calculated and these can as well be misleading as the type of activities are very different in nature. As the sampling included purposive sampling on gender, the total number of respondents is also not considered a good indicator, as girls were specifically requested to be included in the samples.

However, the VT courses participant lists and the list of KIs confirm a good gender distribution. The data shows some vocational training courses attracted different sexes. For example; the auto-mechanics VT attracted mostly men and the offering of tailoring, bakery and bead-making courses attracted mostly girls and young women. CINA reports a good balance in reaching out to girls and

---

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.ssnbs.org> Note that these numbers are published from before the December 2013 crisis, which resulted in many people the fled into EES, resulting in an increase in population.

young women as well, and reports for ALP activities by BRAC indicated almost equal participation numbers of boys and girls.

However, particularly in EES, the traditional gender norms are reported to still be very strong, and girls and young women are less likely to be selected for participation in programme activities, or to receive support from their families. This issue of gender norms is reflected through the lower participation of girls, in particular, advocacy and policy making activities saw less participation from girls. Also, the VCT services in Budi County mainly reached out towards young men. Despite this experience in EES and the recommendations made in the gender analysis report, no specific gender strategies were put in place to ensure female participation.

Overall, in numbers of participation, YouthLEAD has been successful in the inclusion of girls and young women.

In addition to a good distribution in terms of numbers, 44% of the respondents of the signification survey report that the impact of the programme has been different between boys and girls, due to the fact that both genders judge it to be easier for the other gender to obtain a job, and 56% indicate that the impact is equal, providing explanations such as that they were treated as equals during the activity and that they have the conviction that they are equal.

- **Youth-at-Risk**

Although the target group is clearly defined in the programme document, the implementing partners and UNICEF YouthLEAD initiative staff applied a wide interpretation of youth-at-risk. The following descriptions were given by respondents used during the evaluation:

- Anybody, as all lack stable education and access to income-generating opportunities;
- Demobilised child soldiers that have no opportunities when arriving in the city;
- Those that are 'ignorant and have not received any education';
- Anybody who may be considered reliant upon others – orphans, single mothers, and youth with disabilities;
- Those that are perceived as being 'idle', because they are vulnerable to engagement in harmful practices such as violent cattle raiding and thievery.

BRAC provided incomplete records of their vulnerability profiles. The overview that they did provide indicates that at least 3.960 of their ALP participants, and 500 of their agricultural training participants, were classified as youth-at-risk. BRAC reported that participants came from youth groups, women's groups, local leadership, and line ministries.

s/No	Vulnerability Factor	Activity and number of youth beneficiaries	
		ALP	Agriculture
1	Early marriage/early pregnancy	685	104
2	Demobilised soldiers	152	37
3	Returnees*	1352	219
4	Internally Displaced Persons	1151	68
5	Persons with a disability	29	6
6	Child headed family*/Single mothers*	591	66
<b>Total</b>		<b>3960</b>	<b>500</b>

CINA conducted a youth-at-risk analysis. An assessment was made on the prevalence of gender-based violence, cattle raiding, HIV/AIDS, unemployment, and children separated from families. The selection was informed by a needs assessment and indicated where the beneficiaries were located. School, clubs, and localities were identified as the most common recruiting grounds for youth-at-risk. With the help of a community watch programme, CINA identified all cases that would benefit from involvement in the programme activities.


The intended target group for the VT activities in EES was barely reached, as all the defined youth-at-risk categories were dropped – without official agreement from UNICEF or the donor – with the exception of out-of-school youth. The VT used inappropriate means of attracting participants. Registration was made known through community mobilisation and by public announcement. This attracted youth and young adults from all sorts of backgrounds and areas, including a relatively high number of youth from other states who were informed by their families. All youth were accepted, even in-school youth for whom weekend classes were organised. As stated above, the VT providers did not make additional efforts to attract youth-at-risk as defined in the programme document (street children, youth with disabilities, etc.) and therefore their participation was minor. Nomadic youth rarely participated, which created discontent within communities and the local government.

For the peace ambassadors, selection criteria included living in the county they were representing, a willingness to work for peace, contacts with grassroots stakeholders, and appreciation of the importance of youth empowerment. Ambassadors also needed to be nominated by their youth association, and have a reference from local leaders. Despite this careful selection, the intended target group was not prioritised.

- **Age**

None of the IPs reported age as a leading selection criterion, although the programme explicitly states that there is an age bracket of 10 – 24 years. Plan reported that they adapted the definition of youth as set by the youth policy, which goes up to 35 but no formal approval for this change from UNICEF or the donor was found. Below is an overview of the age categories of the respondents.

Note: the sports activities are underrepresented in the data, which include younger children.




Overall, the programme has not been effective in reaching its intended target groups in terms of vulnerability and age. There were especially disappointing results for the economic empowerment activities, and this was due to a lack of technical capacity and know-how among both IPs and UNICEF programme staff, on the economic strengthening of children and reaching adolescents-at-risk.

**12. What is the perception of programme participation by beneficiaries, local authorities, and other stakeholders?**

The programme worked from the top-down, which promoted inclusive activities for youth. At the start of the programme, some stakeholder meetings were organised, to identify the programme locations. After this initial stage, little or no regular monitoring meetings were organised.

Overall, the respondents, including local and state government staff, youth, SPs, and IPs, stated that they were not included in the programme design and that there has been little flexibility in changing the programme activities. During programme implementation, the interaction between IPs and SPs with local and state governments to implement and plan activities was better.

The participation of local government and chiefs has been mostly limited to assisting in the mobilisation of youth. Government officials have reported the following contribution towards YouthLEAD. Note that one respondent can have reported more than one contribution.



The EES State Government and Upper Nile State Government have been reported to have taken a proactive role in organising the peace conference in Torit and the gender trainings for ministries in Malakal, which were both supported by YouthLEAD.

**13. What key internal and external factors have influenced the programme’s ability to achieve the immediate outcomes and how responsive has the programme been to these?**

The internal and external factors reported by all stakeholders include insecurity, poor infrastructure such as bad roads, poor weather conditions, and weaknesses in the functioning of IPs and SPs.

The security crisis in 2013 did influence the implementation of programme activities to a large extent. After the violence in 2013 Plan evacuated their staff, and only continued their programme activities after security was re-established. BRAC staff was evacuated and their offices were demolished. BRAC and UNICEF indicated their wish to relocate activities. It is unclear why the request to relocate went unacknowledged. UNICEF programme management reported that a letter requesting relocation was sent to CIDA, but that they did not respond to its relocation request. UNICEF has not provided the evaluation team with evidence of their communication attempts with CIDA<sup>6</sup>, and UNICEF senior management did not confirm such letter was sent. The CP section has requested YouthLEAD to relocate in support of the reintegration programme of CAAFAG, but the request was not responded to by the programme manager.

In South Sudan the rainy season starts in May and lasts until September. Rain can become so heavy that roads become inaccessible and as a result some participants were unable to travel to the programme locations. Although this is considered a difficulty, it can hardly be noted as unexpected, yet no planning occurred for this likelihood.

The qualities of the IPs and SPs provided the programme with expertise on ALP (BRAC), BEST model (Plan), CINA's close connection and experience with vulnerable youth, and CDSS' long presence in the programme communities. Unfortunately, the lack of experience in working with the intended youth-at-risk of most IPs' and SPs' staff had a direct impact upon the reaching of the target group.

In addition, the underperformance of SMECOS regarding the setting up of the SACCOs and providing micro-credit severely affected the effectiveness of the programme. SMECOS is an implementing partner of Plan and was responsible for providing the entrepreneurship training in Narus. At the end date of the programme, no loans had been given out and the participants that had started a SACCO had not been provided with any guidance or support. Neither SMECOS Juba nor Plan took responsibility for these failings in terms of quality and follow-up. In one instance, the evaluation team was even told NOT to visit a village group in Kapoeta South, because participants were so angry that it might create a security threat.

This evaluation also discovered that understanding of economic programming was generally very weak among IP staff. While a market scan revealed a long list of promising sectors, in the Plan-run VT centre only four VT courses were actually offered throughout the duration of the programme. For example, 150 youth were trained in car mechanics, while there are only around 100 cars in Kapoeta. More diversification, post training support and business mentoring was required. There was an attempt to address the failure of graduates to embrace new livelihoods by the creation of workshops run by the programme where people could learn skills such as tailoring, but these workshops were far too small and did not have the capacity to empower the participants. Trainers and staff seemed to be aware of the problem of oversaturation of similar market-skills, but they commented that there was no space or funds available to implement the necessary changes.

---

<sup>6</sup> Note: that CIDA has not provided information for this evaluation despite many requests.

In EES foreigners dominate the market, especially in Kapoeta South where Ugandans and Kenyans are the biggest investors in the market. Apprenticeships are difficult to find, and if someone is placed in one, it is unlikely that s/he will receive proper training, as they are often perceived as a threat by other staff. Overall, this component of the programme has faced serious challenges, and with the lack of good programme management capacities available, the IPs merely continued to implement failing activities.

This evaluation highlighted the lack of understanding of key players on issues specifically related to working with the target groups, in particular issues of sensitivity related to people of nomadic origin, and different genders.

This evaluation furthermore found that there was a lack of logistical skills among YouthLEAD partners. Many programme activities were hampered by the late arrival of supplies and goods. The ALP began later than planned because learning materials did not arrive in time and some VT began without the materials. Resources such as beads for the bead-making course, condoms, and the VCT test kits were often not available, and the seedlings for the tree-planting activity arrived so late that they were planted at a time when no one was able to care for them.

Some of the above factors were actually already known to the donor, IPs and SPs before the programme began and they were included in the risk assessment, yet no appropriate design was created for them or implemented.

#### *14. Has monitoring been done effectively and programme activities adapted accordingly?*

The programme began with good intentions by designing the logic model to include a programme monitoring framework, with some innovative participatory tools. In addition to the PMF, a baseline survey was conducted and targets were (mostly) set.

The PMF included – but was not limited to - the following data sources, tools, and timing:

Progress monitoring reports	Field visits, observations and FGD with beneficiaries and partners	Quarterly
Programme review meeting reports	Programme review meeting	Bi-annual
Annual reports	Annual work plan review and succession plans	Yearly
Mid-term review report	Desk review and quick survey Mid –term review	In the middle of programme
Final evaluation report	Final programme evaluation	At the end of the programme
Newly formulated policy and programme documents	Observation check lists on availability of youth related policies and programmes	Bi-annual
Reports on policy revisions and/or formulations	Informant interview on policy gaps	Bi-annual

Reports on satisfaction and participation of youth in policies, programmes and services	FGDs with target beneficiaries on satisfaction and participation of young people on policies, programmes and services	Annual
Literacy survey report	Literacy test/ literacy survey among 10-24 year olds	In the middle and end of the programme
KAP survey report on HIV/AIDS	HIV/AIDS KAP survey among 10-24 year olds	In the middle and end of the programme
Targeted ministries and CSOs' capacity gap assessment report	Appreciative Inquiry methodology	At the beginning and end of the programme
Target ministries and CSOs programme impact report		
Records of reintegrated young people by the year 2013/14	Document review on records of reintegrated young people	Quarterly
Monitoring reports	FGD with reintegrated young people on their satisfaction/dissatisfaction	Bi-annual After the end of the programme
Audience survey report	Audience survey	Quarterly
Training proceedings	Taking part in the training activities and audio and video recording	Quarterly
Scripts prepared, edited and transmitted on radio	Reviewing radio programmes	Bi-annual

Unfortunately the majority of monitoring activities have not been followed up on, with the exception of some field visits and general monitoring reports. The MTR was conducted in May 2013, just before the crisis. After the crisis no structural monitoring or adaption of the PMF was done.

One of the reasons progress monitoring was reportedly challenging is that the youth population is mobile and has been since the crisis in 2013. However, once this was known, appropriate tools should have been put into place. There were no surveys conducted to track achieved targets (increased awareness, people employed, behavioural changes, etc.). Finally, no collation of annual numbers and also no collation of final numbers were conducted. Therefore, it can be concluded that neither learning nor adaption has taken place based on basic programme monitoring.

#### *15. How can some of the challenges be creatively resolved for future interventions?*

The most vital improvements to be made for similar programme in the future are:

- Implement short-cycled monitoring of programme activities by continuous capture of short narratives and significant data;
- Revise and adjust the programme activities based on emerging patterns and agree with a mandated committee to adjust the programme where needed;
- For tracking programme impact, a simple database can be created with a tracking system of beneficiaries;
- Include staff with stronger economic programming backgrounds (in UNICEF and IPs);
- Include staff with stronger experience in working with the intended target groups, especially those who are nomadic.



- Include contingency planning to allow maximum flexibility, such as relocation, in highly unpredictable contexts such as South Sudan

---

#### 4.2.1 LESSONS LEARNT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUTHLEAD

---

All planned activities have been implemented, although some of the set targets were not reached. The circumstances within the South Sudan context have been difficult and this may go some way to explain the unreached goals. However, quality in **monitoring from all stakeholders involved has been below the usual and necessary standards**. This has prevented any potential opportunities to learn from mistakes made in this programme, as well as any chances to adapt programme activities during the implementation phase that were not effective, or provide follow-up to potential successful programme elements.

There are large populations of the intended target groups in the selected states, but most strategies **lacked the focus on the inclusion of the intended target groups**. In particular the VT did not respond to the intended target groups. Positive exceptions to these failings include the activities held by CINA and the EES peace-conferences that developed strategies to include the intended target group in their activities.

There was **no agreed definition of the target group**, and no follow-up from UNICEF on this; BRAC did report on vulnerability profiles, but no information was gained as to what extent participants were structurally selected on the profile. Also, a large number of participants were above the age of 24.

In addition to the intended target group, no specific gender strategies have been implemented to reach girls and young women. This is particularly poignant in EES where traditional gender norms are very prominent; the intention to work with girls was not sufficient. The general view **among participants and IPs has been that gender is only about equal numbers in participation**, while this is in fact only one indicator of gender equality in a programme. The girls and young women that were reached by the programme within the VT and peace-building components benefitted from their involvement, and in particular some reported that speaking out in front of their (national) government was transformational.

There was a **high diversity of largely unrelated** programme **activities** and also the approaches were different per location, which adversely affected the original programme plan to apply a uniform approach.

**The building of the YFSs was very expensive and risky in highly volatile areas.** Youth management committee members in Chukudum do assume the responsibility of managing the centre and show a sense of ownership, however skills provision for managing the youth friendly centres has been very basic. Therefore the long-term success of the management of the centre remains to be seen.

The YFS in Bor also had more possibilities to develop due to the availability of services and partners in the state capital compared to in Chukudum, which has remained marginalised for a long time, resulting in few referral services. However it is important to note that the Chukudum hospital offers

more than just HIV/AIDs services, and does actually also provides specialised care for girls and women.

The **VT courses were highly valued by the participants**, which indicates that VT is worthwhile and in high demand. The fact that the opportunity to learn a second skill was offered was considered good practice. At the same time, the effectiveness of the VT could be enhanced significantly considering the following observations on course design and organisation:

- Courses are short and offer basic skills only, therefore limiting the potential of conveying more advanced skills;
- Planning with regards to the supply of goods and materials was often poor e.g. late arrival of beads and ALP course materials delayed the start of the trainings.
- Courses were not market responsive
- There was too little diversification leading to high levels competition.

To ensure that graduates can use their skills, **post training support is needed** including start-up support, microfinance, business training, and long term mentoring.

Due to the lack of capacity of Plan and its service provider, **SACCOs were non-functioning** and participants were upset because promises were made but not kept.

The **activities implemented by CRS and DOT were the most effective** (note that the results in Malakal have not been reported). The set of activities under the peace ambassadors was comprehensive and highly intensive. Participants noted they were the first youths in their two counties to be involved in such a manner in peace building dialogues. The cultural exchange sparked a lot of interest, and government officials have referred to it positively, although some misunderstanding regarding the intention was noticed.

The **media and journalism** trainings did produce a number of radio programmes in Taposa and Didinga languages that were aired. The continued lack of local/community radio since the airing of these programmes has meant the **effect of the training was a one-off**.

The **youth policy was revised in a highly participatory manner**, where the youth were at the centre. The produced booklet with the abridged version of the draft SSYDP was meant to be distributed from the state level; however it went largely unread and the evaluation team found it still in its original boxes. Overall, the **communication and dissemination to state and county levels did not occur**, so the effects on a county level were limited, even to those directly involved in the policy-making process. Also, the SSYDP has still not been passed in parliament, and is again going through a participatory process at the state level. This delay seems to be a result of political procedure rather than of opposition to its contents, as well as the fact that the country is essentially in the middle of a very violent conflict and thus many non-defence-related issues have not been prioritised.

The revision of the SSYDP has been considered an **effective experiential example of capacity development** of national ministries in the involvement of youth.

The **forming of both the State and the National Youth Unions has been a challenging process and lacked longer-term support.** Currently, both are considered as practically inactive and political dynamics influence their functioning. The YouthLEAD initiative programme underestimated the risks of politicising the formation of youth groups under the ministry. Youth are an important electoral power and therefore the democratic processes are highly susceptible to inappropriate politicisation or corruption. The lesson learnt by this is to ensure the independent status of a youth group in the future, and ensure programme staff have the expertise and skills to develop and implement appropriate strategies for establishing youth groups.

The more formal trainings on gender and child protection were recalled as successful by ministry staff and the CSOs did report that they appreciated these trainings, and stated that they had gained skills to improve their work. **Training of ministry staff remains a challenge because of the many movements in staff positions,** within and between ministries, and between national, state, and county levels.

During the KIs little reference was made to the core management training. Government officials did respond positively to the received trainings and some CSOs appreciated the trainings.

**Youth were not involved in activities that they could have easily been included in** and benefitted from, such as the building of their youth friendly centres. Also, youth were not involved in the steering committee for the programme, or any implementation of diagnostics and research such as the baseline study and the gender report, nor the monitoring of the programme.

The peace-ambassadors trajectory has had a transformational character and the youth that were involved emerged as youth leaders. These **role models** are still part of other peace dialogues. The creation of role models could have been made more explicit in the programme design and therefore be more capitalised upon during follow-up activities.

The approach to peace building was mostly conducted through explicit strategies. CDSS applied **creative ways to integrate the peace message** in each activity. For example, in the VT agribusiness course, the participants were brought from different Payams and the activity was used to stress the need to co-exist and focus on a productive relationship. The sports activities have also been proof of that. The lesson learnt is that the integration of peace messaging has contributed to the holistic approach of the programme and that additional results can be reached without necessary additional activities or funds.

#### 4.3 FINDINGS ON IMPACT

---

The programme was implemented over a period of 4 years and many activities were not implemented for longer than six months. Assessing the impact is therefore a challenge and largely depends on the expert knowledge of the evaluation team.

##### *16. To what extent has the programme reduced the vulnerability of boys and girls at risk to engage in conflict and harmful practices?*

The results show that respondents feel that the programme has to a large extent contributed to the reduction of their vulnerability. However, this evaluation must emphasise that a large number of the

intended target groups, especially those with higher vulnerabilities, were not reached by the programme, particularly by the VT activities.

- The team has identified the following areas of reduced vulnerability:
- Some male participants aged 17 – 28 in the VT indicated beforehand that they had been involved in cattle raiding, alcoholism, and other harmful practices in their towns, but following the VT they now have the work skills and opportunities to be more productive people in their communities. It is questionable for those participants trained in VT that have not been able to start generating income – either through employment or self-employment - if the behaviour change will last.
- Some youth have been protected against conflict and harmful practices as they were CAAFAG, they were rescued and reintegrated by CINA and UNICEF Child Protection's efforts.
- The peace-building activities held by DOT contributed to the formation of a core youth group that work with youth-at-risk and avoid conflict escalation by participating in peace dialogues.

#### *17. To what extent have youth friendly spaces and services empowered young people?*

The only active youth friendly space is in Chukudum, Budi County. The building is run by a youth management committee that rents out the space and uses it for gatherings and sports activities. The management committee requested some simple games and resources from the IPs– such as a television – to remain attractive to the youth.

The centre will need to survive on the small income it makes from renting its spaces after the programme closes down, but no sustainability plan has been made and the youth have not been capacitated – except for being provided with a management manual – to develop the centre any further.

The youth friendly services, such as HIV/AIDS awareness and voluntary testing services have empowered youth in Budi, which is where the only functioning youth friendly space remains. This space did empower the youth management committee and helped them to get organised.

In Jonglei, the youth friendly spaces run by CINA have been mostly a comfort zone for children who found themselves out of place, distressed, and unaccompanied. Care is probably more significant than the level of empowerment in this case.

#### *18. To what extent has ALP raised the education levels and future prospect of the youth?*

ALP is part of the MOEST strategy as an effective means to raise education levels.

*“Youth rejoined the armed groups, even those in ALP, if they could have finished we could have won them, now we lost them. Many joined armed groups. 80 000 ALP students dropped out in 2014 due to the conflict”.*

Odur Nelson Hussein 28/05/2015 –  
Ministry of Education. Director General for Alternative Education System

The 6.400 plus youth enrolled in ALP in Jonglei and Upper Nile found that the programme was stopped halfway through. The expectation is that levels of education have improved, although some weaknesses were identified in the overall effectiveness of ALP. The effect of the disruption in

education through the complete halt of the programme is expected to be large, and will probably lead to a return to functional illiteracy.

Due to the lack of competencies in the ALP implemented by Plan, this programme was not introduced in EES. The combined basic literacy and numeracy course was only designed to support the set-up of micro businesses, and did not have the objective to raise education levels.

**19. To what extent have income and career opportunities for youth increased?**

The degree to which career opportunities have increased is difficult to quantify as no monitoring or follow-up to graduates of VT has been conducted. Given testimonies from both Kapoeta South and Narus, the bead-making, bakery, tailoring, and auto-mechanic VTs have provided participants with some skills, although graduates suffered from saturation of the market and some of the taught skills have been indicated to be more suitable in urban rather than rural areas.

The agribusiness training has the potential to provide income-generating opportunities, but due to the late start of activities, progress needs to still be observed. Challenges include the limited access to markets, especially in the case of perishable goods, and the distance of the crop fields – a two-hour drive and at least a four-hour walk - to surrounding communities.

Overall, the youth appreciated the trainings and they reoriented their minds towards production. It provided them with hope, but the quality of the economic strengthening work needs to improve significantly to really create career opportunities leading to sustainable livelihoods.

*“They are not fully empowered by the project, but their understanding of economic opportunities has really increased.”*

Executive Director, Kapoeta East County.

**20. How successful has the initiative been in increasing environmentally sustainable livelihoods and broader environmental awareness?**

The need for environmental awareness was an important element of the programme. Over 5.000 seedlings were distributed and many have been planted. That activity has raised some awareness on taking care of the environment. However, because less than 100 trees survived, the long-term impact is expected to be small. Although the potential benefits of tree-growing are enormous for alimentation, shade, protection against erosion, and aesthetic improvement, it is unlikely that these lessons have been taught.

The programme has so far not had an impact on increasing environmentally sustainable livelihoods. The agribusiness in Budi just began and most plants are still young, therefore measuring results on sustainable livelihoods at this stage would not be realistic. The agribusiness in Budi has an organic approach, meaning that they have not used chemicals, and it is therefore environmentally friendly.

**21. To what extent are there more opportunities for the voices of youth to be heard in society and in the media?**

The opportunities for youth to be heard in society vary greatly in character. The following opportunities can be attributed to YouthLEAD:

- The core group of peace ambassadors that participated in the DOT programme activities have become role models and are still invited to join peace dialogues held between communities and even cross-border peace dialogues.
- The youth policy development process contributed in a very positive way to the voices of youth being heard, and also valued. This also resulted in youth approaching local and state government officials to claim their rights and express their needs. Currently, youth from states that had not previously been heard from are contributing to policy on a state level.
- The youth policy process also resulted in the forming of the National Youth Union. Unfortunately political dynamics entered the union. The union in its current state is not considered to be an independent platform for all youth.
- The youth union in EES also did not produce a strong voice for the youth, due to political interference and a lack of self-organisation. See more on this in the response to question 23.
- Many youth groups already existed on a local level and YouthLEAD have provided them a national platform to contribute to the youth policy.
- International Youth Day already existed, but youth have taken the opportunity to make their voices heard through various other ways, including providing workshops.

- **Youth in the media**

The programme facilitated the peace-radio production and 23 productions were made in several languages, including Taposa and Dinka. After the activity stopped, the production stopped as well. The virtual non-existence of community radios in the region makes it difficult to sustain these voices in the media in other ways.

On a positive note one participant, a young female Toposa, has been hired by Radio Emmanuelle and continues her radio work and the inclusion of youth in radio programmes.

*22. To what extent are youth leading efforts in peace-building, dialogue, and advocacy for peace?*

The evaluation team did not observe youth leading efforts in peace-building, dialogue, or advocacy for peace as a result of the programme. Some individuals remain active in their attempts however, as they are invited to peace dialogues, or through their participation in the dissemination and distribution of the SSYDP.

*23. To what extent are youth more organised?*

Overall, the organisation of youth has been lacking in this programme. Many youth groups were already in existence and did not profit from capacity development activities. The newly formed youth unions lack good governance practices in terms of transparency and accountability.

The development of organisational skills was mostly attributed to the sports and entrepreneurship activities. These activities actively stimulated and contributed to the strengthening of the group dynamic. The sports teams have a very low-threshold to develop organisational skills yet in most teams youth leaders emerge and they are likely to be included in future events.

*24. To what extent are youth involved in policy development and advocacy?*

At the national level youth are more sensitised to issues and do advocate for their common interest. They have willingly attended youth conferences where they contributed to the revision and

completion of the SSYDP. Although youth were selected from across the counties, the interaction was organised on a state and national level. Hence, the criticism is that the policy development did not include the counties.

In EES the Ministry of Youth and Sports is currently working with youth to produce a strategic plan for the ministry. They would not have advocated or produced such a plan with the participation of youth from all 8 counties without the existence of YouthLEAD.

With the exception of the EES Ministry of Sport, youth have not been actively involved in other policy development processes. In the closing speech of the Undersecretary of MOCYS, youth were warned of the difficult dynamics in politics and were encouraged to join 'more productive' activities.

#### *25. To what extent did policies, strategies and services become more youth-centred?*

The revision of the SSDP contributed to that particular policy being more youth-centred. In addition the strategy development for the MOCYS in EES has led to the organisation of several sessions to ensure the inclusion of youth voices. For other policies, no clear evidence was found that they have become more youth-centred as a result of YouthLEAD. To a good extent, policies, strategies, and services have become youth-centred after the creation of an independent ministry at the national level for Culture, Youth, and Sports. In some states there are ministries for youth and sports.

The MOCYS receives the least amount of government funding of all ministries, which shows that the national and county governments are not prioritising youth services. While CIDA is appreciated for having provided some funds that supported a generally underfunded ministry – the lack of government budget allocation to youth remains problematic and questions sustainability.

#### *26. To what extent did policies, strategies, and services become more gender responsive?*

Overall, the concept of gender issues has been understood as merely the need to focus on including an equal number of female and male participants. Gender equality should however also focus on men and women being viewed as equally valuable in terms of rights, services, and in decision-making.

Although the gender policy of the MOGCSW has been revised with the support of UNICEF, overall services, strategies, and policies have not shown greater gender responsiveness.

#### *27. To what extent have the capacities and functionality of the targeted ministries increased?*

The targeted ministry staff gained some knowledge and skills through the trainings and the youth policy revision process (see paragraph effectiveness component 4 and 5). However, the activities did not reach a critical number of people to achieve an overall improvement across entire departments. In addition, most staff that were trained did not remain in the ministries as the system is transferring staff from one ministry to another. While individual capacities will be taken with them to some extent, institutional functionalities have not really improved. Equipment provided did strengthen functionality of some ministries.

The programme did encourage interaction and cooperation between line ministries, although no change in cooperation was attributed to the programme by the government staff. The involvement

and collaboration of both MOEST and MOCYS from the onset to final development of the out-of-school life skills manual is reported to have enhanced collaboration between both ministries and provided them with a tool for effective roll out of large scale life skills based education for youth.

**28. To what extent have the capacities and functionalities of the local CSOs increased?**


The functionality of the CSOs was increased somewhat through material support, i.e. staff were given salaries, offices were supplied with computers and other office equipment, and cars and motorcycles were provided to community mobilisers for easy movement.

Functionality also increased through the provided capacity development. In particular, the CP training was mentioned as being helpful by LRDA and CINA in particular.

There has been no follow-up from the programme as to what extent these trainings were integrated in the practice of the CSO's activities and no clear evidence was found that the CP strategies were changed as a response to the capacity building activities.

**29. How successful has the programme been in boosting ministerial representatives' ability and willingness to advocate and engage with youth?**

Overall, the government officials' response on a county, state, and national level has been very positive, most officials refer to the potential of youth to contribute to society. However, the culture of youth not being taken seriously, and being considered mostly 'the producers of problems' still hampers a real transformation for youth to be included.



**30. What unintended outcomes have resulted from the programme?**

During the field research some unintended outcomes were mentioned. These include:

- **Do-No-Harm**

As stated, the programme did not include a conflict or a Do-No-Harm analysis and has not been monitoring Do-No-Harm indicators, while international good practice stresses the need for this when operating in a high conflict context, as was the case of this programme. As no post-activity participant monitoring has taken place, and the planned perception surveys were not conducted, it has been impossible for this evaluation to assess the unintended positive or negative impact of the programme systematically.



However some issues arose clearly in terms of Do-No–Harm, such as that the programme might have increased the difference between Toposa youth and other youth in terms of economic status, as the programme failed to include this target group.

- **ALP and VT participants**

The ALP and VT activities attracted participants from unexpected groups – such as in-school youth who switched to ALP, and youth residing in other states. By joining YouthLEAD, these youth were better off as schooling was free under ALP and came with incentives, such as textbooks and start-up kits.

- **Reduced cattle raiding**

On a positive note: The peace dialogues between communities in Budi county, and with EES, and the production of peace radio, have addressed the issue of cattle raiding. Although the raiding has not stopped altogether, over the past years it has reduced considerably. This has partly been attributed through the MSC process to YouthLEAD in two ways: youth have become more occupied and have another focus and means of income, and the peace-agreements that were stimulated between counties during the organised peace-dialogues have reduced the desire to raid. In addition, the activities have encouraged open communication on the topic of cattle raiding and the lowering of dowries, which is considered one of the driving factors behind cattle raiding. However, the fact that pastoralist communities have hardly been engaged with economic activities, the actual causal relation expressed by stakeholders between economic activities and reduction in cattle raiding cannot be confirmed and is unlikely.

---

#### 4.3.1 LESSONS LEARNT ON THE IMPACT OF YOUTHLEAD

---

The duration of YouthLEAD was only 4 years and many of the activities were only implemented for 6 months. This makes the chances of creating long-term impact limited.

To achieve the holistic and integrated approach as was intended, the pilot programme had a **large spread both in terms of geography, type of activity, and total numbers of participants, which resulted in rather low intensity of work**. Many activities were of a formative character, such as ALP, VT, and policy development, but innovative approaches and processes were applied.

During the programme many potential successes for impact were created. Many activities that did result in initial **positive results have not been properly monitored or followed up on**, and are therefore unlikely to really flourish.

The programme has been able to create **some pockets of impact**, especially regarding the provision of youth with new skills and related hopes for their futures, the creation of youth leaders in peace building, and the establishment of a more intensive approach towards psychosocial support. There have been many small potential successes, which still need a lot of care before being able to translate this into impact.

The **impact on economic strengthening was very limited** due to the lack of post-training support and the provision of skills training in areas not actually in demand in the markets. These activities mainly created hope for the future, but only for some highly motivated and talented graduates did it actually result in an increase in income.

The impact of the creation of Youth Friendly Spaces is the improved access to youth friendly services. This **improved access to youth friendly services has been very limited**, especially because two of the three spaces are not active anymore. However, the youth management committee in Budi does show a **good level of ownership** and leadership skills. The space generates some income through the renting out of the main hall, however this is not sufficient for long-term sustainability.

The traditional capacity development activities for the ministries have been appreciated, but no wider application of these within the programme, or spin-offs of the trainings, has been observed. The more **experiential approach of the SSYDP created an impact by creating broad awareness** on the possibility to include youth in policy development, and also impacted the EES government through the formation of the MOCYS for EES.

#### 4.4 FINDINGS ON SUSTAINABILITY

---

The sustainability of the programme is hard to predict. The programme was set-up as a pilot programme and many activities were short term and experiential. The lack of follow-up to the programme participants further complicates the likely impact.

##### *31. How effectively has UNICEF coordinated with other key actors to ensure that further building blocks and partnerships on youth development and participation are in place?*


Recently UNICEF has revised its country programme structure and renamed the education section to the Education and Adolescent Development Section. This will see more of a focus on targeted education interventions for out-of-school adolescents and increased support towards the broader involvement of young people in social dialogue and community initiatives.

Capacity development of the MOCYS has been relatively successful and provides building blocks for the future, as well as the Youth Policy. However, further partnerships with other line-ministries relevant for youth programming are required, especially with ministries of Gender, Labour and Commerce.

The programme had no exit strategy and therefore most services and structures are likely to disappear after the closure of the programme. However, the lessons learnt could be used to improve future youth programming which is highly relevant and highly appreciated by the youth and stakeholders.

##### *32. To what extent have the stakeholders, especially youth, taken a lead in the planning, implementation, and decision making of the programme?*

In the early stages of the programme youth were invited to co-design the programme. This was reported by a majority of the government respondents as shown by the chart below.



Unfortunately, most of the youth that were involved during the later stages of the programme have had little or no influence on programme monitoring or implementation. VT courses were selected by the IPs, locations were identified in Juba, and for example, the action-research was not identified as a priority. Some youth have actively approached the SPs and IPs, but without success. In addition, as the result of some activities, recommendations for actions were proposed. There has been no follow-up on these recommendations, mostly due to lack of funds.

The IPs and SPs reported mainly that ‘this is the programme, it cannot be changed’. There has been no structured method for dealing and adapting to changes based on the needs of participants in the programme, IPs, SPs, or UNICEF.

***33. Overall, how successful has the initiative been in increasing on-the-ground ownership to deliver and maintain broad youth participation, development, and other related components?***

Overall, government ownership, especially at the national level has been high. For example, the MOEST explained clearly that the ALP component of the programme was contributing to the existing ALP programme of the GRSS. At state and local level commissioners, and MOCYS and other government representatives have been informed and regularly visited programme sites.

The MOCYS confirms that the work conducted under YouthLEAD is part of their responsibility and that the activities and infrastructure of the programme have provided them with support to implement youth-focused policies. YouthLEAD did provide the ministries on the county, state, and national level with forms and processes for the inclusion of youth and the development of VT and HIV/AIDS awareness activities.

However, as reported the trainings and capacity development activities have not (yet) shown impact in terms of broader youth participation in activities beyond the YouthLEAD programme activities.

Finally, national ownership includes ownership of civil society organisations. While some one-off trainings were delivered, none of the local organisations have been empowered enough to take over the programme activities and to continue the work of youth empowerment.

*34. What is the likelihood of youth groups and youth centres continuing to function after the closure of the programme?*

Under the programme there were only small groups of active youth formed and these were on very different levels in terms of their stability and efficiency, but most were built on existing youth groups. Only one out of the 6 planned youth centres is operational.

- **Low sustainability**

Within the YouthLEAD initiative none of the formed youth groups have gained the sufficient governance skills needed to maintain an active youth group. In addition, no groups reported trying or succeeding to secure any forms of follow-up support from the IPs. Based on this information and the fragile state of the youth groups, the overall expectation is that the continuation of their functioning is unlikely.

An example of this low sustainability is that of the Youth Union on both the EES state and national level which is performing very poorly and will most likely cease to exist or will be incorporated into the youth union of the current leading political party. Moreover, most attempts to form SACCOs were never really able to get off the ground and because of that many participants had already dropped out.

- **Medium sustainability**

A few groups that formed under YouthLEAD were very active, but have only been in existence for a few months. However, with the ending of YouthLEAD activities and the ending of financial support from the IPs, the sustainability of these groups is uncertain.

An example of such a group is one small set of women who formed a jewellery-making initiative after they had received the bead-making training. A local teacher is part of the group and is a positive force behind the group. Although they have suffered some setbacks, such as the late delivery of beads and the theft of their beads, money box, and sugar, they have continued their work. Currently, their small business is going well and the expectation is that if the market remains open, this group will continue.

There were two other business groups also formed after the VT in auto-mechanics and tailoring and these opened, as a group, a basic garage and a small shop for tailoring respectively. These small initiatives have survived several months and are likely to remain open with their business.

The youth management committee that runs the centre in Budi might continue as the participants have been working there for some years and are able to generate some small income through the renting out of the main hall.

- **High sustainability**


The group of peace ambassadors that was trained in EES have gained many valuable skills as individuals. Through the process of their training they have developed an informal group, and they are expected to continue their role as youth leaders and representatives of youth in peace dialogues. In addition, the sustainability of the youth sports groups and local sports events are likely to

continue, although the youth who participate in these expect equipment such as new footballs to be delivered by UNICEF. There is no plan to meet this need and therefore this may have implications for the sustainability of some sports groups.

**35. To what extent have relationships between local stakeholders and youth improved?**

Overall, the relationships between youth and their local governments, and youth and their communities have been improved. This is mostly due to the fact that youth have been enabled to demonstrate their capacity to be productive members of the community. There have been reports of youth approaching and speaking out in front of their local government officials, something that is regarded as a new behaviour and is overall welcomed by these government officials.

The involvement of state and county government officials in activities – such as the agri-business and tree planting - was also regarded as a positive contribution to an improved relationship between youth and government.



**36. What are the lessons and opportunities that have been capitalised upon or missed?**

Many key-informants reported on the need to incorporate trauma healing as an integrated element of the peace-building component, as this is considered an important step towards the prevention of the return to harmful practices.

Potential economic activities that would have contributed to the sustainability of the youth friendly spaces and VT centres were not capitalised upon. Within one of the youth friendly spaces, the youth took the initiative to begin their own bakery activities, which could have been developed further into a teashop or even lodging, but no support was provided to this group.

For the VT courses, commercial activities during the training could have included schemes such as creating agreements with local schools to make and sell affordable uniforms for their students. The auto-mechanics trainees could have run an operational garage where the trainees repair cars and the profits flow back to the VT centre to develop new activities. These are missed opportunities.

**4.4.1 LESSONS LEARNT ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF YOUTHLEAD**

The main implementing partners of YouthLEAD were the state and national MOCYS and MOEST. These ministries have shown a good level of ownership and report that the YouthLEAD activities are

clearly within their field of responsibilities. Yet despite this, there has been **no clear handover strategy to the ministries and the MOCYS is the most under-budgeted ministry, and at no level has there been any budget made available to continue the activities.**

It is expected that many activities will soon come to a halt once YouthLEAD financial support stops. The journalist project which involved the production and broadcasting of radio programmes already ended as programme funding for this activity stopped. The HIV/AIDS awareness and testing held in the Youth Centre in Budi will come to a halt as soon as there is no money remaining to purchase testing kits and condoms, as no official financial continuation has been made and there is no proposal to include this in other HIV/AIDS initiatives. **No commercial models to ensure income generation by, for example vocational training centres, have been developed.**

Most significantly, most **acquired skills were very basic** – either VT, peace-building, environmental, or HIV/AIDS awareness etc. Because of this, without any follow-up trainings or employment, the individuals are most likely to lose the skills they learnt in a short period of time.

On a positive note, the **SSYDP will remain the guiding document** to develop youth activities in the country. Also, Plan South Sudan received **EU funding to continue VT** in Kapoeta and Narus, this is, however, not included in the YouthLEAD programme continuation. The CINA programme on Lifesaving and Conflict Resolution will also continue. This is because CINA have diversified their funding source and institutionalised local ownership.

The **activities in CDSS will not continue** in the same way, and the HIV/AIDS testing will probably have to end as the counsellors and community mobilisers will not receive any financial means after the programme funds have stopped to buy testing kits and condoms. However, the agri-business is integrated in many programmes and is likely to be integrated into another funding proposal, such as Cordaid's food security programme.

#### 4.5 EFFICIENCY AND VALUE FOR MONEY

---

The evaluation team has not received any detailed financial monitoring reports. To provide a general insight into the finances, it has based the information below on the UNICEF South Sudan reports<sup>7</sup> to CIDA/DFATD.

- **Budget**

UNICEF reported that they planned for a total programmable contribution of **USD 8.407.479** for years 1, 2 and 3 of the programme. The final figures have reported a total spending of **USD 9.244.916**. The overspending has been accounted for by a fluctuation due to favourable currency exchange rates. In addition to the funds made available through UNICEF, Plan South Sudan provided SSP 723.340 (equalling USD 250.000) to the programme.

---

<sup>7</sup> SC/110139/South Sudan GRSS-UNICEF YouthLEAD initiative CIDA Supported Project  
Progress Report April 2011-May 2012 / June 2012-May 2013/ June 2013 – May 2014 / June – 2014 – June 2015  
– Final report

The table below provides an indication of the available financial resources spent as reported in the different reports. The table below can only be used to get an idea of the distribution of the funds, as the numbers were taken from various reports and the totals do not correspond with the total programmable contribution of \$9.244.916 as presented in the final report.

Outcome	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Total	%
1 Youth friendly spaces and services	\$1.028.868	\$395.387	\$344.595	\$105.938	\$1.874.788	<b>19%</b>
2 Basic education, skills training and livelihoods	\$311.112	\$841.291	\$1.332.341	\$1.054.117	\$3.538.861	<b>36%</b>
3 Youth voices in peace and governance	\$4.188	\$515.394	\$115.817	\$274.474	\$909.873	<b>9%</b>
4 Capacity building in policy and advocacy	\$109.476	\$652.717	\$202.258	\$84.226	\$1.048.677	<b>11%</b>
5 Institutional capacity building of Civil society Organisations and Ministries supporting youth.	\$76.180	\$100.975	\$175.784	\$32.099	\$385.038	<b>4%</b>
Knowledge development	\$5.352	\$9.889	\$24.662	\$102.846	\$142.749	<b>1%</b>
In-country support in logistics, administration, supply, security, communications, and contribution management	\$701.191	\$644	\$591	\$1.170.045	\$1.872.471	<b>19%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2.236.367</b>	<b>\$2.516.297</b>	<b>\$2.196.048</b>	<b>\$2.823.745</b>	<b>\$9.772.457</b>	<b>100%</b>

Basic education, skills training, and livelihoods received the largest portion (36%) of the total budget, compared to just 4% for institutional capacity building. The coordination and overhead costs constitute about 19% of the total budget. The shared final grant utilisation summary of the UNICEF accounts were not separated by component.

- **Budget per implementing partner**

There have been no clear consolidated financial – budget and expenditures - reports per partner. The evaluation team was not allowed to copy any details from the contracts. Only Plan SS provided financial details in their report, but no detailed expenditure was shared.

Outcome	UNICEF	Plan contribution	Total
Plan South Sudan	SSP 5.384.354	SSP 723.340	SSP 6.107.694

Due to the recent rise in inflation, the payments in SSP have been unfavourable and in practice everything has become more expensive.

- **Value for money**

As this evaluation did not include a detailed assessment of the efficiency of the programme and very little financial information has been shared, only limited observations can be made in terms of value

for money. The evaluation team still wishes to provide their impressions. The programme implemented a wide range of activities and processes, which resulted in successes that are still very fragile and with low financial sustainability of the activities. Elements of good value for money are the: participatory process for policy review, bead-making course which was simple and locally based, peace-dialogue process implemented by CRS, which created a group of lasting role models, the integrated peace messaging and the VCT outreach by CDSS.

With an overall spending of over 9 million USD, and an expectation of only a few lasting positive results, it must be concluded that the programme did not deliver sufficient lasting value for money.

#### 4.6 UNINTENDED RESULTS

---

During programme implementation some unintended results were reported on:

ALP and VT attracted participants from unexpected groups – such as in-school youth who transferred from regular schools to sign up for ALP, and youth residing in other states who travelled from their home states to access these courses – this can largely be attributed to the fact that ALP and VT were free and came with incentives, such as textbooks and start-up kits.

Some of the youth involved in the action research were threatened and accused of being government spies. These youth have now fled their communities. This is a highly problematic situation in Budi County, as these youth have now been placed in a high-risk situation by a programme activity.

The appointing of the former Chair of the National Youth Union as an MP can be considered both a positive and negative result of YouthLEAD. Respondents that regarded the appointment as a positive result mainly focused on the fact that a young person had now gained influence and a voice. Those that considered this to be a negative believed that this was a highly politicised action, which has demonstrated and increased the political influence of the current governing party and decreased the independence of the youth union.

On a positive note, DOT/CRN employed one Toposa female youth who was trained under the programme activities, and one programme assistant who received capacity development through YouthLEAD. This created a positive conviction that many more smart and capable young people are out there who can contribute productively to DOT and other organisations.

#### 4.7 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

---

The evaluation team found a significant number of issues regarding the quality of the implementation of the programme, which have influenced the overall effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the programme. The major elements are described below.

- **Pilot status**

The programme was considered a pilot programme and implemented in three states and seven locations. The programme was supposed to have an integral approach, however the selection of very



different IPs and programme activities in the different states meant that the intended comparative information sharing on successful approaches did not occur. The multiplier effect also did not occur and a lack of sharing and collaboration between IPs and service providers, as well as weak consolidated monitoring by UNICEF, meant that there were no lessons learnt during implementation, which is the main purpose of a pilot programme.

- **Lack of flexibility**

The logic model was supposed to be a working document, yet many changes were made informally without permission from the donor or inclusion into the logic model. For example, the change in the number of youth friendly centres, the raise of the maximum participant age to 35 years old, the changes that occurred after the economic crisis, and the withdrawal of BRAC from programme activities, were not approved of or included in the logic model.

Field monitoring resulted in some smaller adaptations like the support of MOCYS in Upper Nile to develop a locally ministry led low cost youth centre in Ulang and also resulted in the segregation of interventions between Plan and CDSS on Agribusiness activities. However, overall there has been insufficient flexibility in response to the changing context, which was particularly evident after the December 2013 crisis. The decision not to relocate the activities implemented by BRAC in Jonglei and Upper Nile States has been the most significant result of this lack of flexibility. In addition, there was a complete lack of adaptation of the content of the vocational training courses despite the evident market saturation. There were also no changes in the programme approach after the failure in setting up SACCOs came to light. During the programme there was little indication of any flexibility to adapt programme activities by the IPs, and IP staff complained that there was no space or budget for adaptation. Overall, it can be concluded that neither learning nor adaption has taken place based on the basic programme monitoring.

- **Lack of monitoring**

The lack of learning and adaptation is directly related to the lack of consolidated monitoring. Programme monitoring during YouthLEAD was extremely poor, and many assessments, such as perception surveys to measure change and draw comparisons to the baseline survey, were designed but not implemented. This has had serious consequences for the effectiveness and impacts of the programme, as problems such as market saturation, failure to attract the target groups, inclusion of many older participants etc. remained unknown to UNICEF and were therefore not corrected.

- **Lack of follow-up**

The programme has created many opportunities for a positive impact on the lives of youth within the South Sudan context. Most of these opportunities have not been acted upon after the programme activity stopped. Those who were involved in management focused more on starting new short-term activities, instead of nourishing successful activities.

- **Internal cooperation**

YouthLEAD had a clear cross-sectional approach and provided attention to the needs of youth, which cuts across all UNICEF sections. At the beginning there was an informal working group for this programme, but this phased out. After that initial stage, the programme was put under the responsibility of the deputy representatives, who coordinated with concerned sections directly. Most

UNICEF staff from the different sections reported, however, that consultation between sections and programme management was only informal and not very frequent.

The collaboration with the CP section of UNICEF, a section with solid expertise in supporting vulnerable children, contributed directly to reaching out to the intended target group in Upper Nile but not in Eastern Equatoria, where the CP section has no activities. The results of this can be directly observed as in Eastern Equatoria the target groups of vulnerable youth were not included.

For future youth programming, it is advised that a UNICEF internal committee would be needed to support, monitor, and steer youth at risk programmes.

- **Government partnership**

The main partners of YouthLEAD were the MOCYS and the MOEST at both the state and national levels. These ministries have demonstrated a good level of motivation and ownership and agree that the YouthLEAD activities are clearly within their field of responsibilities. However, the MOCYS is the most under-budgeted ministry in South Sudan, and at no level has there been any budget made available by any party to continue programme activities.

The ministries of Agriculture and Forestry were only involved upon request, and participated in training for the tree-planting, as well as the agribusiness training in Budi County. While this programme had a strong focus on vocational training and entrepreneurship development, the ministries of Labour and Commerce should have been partners, but they were not involved.

The programme would have benefited from involvement of other ministries, like on the gender, labour and commerce parts of the programme.

The involvement of UNICEF mainly occurred at the state and national level. The cooperation between UNICEF and the government was considered positive overall, although the local governments mentioned that UNICEF did not consult them on the design of programme activities.

- **Implementing Partners**

YouthLEAD was implemented through five IPs who were selected based on their specific strengths and areas of expertise. The combination of such IPs enabled the optimisation of results in their respective work areas. On the downside however, the implementation of different programme elements by different IPs affected the intended holistic approach of YouthLEAD to some extent. Overall, UNICEF missed the opportunity to make YouthLEAD an integrated programme, and did not identify or implement actions to improve integration and knowledge-sharing between the different partners.

In addition, some programme partners lacked crucial expertise, skills, and sometimes even the appropriate attitude to develop or work with the intended target groups. Knowledge on entrepreneurship development, youth group development and to some extent gender responsive programming was also lacking.

- **Inter-agency cooperation**

The original programme document has some references to UN agencies, however in the final logic model only the FAO are mentioned, as they were included in an indicator. The holistic and integrated approach could have been implemented much more effectively through more intensive interagency cooperation. This is especially true of, but not limited to, ILO's experience and knowledge on entrepreneurship development after vocational training, UNEP's experience in environmental sustainability community forestry and work with pastoralists, and UNFPA knowledge of youth friendly services with a focus on working with girls and young women.

Nevertheless, some successful inter-agency cooperation during implementation has been achieved, particularly with the UNFPA. The following has been reported:


- UNOPS was contracted for the building of the 3 Youth Friendly Centres in Budi, Uror, and Nassir.
- YouthLEAD has actively cooperated with UNFPA on the training of peer educators and the development of the Y-PEER network. The work also resulted in the development of the South Sudan Peer Education standards. In addition to peer education, of which YouthLEAD achieved to only a small extent in EES, UNICEF and UNFPA also joined efforts in the development of youth facts, and made active contributions to youth presentations during International Youth Day events.
- UNESCO conducted a literacy programme mapping under YouthLEAD and facilitated the TVET policy workshop, and also contributed through the AES Technical working group to the Alternative Education Services Policy.
- The role of ILO has been minimal. ILO participated in the youth policy task force and review sessions and contributed to the TVET programme for youth, although no evidence was found on the latter.

## 5. FINDINGS MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

---

This chapter describes the findings collected through the Most Significant Change technique and the signification survey. The information presented here includes the changes that occurred due to YouthLEAD as attributed by the actual participants, community members, UNICEF IPs and SP staff, and government officials. As opposed to the findings described in chapter 4, which answer the research questions with an expert view, the MSC analysis does not hold an expert interpretation, but only reflects the views and perceptions of the participants.


The main activities of YouthLEAD can be recognised in the indicated 'main change' areas. It should not be underestimated that the activities provided are rather unique in the area. Activities that are related to the described change-areas can be seen in the graph below.



### 5.1 CHANGE AREAS

---

When asked what the most significant change was that the programme brought to them, at least 80% of the stories from beneficiaries about their experiences gathered are overwhelmingly positive. No significant changes were found between the stakeholder groups. The stories shared were characterised by hope, however the respondents also shared the need for more follow up. The table below presents the main change areas, as expressed in the stories. Per story more than one change area was possibly mentioned.



Quotes from the stories illustrating these change areas are:

### Career opportunities

"Because I now work as auto mechanic and a driver, I earn some money that is able to support me and my family"

"It makes me not to waste money from different tailors by stitching cloth personally"

"It is important because the people they have benefited. They have their own businesses now and not suffering very much like the rest of people."

"Because after training I immediately started my own business. I have phone-charging shop. I own some money daily"

"I was idle but now I am working and getting money for myself"

"I am now an independent person because of the knowledge and skills I got from YouthLEAD programme I have certificate in mechanics and computer. Before I was idle at home"

### Peace / togetherness

"It help the youth to divert away from violence and other anti - social cultural practices"

"Because before there was a lot of cases of robberies, cattle raiding. But now things have come back to normal all these activities were carried out by the youth themselves"

"Now we are in peace and also if we are play a football in another county that bring peace in our counties."

"This can be so important by making youth to become self-reliant so that to reduce robbery, cattle raiding. This thing and also poverty among the youth."

"I like playing football with my Dinka friend. He is really good, I can learn from him."


"It was really important because people were able to know each other."

"It is so good to integrate to become one. To avoid isolation. So you don't make an enemy of the other."


“This is important because it brings youth together to share their common problems. It helps us to understand human behaviour and it helps us to know the causes of conflict in our community.”

“Communities are really appreciating; they also expected that, there will be more training to really strengthen them in the livelihoods in their community. And what we’re seeing that it has great impact, the impact we are seeing from them, the two counties they are now friendly.”

55% marked the change as highly relevant and another 26% as relevant for the context as can be seen in the graph below.



In addition to the change areas that were provided through the answers to the open question, the storytellers also attributed the reduction of conflict related vulnerabilities of youth to the programme.



*“To me it was the debate that was organised in the community. It was about cattle rustling. There was one group for and another against. The men were all talking. Then there was this very strong lady. She made a strong statement against the cattle rustling. When we do it men die and we women are crying, and when a child dies women are crying. And it will never stop. This statement i still use and people are still impressed when they hear this. The debate was one hour, but it shows that if a women stands up, she can have a strong voice.”* – Participant of one of the peace building activities

## 5.2 DRIVERS OF CHANGE


During the MSC interviews, the respondents were requested to identify which drivers enabled the change to happen. The respondents identified the following internal and external drivers as contributing to the creation of positive change:

Internal drivers:


- The programme (funding), i.e. the change would not have happened without the programme and the IPs;
- The training subjects and the quality of the trainers;
- The bringing together of youth;
- The facilities and equipment.

External drivers:

- Commitment of participants. Interestingly the government, IPs, and the respondents all identified the strong commitment of the participants as an external factor that greatly contributed to the success of the programme. Commitment was evident in the participation rates of the courses, even when long distances had to be travelled every day;
- Support from family and the community enabled participation in the VT and allowed girls and young women to take part in the peace-building activities;
- The presence of relative and stable security during the implementation of the activities – which enabled safe travel between communities.




In addition, about 74% of the respondents attribute changes directly to the programme interventions.



It is a rather remarkable outcome that the majority of changes that are attributed to YouthLEAD can be directly related to the activities undertaken. It is important to note that this is not altogether common as in many other evaluations participants have been involved in several programmes implemented by different donors, so it is not always as clear whether changes can be directly attributed to just one programme.

### 5.3 DISAPPOINTMENTS

The informants were also requested to share the main disappointment they experienced during the implementation of the programme:





The lack of post-training business start-up is mentioned as being a disappointment with the highest frequency (27 times), one example of such a comment is illustrated below:

*“Since I joined tailoring course with Plan in 2013 I have learnt that I can be called a tailor. Plan came to Kapoeta South to train specially youth who are idle to become skilled. Personally, I was trained for three months and I learnt a lot from being a tailor and I can measure, cut, and stitch the garment cloth. But currently I took a year and a half not touching a machine because I was told to buy one, but I could not afford. That is how I remain jobless just due to money buying machine”.*

- Graduate of the tailoring training course -

## 6. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

---

This chapter presents the main conclusions and lessons of the programme and the programme management. The conclusions and lessons describe the extent to which the outputs have contributed to intermediate outcomes and identified changes.

### 6.1 CONCLUSIONS

---

#### 6.1.1 CONCLUSIONS ON RELEVANCE

---

- All stakeholders – including county, state, and national government, participants, and community members – confirm the high relevance of the programme goals to their lives and the context of South Sudan, and therefore the need for youth-programming in South Sudan.
- There are large populations of the intended target groups in the selected states, however the IPs did not implement relevant strategies or have the necessary focus or skills for the inclusion of the intended target groups. Positive exceptions to this were the activities led by CINA as well as the EES peace-conferences that both utilised well-developed strategies to include the intended target groups in their activities.

#### 6.1.2 CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

---

The programme logic model describes five intermediate outcomes. Per outcome there was a programme component developed with a different focus, although some activities have contributed to more than one component. The effectiveness and impact per programme components are described below.

##### **Effectiveness and impact of Component 1**

***Improved access to youth friendly spaces and services, including those that address the particular needs of girls and young women***

This component received approximately 19% of the budget.

- The planned referral networks which were to be managed from the youth friendly spaces were unfortunately not created and are largely non-existent, however the outreach activities that were implemented instead were more successful in providing youth friendly services.
- In Bor and Budi Counties youth networks were established, although the network in Budi County is barely operational.
- The Youth Centre in Budi is still active and provides a space for youth to play sports and participate in YouthLEAD activities. The renting out of the main hall is providing some income to the functioning management committee.
- The building of physical spaces is very expensive and is at a great risk of being subject to vandalism in highly volatile areas.
- Physical spaces can only to a limited extent be attributed to the positive outcomes of access to youth friendly spaces and services. The youth did not attribute many changes or impacts to the creation of these physical spaces.

## **Effectiveness and impact of Component 2**

***Improved knowledge and skills of young people in: literacy, numeracy, employment and livelihoods, health, nutrition, food security, sustainable use of land and water, gender equality, and peace-building.***

This component received approximately 36% of the total budget.

- Participants were very positive about their acquired skills and the opportunities provided.
- Market saturation proved to be problematic, due to the low diversification in courses provided under the VT.
- The majority of students did not receive any start-up kits after their training courses and thus had no means to start-up any form of business. Also, no post-training mentoring was provided, Plan did hold entrepreneurship training but this did not target the VT graduates, which would have been hugely beneficial to them.
- The insufficient creation and support of SACCOs is a serious weakness of the programme.
- Although the IPs focused on reaching equal numbers of men and girls and young women, there was no focus on more established and inclusive gender strategies – such as those recommended in the gender analysis report.
- Vocational training courses did not comply with market demands or target group needs, despite a market study proposing a much wider scope of course provision.
- The intended target groups remained largely left out of this component and this particularly applied to pastoralists. This is likely to have contributed negatively to the already existing differing career opportunities between pastoralists and sedentary and urban youth.
- The ALP did not meet its targets due to the early halt of ALP activities following the December 2013 crisis and the subsequent decision not to relocate the programme.
- The tree-planting programme was largely unsuccessful due to poor logistics.
- Youth attributed new career opportunities, generation of income, and hope for their futures to the VT activities.

## **Effectiveness and impact of Component 3**

***Enhanced leadership and participation capacity of young people in peace-building, governance of youth initiatives, and other youth-centred programming (government, civil society), as well as in gender-responsive dialogues and advocacy on issues that are critical to the lives of youth.***

This component received approximately 9% of the total budget and included a wide variety of activities with an aim to achieve the outcome of the enhanced leadership and participation capacity of young people. The activities included the revision of the South Sudan Youth Development Policy, the facilitation of peace dialogues, the spread of peace messages, and media training.

- The approach to peace-building introduced several effective ways to include and reinforce the message of peace through its activities.
- The CRS/CRN/DOT activities facilitated a group of youth leaders who continue to be involved in peace-dialogues and remain in contact with their fellow-trainees from other – rival – communities. These youth now communicate a clear message of listening to one another, co-existing, and promoting peace.
- The revision of the SSYDP developed capacities and produced a strong framework for future youth programming in South Sudan

- Youth LEAD supported the development of over 10.000 SSYDP promotion materials that included an abridged version of SSYDP, posters on various themes, banners, and flyers. These were distributed to state level officials, however they unfortunately remained in the offices of MOCYS and were not distributed as intended.
- Youth groups have not received sufficient guidance on how to deal with both the internal and external dynamics that result from establishing a youth group.
- Many youth benefitted from the varied activities which empowered youth to become more involved in the decisions of their tribes and the government.
- Activities have contributed to the creation of individual leadership and youth-centred approaches in the policy development process, the content of which has been successfully implemented.
- The main changes attributed to this component are that participants reported learning how to work together and coexist peacefully, that there has been a reduction in cattle raiding, and that youth now report feeling empowered to speak out in front of the government.

#### **Effectiveness and impact of Component 4**

***Enhanced knowledge and skills of targeted government ministries, CSOs, and young people on child protection systems and youth enabling environments, including gender-responsive policies, youth-centred policies, programs, and services***

This component received approximately 11% of the total budget.

- As a result of the revision of the SSYDP, it can be claimed that YouthLEAD contributed to the awareness of the importance and potential of the participation and inclusion of youth, and the importance of creating an enabling environment to include youth. The highly participatory process can be considered good practice for youth participation.
- Capacity development was mainly achieved at the national and state level as there were no feedback loops, and engagement with the youth at the programme sites was, for the most part, insufficient.
- The more traditional trainings on child protection and gender were appreciated, but did not lead to any visible changes in programming approach.
- Overall, involved line ministries were highly motivated at all levels.

#### **Effectiveness and impact of Component 5**

***Enhanced knowledge and skills of targeted government ministries and CSOs in core management, administrative and programming functions, including gender-responsive and environmentally sustainable programming***

This component received approximately 4% of the total budget.

- The programme implemented some core management trainings for ministry and CSO staff and, in addition, provided some material support in the form of computers and cameras. The trainings were well received and assisted in the functioning of programme activities.
- There was a design overlap between the components, therefore the gender responsive programming training was implemented under component 4 and the environmentally sustainable programming was implemented under component 2: through the agri-business and through component 3: the one-tree-one-youth activities.

---

### 6.1.3 CONCLUSIONS ON IMPACT

---

- The duration of YouthLEAD was only 4 years, but many of the activities were only implemented for 6 months. This makes the chances of creating long-term impact small.
- The programme has created many opportunities for positive impact on the lives of youth and the greater South Sudanese context. Most of these opportunities have not been acted upon since programme activities stopped.
- The programme focused more on starting new and short-term activities, and unfortunately there was less nourishing and building upon activities that had the potential to be successful and sustainable.
- The large reach of the programme both in terms of geography, range of activities, and total numbers of participants resulted in a rather low intensity of work. This meant that only the really active and enthusiastic participants were able to take full advantage of the provided opportunities and profit in the longer term.
- The programme has created some pockets of impact, particularly in regards to career opportunities, which resulted from the VT for some participants, the creation of youth leaders in peace building, the creation of the SSYDP, and the more intensive approach towards psychosocial support. All of the above are positive impacts of YouthLEAD.
- The participants that have not realised income-generating activities perceive that their newly learnt skills will remain with them and provide them with opportunities in the future.

---

### 6.1.4 CONCLUSIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY

---

- Many activities are expected to come to a halt as soon as YouthLEAD financial support stops. For example, while successfully initiated, the journalist programme that involved the production of radio broadcasts already ended when programme funding stopped. Unfortunately, other activities are expected to follow this pattern.
- The MOCYS has insufficient budget to continue YouthLEAD activities
- On a positive note, the SSYDP has already become the guiding document for the development of youth activities in South Sudan.
- Plan South Sudan received EU funding to continue VT in Kapoeta and Narus, although this is no longer related to YouthLEAD.
- CINA and CDSS will likely continue some youth activities under new programmes, such as Cordaid's food security programme.
- UNICEF intends to further support adolescent programming in South Sudan

---

### 6.1.5 CONCLUSIONS ON PROGRAMME DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND COORDINATION

---

#### Conclusions on programme design

- The programme design was considered coherent, although it was never informed by a conflict analysis or a do-no-harm analysis and some indicators were impossible to measure.
- The identified means of verification and the programme monitoring framework were well developed, but were never actually implemented to monitor and measure changes.

- The risk assessment indicated a high risk of violent outbreaks. However, no continuity plan was developed or approved beforehand with CIDA. Highly volatile areas would have benefitted from an adapted strategy in case of an outbreak of violence.
- Overall, there has been little flexibility in response to the changing context, particularly following the December 2013 crisis. The decision not to relocate the activities implemented by BRAC in Jonglei and Upper Nile has been the most significant result of this, as well as the lack of new VT courses after signs of market saturation and reported isolation of key intended target groups. Neither the design nor the implementation modalities included means to be sufficiently flexible to these contexts.

### **Conclusions on programme management**

- YouthLEAD had a clear cross-sectional approach as it provided attention to the needs of youth, which cuts across all UNICEF sections. The informal working group who collaborated during the initial stages of the programme did not continue to monitor the programme. The programme was put under the supervision of the Deputy Representative of UNICEF and coordination occurred with concerned sections directly and irregularly. Monitoring and technical support from the relevant sections was insufficient.
- The collaboration with the CP section of UNICEF, a section with solid expertise in supporting vulnerable children, contributed to some extent to the involvement with intended target groups, because the CP section already had links with said groups. However, in Eastern Equatoria this did not happen as the CP programme had no presence there.
- Although the PMF was very comprehensive, neither the basic monitoring nor the innovative approaches that are highlighted were implemented. Overall, it can be concluded that little learning or adaption has taken place based on basic programme monitoring. Immediately when problems appeared, such as the lack of vulnerability and age profiles of participants in the VT, UNICEF could have advised partners to intervene.

### **Conclusions on coordination**

- YouthLEAD partnered with the MOCYS and MOEST to realise the activities. The cooperation from UNICEF was mainly on the state and national level. The cooperation with UNICEF was considered positive, although local governments mentioned that they were excluded from the design of programme activities. Collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, Public Service, and Human Resource Development (MOLPSHRD), responsible for vocational training and business start-up was lacking.
- YouthLEAD was implemented through five IPs who were selected based on their specific strengths and their focuses. The intention of a combination of such IPs was that this would enable the optimisation of results in their respective work areas. On the downside, however, the implementation of the different programme elements by different IPs affected the intended holistic approach of YouthLEAD in some areas. Overall, the opportunity to make YouthLEAD an integrated programme was missed, and actions that would have improved the integration and knowledge sharing between the different partners were not sufficiently implemented. In addition, the programme partners lacked some expertise, skills, and even to some extent the appropriate attitudes necessary to develop or work with the intended target groups, especially Toposa, youth with disabilities, street children and girls.

- Knowledge on economic strengthening and youth group development did not seem to be present among the IPs and no external expertise was provided, with the exception of gender expertise.
- The holistic and integrated approach could have benefited further from more intensive interagency cooperation. However, interagency cooperation was limited. While the original programme document makes some references to UN agencies, only the FAO were actually included in an indicator in the final logic model.

---

### 6.1.6 CONCLUSIONS ON EFFICIENCY

---

- As this evaluation did not include a detailed assessment of the efficiency of the programme and little financial information has been shared, only limited observations can be made in terms of value for money.
- While the programme has created opportunities and was implemented under challenging circumstances, with an overall spending of over 9 million USD, and an expectation of only a few lasting positive results, it must be concluded that the programme did not deliver sufficient value for money.

---

## 6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

---

- **Integrated Programming**

The programme was relatively well designed and highly relevant to the context of South Sudan. Youth programmes should continue to remain multi-sectoral, and integrated implementation should be further developed.

YouthLEAD had a clear holistic approach and provided attention to the needs of youth, which cuts across all UNICEF sections. It is recommended that youth-at-risk programming within UNICEF should remain cross-sectional, as the expertise of all sections is required. For future youth programming, it is advised that a UNICEF internal committee should be created to regularly support, monitor, and steer the programme.

Simultaneously, inter-ministerial work with youth should be strengthened. While relatively effective at a central level, the focus is currently on working with the MOCYS, a ministry with a relatively small budget and power. Future programmes should ensure more active participation from other relevant ministries.

The evaluation team also recommends that exchanges between IPs and SPs should be stimulated during the implementation of the programme. This will encourage a more coherent approach, increase the capacity development of partners, reduces costs and make better use of each IP's strengths, which will ultimately lead to greater programme impacts.

- **Reaching youth at risk**

It is of specific importance for UNICEF to find and assist especially adolescents at risk in South Sudan. The informal agreement to enlarge the target group to 35 has led to under-serving the intended age-group by nearly 50%. UNICEF is recommended to remain focussed on youth as per UN definition (15-24) and work with other agencies to assist the older youth as per definition of the South Sudan Youth

Policy. In this, the focus should be on adolescents in line with UNICEF's mandate and the high risks among adolescents in South Sudan.

Furthermore, the lack of focus on strategies to attract the intended target groups resulted in the exclusion of youth-at-risk, the intended target group. International lessons learnt have long been translated into specific measures to attract and include special groups at risk (e.g. street children, youth with disabilities, chronically ill youth, etc.) but these were not applied in this programme by the IPs, and were neither noticed nor corrected by UNICEF programme staff. Closer collaboration and monitoring from the UNICEF CP section, building on their solid expertise in supporting vulnerable children, is recommended for the future.

Additionally, designing programmes focused on pastoralists groups requires specific expertise and cooperation with other related UN initiatives such as UNESCO. For future programming it must be ensured that IPs and UNICEF programme staff possess the appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitude to work with pastoralist youth which requires specific knowledge and language skills.

Gender specific strategies should be incorporated from the start of the programme. Within the context of South Sudan, this means that activities with family members need to be included to allow girls and young women to participate. Gender responsiveness should furthermore aim at gender transformative results and not only on equal numbers of participation among boys and girls.

- **Flexibility, monitoring and conflict sensitivity**

In the future, programmes in conflict-prone areas should allow for more flexibility to respond to changing dynamics, such as changing locations and/or nature of activities and implementation modalities. Furthermore, in conditions such as those of the locations chosen for this programme, there needs to be realistic and flexible planning that takes into account variables such as the weather, road conditions, and insecurity.

Programme monitoring was not sufficiently present and many assessments, such as perception surveys to measure change and draws comparisons to the baseline survey, were designed but not implemented. As in other UNICEF-led programmes, youth-at-risk programmes should include participant tracking and case management. This will allow for timely adaptations based on the progress observed. Monitoring is particularly important in conflict settings, which should include explicit monitoring of Do-No-Harm. It is furthermore recommended that monitoring and feedback loops of the youth themselves are ensured during the programme.

The length of the programme was regarded as too short, as change takes time, especially in peace-building. Pilots should be designed in three phases: piloting, learning and consequent adaptations, followed by longer-term programmes. Also, it is recommended that the targets set for success and long-term impact should be more modest.

- **Feedback and communication strategies for ownership**

Line ministries were highly motivated and ownership was strongly felt at the national level. This feeling of ownership should be further facilitated to county levels, requiring more bottom-up design and inclusion of county administration in monitoring and adaptations.



It is recommended to involve more stakeholders, including youth, government staff at all levels, IPs, SPs, and UN-agencies during the design, monitoring, and development of programme activities, especially as this programme design had a focus on youth participation. Activities should be developed with participation of the youth so that their ownership and interest are ensured. Participatory monitoring should also be ensured, giving youth a chance to redirect programme activities.

The programme was greatly appreciated by the youth who participated, and this is further reflected in the high levels of participation of local youth. However, people can easily feel excluded when only a select number of representatives from the state and national levels are involved in a programme. To ensure the continued engagement of local youth, carefully designed communication and feedback mechanisms need to be developed which would increase ownership.

The programme sustainability of services can also be fostered through the development of commercial activities, such as the production of products and services during the VT courses, the potential of the YFS to develop economic activities such as the production and sales of bread, tea, cinema, lodging etc. This opportunity has been missed in YouthLEAD and should be included from the start in future programming.

Ownership is also an important contributor to the sustainability of programme activities. In this, some hand-over of activities can be done to local organisations, but this requires early capacity development and gradual handover of responsibilities, as part of an exit strategy.

- **Specific recommendations for programme activities**

**The Economic Strengthening** of youth in the context of South Sudan is highly relevant. Future programmes should ensure that market surveys are used by IPs and updated, and consequently ensure that vocational training is market responsive. In addition, courses should focus on sectors that are closely related to their target group's livelihoods, trainers should be capable of speaking the local language and able to provide food for their participants if needed. Furthermore, programmes should ensure diversification of skills and monitor the progress of participants after training. Finally, and maybe most important, vocational training on its own does not lead to economic strengthening and needs to be followed up with post training business development support including business training, start-up support and long term mentoring. It must be ensured that UNICEF and IP programme staff possess the relevant knowledge of livelihoods development.

**The formation of effective youth groups** requires set processes, structures, knowledge, and skills to govern the group and ensure that issues of both internal and external dynamics and power relations are avoided. Activities focused on the creation of youth groups need to include the building of good governance skills.

The **peace building and exchange activities** were highly appreciated by the youth who were involved and such activities should remain at the core of youth programming in South Sudan. The integration

of peace messaging has contributed to the holistic approach of the programme and that additional results can be reached without necessary additional activities or funds.

**The participatory policy development process** is a good practice and this should be applied in other UNICEF guided policy development processes in South Sudan and other countries. Future processes need to be more focused on feedback and communication strategies, to ensure that the local levels remain informed about the process and, in addition, that representatives understand their responsibility to also inform the community on the process and decisions made during workshops etc.

## ANNEXES

---

### ANNEX A. PROGRAMME LOGIC MODEL

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX B. REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX C. PEOPLE CONSULTED FOR THIS EVALUATION

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX D. EVALUATION TOOLS

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX E. OUTPUT RESULTS

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX F. SWOT ANALYSIS

---

See separate document.

### ANNEX G. SECONDARY SOURCES CONSULTED

---

See separate document.